

February 20, 1934

No. 1, p. 4 - On the organization of the Union People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (comrade Stalin).

a) To recognize as necessary the organization of the Allied People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs with the inclusion of the reorganized OGPU in this People's Commissariat.

b) Instruct t.t. Yagoda, Kaganovich and Kuibyshev shall submit draft proposals within five days, taking into account the exchange of opinions.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 939. L. 2. Original. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yagoda, Kaganovich, Kuibyshev.

No. 413

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"On the PB COMMISSION ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE NKJU AND THE OGPU"

February 20, 1934

No. 1, p. 41/21 - On the commission of the PB on the affairs of the NKJ and the OGPU.

Introduce comrade I.A. Akulova to the Politburo Commission for the consideration of cases on the highest measure of social protection. with the replacement in his absence by Comrade Vyshinsky A.Ya.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by the board of members of the Politburo on November 15, 1934.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Kalinin, Akulov, Vyshinsky.

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DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT WAREHOUSES FOR STORING BREAD IN DVK"

February 20, 1934

No. 1, p. 42/22 - On warehouses for storing bread in the Far East.

1. To oblige the Regional Committee of the Far East and Comrade Deribas to take under special supervision the construction of warehouses for storing grain of a special defense fund, ensuring the construction of such warehouses that allow storing grain in bulk (without containers) and exclude the danger of spoiling bread due to the quality of the warehouse.

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2. To predetermine the construction of two small mills in DVK - on Sakhalin and Kamchatka - after the completion of mills under construction in Khabarovsk, Bochkarev, Komsomolskaya, etc.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op.162. D. 16. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

ÿ The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 11/15/34.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Deribas, Chernov, Kuiby Sheva, Mikoyan, Miroshnikov; Dalkraikom - everything; Mezhlauku - p. 2.

No. 415

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE TERMINATION OF WORK WITH THE COMPANY "CONTROL-K 0"

February 20, 1934

No. 1, p. 66/46 - About "Control-K 0"

1) Accept the proposal of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade on the termination of work with the company "Control-K 0" within the Union. The exact term for the termination of work with this firm during 1934 is to be established, t.t. Rozengolts and Yagoda.

2) Consider it possible to continue work with "Control-K 0" abroad on the weight delivery of bread.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 11/19/34.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Rozengolts, Yagoda.

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MESSAGE IL. Akulova I.V. STALIN AND L.M. KAGANOVICH ON  
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE OGPU AND THE  
CREATION OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR

February 22, 1934

Owls. secret

In connection with the decision taken to create the Allied NKVnudel and reorganize the OGPU, I consider it necessary to state to you my thoughts \*on the proposed reorganization\*.

At present, the so-called \*troikas with judicial functions\* operate in the periphery under the OGPU PP, i.e. with the right to consider on the merits

to cases of all kinds of crimes, both counter-revolutionary and general crimes, and with the right to pass sentences with punishments up to and including execution by firing squad. In this latter case, the sentences are subject to the approval of the center.

The main drawback of the work of these triplets is the acceptance for their consideration of any cases that fall into the field of view of the OGPU PP\*. The troikas consider not only counter-revolutionary cases or cases of especially important state crimes, but also such cases, which are very often considered by people's courts and, by their very nature, are not

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constitute nothing exceptional that justifies an out-of-court consideration.

\* We have cases when a troika at the Crimean OGPU PP, having considered the case of a certain HRONI, who was accused of leaving in the open air from 8 o'clock in the winter. in the evening until late at night collective farm horses, while he himself, being drunk, inflicted a number of insults on an official, presented him with 58 (7) and 58 (10) of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to a concentration camp for 10 years \*. Or - a troika at the OGPU PP North-Kav. The Krai sentenced a certain KONDYBA to 5 years in a concentration camp because he fled before being sent to a special settlement, where he allegedly was sent as a former kulak. It turned out that Kondyba was not a kulak, he had not been evicted to the special settlement, he had not fled from the special settlement, and that, consequently, his condemnation was wrong.

- The practice of the work of the troikas also speaks of a significant number of cases of both unsatisfactory conduct of the investigation and judicial errors \* that the Collegium of the OGPU has to correct.

So, for example, in the case of an insurgent organization in the BSSR, 11 people were sentenced to death by the troika of the OGPU BSSR. During the final consideration of this case in the Collegium in November. none of the convicts was sentenced to the highest measure. We have similar cases in Kazakhstan, the Gorky Territory, etc.

\*\* This speaks for the fact that when judicial functions are removed from the organs of the OGPU, it is not advisable to retain the triples under the PP OGPU \*\*.

Based on the fact that the vast majority of cases initiated and considered by the OGPU Collegium can also be resolved in court, \* I consider it expedient to establish only this procedure for considering cases, and in a number of cases court sessions can be secret and in a special composition \* ( the law directly provides for the possibility of forming special presences of the Supreme Court - I think that it would be expedient to establish such special presences at the forthcoming reorganization of the OGPU both at the regional (regional) courts and at the supreme courts of the Union republics), which in sufficiently guarantees the secrecy of the trial, on the one hand, and caused by the political situation in which this or that case will be considered, the corresponding qualifications of the composition of the court, on the other.

- The scope of administrative rights of the central bodies of the OGPU should be revised.

The reorganized OGPU should be left with the right to administer

active expulsion for up to 3 years and administrative exile for up to 5 years. Exile up to 5 years must be organized in accordance with the Regulations on exile with compulsory corrective labor, the draft of which was once submitted by me to the Fraction of the Presidium of the CEC \* of the USSR and the latter approved (the draft regulation on exile is attached ).

•At the same time, the question arises of reorganizing the GULAG\* (concentration camps and labor settlements) and managing places of deprivation of liberty (under the People's Commissariat of Justice of the Union Republics). \* In my opinion, it would be expedient to unite this case in the appropriate department (say, the Main Directorate of Places of Detention) of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

At the same time, the scope of the rights of the Prosecutor's Office to supervise the administrative activities of the OGPU should also be revised to a certain extent.

At present, according to the instructions of May 8, the OGPU has the right to make arrests without prior approval from the prosecutor's supervision in a number of cases.

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cases (terror attacks, explosions, arson, espionage, defectors, political bandits and KK anti-party groups). Without objecting to the preservation of this order in the future, \*\* I suppose to supplement this rule with an indication that after a certain period of time (10-14 days) all arrests in these cases are sanctioned by the prosecutor's office, depending on what should be established further preventive measure\*\*.

I. Akulov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 4. L. 14-15. Script. Typescript".

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\*\_ŷ\* Underlined in pencil and underlined in the margin with two vertical lines.

No. 417

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
"COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" ORGANIZATION IN  
SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTES AND THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR

February 26, 1934

No. 50229

\*In Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine, the Azov-Black Sea Territory and the Western Region, we have arrested members of a widely branched fascist organization called the Russian National Party.

The organization set as its ultimate task the armed overthrow of the Soviet power and the establishment of a fascist dictatorship in the country\*. On this basis, it united various nationalist elements.

The organization paid special attention to the issue of Ukraine. The failure of independent attempts by Ukrainian nationalists to overthrow the Soviet power in Ukraine and the importance attached by the foreign interventionist circles served as the basis for a bloc of Ukrainian nationalists with Russian



skim.

The investigation established that the organization was led by the political Center.

According to undercover data and testimonies \*arrested members of the organization Durnovo A.N., Sychev N.P., Kryzhanovsky B.G., Shmidt F.I., Valyashko M.G., Gordeeva D.B., Taranushchenko S. .A. the following leading members of the organization\* have been established:

- 1) "Academician Peretz V.N. \* - a prominent Ukrainian nationalist, vice-director of the Institute of Slavic Studies in Leningrad;
- 2) \*Academician Speransky M.N.\* - monarchist, literary critic;
- 3) \*Academician Derzhavin N.S.\* - Director of the Institute of Slavic Studies in Leningrad;
- 4) \*Academician Vernadsky V.I.\* - b. minister in the government of Hetman V-Koropadsky in Ukraine, b. member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, his son is a prominent leader of the Eurasian movement abroad;
- 5) "Academician Kurnakov N.S. \* - Director of the Chemical Association of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR
- 6) "Academician Grushevsky M.S. \* - former chairman of the Central Rada" in Ukraine;

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7) "Professor Korablev V.N. \* - former active politician under tsarism, Black Hundreds, one of the leaders of the Institute of Slavic Studies in Leningrad, was arrested, gave evidence;

8) "Professor Durnovo N.N. \* - nobleman, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, former Octobrist, relative of the tsarist minister Durnovo, arrested, testified;

9) Professor Ilyinsky G.A. - nobleman, former professor of the 1st Moscow State University, who had been removed due to the purge, was arrested and gave evidence.

The organization was created on the direct orders of the foreign Russian fascist center, which unites emigrants of various directions and is headed by Prince N.S. Trubetskoy, Evreinov and others. Professor Durnovo N.N. (in 1924 on a business trip from the Academy of Sciences) contacted Prince Trubetskoy there and received directive instructions from him on the creation of a k.r. organizations within the USSR.

"During a search in the apartment near Durnovo, a collection of articles by Prince N.S. Trubetskoy "On the Problem of Russian Self-Knowledge"\*", published abroad, was found, which are in the nature of a platform of Russian fascism. The document bears Trubetskoy's personal inscription to Durnovo.

"According to the testimony of Durnovo A.N., the main provisions of this document were used in the organization's platform for the organization's software installations \*.

The fascist center abroad, formed on the basis of the Eurasian movement, included pan-Slavic elements and was closely associated with French interventionist circles. The latter, moreover, were directly connected with the organization in the USSR. In particular, the prominent French professor, reactionary Mazon, an agent of the French General Staff, during his visits to Moscow, contacted members of the center Grushevsky, Speransky and Durnovo.

"Beginning in 1932, in connection with the strengthening of fascism in Germany and then Hitler's coming to power, the organization was oriented towards fascist Germany, while maintaining, however, ties with French interventionist circles\*.

According to the testimony of the arrested Fasmer R.F. - researcher, The numismatic department of the State Hermitage Museum in Leningrad, a member of the Swedish Archaeological Academy, through his brother Fasmer Max, director of the Slavic Institute in Berlin, an active fascist, he and Academician Vernadsky "established a regular connection between the organization and the German fascists \*.

The arrested Kule, a professor at the Oriental Institute in Leningrad, testified about the organization's connections with the German consulate in Leningrad.

"The organization expanded its activities and recruited cadres among the reactionary professors and young scientists who were under their influence", among the technical intelligentsia, b. nobility b. officers, paying special attention to work among young people, from whom combat terrorist personnel were trained.

"Weapons belonging to the organization (about 240 rifles, sawn-off shotguns and revolvers, hand grenades and one machine gun) were seized in Ukraine and the Leningrad Region.\* The weapons were received in Leningrad from the Military Artillery Museum, ostensibly for an exhibition, but in fact by prior agreement was transported to the cells of the organization.

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The organization set itself the task of sabotage in various areas of the national economy and research work, the preparation and commission of acts of sabotage and carried out espionage work.

ŸThe testimonies of the arrested chemists - researchers of the USSR Academy of Sciences Razuvaev G.A., Andrievsky I.A., Lichkov B.L. and Valyashko M.G. wrecking activity carried out by the organization in a number of institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, such as, for example, in the chemical association and the chemistry group of the Academy\*, in the high-pressure laboratory at the State High-Pressure Institute, etc., is revealed.

As a result, the development of a number of issues of defense significance

nie, was sabotaged.

It was established that members of the organization had handed over a number of classified materials of defense importance across the border\*.

So:

a) frustrating and hindering the resolution of the sapropel problem in the USSR, the organization simultaneously, through a member of the center, academician Vernadsky, transmitted materials on this issue to the German chemist Potonier, a member of the Prussian Geological Committee\*;

b) the organization systematically transmitted through the German "Beirische Sticksstoff Gesellschaft" materials on important defense work carried out on the production of phosphoric acid and hydrogen under pressure; according to Razuvaev's testimony, he personally had a number of meetings in Berlin with a company representative, Dr. Freitag, to whom he gave information about works of defense significance and received instructions from him to prevent Soviet industry from using them;

c) chemist V.V. Ipat'ev (not arrested), the son of Academician Ipat'ev, who had gone abroad, all the materials on the solubility of gases under pressure were also illegally transferred\* to Germany.

d) at the direction of a member of the center acad. Kurnakov, Makarov, a member of the organization, hid from the state the results of the work of the Academy's expedition to the Kulunda steppe and other places of salt lakes, etc.

The investigation revealed a connection between the Socialist-Revolutionary organization being liquidated by us and the emissaries of the Socialist-Revolutionary Center in Prague - Skachkov M.N., Svyazheninov and Kolpikov, who were being liquidated by the Russian National Party represented by Durnovo N.N. and Durnovo A.N.

Arrested in connection with the case: in Moscow - 32 people, in Leningrad - 65 people, in Ukraine - 22 people, in the Azov-Black Sea Territory - 15 people, in the Western Region - 5 people and in Belarus - 1 person. Only 140 people.

Of the active participants in the organization, it should be noted in Moscow: 1) Durnovo A.N., son of Durnovo N.N., researcher, writer; 2) Trubetskoy N.S. - b. prince, b. Guards officer (arrested); 3) Shishova V.I. - son b. manufacturer, literary critic, who worked in the Book Chamber.

"Leningrad: 1) Kryzhanovskiy B.G., a researcher, was arrested in 1931 in the case of the monarchical organization of academician Platonov (arrested); 2) Sychev N.P. - professor, Ukrainian nationalist, nobleman, member of the Academy of Material Culture (arrested); 3) Miller - b. dvoryanin 6 Guards Rifle ^sky officer, researcher at the Russian Museum (arrested)

In Ukraine: 1) Gordeeva D.B. - Professor of the Ukrainian Institute of Material Culture in Kharkov (arrested); 2) Taranushchenko S.A. - Professor of the Kharkov Art and History Museum, b. member of the Ukrainian party Social-Federalists (arrested).

In the Azov-Black Sea Territory: Voytsika R.K. - professor of the literary department of the Krasnodar Pedagogical Institute, b. employee Osvag (arrested). Investigation of the case and further development of the c.r. organizations continue. \*\*We consider it necessary to arrest Academicians Peretz and Speransky. Acad. We consider it expedient to remove Kurnakov from the leadership of works of defense significance\*\*. (125)

ZAM. PREV. OGPU Agranov AP  
RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 201. L. 1-6. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: Poskrebyshv: "From Comrade Agranov"; "We need to have a special discussion. Couldn't the Academy of Sciences be completely kicked out of defense work? Stalin."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\* —\*\* It is underlined in the margins with two lines.

No. 418

MEMORIAL N.V. Krylenko I.V. STALIN,

L.M. KAGANOVICH and V.M. MOLOTOV

ON THE NEED FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF THE NKJUST

February 27, 1934

Owls. secret

Dear comrade. Stalin!

At one time, immediately after the publication of the theses of the Central Committee on organizational issues, I sent a letter to you pointing out the need for a radical reorganization of the entire work of judicial and prosecutorial work in accordance with the published theses.

I pointed out that the management of the judicial and prosecutorial periphery from a single republican people's commissariat center is extremely difficult given \*the presence of two centers in the Union - the Supreme Court of the Union and the Prosecutor's Office of the Union\*, independently and through the head of the People's Commissariat of the RSFSR, operationally managing the judicial and prosecutorial periphery, and that, at the same time, the abolition of functional departments in the People's Commissariat of Justice itself, which follows from the theses of the congress, creates an even greater disunity between completely independent departments.

In this regard, I asked to discuss the issue of liquidating the People's Commissariat of Justice and restructuring the entire work of the judicial and prosecutorial system according to a clear and harmonious scheme:

a) \* an independent prosecutorial system;

b) The Supreme Court of the RSFSR as an independent body managing the judicial system\* on the orders of the Supreme Court of the Union, with the Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Institutions subordinate to it as the body for the execution of court sentences under the general supervision and control of the prosecutor's office.

“The decision of the Central Committee on the reorganization of the OGPU and the re-establishment of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs poses the same question even more sharply”.

If the Allied People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which is being formed, will have a special group for the management of places of deprivation of liberty, covering the current camps of the OGPU. then it follows logically that for the purposes of a) the unity of the implementation of the corrective labor policy, b) the economic expediency of uniting the entire system of economic enterprises, correct

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labor institutions - the transfer from the People's Commissariat of Justice of the places of deprivation of liberty under its jurisdiction, correctional labor colonies, juvenile colonies, remand prisons, etc. - into a single administration, into a new single People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs \*\*. The current "Department of Convoy Troops" should also be sent there, which, together with the Directorate of Border Troops, should constitute " " one Military Directorate of the NKVnudel \*. Now the Directorate of Convoy Troops is homeless - legally it is under the Council of People's Commissars of the Union, but in fact it is inside the People's Commissariat of Justice. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 4, 1933, he was entrusted with food and clothing allowances for prisoners being transported, but he was not allocated any funds or funds for this - both have to be done at the expense of the corrective labor system of the People's Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR.

But if the Department of Correctional Labor Institutions and the Department of Convoy Troops leave the People's Commissariat of Justice for the new People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, what will remain of the People's Commissariat of Justice?

“The management of the Prosecutor's Office is more and more centralized in the hands of the Prosecutor's Office of the Union, which has long since mastered, as I wrote, the system of direct operational management of localities, bypassing the NKJ\*\*\*.

\* In the NKJ system, only the court will remain, controlled, however, so far only de jure, and not de facto by the Supreme Court of the Union \*.

With such a structure, the People's Commissariat of Justice becomes an absolutely unnecessary and superfluous superstructure over the judicial system. Meanwhile, in connection with the reorganization of the OGPU, the court acquires special significance and the struggle for the appropriate judicial personnel becomes especially acute. Under these conditions it is quite expedient to single out the court as a completely self-sufficient independent system\*. This will enable the comrades who manage this system to focus their concentrated attention on it and free the court from forced cohabitation with the prosecutor's office and the Correctional Labor Institutions Administration. At one time, this cohabitation - during the period when a single line of judicial policy was being hammered together - was necessary; now it should be \*\*\* provided in other ways: by concentrating in a single union body - the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Union, a joint discussion of issues of judicial policy common to all three systems (the court, the prosecutor's office "G Narkomvnudel) \*\*\*. ---

Such a structure will ensure political supremacy and independence.

court and will correspond to the main ideas developed by Vladimir Ilyich in his letter on the prosecutor's office dated May 20, 1922 \*)

With communist greetings, Ya. Krylenko

) "In the center, we must find about 10 people who will exercise central prosecutorial power in the person of the Prosecutor General, the Supreme Tribunal and count

Legia of the People's Commissariat of Justice. These 10 people, being in the center, work under the closest supervision and in the most

direct contact with the three Party institutions, which constitute the maximum guarantee against local and personal influences, namely: the Organizing Bureau, the Central Committee, the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission" (Lenin , vol. XXVII, p. 300). [note N. Krylenko]

APRf. f; h. Op. 58. D. 4. L. 18-19. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "From. Krylenko. About the need to face Nitsatsi and the NKJUST".

„ ~\* Underlined in pencil.

It is underlined in the margins with one line.

The paragraph is enclosed in parentheses in the margins.

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LETTER N.N. KRESTINSKY I.V. STALIN AND V.M.  
MOLOTOV IN THE CASE OF CONTROL-K°

March 2, 1934

No. 58

Owls. secret

Dear comrades! In accordance with the decision of the Politburo, the OGPU proceeds with the expulsion of German and Austrian citizens arrested in connection with the Control-K° case - an official request for this by the German ambassador and the Austrian envoy has already been received.

Comrade Litvinov recalls that when the decision on the expulsion was made in the Politburo, the opinion was expressed that a notice of the expulsion should be published in the press. No decision, however, was made on this issue. Tov. Litvinov thinks it would be better not to publish any report. I ask you to authorize the non-publication of the notice of expulsion in the press.

Tov. Litvinov is lying ill, this is my appeal to you agreed with him.

With comradely greetings, Krestinsky. APRF. F.  
3. Op. 58. D. 244. L.6. Script. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "For. I. Stalin.

No. 420

NOTE V.A. Balitsky I.V. TO STALIN ON  
STRENGTHENING THE  
WORK IN THE GERMAN CONSULATES (126)

March 5, 1934

No. 1504-sk

Your instructions about the need to intensify work on the Kharkov, Kiev and Odessa consulates are entirely and completely confirmed by the materials we have on the counter-revolutionary work of these consulates.

If earlier, before Hitler came to power, German religious and nationalist societies and organizations tried in various ways to carry out their work among the half-million German population of Ukraine, then WITH HITLER'S COMING TO POWER, ALL THE WORK AGAINST US IS CONCENTRATED IN GERMAN CONSULATES, WHICH THEY LEAD THE MANAGEMENT OF ALL THE FASCIST PAN-GERMAN INTELLIGENCE AND SUBVERSION WORK, making extensive use of German Lutheran and Catholic cadres.

All three consulates, Kharkov, Kyiv and Odessa, are headed by fascists.

The Odessa Consulate is headed by Consul Roth and Secretary Gan, both National Socialists. To characterize Roth, it is interesting to point out that he is the only German diplomat who defiantly wears the fascist badge all the time. Gan is known from investigative materials as the organizer of the arson of the boathouse in Nikolaev.

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At the head of the Kyiv consulate is the National Socialist, a former officer of the Reichswehr Genke. The latter was appointed to this post at the insistence of Rosenberg, with whom he maintains direct contact, being a resident of the foreign policy department of the NSRPG.

The Consul General in Kharkov is the National Socialist Walter. Vice-Consul - National Socialist Ert.

Particularly noteworthy for his activity is Ert, whose son is the author of the well-known book Armed Uprising, which he published for the Leipzig trials. Thanks to the activity of Ert, the Kharkov consulate, not limited to the ongoing work in Ukraine, through its agent arrested by us, the head of the Lutheran church, Provost Birt, began to spread its influence in the German colonies of the Crimea, North Caucasus

Kaz, Transcaucasia and the Republic of the Volga Germans, giving instructions there on carrying out fascist work and financing this work.

The materials we have at our disposal\* clearly established that the German consulates in Kharkov, Kiev and Odessa are directly supervising the work:\* 1. On the preparation of the organization of the NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY OF UKRAINE, which would unite the fascist elements of all nationalities and organizations youth in the so-called "UNION OF FIGHTING YOUNG GERMANS"

2. Propaganda of pan-German fascist ideas among the German population and organizations like Hitler's assault detachments, insurgent cells.

3. By planting sabotage and espionage groups in our defense industry.

For this work the German consulates make extensive use of German specialists in our industry, the German clergy and their agents among the German chauvinist intelligentsia.

ALL THIS ACTIVITY HAS ITS FINAL PURPOSE TO TRAIN ACTIVE FASCIST STAFF NECESSARY IN THE EVENT OF EXTERNAL COMPLICATIONS WHICH WOULD FACILITATE THE INTERVENTORS FROM WITHIN.

I

We have undercover information that the Kharkov Consulate is working on the creation of the "NATIONAL SOCIALIST PARTY OF UKRAINE", IN WHICH INTEND TO RECRUIT NOT ONLY GERMAN FASCISTS, BUT FASCISTS OF ALL OTHER NATIONALITIES.

These data are confirmed in the testimony of the manager arrested by us. Mariupol branch of "Control-K 0" of a German resident, who arrived from Germany, an Austrian citizen Weinzel:

"According to the instructions I received, I had first of all to proceed with the creation in Ukraine of such a National Socialist party organization, in which it was necessary to involve not only the German population, but also persons of other nationalities, and in particular from the composition of the technical Russian intelligentsia, concentrated mainly in the "Industrial centers ..."

On the question of organizing the "Union of Fighting Young Germans", a member of this union and a member of the NSRPG, the arrested teacher Schultz testifies:

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"...Upon my arrival in the USSR, I made it my task to carry out fascist influence in every possible way among the Russian Germans. Having become a teacher in a German school, I instilled fascist ideas in the German student youth...



... All my activities were aimed at doing as much as possible useful for fascism in the USSR ...

... On this basis, I made friends with the employees of the Kyiv German Consulate by Strez, who suggested that I join an illegal fascist organization called the "Union of Young Fighting Germans" ...

... Stresz instructed me to create organization cells in Kiev, involving German youth in it ...

... The main task of the organization, at the direction of Strez, was to educate the Germans in the fascist spirit and train personnel from the members of the organization for assault detachments.

## II

\*

To date, we have eliminated 81 rebel cells, built according to the type of Hitler's assault detachments. Of them:

in the Dnipropetrovsk region - 29 Odessa - 23

Donetsk - 21

Kievskaya - 8

With regard to the leadership of the consulates in the propaganda of fascism, we have the following materials. The head of the Lutheran Church in Ukraine, who was arrested by us, Probst 1 Birt, who is one of the most active German agents, testifies about the role of the Kharkov German consulate: and his vice-consul Ert...

My counter-revolutionary pan-German and espionage work, as well as the pastors I brought in for this purpose, basically boiled down to: 1) indoctrination of the German colonists in a counter-revolutionary nationalist Germanophile spirit; 2) the education of the German colonists as ideological enemies of the international policy of the Soviet government and its measures in this area; 3) to resist the implementation of all measures of Soviet power in the German colonies in general; 4) to espionage work in favor of Germany, the collection of compromising materials, and 5) as the ultimate goal, all this activity was reduced to the preparation of counter-revolutionary hostile cadres from the German colonists, necessary in case of any external complications that would contribute to the speedy overthrow of Soviet power ... "

"... Basically, in all the c.-r. espionage activities, I reported directly to Consul Walther or vice-consul Erth. I systematically conveyed to Walter or Ert the espionage information I had obtained and always informed them in detail at meetings both at the consulate and at my apartment about the situation in the German colonies, the course of economic and political campaigns, the sowing campaign, grain procurement, dispossession and eviction of the kulaks and political the mood of the colonists...

Senior pastor of the Lutherans. - Ed.

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... also obtained and transferred to Walter and Ert materials and facts compromising the USSR ... "

Speaking of funding the work, Birt reveals:

"...Money was released to me by order of Consul Walter by Vice-Consul Ert and was taken by me as needed, both for me and for other pastors...

...Thus, in addition to the 80,000 rubles I received from Walter and Ert, which went to activate the c.-r. nationalist and pan-German work in the German colonies of the Ukraine and the Crimea, Walter, as I know, 52,000 rubles were given to the pastors of the Volga for the same purposes, including 22,000 rubles were transferred personally by me. 20,000 rubles to Bishop Mayer during my stay in Moscow, 2,000 rubles to the members of the All-Union Church Council Algauzen on his journey through Kharkov, 30,000 rubles were received by pastor Pfeiffer on his visit to Kharkov..."

"... In total, Walter and Ert for the indicated purposes, as far as I know, were given out to pastors up to 150.00 rubles. If, however, we take into account individual extraditions to pastors and FAMILIES OF THE ARRESTED FOR K.-R. ACTIVITIES OF PASTORS, which took place, then the amount of money issued will be expressed in 200,000 rubles, if not more.

The arrest of Birt, according to our intelligence data, caused great alarm in German consular circles. 6 days after the arrest, Consul General Walter handed over a note to the Commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, in which he writes: "All of us who have known Provost Birt for many years value him very highly and are convinced of his loyalty to the Soviet authorities. It is especially incomprehensible to us that, in his high position, he could have committed any actions to the detriment of the Soviet authorities ... I have the honor to submit to the Plenipotentiary of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs under the government of the Ukrainian SSR the request of the Church Council and members of the community to take measures to release the probst. I personally join this request, especially since Provost Birt, according to German law, has been accepted into German citizenship and is a German citizen ... "

Some time later, Consul General Walter, returning to this issue in a conversation with the Executive Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, said that the GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW NADOLNY HAD A SPECIAL CONVERSATION ON THIS CASE WITH OUR BERLIN POLISSIONARY HIN CHUK, REQUESTING HIM TO BE INTERVIEWED ON THIS CASE AT THE MOSCOW GPU BE .

It should be added that BIRT HAS NEVER BEEN A GERMAN ALLOY

III

Significant work has been done by the consulates to plant subversive and espionage groups in the defense industry. Particularly active is the work of the secretary of the Odessa consulate of GANA, as we have established, who is closely connected with the Japanese consul in Odessa, Tanaka. The German citizen Werman, whom we have recognized, and who has been an agent of the German headquarters since 1908, who was awarded during the German occupation of Ukraine for merits in espionage by the Iron Cross, shows: "In May 1933 I was at Ghana and handed him a number of spyware materials.

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raktera. Hahn told me that a directive had been received from Germany from the Ost-Abteilung (Eastern Department) to immediately begin organizing acts of sabotage at large industrial facilities and strategic structures.

zhenyakh.

In the development of this directive, Gan proposed to organize a sabotage act at the Marty and 61 factories, at a power station, water supply, etc.

The act of sabotage at the Marty plant, as you know, took place.

Verman's testimony is fully confirmed by the testimony of the arrested German Catholic Father Zisko that "at the end of May or the beginning of July 1932, I came to Odessa to Father Schubert to inform him about the espionage and counter-revolutionary work I had done and to receive further instructions. After I told Schubert in detail about the work I had done, he told me that he had received new directives from the Odessa German consulate on the preparation of new acts of sabotage at the moment the intervention began ...

... Schubert proposed to me to create sabotage cells at the A. Marty "and" 61 ", which are of defensive importance, in parts of the Red Army of the Nikolaev garrison, in contact with the protection of warehouses of firearms and explosives, and among persons related to the Nikolaev railway. dor. bridge and Vodopoy station...

...According to Schubert, my sabotage work had to be structured in such a way that, at the necessary moment, the military workshops of the A. Marty" and "61", depots of firearms were blown up, railway. bridge and main tracks Waterhole".

Particularly bright light on the sabotage plans and activities of the Germans on the territory of Ukraine is shed by the testimony of the resident of the German headquarters arrested by us, sent directly from Germany, the manager of the Mariupol office "Control-K 0", an Austrian subject Weinzel, who was supposed to:

2) engage in the collection of information at factories of defense importance. "For this purpose, I had to recruit German and Russian specialists.

3) I must pay special attention to shipyards and shipyards.

4) Along with the fulfillment of the above tasks, I must also take up the selection of people to create sabotage cells in factories of defense importance, to carry out acts of sabotage in the event of intervention and carry out daily wrecking work.

According to the first 3 points, I had to start work immediately upon arrival in the USSR. Regarding the deadlines for the implementation of the last paragraph of the task, I had to be informed additionally ...

... In Odessa, I had to contact the secretary of the German consulate Gan, who would be informed about me, and he would continue to supervise my work."

About the specific work done by Weinzel in the implementation of the directives received in Berlin, shows the recruited head of the steam economy of the Mariupol plant named after Ilyich, a Romanian citizen of Tanku:

"Along with the performance of intelligence work, Weinzel instructed me to carry out acts of sabotage for the period of wartime, so

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how, according to his assurances, the proximity of an armed clash between Germany and the USSR is brewing... According to the sabotage plan he had thought out, I was entrusted with the task of:

1) the decommissioning of a new power plant that supplies energy to the plant. Ilyich. The station is equipped with 6 boiler plants with 3 turbines, each with a capacity of 6,200 kilowatts.

For this purpose, it was necessary to recruit reliable people from the operating personnel of the boiler house, whom I encountered as a specialist.

At the right moment, to disable the plant, it was enough to stop the pumps pumping water, to stop the supply of water to the boilers, which, with normal heating for a maximum of 30 minutes, would have been burned due to lack of water.

To restore the boilers, it takes time in the presence of pumping pipes - one month for each boiler, in the absence of pipes, a longer period.

2) Disabling the steam economy of the plant. Ilyich, which serves all the units of the plant and consists of 5 boiler plants.

In this case, recruitment work had to be carried out with the calculation of the alignment of forces of the sabotage organization at all points.

It was necessary to attract for sabotage work people proven, reliable, hostile to the Soviet regime ... "

In total, we identified sabotage cells at twenty-nine enterprises, including Krammashzavod, the OR plant in Lugansk,

water them. Ilyich in Mariupol, the Gorlovsky nitrogen-fertilizer plant, the fireclay plant in Chasovoy Yar, at the mines of Donbasanthracite, at the plant "61" in Nikolaev, the Nikolaev city water pipeline, at a number of mines in the Kadievsky, Krasnoluchsky, Chistyakovsky and Gorlovsky districts, at the plant "A March ti "y at the Nikolaev power plant, at the Zaporozhye group of plants: Dneproges, Dnepropetrovsk aluminum plant, Zaporizhstal, the Kommunar plant, aircraft plant No. 29.

Separately, one should dwell on the activities of the sabotage group laid down at the Dneproges, which was supposed to begin its operations only with the outbreak of war at the time of the alleged air attack on the Dneproges.

The arrested senior mechanic of the communications service of the Dneproges Kornis on this occasion shows:

"... During the war with Germany and the advance of German troops to Ukraine, which, according to Finer (a German engineer, a representative of the Telefunken company at the Dneproges), should be expected no later than 1934, Dneprostroy, as the main energy base The Southwestern Front, which feeds the plants of Dneprokombinat, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk and Kamensky with its electricity, will attract the attention of the advancing troops interested in putting it out of action as soon as possible, and, of course, will be subjected to air attack, bombardment, etc.

At one of these moments, I must stop the operation of all high-frequency communication posts of the DGES, for which it will be enough for me to disable the Central post of the communication system at the DGES, which I can do completely unnoticed, if only by damaging the relay, punching condensates and etc. (which will not have external signs of damage and at the same time very

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difficult to detect), and at the same time try to damage other types of communication (damage to the fuses on the telephone switchboard, in the control room). This will cut off the supply of electricity to the factories of Dneprokombinat, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk and Kamensky for quite a long time, since, as I have already indicated above, in the absence of communication, the supply of powerful electricity will immediately stop due to the threat of major accidents. and serious damage to expensive electrical equipment that may take a long time to repair.

The leaders of the sabotage group were fully aware of the consequences of this sabotage [act] for cities and enterprises powered by the Dnieper energy: "... In the cities of Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Kamensky, with a power outage, the water supply, the movement of trams, the lights would go out, etc., in a word, the normal course of life in the city would be disrupted. In addition, the absence of current supply for some time (10-12 hours) threatened with extremely serious and subsequently difficult-to-remove accidents of blast furnaces, since due to the lack of electricity, the operation of the blower stops, and hence the supply of hot air to the blast furnace, which threatens cooling inside the blast furnace of molten metal, due to which the blast furnace can be removed for a long time

out of action..." (Testimony of Kornis dated 2.1.34).

The entire composition of the sabotage group was arrested by us.

In connection with your instructions, I have carefully instructed the apparatus of the GPU, and the work of the consulates has been placed in the center of attention.

Chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR Balitsky

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 172. L. 11-23. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: Poskrebyshev: "From Comrade. Balitsky";  
"In my archive—I. Stalin."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 421

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION G.G. YAGODY I.V. TO  
STALIN ON THE INTERCEPTED JAPANESE MATERIAL  
ON THE QUESTION OF THE USE  
OF THE MUSLIM STATES AGAINST THE USSR

March 11, 1934

No. 50275

Top secret

"At the same time, I am sending documentary Japanese material confiscated by agents, sent by the Japanese military attache in Turkey to the General Staff of Japan in Tokyo.

The document presents an assessment of the possibilities of using Muslim states in the line of political and strategic measures against the USSR \*, as well as considerations regarding the implementation of the necessary measures in peacetime.

Deputy chairman of the OGPU Yagoda

\*

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Series "K"  
DOCUMENTARY  
Translated from Japanese

Extremely secret

February 15, 1934 in Tokyo

## GENERAL STAFF OF JAPAN

From the Japanese military attache  
at the Japanese Embassy in Turkey KANDA  
Masatane

### EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF USE OF THE MUSLIM STATES IN THE LINE OF POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC MEASURES AGAINST THE USSR AND CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE NECESSARY MEASURES IN PEACETIME

#### Foreword

In January of this year, having received permission to travel to Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Egypt, I had the opportunity to personally explore these countries and meet with Muslim representatives. This trip finally strengthened the opinion that I had already formed before. Now I am setting out my thoughts and asking the command to discuss them, believing that due to the tension in our relations with the USSR, it becomes necessary that our political and strategic measures enter the stage of concretization, and also believing that the current situation in Europe necessitates that our empire pay attention as soon as possible to the use of Muslim states.

## CHAPTER 1

### Political and strategic measures against the USSR and Muslim states

1. At the moment, the importance of political and strategic measures during the war with the USSR is finally realized by our army. \*For us who are working abroad, it seems very joyful that the preparation of these events is gradually moving forward\*.

But this work is one of the most difficult of all difficult problems. It requires deep and serious study. Its implementation requires extreme caution. Before proceeding with this or that combination, it is necessary to study the problem in its entire breadth and properly prepare in order to avoid obstacles and errors in the process of implementing the combination.

\*\*2. The improvement in foreign policy relations between the USSR, on the one hand, and Poland, France, and other European states, on the other, is by no means lasting. However, assuming the emergence of a war with the USSR in the near future, we must be prepared for the fact that this war will generally begin under the international political conditions that exist at the present moment\*\*.

In this case, we will have to carry out political and strategic measures against the USSR on the part of Europe under conditions that are very unfavorable for us. This will be especially felt at the initial moment of the war, during that period of time when the outcome of the war has not yet been determined, and just during this period we will need one or another effect from political and strategic combinations. Unfortunately, it must be said that \*everything that has been said above regarding unfavorable conditions applies entirely to Turkey, which at the present moment has friendly ties with the Soviet Union\*.

3. Given the above situation in Europe, our political and strategic activities should not be limited to Europe. \*We must think about carrying out political and strategic measures against the USSR from all sides, not limited to Europe and practicing any methods. In this case, one of the more or less favorable plans for us is the use of Muslim states.

In order to carry out this plan, it is necessary to establish positions of trade representatives in Afghanistan, Turkey, Persia, Arabia, Egypt \* and other countries (i.e., send there in disguise suitably capable officers, because at the moment it is very difficult to find suitable candidates from among the diplomatic officials). \*All points above must be kept in mind when sending sales representatives to these areas\*. Considering that these countries have a tendency to shy away from purchasing goods in neighboring countries, considering that economic relations are intertwined with political ones, we can skillfully use this circumstance and achieve a certain success. There is no need for us to seek orders for large amounts.

#### 4. \*Organization of propaganda organs\*

These bodies should aim at anti-communist propaganda among Muslims in general. To do this, it will be necessary to use the international Muslim association in Jerusalem and, first of all, to start printed propaganda about the city in Turkestan to provide assistance to the new independent state in Xinjiang. Along with this, propaganda must be carried on among prominent Muslim leaders in all countries in order to prepare the basis for anti-Soviet political and strategic combinations. With an allocation of about 200,000 yen for the first year of operation, preparations can begin. (Support for an independent state in Xinjiang is very necessary from the point of view of the prospects for political and strategic combinations). It seems more expedient for Japan to act not directly, but through the Muslims.

#### 5. \* Stimulation of friendly relations between Manchukuo and Muslims \*

\*Taking advantage of the proclamation of a monarchical regime in Manchu-Guo, one must declare freedom of religion, respect for religion in general\*. Mosques should be created for Muslims, influential persons who are respected by all Muslims should be attracted to Manchukuo, libraries and schools for Muslims should be organized, and relations between Manchukuo and Arabia and Egypt should be strengthened in every possible way.

In addition, various methods should be practiced, such as organizing excursions, inviting scientists, and so on.



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Chapter II

Measures to be taken during peacetime through the use of Muslim states

As for the methods of using Muslims in wartime, I will not touch here, since on this occasion I have to submit a report separately. Here I touch on the work that we can begin now in peacetime. In terms of diplomacy and other peacetime activities, our empire has so far paid very little attention to Muslim states. Therefore, we must now begin this work without wasting a single hour.

Promoting diplomatic relations

a) 'Immediately resolve the issue of establishing a diplomatic mission in Egypt\*. Of course, it will be necessary to choose a suitable candidate for envoy, without clearly limiting the circle from which the candidate will be selected.

b) 'To charge our envoy in Persia with the duties of an envoy in Iraq\*. (When I visited the Iraqi Foreign Minister, one of the department heads said that although Poland has almost no relations with Iraq, its envoy to Persia is also acting envoy to Iraq; Czechoslovakia will soon follow suit.) It is a pity that Japan, whose economic relations with Iraq have grown significantly in recent years, does not have its own diplomatic representative. This statement, although it is in the nature of a compliment, we need to take note of.

The Austrian envoy to Turkey combines the duties of an envoy to Iraq. As for America, France, Italy, of course, they have special representatives in Iraq.

development and stimulation of economic relations

'The penetration of our goods into the Middle East, Arabia and Egypt is very rapid\*, despite the creation of customs barriers. When I traveled, I had to see Japanese goods everywhere. Japanese goods are very suitable for the natives, who have very little purchasing power and whose standard of living is very low. In the event that we present the matter to our development, our businessmen ... (note omission)

"Most of the frontier strip of Asiatic Russia is populated by Muslims, who are much more strongly interconnected, regardless of tribal differences, than Buddhists and Christians\*. Everyone who deals with

Muslims are amazed at this well-established connection that exists between Muslims of all countries.

During the trip, Muslims everywhere asked me questions about whether Japan would help an independent Muslim state in Xinjiang or not. All Muslims, in general, express the wish that peace be concluded between China and Japan. This wish is connected with the well-being of the ten million Muslims in China.

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ÿ The so-called East Turkestan Republic, newly formed in Xinjiang, sent its delegates not only to India and Afghanistan, but also to Egypt and Turkey\*.

In addition, she appealed to all prominent Muslims in Europe for help. About 20 young people who emigrated to Turkey from Soviet Turkestan went to Xinjiang to help the new state.

It cannot be denied that Muslims, following the spirit of the age, have largely lost their militancy, but still they have retained a fanatical devotion to their faith. If they are used in the same way as the British used the Arab troops in Palestine during the world war, then certain results can be achieved. The Turks in this respect are superior to other Muslim tribes. If we compare the Muslims with the Ukrainians, then the advantage in terms of militancy is on the side of the former. It should also be taken into account that Chinese Muslims are exclusively militant.

veins.

After the European war, the influence of the white states began to decline, and this naturally stimulated the growth of the self-consciousness of the Muslim peoples. Especially in this regard, they are excited by the rapid development of the Japanese Empire.

ÿThe attitude of Muslims towards Japan is very friendly, and these feelings can be developed in the future.

The interests of England and the USSR are in irreconcilable contradiction, and the influence of these two countries collides precisely in the territories inhabited by Muslims. Therefore, if the Muslims of those regions that are in the sphere of influence of England carry out an anti-Soviet movement, then England will support them or, in any case, will not hinder them\*.

Most of the Muslims are under the rule of the British, and therefore their ultimate goal is to free themselves from the influence of England, but the orientation towards the USSR against England is tantamount to replacing a lion with a wolf for them, therefore it seems quite logical for Muslims to help Japan, which also sets its ultimate goal of expulsion Anglo-Saxons from Asia. In order for Japan to assert its power, Muslims must help it in the war with the USSR, which it primarily has in mind to carry out.

From the foregoing, it is clear how necessary the use of Muslims is from the point of view of plans for waging war with the USSR and how feasible it is\*.

We are aware of the difficulty of organizing a pan-Islamic movement, we are also aware that there are various tribal, sectarian and personal conflicts among Muslims. But it must be taken into account that we will also encounter these collisions along the line of using Ukrainians and Belarusians. Our goal should be to use the religious feelings of the Muslims, to incite hostility against the USSR, which has declared war on religion. We must explain to Muslims the meaning of our holy war against the Soviet Union and compel them to give us moral and concrete support.

It should also be taken into account that the majority of Muslims are now in those countries that are part of our trade zone. Therefore, in the process of

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in peacetime, we must win over the Muslims and force them to abandon their economic bloc with the Europeans. Due to my official position, I limited myself to considering the question of the use of Muslims against the USSR, but I must add that the question of the use of Muslims can be even more serious when used against England.

Head of the Special Department of the OGPU GAI

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. ID 186. L. 117-127. Script. Typescript.

There is Stalin's handwritten note in the text: "T. Radska! Shouldn't it be published, maybe with some omissions? I. Stalin.

And Radek's answer:

"Dear Comrade Stalin!

1. Not knowing the state of our negotiations with them and your assessment of the military danger, I am embarrassed to make a judgment about the expediency of publishing.

Printing a document has one advantage: it shows the danger to the country and the world. But this can be achieved by other means, while printing is a very sharp thing.

2. If you consider it necessary to print, then I think that it is better without abbreviation. It's worth cutting back if it were necessary to throw out what was not suitable for us, but I didn't find one. I'm waiting for instructions.

Hearty greetings. K. Radek. 17/III".

\*—\* Underlined by hand.

\*\*—\*\* The paragraph is underlined by hand with a pencil, on the left side is taken in a curly bracket, and a question mark is put.

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NOTE A.Kh. Artuzova I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
REPORT OF THE JAPANESE CAPTAIN TANAKA MAKOTO,  
WHO SURVEYED THE EASTERN LINE  
OF THE KVZHD

March 15, 1934

No. 50293

TOP SECRET

The attached documentary material is a translation from a Japanese report by the company commander of the engineering battalion Cap. Tanaka Makoto, who in July 1933, on behalf of the commander of the 10th Japanese division, surveyed the eastern line of the CER and the adjacent part of the Ussuri railway.

The survey was carried out in order to find out the most vulnerable places of the mentioned railway sections from the point of view of the possibility of their destruction in the event of an offensive by the Red Army from Vladivostok \* and the retreat of the Manchurian-Japanese troops to the west.

\*In relation to the Ussuri railway. Captain Tanaka gives descriptions and calculations for undermining the three tunnels of the mentioned road, located near the station. Border. He points out that blowing up the first tunnel will not be of great importance, while blowing up the other two tunnels and their dams can paralyze the railway for quite a long time and thus delay the movement of the red parts \*, since it will take about 5,000 people to restore these tunnels. man-hours, and there are no detours in the area.

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Cap. Tanaka also points out further that "attempts. destroying these tunnels from the air due to the thickness of the flooring cannot be effective \*. Despite the fact that to undermine the tunnels, you can use the mine chambers located in them for the preliminary preparation of explosions, \*according to the cap. Tanaka, it is necessary 5 days before the explosion to send one platoon of Japanese sapper troops to the site to carry out work. The storage of materials necessary for the production of explosions should be entrusted to the Japanese military mission at station. Frontier \*, because: "it is difficult to trust the border detachment, by the nature of its duties and the properties of (its) people, to keep secrets."

Next cap. Tanaka \*gives a description of the area of the western and eastern slopes of the Taipinglin Range and indicates that in addition to the presence in this area of a number of bridges, the destruction of which will interrupt railway communication for a long time

ge, there are a number of dangerous curves, the destruction of which must inevitably lead to a fall down the slope of moving trains\*.

Giving a description of the Xiaosuifynhe valley river, cap. Tanaka says that "the three railroad bridges and one excavation that are present here can serve as objects of destruction\*.

Exactly the same data are given for the sections of the CER located on the western and eastern slopes of Mount Laoyeling.

BEGINNING IN OGPU ARTUZOV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. I. D. 186. L. 115, 116. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "T. Artuzov. What should be the measures to prevent explosions and sabotage in general? Who will develop them, who will carry them out? I. Stalin"; Poskrebyshev: "From Artuzov"; "T. Slutsky. To business. Artuzov 20.VI.35 G.".

\*—!\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 423

NOTE G.E. PROKOFIEV TO I.V. STALIN ON THE DEVELOPMENT  
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GERMAN CONCERN

March 15, 1934

No. 50287

OWL. SECRET

\* In 1933, the representative of the German concern Gutehoffnungshütte (combining 12 firms of heavy engineering and ferrous metallurgy) Estonian citizen Edgar Eduardovich SHVERTS, who held the position of head of the Russian department of the concern, repeatedly came to the Union \*.

Schwartz's frequent trips to the Union were connected with his commercial activities with Gormetmashimport, VOMT NKPS and other economic organizations.

"Schwartz's undercover work revealed that he had been a spy since 1907 and had recently worked on assignments from the Foreign Political Department \* of the German National Socialist Party, led by representatives of the National Socialist Party von BIBRA and SHEKEDANZ.

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Further observation revealed that the following persons in the public service were working for him as spies:

1. KUZMIN Konstantin Fedorovich, born in 1891, non-partisan, citizen of the USSR, unfinished higher education, before the revolution

Head of the office of the Joint Stock Company "Elektrosvet" in Moscow. Prior to his arrest, he was the head of the Planning and Resource Section of Soyuzneftetorg.

He was accepted into the service by the manager of Soyuzneftetorg EFUNI.

2. SHISKOV Georgy Sergeevich, born in 1890, non-partisan, citizen of the USSR, higher education (graduated from the Stuttgart Conservatory and holds the title of professor of music). A nobleman by birth, a lieutenant in the old army, served under Kolchak. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a foreman for Gosgrazhdanstroy.

He was recommended for work by the secretary of the VKP (b) cell of the 5th office of Gosgrazhdanstroy KUSHNAEV.

3. GRIG Grigory Evseevich, born in 1898, non-partisan, citizen of the USSR, graduated from the Leningrad Forestry Academy. The son of a big merchant.

He entered the service on the recommendation of the head of the Forestry Department of the Aviation Supply Base KHOLIN P.M.

4. KHOLODOVSKY Isaak Nazarovich, born in 1887, non-partisan, citizen of the USSR, higher education. The son of a mill tenant. Until 1913, he worked for various firms in Germany and Austria, from 1923 to 1928 he worked in the Berlin Trade Representation, and before his arrest, he was the chief engineer of plant No. 24.

He was recommended to plant number 24 by a member of the Board of the NKVT BRONOM.

5. SHVERTS Edgar Eduardovich, born in 1876, a German by nationality, an Estonian citizen, before the revolution the commercial director of the Joint Stock Company "Felser and Co" in Riga, before his arrest, he worked in the German concern "Gutegofnungshütte" as head of the Russian – deed.

SHVERZ received the following spy information:

1. Secret information on aircraft plant No. 24 and the plan of the plant itself (an aircraft engine plant in Moscow).

2. Information about the production of tanks and the plan at the Podolsk Machine-Building Plant.

3. The main design data and schemes of newly introduced, in the order of experience, transceiver radio devices for servicing military equipment  
moletov.

4. Materials on special construction in the DVK, which included data on the state of construction, its objects, and characteristics of individual objects.

5. Materials characterizing the work of the Military Transport Academy  
missions.

6. Data on the construction of strategic roads on the western border.

7. Information about orders for vehicles of military importance.

»• Information about the supply of materials for the aircraft industry and the location,

appointment and condition of the main aircraft factories.

Of the 16 arrested in this case, the above persons constitute the Even Core, which collected military information \*.

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One of the main defendants, namely SHVERTS, is an Estonian citizen, in an out-of-court case, he can be expelled from the Union.

His espionage work deserves a harsher punishment. \*I ask for instructions: whether to consider this case out of court or take it to court\*.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 244. L. 7-10. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "T.t. Molotov, Voroshilov. Need to discuss. I. Stalin"; "Molotov"; Voroshilov.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 424

LETTER N.V. KRYLENKO to the commission

L.M. KAGANOVICH ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NARCOMVNUDELA

March 17, 1934 Sov.  
secret

I cannot, unfortunately, take part in the first meeting of the Commission because of my departure to Bashkiria. I beg you, nevertheless, when discussing the regulation on the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, to discuss the following proposals of mine:

1. The newly organized People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs cannot help but include the current OGPU Camp Administration, which includes over 500 thousand people, as one of its Directorates. convicts and producing the largest work of national importance. As the experience of Belomorstroy has shown, the OGPU is also doing a good job of implementing the basic principle of corrective labor policy - political educational work among convicts.

It is all the more inexpedient under such conditions to maintain a dual leadership of this corrective labor policy - in the People's Commissariat of Justice and the OGPU, moreover, the People's Commissariat of Justice contains up to 400 thousand prisoners and almost the same number of people sentenced to corrective labor work without deprivation. freedom. It also manages investigation and transit prisons. The People's Commissariat of Justice could either transfer all this entirely to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, or retain only the maintenance of those sentenced to corrective labor without imprisonment.

This transfer will also be expedient because the OGPU bodies are better supplied with clothing allowances, raw materials and equipment and have their own line in the Union budget, while the People's Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR, being among the "others", is even deprived of the opportunity to defend their applications. in union bodies.

This is my first suggestion.

2. The second proposal concerns the organization of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs in the republic faces.

Since the People's Commissariat, apparently, is not united, but directive, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs must be preserved under the union republics. There is no need to centralize this People's Commissariat like the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat for the Military Sea.

3. With regard to the right of the OGPU to consider cases out of court, one could return to the Regulations of 1922, by which the rights of the OGPU were limited to the right of administrative expulsion and exile to concentration camps up to 3 years. The right to out-of-court consideration of individual cases is regulated

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was specially issued in each individual case by a resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Union. It is necessary to distinguish between exile and imprisonment in a camp. The latter is deprivation of liberty, while exile is only forced settlement. The OGPU tends to gloss over this difference.

As for the judiciary, which should take over the consideration of cases that have been considered by the OGPU so far, I think there is no need to refer them to any special courts. If cases of military espionage and terrorist organizations can be referred to a military tribunal, then there is no need for the rest of the mass of cases that the OGPU considered - on counter-revolutionary crimes, on speculation, malfeasance, smuggling, counterfeiters, etc. - refer to military courts. Regional and regional courts can easily deal with this case as a court of first instance. And the repression there will be, in any case, no less severe than the repression of the OGPU. There will be, of course, much more guarantees in the correctness of the decision, under all conditions.

With communist greetings, Ya. Krylenko

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 4. L. 36-36v. Script. Typescript.

No. 425

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)



"On the development of a draft regulation on the NKVD and a special meeting"

March 20, 1934

No. 3, p. 44/24 - On the development of a draft regulation on the NKVD and the Special Meeting.

Instruct the commissions as part of t.t. Kaganovich (prev.), Kuibyshev, Yagoda, Kosior St., Beria, Chubar, Leplevsky Gr., Akulov, Vyshinsky, Prokofiev, Bulatov, Agranov, Balitsky, Redens, Belsky and Krylenko to develop a draft regulation on the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and about the Special Meeting.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 4. L. 20. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the PB dated 8.3.34.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Kaganovich, Kuibyshev, berry, Kosior St., Beria, Chubar, Leplevsky Gr., Akulov, Vyshinsky, Prokofiev, Yulatov, Agranov, Balitsky, Redens, Belsky, Krylenko.

No. 426

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT SCHUTSBUNDA" (127)

March 20, 1934

No. 3, p. 65/45 - About the Schutzbundists.

Allow the plenipotentiary in Austria, together with the representative of the OGPU, to issue visas for entry into the USSR to all Schutzbund members, if they are not suspected in espionage.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 15. Original. Typescript.

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No. 427

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. TO STALIN  
ON THE SITUATION ON PRIBALKHASHSTROY (128)

March 26, 1934

Owls. secret

No. 50338

According to the PGPU of the OGPU of Kazakhstan, the situation in Pribalkhashstroy is excluded

quite tense.

The construction program of 1932, 1933 and two months of the first quarter of 1934 failed.

There are quite obvious prospects for non-fulfillment of the 1934 program.

The financial situation of workers and specialists is very difficult.

Excesses took place at the construction site, reaching the point of open protests by workers. There is a mass exodus of workers and employees.

To a large extent, the head of construction IVANOV V.I. is to blame for the situation that has arisen, who is trying to hide the real situation from the allied and regional authorities and thereby deceiving state bodies.

So,

a) IVANOV's information from the decision-making authorities that the Balkhash power plant will be completed by April 1 does not correspond to reality. To complete the box, 360 tons of cement and equipment for mounting 3 boilers must be brought to the site, some of which is located on ships frozen in ice on lake Balkhash, part is unknown where on the way, part is not

ordered.

b) At the end of 1933, IVANOV, reporting on the state of construction, informed the decision-making bodies that by February 1, a temporary repair machine shop with a forge and a foundry for 102 units would be completed. 2 sawmills have been installed and are operating, the third one is being installed in January.

In fact, the technical readiness of the mechanical repair shop on February 1, 1934 was 27%. The installation of the 3rd frame has not yet begun, and two frames were installed in July 1933.

c) In the field of manufacturing local building materials, IVANOV informed that a plant of lime-ash stones for 780,000 pieces had been built and was being installed. per year, in fact, the plant has not been built and is not being assembled.

The same false information from IVANOV was about the construction of barracks for workers, the availability of building materials on the site, the construction of two brick factories.

The investment program of the 1st quarter of 1934 was disrupted:

On the 20 million rubles planned for investment in 1 sq. only 316,500 rubles were disbursed in the 2nd quarter. At the construction site, the top and middle technical personnel work unsatisfactorily.

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The main reason for this situation is the system of intimidation and bullying of workers.

The technical management at Pribalkhashstroy is completely unsatisfactory.

Beginning in November 1933, Ivanov sent all the section chiefs and senior engineering and technical personnel on business trips.

Chief Engineer ARKHIREEV was at the site for 2 months. He was not engaged in any organizational work, refusing to speak directly with engineers and superintendents.

In October, he left for Moscow, where for 2 months, instead of organizing the supply of the site with projects, materials and equipment, he was engaged in clarifying the already clarified question about the suitability of Balkhash water for drinking.

Assistant chief engineer KRAINES, the former owner of a copper smelter, with his disbelief in the success of construction and inaction, ruined the engineer.

Deputy Chief Engineer NECHAYEV thwarted the mechanization and construction of workers' barracks and is not interested in the construction site.

The situation is the same with a number of other responsible technical managers.

All work in 1933 was carried out without projects and estimates.

For 1934, projects have not yet been received either.

The lack of a construction plan resulted in the fact that the manufacturing sectors did not give specified bids for the required materials. Shipment of materials for construction is extremely slow and there is a threat that at such a rate of shipment in July, construction will be without building materials.

Arriving equipment is not taken into account by Techsnab and the Department of Chief Mechanics and its storage is not checked, which results in complete ignorance of the availability of equipment in warehouses, its condition and completeness.

The lack of transport and mechanization created a situation where workers carry timber on their shoulders from the sawmill at a distance of 3-4 kilometers: earth, peat, sand are supplied in bags, and water in buckets.

Transport on site is the bottleneck. Intrasite transportation is provided by 5%.

An exceptionally difficult situation with personnel: recruitment is carried out by accident, construction is littered with a socially alien element. Service for the workers is ugly: the barracks are not insulated, there are no beds, trestle beds, benches or washstands. In December, IVANOV canceled the delivery of water and fuel to the barracks and

ITR dwellings.

Families of workers are not given food cards, the norms of bread distributed to the workers are cut off by Ivanov without permission. The mood of the workers and engineers is depressed - everyone wants to leave as soon as possible.

Despite the difficult, risky four-hundred-kilometer journey through the deserted Balkhash, in frosts and snowstorms, in January and February, 300 people still quit and fled.

ZAM. CHAIRMAN OF THE OGPU (. PROKOFIEV)

CA FSB. F. 3. Op. 1. D. 594. L. 52-55. Script. Typescript.

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No. 428

DRAFT DOCUMENT ON THE JUDICIAL RIGHTS  
OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OF THE USSR SENT TO L.M. KAGANOVICH, G.G. Yagoda and V.M.  
I.V. KUIBYSHEV STALIN (129)

March 26, 1934

SPECIAL REGULATION (not  
for publication)

1. To extend to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, its local bodies and troops and its employees "the existing regulations and laws on the former United State Political Administration, with the exception of judicial rights \*.

2. In order to maintain firm discipline and prevent disclosure of secrets, extend the existing provision of the former OGPU with regard to disciplinary punishments to all full-time and secret employees of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR and its local bodies and grant the right to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR on the basis of a "special provisions\*\* to consider cases of all crimes [and] misdemeanors of overt and covert employees of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and its local bodies with the application of penalties under the "relevant articles \*\*\* of the Criminal Code.

APRF F. 3. Op. 58. D. 4. L. 123. Original. Typescript.

\* The document has Stalin's handwritten notes in the margins:

\*- \* "What is it?"

\*\*—\*\* "Which one?"

ÿ•-'« "What kind?"

No. 429

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT DEFENSE PLANTS"

March 29, 1934

No. 4 p. 6 - On defense plants (comrade Stalin).

Instruct the commissions as part of t.t. Zhdanov (convocation), Pyatakov, Yagoda, Yezhov, Khakhanyan, Kuibyshev N.V., Redens and Guy to study in detail the procedure for admission (how they accept, who accepts), dismissal, placement at work, etc. of workers and employees at military factories and submit to the Politburo a draft of practical measures to fully ensure our military factories from the penetration of undesirable elements into them, taking into account the exchange of opinions. The first report of the commission to be heard at the next meeting of the Politburo

RGASPI: F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 25. Original. Typescript.

\*  
The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Zhdanov, Pyatakov, Yagoda, Yezhov, Khakhanyan, Kuibyshev N.V., Redens, Guy.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 430

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE CHECK OF THE FLIGHT STRUCTURE"

March 29, 1934

No. 4, p. 7 - On the verification of flight personnel (comrade Stalin).

a) Establish stricter checks for admission to flight schools and for transfer to pilots; especially to strengthen the check when sending a VDVK.

b) Strengthen control measures in relation to those admitted from the army in such a way that the check upon admission from the army is no less stringent than upon admission through party commissions.

c) Instruct Comrade Gamarnik to carefully check the Vakhromeev case on the spot (130).

d) To instruct the Organizing Bureau to select 6,300 Communists to be sent in years  
nye schools.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 25. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Voroshilov, Gamarnik, Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Yezhov.

No. 431

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT COURTS AND PROSECUTION"

March 29, 1934

No. 4 p. 8-s - On the courts and the prosecutor's office (comrades Stalin, Akulov, Krylenko, Vyshinsky).

a) Establish that the question of the existence of the NKJ is not subject to discussion.

b) Instruct the commission as part of t.t. Kuibyshev (convocation), Yenukidze, Akulov, Krylenko, Vyshinsky, Yagoda, Yezhov, Bulatov and Vinokurov to consider all issues arising from the new regulation of the court, the prosecutor's office and the GPU and submit to the Politburo a draft of specific proposals, taking into account the exchange

opinions.

Hear the commission's report at the next meeting of the Politburo.

c) Permit the convening of a meeting of employees of the prosecutor's office and the court.

APRF f. 3. Op. 58. D. 4. L. 105. Copy. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Kuibyshev, Yenukidze, Akulov, Krylenko, Vyshinsky, Yagoda, Yezhov, Bulatov, Vinokurov.

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No. 432

NOTE N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN ON THE DRAFT  
NOMENCLATURE OF NKVD EMPLOYEES APPOINTED AND  
REMOVED BY THE DECISION OF THE CC AUCP(b)

April 8, 1934

I am sending a draft nomenclature of employees of the NKVnudel, appointed and dismissed by the  
decision of the Central Committee.

1. The nomenclature was drawn up in relation to the draft structure of the NKVD, developed in the Commission of  
Comrade Kaganovich.

2. The project is agreed with Comrade Bulatov.

3. I did not talk to Comrade Yagoda.

#### DRAFT DECISION OF THE CC

Establish the following procedure for the appointment, dismissal and transfer of employees of the All-Union Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

1. Appointed and removed by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks:

a) People's Commissar for Internal Affairs and his deputies;

b) Heads and deputies of the main departments: state security, workers' and peasants' militia, border and internal guards, fire guards and labor camps and labor settlements;

c) Heads of departments of the Main Directorate of State Security: secret-political, economic, transport, special, foreign, operational, special and personnel;

d) Heads of departments and people's commissars of internal affairs of the Union republics and heads of departments of the NKVD in territories, regions and autonomous republics that are not part of the corresponding territories;

e) Heads of the political departments of the main departments: the workers' and peasants' militia and the border and internal guards.

2. They are appointed and dismissed by the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

a) Head of the administrative and economic department of the NKVD;

b) Heads of departments of the NKVD: acts of civil status and financial;

c) Heads of departments and their deputies of the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia: external service, criminal investigation, passport, command and combat;

d) Heads of departments and their deputies of the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Security: operational, combat training, organizational and mobilization, command, weapons;

e) Deputy heads of departments of the Main Directorate of State Security: secret-political, economic, transport, special, foreign, operational, special and personnel;

f) Heads of departments of the following departments of the Main Directorate of State Security: secret political, economic, transport, special and foreign;

g) Deputy heads of departments of the NKVD in the union republics, territories, regions and autonomous republics that are not included in the corresponding regions,

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h) Heads of departments (departments) of state security of the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union republics;

i) Heads of the departments of the workers' and peasants' militia in the people's commissariats of internal affairs of the union republics and the departments of the NKVD in the territories, regions and autonomous republics that are not included in the corresponding regions;

j) Heads of the border and internal security departments in the people's commissariats of internal affairs of the union republics and the departments of the NKVD in the territories, regions and autonomous republics that are not included in the corresponding territories;

k) Heads of transport departments of railways and water basins;

l) Heads of special departments of military districts and fleets;

m) Heads of political departments of the departments of the border guard and troops in the people's commissariats of internal affairs of the union republics, territories, regions and autonomous republics that are not included in the corresponding regions.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 4. L. 124-126. Script. Typescript.

\*

There is a handwritten note in the text: "Discuss with the secretariat. I. Stalin.

No. 433

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE DRAFT REGULATION ON THE  
NKVD AND A SPECIAL MEETING"

April 15, 1934

N ° 5, p. 34/16 - On the draft regulation on the NKVD and the Special Meeting (PB of 8.III.34; pr. No. 3 p. 44/24).

To include in the commission for the development of a draft regulation on the NKVD and the Special Meeting of comrades. Stalin and Yezhov (131).

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 943. L. 10. Original. Typescript.

\*

The decision was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo from 1.1-.34.

No. 434

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"QUESTIONS OF OGLU"



April 15, 1934

No. 5, p. 145/127 - Issues of the OGPU.

- 1) The case of the Kiev KhoZO is to be transferred to the Supreme Court of Ukraine with a trial in Kyiv in an open trial.
- 2) The case of the Harbin residents (Ukhtomsky and others) should be submitted for trial to the Collegium of the OGPU with a sentence to a concentration camp for 10 years.

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- 3) The Schwartz case should be referred to the court session of the OGPU collegium with a sentence to a concentration camp for 10 years.
- 4) Consider Schmidt's case at a court session of the OGPU collegium with a sentence to a concentration camp for 10 years.
- 5) The case of the Japanese about the arson of the airfield in Kamchatka should be submitted to a closed session of the military tribunal, giving them from 5 to 8 years.
- 6) Allow the arrest of Peretz and Speransky.
- 7) Submit the Kimzaen case for consideration in a closed session of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the Union.
- 8) Protocol No. 14 to be approved with the exception of: a) paragraph 92-93-94, according to which Abrikosova, Krushelnitskaya and Brilliantova are given 8-10 years instead of CMN; b) paragraph 96-101, Zalezhev, Makkoveysky and Saltykov VMN, and the rest to be imprisoned in camps for 10 years.
- 9) Protocol No. 15 to be approved with the exception of: a) the cases of the UVO and the Ukrainian terrorist group, which are to be postponed; b) from the case of arson of flax factories, instruct comrade t. Akulov and Yagoda to allocate one case for trial in demonstrative order, and approve the CMN for the rest of the cases. (132)

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 37, 38. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 10.1-.34.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Berry, Akulov - everything; Vinokurov - p.p. 1.7".

No. 435

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE WORK OF THE OGPU AND THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE"

April 15, 1934

No. 5, p.159/141 - On the work of the TO of the OGPU and the Prosecutor's Office.

Approve the following resolution of the railway transport commission:

1. Establish that the bodies of the TO OGPU should not arrest railway workers without the consent of the head of the road in each individual case.
2. Instruct the TO OGPU and the USSR Prosecutor's Office within 5 days to develop a procedure for arresting officials in transport and submit for approval to the Commission on the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.
3. Instruct the OGPU within 5 days to develop a regulation on the Transport Department (TO) of the OGPU, its rights and functions and submit for approval to the commission for the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
4. Instruct the Commission Comrade Kuibyshev:
  - a) within 5 days, consider the issue of strengthening the bodies of the Prosecutor's Office with qualified personnel;
  - b) within ten days to consider the issue of paramilitary guards and troops of the OGPU on the railway. dor. transport.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 943. L. 36. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 11 February 1934.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 517

No. 436

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN  
ON THE SITUATION IN THE EASTERN PAMIRS

April 26, 1934

Owls. secret

No. 50554

In connection with Comrade Broido's telegram, I am reporting the current situation in the Eastern Pamirs.

Over the past few months, there has been an increase in emigration sentiment in the Eastern Pamirs.

One of the reasons for this is the organized counter-revolutionary work of the clergy and the bais, supported and led from behind the cordon by the Islamist clergy, and in particular:

TAKHTA SUN KHANOM, a British resident, the leader of one of the Afghan tribes in Algeria;  
KANCHIBEK AILCHIBEKOV, former deputy executive committee of the autonomous Gorno-Badakhshan region, member of the CPSU (b), who emigrated overseas in November 1933;  
ASAN AILCHIBEKOV, former chairman of the Murgab regional executive committee,

emigrated together with KANCHIBEKOV; DZHELIKA KHALMATOV, former \*chairman of the Murghab regional control commission\*, now the leader of the Kyrgyz emigration, and KASYM BERDYBEKOV, former chairman of the regional executive committee and cultural propagandist of the Murghab regional Party Committee;

K.-r. elements of the Murghab region, led from behind the cordon, using the infestation of the district party and Soviet organization, created in the latter k.-r. a nationalist group whose members, using their official position, dragged their representatives into the entire system of regional organizations. The group also included: \*MUKHAMEDZHANOV - secretary of the district party committee, SHABAYEV - responsible. secretary of the committee of the Komsomol, SARYGULOV, chairman of the district trade union council; DZHUMAEV - people's judge and others.

The activity of the persons mentioned above was expressed in the grossest excesses of the party guidelines.

Recently, these excesses have been expressed: in the wrong distribution of loans, without differentiation of social strata, in the organization of collective farms contrary to the instructions of the regional committee; in delaying the issuance of loans to victims of natural disasters, non-payment within five months to dehkans of the amounts due to them for the supply of firewood, hay, etc.

The lack of political work among the population led to the fact that the poor during the period of harvesting and sowing turned to beys for help. A number of the most important measures of the center and the region were not brought to the poor. No work has been carried out to identify the Baik households, former high-ranking officials and the clergy are not deprived of the right to vote, there is a squandering of manufactured goods and products. In the region, the Meat stock and partly the grain stock were squandered in a short time.

The secretary of the district committee of the party MUKHAMEDZHANOV threw out the slogan: "The expulsion of Russian and Tajik workers from Murgab."

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Measures taken by the brigade of the regional committee to correct the excesses MUKHAMEDZHANOV regards as follows: "We want to help the dekhkans, but the Russians are in the way."

The discontent of the population, which arose on the basis of excesses, created favorable conditions for the emigration c.-r. agitation, the latter amounted to spreading rumors that "the Soviet government will make mass arrests, take away cattle, deport everyone to Russia, and that the only way out is to flee to Afghanistan."

The situation described above in the Eastern Pamirs is aggravated by the fact that the leaders of the national k.r. emigration AILCHIBEKOV and DZHELIKE KHALMATOV urgently demand from TAKHTA SUN KHAN, KUDRAT ULLA to raid our territory in order to defeat us, our border outposts. Now the Basmach, the groups are intensively preparing these raids.

\*\*In connection with the above situation in the Murghab region of the Pamirs

I consider it necessary to sanction the arrest of MUKHAMEDZHANOV and other participants in the K.-R. groups, for which, under a plausible pretext, call them to Khorog \*\*.

Deputy prev. OGPU Yagoda

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 202. L. 134-136. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a resolution: "To the meeting. It would be necessary to send a battalion of good Red Army soldiers to the Pamirs, increasing the salary of the latter several times over. I. Stalin. \*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\*—"It was crossed out in the margins with one line.

No. 437

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT DEFENSE FACTORIES" (133)

May 4, 1934

No. 6, p. 2 - On defense plants. (PB dated 15.IV.34, pr. No. 5, p. 4) (comrades Zhdanov, Pyatakov, Yagoda, Kuibyshev N., Yezhov).

a) Accept, in the main, the proposals made by the commission of Comrade Zhdanov on the organization and procedure for hiring workers, employees and engineers at especially important defense plants.

b) Instruct the same commission to work out on this basis a draft order of the NKTProm and the OGPU, taking into account the exchange of opinions, and submit it to the Politburo for approval.

c) Approve the list of enterprises at which, first of all, a special procedure for hiring and firing is introduced (see annex).

d) The organized departments for hiring and firing should be headed by employees of the OGPU.

e) Propose commissions as part of t.t. Yagoda, Yezhov, and Pyatakov, within a two-decade period, personally select employees of the OGPU for appointment as heads of departments for hiring and firing at factories where a special procedure for hiring and firing is introduced in the first place.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 45. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Zhdanov. Pyatakov, Yagoda, Yezhov, Khakhanyan, Kuibyshev N., Redens, Gai.

\*\* Published without attachment.

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No. 438

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT LYZIN" (134)

May 4, 1934

No. 6, p. 27/10 - About Lyzin.

The case of Lyzin to be considered at a court session of the Collegium of the OGPU with a sentence to a concentration camp for 10 years.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 46. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 17.IV.34.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "The extract was sent to Comrade Yagoda."

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MESSAGE A.M. Tagirova I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT A. GAZIZOV  
(SAKMARI)

May 11, 1934

On May 10, 1934, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Ab was a former white émigré in my office. Sakmari, currently working in the Far East through the People's Commissariat of Education. Now he is sent to Moscow by the Regional Department of Public Education to resolve some issues there, I did not recognize him; when he came to see me, he introduced himself and said that he had come to see me and talk to me as a writer.

In talking to him, I learned that:

1. The white emigrant Gayaz Iskhakov, who was in the west, has now arrived in Japan and is sent by Japan to Dzungaria (Western China).

2. Kurbangaliev, who was in Harbin, was sent there as well.

3. Rashit Ibragimov (a well-known pan-Islamist), who was still in Turkey, also arrived in Japan and was sent there to Dzungaria.

4. Ab. Sakmari says that Ibn Sagut, the son-in-law of the former Turkish sultan Abdulhamid, was transported to Dzungaria by the Japanese from Arabia.

Finally, on May 8, I visited the Mufti and inquired about who and what Organization should be petitioned in order to obtain permission to travel to Afghanistan or Dzungaria.

I think Ab. Sakmari knows something else. In this regard, I consider it necessary to find out for what purpose he is going to Moscow. Is it for the purpose of recruiting

there are known elements for Japan, which Japan sends to June-Riya to create "Islamistan" (in Japanese "Turanstan") according to the British plan.

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 245. L. 17. Original. Typescript.

On the first sheet in the upper left corner there is Stalin's resolution: "T. Berry\*.

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No. 440

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN  
ABOUT A. GAZIZOV (SAKMARI)

21 May 1934

No. 50710

Top secret

Gr. \* SAKMARI, which is reported in the letter you sent from the Chairman of the Bashkir Central Executive Committee Comrade. TAGIROV, we know \*:

SAKMARI (literary pseudonym of the Tatar writer GAZIZOV Abdulla), the son of a mullah, the son-in-law of the Ufa millionaire USMANOV, an active participant in the former Muslim national assembly in Ufa, a supporter of Gayaz ISKHAKOV. During the Civil War, he was associated with Ataman SEMENOV. He emigrated to Manchuria, where he served on the board of the Muslim community in Harbin. In 1927, he restored Soviet citizenship and got a job at the KV railway. English teacher at St. Borderline. In 1932 he moved to Vladivostok, where he worked at the Bibliographic Institute.

\*At the moment, the OGPU is conducting an investigation into the case of a spy and sabotage group of Tatars discovered in Moscow and Kazan, who were recruited by the Japanese military mission in Harbin and transferred to Soviet territory. The task of this group included, in addition to collecting espionage information, the creation of a Tatar-Bashkir nationalist organization \*, whose active performance, in particular the rise of an insurrectionary movement in the national regions of the Volga region and the Urals, was timed to coincide with the start of the war between Japan and the USSR .

\*Gr. SAKMARI, living at st. Pogranichnaya and in Vladivostok, carried out illegal communication between K.-R. nationalist elements on the territory of the USSR, on the one hand, and with the Muslim community in Harbin and Japanese intelligence, on the other\*.

The testimony of Faiz Khabirov, who was arrested by us in the above case, and transferred by Japanese intelligence from Harbin for espionage and sabotage work, SAKMARI is convicted of being a member of a special illegal five under the rule of the Muslim community in Harbin, which

Rai, on the instructions of the Japanese military mission, conducts active anti-Soviet work on the territory of the USSR by sending special agents for this.

\*\* In connection with this and with the aim of revealing his connections among the nationalist] c.r. circles of Bashkiria and Tataria, we in April of this year. It was proposed to the PG OGPU DVK to arrange a business trip for SAKMARI to Moscow, taking into account his intention to visit Ufa and Kazan on the way \*\*.

\*In Ufa and Kazan, he contacted a number of people who are being developed by us as leading k.r. nationalist work, in particular, SAKMARI visited the members of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims (TsTsUM), informed them about the situation of the Muslim community in Harbin and the Tatar emigration in the Far East, headed by a Japanese agent, the mullah of the Tokyo mosque KURBANGALIEV\*.

\*\*\* One of these days SAKMARI is coming from Kazan to Moscow and will be arrested by us\*\*\*.

In essence, this SAKMARI information comrade. We inform TAGIROV:

From the documentary and intelligence data at our disposal \* it is established that the General Staff of Japan through the

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nat. k.r. emigrant contingents to organize insurrectionary and sabotage actions within the Sov. Union\*.

ÿWe know, in particular, the following facts:

1) Japanese military attache in Istanbul in early April this year. presented to the chief Gen. The headquarters of Japan a specific work plan, which indicates the possibility of transferring to owls. the territory of a large armed detachment of Azerbaijanis from the side of Northern [northern] Persia \*; for the direct preparation of this event, he has already sent Dr. KHOSROV-BEK-SULTANOV to Persia;

2) The same attache vigorously develops contact with representatives of the nat. k.r. emigration in the Middle East (Osman-Khoja, Jaffar-Seid-Ametov, Seid-bek-Shamil and other leaders);

(Reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on May 10, s/g No. 115575).

3) \* At the expense of the military attaché in Warsaw, Gayaz ISKHAKOV was sent to Japan and Manchuria, who in 1933 presented to the Japanese General Staff a plan for the creation of the Idel-Ural Republic under the protectorate of Japan; The notorious Pan-Islamist RASHID-KAZI-IBRAGIMOV\* was sent there as a military attaché in Istanbul. Both of them are instructed to make their way to Xinjiang to organize anti-Soviet work through Central Asia; ÿThe arrival in Xinjiang of the leader of the Turkestan emigration in Istanbul MEDJEDIN\* and prominent pan-Islamist Musa BIGEEV is also expected, trips

which are organized by representatives of Japanese intelligence.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 245. L. 18-20. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\*—\*\* Underlined in pencil and underlined in the margins with a single line.

\*\*\*—ÿÿÿ Underlined in pencil and underlined in the margins with two strokes.

No. 441

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT DEFENSE FACTORIES" (135)

May 26, 1934

No. 7, p. 6 - On defense plants (PB dated 04.V.34, project No. 6, p. 26) Zhdanov, Yagoda.

a) Approve in the main (with amendments) submitted by the commission comrade. Zhdanov draft regulations and orders (see appendix)\*:

1. OGPU and Narkomtyazhprom on the organization of security and the regime of passes at military plants;

2. Narkomtyazhprom on the organization and procedure for hiring at military plants.

b) To instruct Comrade Zhdanov to convene, to discuss these orders and the provisions and explain the meaning of the measures being taken, a meeting of factory directors, heads of military units, OGPU PP, party organizers, secretaries of Party committees, chairmen of factory committees and planned for the position of heads of departments for hiring and dismissing military factories, at which a special procedure for hiring and firing workers and a special permit regime are introduced.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 945. L. 3. Original. Typescript.

Published without attachment.

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No. 442

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ISSUES OF THE IV DEPARTMENT OF THE RKKA" (136)

May 26, 1934

No. 7, item 229/213. Issues of the Main Directorate of the Red Army.



1. Recognize that the system of building an agency network of the IV Directorate, based on the principle of combining agents serving a particular country into large residencies, as well as concentrating at one point communication lines with a number of residencies, is incorrect and entails, in the event of a failure of an individual agent, the failure of the entire residency. The transfer of workers uncovered in one country to work in another country was a gross violation of the basic principles of conspiracy and created the prerequisites for failure simultaneously in a number of countries.

2. The failures that took place showed an insufficiently careful selection of agent workers and their insufficient training. The verification of employees sent by the IV Department for work abroad by the OGPU was insufficient.

3. The undercover work of the IV Directorate is not sufficiently linked with the work of the Special Department and the INO OGPU, as a result of which misunderstandings arise between these institutions and their individual employees.

4. The management of the intelligence work of the headquarters of the border districts is decentralized and allows the local command, inconsistently with the center, to set the agents not only operational, but also organizational tasks.

5. The installation in the operational work of the Main Directorate to cover almost all countries, including those that are not of particular importance to us, by undercover means is wrong and leads to a dissipation of forces and means.

6. The orientation in information work to meet all the requests of various military and military-industrial institutions is wrong, leading to scattering in work, insufficiently careful processing of incoming materials, extensive publishing activity, and parallelism with Voengiz.

7. The head of the Main Department did not pay enough attention to intelligence and operational work, which led to a number of serious blunders.

To eliminate these shortcomings:

1. The People's Commissariat of Defense to allocate the GV Directorate from the system of the Headquarters of the Red Army with direct subordination to the People's Commissar. As part of the Headquarters of the Red Army, leave only the department in charge of military intelligence, linking its work with the work of the Main Department.

In order to avoid loading the Main Directorate with insignificant or unimportant tasks, establish the procedure for giving tasks only through the people's commissar or with his knowledge and approval. \* In the line of information, reduce publishing activity, limiting itself to issuing only the most necessary reference books and manuals for the Red Army.

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Strengthen the management of the IV Directorate with 2-3 major military workers of appropriate qualifications. To staff intelligence agencies, allocate the most persistent, proven, well-trained military personnel.

2. The management of the undercover work of the 4 departments of the districts should be concentrated in the hands of the 4th Directorate, while leaving the right to the district command to give the agents operational tasks.

3. To oblige the head of the IV Department to reorganize the entire system of undercover work in the shortest possible time on the basis of the creation of small groups of agents who work completely independently and do not know each other. Organize the work within the groups in such a way that one source does not know the other. Communication between the center and each group must be organized independently. Conspiracy in all parts of the agent system should be as strong as possible.

Lena.

4. In the shortest possible time, create a special school of intelligence officers, which will be staffed with carefully selected officers and command and political staff, verified through the OPTU and party organizations. When selecting, pay special attention not only to social origin, but also on nationality, taking into account that nationalist sentiments can be a source of treason and betrayal. Organize a school for 200 people; conduct the exercise separately in groups of 10-15 people.

5. Transfer the center of gravity in the work of military intelligence to Poland, Germany, Finland, Rumania, England, Japan, Manchuria, and China. The study of the armed forces of other countries is carried out legally through official military representatives, trainees, military receivers, etc. d.

6. For greater coordination of the work of the Main Department with the Special Department and the INO OGPU:

a) create a permanent commission consisting of the heads of these institutions, setting the commission the task of discussing and agreeing on a general plan for intelligence work abroad; mutual information and warning about possible failures; experience exchange; careful study of failures and development of measures against failures; a thorough check of employees sent to overseas work, control and monitoring of workers who are on overseas work;

b) appoint the head of the INO OGPU comrade Artuzov as deputy head of the Main Department, obliging him to give two-thirds of his working time

Management.

Comrade Voroshilov, People's Commissariat of Defense, personally checks the implementation of these measures.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D.16. L. 64-66. Script. Typescript.

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated May 25, 1934. Voroshilov, Yagoda, e Rzin, Artuzov\*.

No. 443

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"COMRADE GAMARNIK'S PROPOSALS IN CONNECTION  
WITH THE VAKHROMEYEV CASE" (137)

May 26, 1934

No. 7, p. 231/215 - Comrade Gamarnik's proposals in connection with the Vakhromeev case (PB dated 29Dyü.34, pr. No. 4, p. 7).

- a) It is categorically forbidden from now on to call and interrogate commanders and Red Army soldiers without the knowledge and consent of the commissar parts.
- b) Strengthen the Special Departments with strong, proven workers, and in the first place aviation.
- c) Remove from work and prohibit work in special bodies to the head of the 00 Brigade Eremin and authorized 00 in the squadron Kozlovsky.
- d) Suspend Squadron Pompolit Salazkin from his post for his irresponsible attitude to his study of the squadron's personnel and forbid him to hold responsible political positions in the army for two years.
- e) Bring these decisions to the attention of all Special Departments by a special order of the OGPU.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 66. Original. Typescript.

\*

The decision was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on May 25, 1934.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Extracts sent: vol. Yagoda, Voroshilov, Gamarnik (in cipher).

No. 444

AGENCY MESSAGE FROM BERLIN ABOUT  
A. HITLER'S SPEECH AT THE  
MEETING OF THE REICHSWER MANAGEMENT

28 May 1934

Owls. secret

\* INO OGPU received the following intelligence reports from Berlin:

1. In early May, Hitler, at a meeting of the Reichswehr leadership, at which, apart from him, there were no members of the government, made a speech in which he emphasized that the Reichswehr was his most reliable support \*. The Reichswehr must fight not only with an external enemy, but also with an internal one.

\*Alluding to the situation in the SA (assault troops), Hitler said that history knows such cases when yesterday's friends become enemies\*.

2. In wide circles, Hitler is openly blamed for all external and internal failures. Ram openly speaks out against Hitler. ReM recently said in a fairly large society that a civil war is possible in Germany this year. When asked what this meant, \* Rem replied "that the Reichswehr had treated Hitler so that he was ready to abolish the SA (assault troops). He does not intend to make any concessions to the leader, and

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It is in vain to think that the SA \* (assault detachments) can be abolished by a simple order.

3. Rosenberg submitted to Hitler a memorandum aimed at proving the necessity of maintaining the Foreign Policy Department of the National Assembly of the Party (VPO).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to Rosenberg, will not be able to replace the VPO, since it does not have "party flexibility and agility", like any state institution, it is bureaucratic.

The report provides an overview of the international situation for each country separately.

ÿAbout the USSR, Rosenberg writes:\* "Despite the seeming successes of the foreign policy of the USSR, a number of disappointments have recently brought the Soviets - namely, relations with Poland, France, the USA.

The chapter on Russia ends with the fact that he, Rosenberg, is by no means an enemy of the soviets and is not opposed to improving relations with them, if this is advantageous politically and economically.

STEINBRUCK

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 187. L. 25, 26. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "t. Stalin. Ya. Agranov. May 28, 34"; "My archive. I. Stalin\*.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 445

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN  
ON THE SENTENCE ON THE LEADERS OF THE  
"POLISH MILITARY ORGANIZATION" (138)

May 29, 1934

No. 50762

Copy

Owls. secret

By the decision of the Political Commission of April 10 of this year. the verdict on the application of the highest measure of social protection against the leaders of the opened "Polish Military Organization" ("POV") and provocateurs in the Communist Party of Poland was approved:

1. Kapinsky-Mikhailov Mikhail Mikhailovich - agent of the II Department of the Central Headquarters, who carried out provocative work in the KPZU, where he was the secretary of the district committee. In 1931 he was sent to the Ukraine to direct the intelligence work of the POV. (arrested on 17.VI.1933)
2. Sokhatsky Stefan Vatslavovich - b. director of the Polpedinstitut in Kiev, a member of the leading center "POV" in Ukraine, who led the preparation of sabotage work. (Arrested 15.VIII.1933)
3. Leon Ioakhimovich Klenovich - a provocateur in the KPZU, where he was a Plenipotentiary of the Central Committee, who recently worked as a deputy. resp. editor of the newspaper "Economic Life" and, being a member of the leadership of the "POV", which carried out intelligence work. (Arrested on July 13, 1933)
4. Vandursky Vitold Vatslavovich - a member of the "POV" since 1915, one of the 3 leaders of the "POV" in Kyiv, who carried out recruiting work, and in less time was a candidate member of the Secretariat of the MOPR. (Arrested on September 11, 1933)

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5. Skarbek-Shatsky Boleslav Vladislavovich, b. cultural propagandist of the Chernihiv district committee of the CP(b)U, head of the "POV" in Ukraine. (Arrested 16.VIII.1933)
6. Egon Bogdanovich Denizo-Stern, an agent of the II Department and a provocateur in the Communist Party of Poland, who recently carried out intelligence work on the chemical industry in the USSR, where he was Head. center, the laboratory first of the Chernorechensky chemical plant, and then of the Nitrogen-Fertilizer plant in Gorlovka. (Arrested on 14.XII.1933)

At the same time, it was decided to temporarily suspend the execution of the sentence.

In view of the fact that the necessary investigative measures in the case have been completed, I ask for a decision on the enforcement of the sentence.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 245. L. 59-60. Script. Typescript.

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SPETSSOOBSHCHBNIB G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN  
ON THE ARREST OF THE "JAPANESE SPY" (139)

June 2, 1934

No. 50789

Top secret

\* In the investigative case of espionage in favor of Japan, which was reported to you on March 15, 1934 No. 50297 of the OGPU, the head of the 1st detachment of the 5th air squadron of the 9th school of the Red Army Air Force SITNIKOV Igor Alexandrovich, born in 1902, non-partisan, native city of Leningrad, the son of a former colonel of the General Staff \*, in 1932 was sentenced by the Revolutionary Tribunal to imprisonment for 2 years for violating military discipline.

- The data of the investigation and Sitnikov's personal confession established that he was recruited for reconnaissance work in the aviation sector in September 1931 by the Japanese intelligence agent Blues A.I. (Soyuzshelk construction inspector, arrested, confessed)\*.

BLUES SITNIKOV was given a number of classified materials on aviation, such as:

1. On the aircraft systems adopted by the Red Army Air Force, their technical and tactical data, on the types of reconnaissance and fighter aircraft, heavy bombers.

2. About aircraft of new designs being tested.

3. On aviation units located at the Moscow airfield.

SITNIKOV systematically received monetary rewards for passing secret information on aviation to Blues.

APPENDIX: Sitnikov's testimony 25-26.V. 1934

ZAM. PREV. OGPU YAGODA

APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 172. L. 105. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "My archive. I. Stalin.

\*\* Published without attachment.

\*- 1        \* Underlined in pencil.

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No. 447

P.P. Postysheva I.V. TO STALIN WITH A LETTER FROM THE  
CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE MTS ON  
THE CAMPAIGN TO HELP THE STARGING GERMANS

June 3, 1934

No. 081264/t

As far back as last year, after Hitler came to power, the fascists began sending so-called aid to individuals in the form of transfers of 5-7-8, sometimes 10 marks, to the addresses of persons who, obviously, were being told from here.

We fought against these transfers by carrying out mass work for a demonstrative rejection of the transferred money and transferring them to MOP Ru. However, starting from the autumn of last year, this provocative sending of "aid" from the fascists from Germany began to take on an exceptionally large scale and covered almost all of our German regions - Spartakovsky, Zeltsky, Molochansky, Pulinsky and other areas of Kiev, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk regions and Donbass. Remittances from abroad began to arrive in every district by the hundreds.

In addition to translations, the Kiev and Kharkov German consulates, apparently through their agents, organized the arrival and appeal of various people from the village and even individual collective farmers for help. They used various methods: sending out photographs of the "starving", sending provocative letters from "special correspondents". Moreover, as it has been established more than once, these letters came and do not come from the needy, but from persons who are sufficiently well off.

At the present time, the sending of money from Germany, especially to our border regions - Pulinsky, Spartakovsky, has assumed very significant proportions. So, for example, about 300 transfers were sent to Pulinsky district during April. A significant part of the transfers are sent directly to Torgsin, and Torgsin notifies the recipients of the amounts received in their name, and some leaders of the Torgsin organization, under the guise of mobilizing currency, organize the receipt of these transfers in every possible way, and talk among the German population that it is necessary to apply for help, etc.

To all this, it must be added that recently the employees of the Kyiv German Consulate have been practicing personal trips to German villages and personally distributing Hitler's (as they say) "aid" there. This assistance is also provided to leading rural workers (fore-collective farms, chairmen of the village councils), and even on a larger scale than ordinary collective farms.

nikam.

The whole thing has assumed such a wide scope that decisive measures are needed to put an end to this provocative fascist work.

For our part, we have done the following:

- 1) Arrested and prosecuted a number of employees of Torgsin for them. on the merits, provocative work.
- 2) A number of workers were sent to the German regions to strengthen the work, defiantly refusing Hitler's help and transferring these MOPR funds.
- 3) We carry out the arrests of various agitators, correspondents and organizers of appeals to Hitler for help.

However, this is not enough. We therefore ask that the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks take additional measures, namely:

1. To take measures, if not to stop, then to decisively limit the obviously provocative sending of translations that bear the character of an open political fascist campaign.
2. Through the intervention of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, to prohibit all kinds of trips of representatives of the consulate to the villages to distribute aid and conduct provocative work. Representatives of the consulate who left after a warning were arrested for counter-revolutionary work.
3. Take measures through Torgsin to stop accepting fascist transfers of aid for implementation by their branches. (140)

POSTYSHEV

APPLICATION:

Chief's letter

political department of the Akkarzhanskaya MTS.

Dear comrade Kosior.

I am addressing you with one question, which in my opinion is very important, and which only the Central Committee can resolve.

We are talking about an open, impudent fascist recruitment of forces in our German national region. Briefly, this boils down to the following: since last year, the German fascist "society for helping the starving Germans of the USSR" began to send individual transfers to "Torgsin" to the collective farmers of our region. In response to my ciphered telegraph request, Comrade Kaganovich suggested that we, by staging mass work, get the collective farmers to refuse this assistance and transfer this money in favor of the Central Committee of the MOPR. We did just that: the collective farmers refused this money, handing it over to the MOPR, and in a rather polite but convincing manner reported this to Berlin.

It is easy to imagine how much labor, energy, sleepless nights this work cost us. Along with our work, with the creation of an appropriate situation in which the collective farmer - a prudent, stingy burgher, a German "colonist" would be embarrassed to receive money from our enemies - it was necessary to process individually each collective farmer who received a summons for a transfer abroad. As soon as we, however, overlooked a bit, how the collective farm bag is full of all kinds of Torgsinov's goods. After all, the temptation was too great - in Torgsin the grain flour was so dazzlingly white, the Danube herring smelled so appetizing, and at that time there was no cornmeal at home at the collective farmers.

Furious, obviously, with our persistence, impudent, in their opinion, answers of our collective farmers, the fascist society "Help" decided to starve us out. It not only does not stop, does not reduce the sending of individual transfers, but, on the contrary, sends them intensively, obviously in the hope that we will not be able to reach a large number of people. In order to lull our political department vigilance, it very often changes the methods, tactics, their "clients". The clientele, of course, is quite diverse, motley: it was the former



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first kulaks, now middle peasants, now poor peasants, even farm laborers, and sometimes Komsomol and party members.

The fascists have become especially insolent in recent times. Along with the Torgsin transfers, they began to send foreign currency directly to their clients - by putting 20-40 German marks in ordinary envelopes. Very often now these transfers are no longer on behalf of the "Society", but from individuals from various cities in Germany. Along with the money, even a warm letter with greetings from fictitious relatives is put into these envelopes (obviously, the Nazis found out about my intention not to take stamps sent by relatives). There are cases when collective farmers do not receive money, but garden seeds (the seeds are then handed over to the management of the artel for sowing the "garden ha of MOPR", about which the collective farms report to Berlin).

The awareness of the Nazis is amazing. A collective farmer died a month ago, and the "widow" receives a package to cover the cost of the funeral. Even a one and a half month old child is not forgotten - he receives a transfer to a diaper.

The last days were marked by the sending of two valuable letters containing 20 counterfeit stamps and a German loan bond from the time of the occupation of Ukraine in 1918. Obviously, the fascists here in this case counted on the fact that we did not need this counterfeit money and the old loan, and the collective farmers would be able to get real money for them at the German consulate and at the same time, obviously, they would have to be recruited into the fascist organization.

As you can see, our single combat with the fascists is more than difficult, more than serious (besides, my deputy for party mass work does not know German, and the deputy GPU, who also did not know the language, was transferred to another MTS as a chief political officer). Our difficulties are further aggravated by the fact that of the two German party members sent to us by the regional party committee to help us, one turned out to be ... a fascist and is now sitting in the OGPU himself, especially against local people

cannot be relied upon.

What conclusions can be drawn from everything I have said here?

1. In my opinion, we need to stop this comedy, this game of "helping the hungry", we need to close this fascist recruiting shop, and not allow any more fascist transfers. If last year our government, bearing in mind the really difficult food situation in some areas, which it was obviously difficult to hide, was forced to allow this "aid", now we can and should politely but decisively refuse it. , from this, as the collective farmers here openly call, "Hitler's help."

.2. If, nevertheless, it is impossible for some other reason to refuse "help", then I earnestly ask you to help me and send a couple of faithful people, Germans, who would help me in this Sisyphean labor.

With communist greetings M. Polyansky

Beginning Political department of the Akkarzhan  
MTS of the Spartak region of Odessa region

21.IV-34

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 268. L. 11-17. Script. Typescript.

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No. 448

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT SENTENCES AGAINST THE LEADERS OF THE "POV"

June 9, 1934

No. 8, p. 39/27 - Question of the OGPU.

Allow the OGPU to carry out the sentence against the leaders of the opened "Polish Military Organization" ("POV") and provocateurs in the Communist Party of Poland.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 86. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on May 31, 1934.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T. Berry".

No. 449

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON MEASURES TO COMBAT HOOLIGANCY  
AND DECLINES ON THE RAILWAYS" (141)

June 9, 1934

No. 8, paragraph 62/50 - Approve the draft resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (see annex).

Appendix to paragraph 50 of def. pr. PB No. 8

On measures to combat hooliganism and derailments on railways (Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks)

In connection with the increasing cases of train derailments caused by acts of sabotage and hooliganism on the railways, which have assumed wide proportions, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decide:

1. To oblige the TO of the OGPU on the basis of the available undercover material in the

for a period of ten days to withdraw throughout the territory of the railways in the exclusion zone of professional hooligans, criminals and homeless children.

2. Grant the OGPU the right to imprison in concentration camps for a period of 6 months to 3 years malicious hooligans who violate the order of railway traffic, damage railway property, terrorize railway personnel and passengers, and homeless children who hooligan on railways, confinement in special camps.

3. To oblige the railway guard of the NKPS to intensify the fight against hooligans and homeless people, to streamline boarding trains, and not to allow travel on buffers, steps and roofs of cars.

4. Oblige the organs of the OGPU to arrest and imprison in a concentration camp for a period of 6 months all those traveling in freight trains without the special permission of the head of the station.

<...>

7. Establish responsible persons for registration and residence without registration in railway houses, traveling barracks and booths. To oblige the bodies of the TO OGPU to organize the strictest supervision of compliance with the rules of residence in the right-of-way.

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8. ... Propose to the NKPS and its local authorities to take on work related to the movement of trains, only after checking the OGPU TO accepted in the local authorities, partly guilty of violating these rules.

9. To oblige the NKPS within two months to remove from work on the Ussuriysk, Trans-Baikal, East Siberian, Tomsk, Omsk, Perm, South Ural, Western, South-Western, Ekaterininskaya, Donetsk and Southern roads persons in positions related to traffic safety on the basis of the materials of the TO OGPU suspected as elements capable of sabotage.

<...>

11. Grant road chiefs the right to award a bonus of 1,000 to 5,000 rubles to all persons who prevent crashes, contribute to the capture of intruders, and help the OGPU bodies in uncovering sabotage organizations.

Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Kuibyshev  
Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. Stalin

June 1, 1934

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 946. L. 14, 65. Original. Typescript.

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DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE SUPPLEMENT OF THE ALL-UNION LAW ON  
STATE CRIMES WITH ARTICLES ON  
TREASON" (142)

June 9, 1934

No. 8, paragraph 126/114-def. - On supplementing the all-Union law on state crimes with articles on treason.

To propose to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union to introduce into the all-Union law on state crimes articles on treason in the following edition:

Art. 1. Treason to the motherland, i.e. actions committed by citizens of the USSR to the detriment of the military power of the USSR, its state independence or the inviolability of its territory, such as espionage, the issuance of military or state secrets, defection to the side of the enemy, flight or flight abroad, -

are punishable by the highest measure of criminal punishment - execution with confiscation of all property, and under extenuating circumstances - imprisonment for a term of 10 years with confiscation of all property.

Art. 2. The same crimes committed by military personnel are punishable by the highest measure of criminal punishment - execution by firing squad with confiscation of all property.

Art. 3. In the event of a serviceman escaping or flying abroad, adult members of his family, if they contributed in any way to the impending or committed treason, or at least knew about it, but did not bring it to the attention of the authorities -

are punishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 to 10 years with confiscation of all property.

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Other adult family members of the traitor, living together with him or being dependent on him at the time of the crime -

are subject to deprivation of voting rights and exile to remote regions of Siberia for 5 years.

Art. 4. Non-reporting on the part of a serviceman about an impending or committed treason -

entails imprisonment for 10 years.

Non-reporting by other citizens (non-military personnel) is prosecuted in accordance with Art. 2 Regulations on state crimes.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 59. L. 50. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on June 8, 1934.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Kalinin".

No. 451

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION Ya.S. AGRANOVA I.V. TO STALIN  
ABOUT THE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY"  
GROUP AT THE COURSES OF JOURNALISTS-ECONOMISTS

Owls. secret June  
13, 1934

No. 50854

At the higher courses of journalists-economists at the Krestyanskaya Gazeta, staffed by promoted villagers, a counter-revolutionary group was uncovered, headed by a student of the courses and an employee of the Krestyanskaya Gazeta Korotchenko V.M. The group included: Vasily Mikhailovich Korotchenko, born in 1912, member of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, from collective farmers, an employee of the Krestyanskaya Gazeta and a student of economic journalist courses; Kurakin Pavel Vasilievich Born in 1912, member of the Komsomol, from collective farmers, an employee of the Krestyanskaya Gazeta and a student of courses for journalists-economists, Chizhikov Mikhail Kuzmich, born in 1913, a member of the Komsomol, a former student of courses for journalists-economists, now a worker at Metrostroy.

All three are arrested.

During a search at Korotchenko's. an appeal to the peasants.

The group set as its task a branched k.-r. organization in the countryside, which was supposed to organize a mass peasant movement, win over the Red Army by sending letters to the Red Army men about the difficult situation in the countryside with an appeal to join the demonstrations.

Volokonovsky and Shebekinsky districts of the Central Chernobyl region were designated as the basis for the creation of this organization.

Processing a number of students of courses for recruiting them into the organization, the head of the group Korotchenko distributed among them what was written by Ph.D. appeal, and a member of the Kurakin group, anti-Soviet poems written by him.

The defendants confessed to their counter-revolutionary activities.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU AGRANOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 202. L. 138-139. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first page there is a resolution: "vol. Zhdanov. What's the matter here? Is it possible to get to the roots and warn the Central Chernozemsky District about the Volokonovsky and Shebekinsky districts? AND. Stalin"-

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No. 452

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ACADEMICS SPERANSKY M.N. AND PEPPER" (143)

June 26, 1934

No. 9, p. 79/69 - About Academicians Speransky M.N. and Peretze.

Accept the proposal of the OGPU on the exclusion of the accused in the case of Ph.D. fascist organization of academicians Speransky and Peretz from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and about their expulsion for three years.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 102. Original. Typescript.

Published: Academy of Sciences in the decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b)-VKP(b)-CPSU. 1922-1991/1922-1952. Comp. V.D. Yesanov. M.: ROSSPEN., 2000. S. 147.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 17.1.34

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "To Yagoda, Kuibyshev."

No. 453

AGENT REPORT FROM A POLISH SOURCE INO OGPU  
ON FRENCH-POLISH RELATIONS AND OTHER  
ISSUES

June 29, 1934

Owls. secret

\*INO OGPU received the following intelligence report from a serious Polish source\*:

I

FRENCH-POLISH RELATIONS  
from a conversation with Beck

April 23, 1934 - the day of the conversation between Barthou and Pilsudski is considered by Pilsudski's entourage to be a turning point in Franco-Polish relations, i.e. almost open withdrawal of Poland from the orientation towards France.

Returning to Paris, Barthou made a report to his government about the conversation with Pilsudski and about the concept of Franco-German-Polish cooperation put forward by Pilsudski as the only reliable, in Pilsudski's opinion, factor of peace in Europe, as well as about Pilsudski's hostile attitude sky to the USSR.

\*Summarizing his impressions of his trip to Poland, Barthou comes to the conclusion that, despite the pronounced Germanophile tendencies of Poland's official policy, Polish public opinion is set against Germany. This public opinion has a negative attitude towards Piłsudski's military plans in relation to the USSR and is resolutely in favor of maintaining the alliance with France\*.

When this became known to Piłsudski (through the Polish military agents in France), the latter became angry with Barta for Barta opposing "public" opinion to Piłsudski's opinion.

However, despite this, the immediate task of his diplomacy Piłsudski still considers the accession of France to the plan of the Polish-German

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but French cooperation. Piłsudski's efforts are directed in this direction.

Piłsudski is very concerned about France's relations with the USSR and wants to prevent the Franco-Soviet rapprochement, in every possible way proving the unrealism of an alliance between France and the USSR.

The Doumergue government, for its part, also does not want a break with Poland, but, on the contrary, is trying to keep Poland in its sphere of influence in order to prevent the possibility of breaking the Franco-Polish alliance; Doumergue's government is not yet confident in the USSR as a real military ally.

II

## INTERNAL SITUATION OF FRANCE

Regarding the internal situation of France, the possibility of the Tardieu-Weigand grouping coming to power, Piłsudski's entourage (Gonsiorovsky, Beck, and others) has the following information:

a) "The Tardieu-Weigand group in July of this year is preparing a street demonstration by front-line soldiers and neo-socialists demanding a reform of the constitution". The demands are as follows: a) strengthening the power of the president at the expense of parliamentary rights; b) a new prime minister is appointed for the entire session of parliament c) Parliament can decide on the government by a majority of 2/3 votes d) the fall of the government entails the dissolution of parliament and new elections, etc.

\*According to the plan developed by the Tardieu-Weigand group, the Doumergue government, on the basis of the "demand of the masses," submits this draft of theirs to parliament. If Doumergue does not submit, the ministers Marquet and Rivolet will resign from the government, and thus there will be a cabinet crisis. The speech of the socialists and communists against the front-line soldiers will give a reason to intervene in the events of the army in the person of the general. Weigand and Pétain will declare a temporary military dictatorship\*. Weigand or Pétain will take as a basis the draft reform of the constitution proposed by the front-line soldiers, they will appoint new elections and a new party

The parliament will be presented with a draft of a new constitution for approval.

b) \*Gonsiorovsky receives letters from the Tardieu-Weigand group, in particular from Gen. Debney that they hope to come to power this summer and ask Piysudski to be patient and believe in their strength\*. Debney wrote to Gonsiorovsky about; that the number of real supporters of intervention against the USSR in England is growing, namely: in addition to Minister of War Hale Sham and min. Eden was joined by the following persons, members of the British cabinet: the Minister of Aeronautics, Lord Londorderry, and the Chief of the General Staff, Messingberd.

Debney wrote that Gen. Weigand travels to London, where he will negotiate with this British grouping about a Franco-English military alliance directed against Germany in the event that Germany encroaches on the interests of France in the future.

### III

#### GENEVA CONFERENCE

Pilsudski was extremely worried about the tactics of France and the USSR at the last conference in Geneva. Barthou-Litvinov's tactics were understood in such a way that the reality of an alliance~USSR with France by the Little Entente was coming. This took Beck by surprise in Geneva. When Piysudski received from Beck the body

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a gram about the situation in Geneva, he immediately after receiving telegram 4 Beck gave the following telegraphic instructions\*:

a) Beck - maneuver, in no case lead to a break with France.

b) Lipsky - to immediately talk to Hitler and organize the arrival of Hitler or his closest associate in Warsaw in order to demonstrate and warn France in connection with the possibility of a Franco-Soviet alliance;

c) Gonsiorovsky - inform Debney to delay his arrival or the arrival of General Pétain in Warsaw for negotiations on the question of franchising.

co-Polish military alliance.

### IV

#### POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS

\*There are agreements between Poland and Germany on the following



questions\*:

a) in July, Germany will officially announce: 1) that Germany considers the Versailles Treaty in terms of disarmament to be optional in the future; 2) that Germany is increasing its army to 300,000 fighters; 3) Germany is putting into service with the army the types of weapons forbidden to it by the Treaty of Versailles, and 4) will declare military service.

The English group Norman-Halesham and others agreed to this action by Germany. The Tardieu-Weigand group was also warned of this.

b) \*Poland and Germany will act in such a way as to prevent in any case a military alliance between the USSR on the one hand, France and the Little Entente, on the other hand.

In the event that such an alliance has been concluded, Poland openly breaks off its alliance with France and also openly concludes a Polish-German military defensive alliance directed against the USSR, France and the Little Entente\*.

In the future, the Polish-German alliance would include the Italo-Austrian-Hungarian group.

\*Poland and Germany openly enter into a military alliance with Japan.

Norman-Halesham's English grouping was warned about this, and  
She has her consent to this.

c) Poland and Germany will not allow the formation of a union of Balkan states\*, and they will not allow not only the USSR, France, but also England to influence these states.

d) \*Poland and Germany will oppose the signing of the Eastern Pact and will not enter it\*.

e) During April-May of this year. Poland and Germany have signed the following formal treaties:

1) an agreement was renewed and significantly expanded on the general export of grain products to foreign markets, on the export of livestock products from Poland to Germany.

2) An agreement on mutual assistance for the unemployed, by virtue of which Polish citizens in Germany receive benefits and work on an equal basis with German citizens and vice versa (Poland has not yet concluded such an agreement with any other state).

3) Work is being intensively carried out to prepare a customs union. Those who sabotage or hinder this work are removed from the commission.

4) \* An agreement was concluded between Poland and Germany, by virtue of which Germany undertook to stop providing financial assistance to Ukrainian

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nationalist organizations (UVO) operating in the territory of Galicia against Poland\*. In January, Germany actually ceased to finance the work of the UVO in this area, and now it has handed over a network of Ukrainian organizations to the Polish police. The latest arrests of Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia are allegedly carried out on the basis of materials and data received from Germany.

v.

#### COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND GERMANY IN THE FIELD OF THE MILITARY

(from conversations with Gonsiorovsky)

1. \*Polish-German military cooperation is developing\*. The question of the unification of the weapons of both armies and the basing of the weapons of the Polish army not on the French military industry, but on the German one is being developed.

2. \*There are mutual military commissions\*. The number of members of these commissions has been increased from 7 to 10 people. The three new members of the Polish commission in Germany are specialist officers in armaments and the military industry. The following names of Polish officers are known: colonel[ovnik] Obertynsky, colonel[ovnik] Langer, colonel[ovnik] Albrecht, major Wojciechowski and major Steifer. The work of this Polish commission is led by the former. Vice-Min[istr] of Military Affairs General Fabrytsy, now appointed Army Inspector. Fabrytsy is in charge of the entire policy of military cooperation with Germany. His adjutant, acting as secretary and specialist. The courier for trips to Berlin is Colonel Anton Rosner of the General Staff.

ÿ In the autumn of last year, as well as in March and May of this year, Fabrytsy traveled secretly to Berlin.

3. Piysudski entrusted Fabricius with the development of Polish-German military plans, and Gonsiorovsky with the development of Polish-French military relations and work in the field of contact with the Tardieu-Weigand group \*. Gonsiorovsky also conducts military affairs with Romania and Japan. His secretary-courier in relations with the French is, as before, lieutenant-colonel] of the General Staff Glyabish.

The work of Fabrytsya and Gonsiorowski is carried out separately and is personally united by Piysudski. At present, under the pretext of treatment, the commander of the Krakow Corps, General Narbut-Luchitsky, is in Germany and is conducting business on a special assignment from Pilsudski. Fabrytsy, a relatively young general, is considered a capable organizer, intelligent, but a little talkative.

VI

GERMAN-FRANCO-ENGLISH RELATIONS IN COVERAGE  
OF THE POLE (from  
conversations with Beck, Gonsiorovsky and Fabrytsy)

a) During Weigand's stay in London, the beginning of the Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Shezel, in order to keep abreast of Weigand's negotiations with the British government, and especially with the Norman-Heilsham group and others. Shezel's departure was coordinated with the Tardieu-Weigand group.

A representative of Hitler went there to London with the same goals and with great powers. Schetzel and Hitler's representative are in contact.

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b) The Norman-Halesham group promoted the appointment in Tokyo of their man, the ardent Soviet-phobe Clive, as the British ambassador, who will lead the policy of inciting and accelerating Japan's attack on the USSR.

c) Hitler, in addition to agreeing to a Franco-English alliance as a guarantee for France, offered the Doumergue government, and above all the Tardieu-Weigand group, cooperation between the French and German General Staffs, and agreed to allow the French General Staff officers to the German General Staff as controllers-witnesses that German military armaments and plans are not based on a conflict with France. This proposal by Hitler is regarded by Beck, Gonsiorovsky and Fabrytsy as a fact of great importance in the matter of a possible Franco-German rapprochement.

d) The Germans warned Warsaw about the trip of von Ribbentrop, Hitler's man, to Paris for informal talks with Barthou.

Beck said that Ribbentrop's trip was previously coordinated with the Tardieu-Weigand faction, which is trying by all means to influence the Doumergue government in order to prevent the Franco-Soviet alliance, as an obstacle to the Franco-German negotiations on an agreement.

\*Beck evaluates the situation like this\*:

Doumergue's government will by no means break with England. Weigand will return from London with a guarantee for France. The Doumergue government is already inclined towards an agreement with Germany and is making concessions to the latter. The solution to the Saar question is the first step towards a Franco-German rapprochement (the influence of the Tardieu-Weigand group on the Doumergue Peninsula has already affected this issue) (144). The second step in rapprochement will be the conclusion of a French-German trade treaty, which should take place supposedly in June. France is supposed to make far-reaching concessions to Germany in this treaty. Doumergue must reckon with the fact of the forthcoming reorganization of the British cabinet, in which the Norman-Halesham group, which wants a Franco-German conspiracy and intervention against the USSR, will take the leading role. The current line of Barthou in the area of the Franco-co-

Beck understands the Soviet rapprochement as a maneuver aimed at intimidating Germany and Poland, as well as obtaining better guarantees from England.

VII.

#### ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

a) Regarding the war between Japan and the USSR, there is a certain belief among Pilsudski's entourage:

\*1) Japan will inevitably attack the USSR as soon as it completes its rearmament.

2) War is possible even this year precisely because: a) none of the great powers can currently interfere with Japan; b) that Japan needs to fight before the upcoming naval conference, because after the conference, her hands in the war with the USSR may be bound by a conspiracy of the great Powers. 3) Japan is sure that, having started a war with the USSR, she will not be left alone, because the USSR will be attacked, taking advantage of this opportunity, by Poland and Germany, even if there is no Franco-German-Polish agreement. 4) Nobody will help the USSR, but Japan will be helped financially \*. 5) America is exhausted by the crisis for several years and will remain neutral. Gonsiorovsky and Fabrytsky foresee the unconditional defeat of the Red Army, which has no secure rear areas inside the country.

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VIII.

#### POLISH-GERMAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

There is a secret agreement between Poland, Germany and Japan to destroy the Soviet-Turkish friendship. These intentions are strongly supported by the Norman-Halesham faction. The above-mentioned allies offer Turkey a free hand in the Caucasus. The agent knows for sure that there has already been a conversation with Kemal Pasha about this, which Potocki, the Polish ambassador to Turkey, conducted with him on behalf of Pilsudski. (The agent read a letter from Pototsky to Beck on this matter). Kemal Pasha refrained from answering and said that, being in Warsaw this year, he was ready to personally talk about this matter with Pilsudski, but asked Potocki whether Pilsudski and his allies could guarantee him the strengthening of the straits and break the resistance of England in this matter \*. Kemal added that he was not afraid of the resistance of the Balkan states.

Pilsudski awaits the arrival of Kemal Pasha. Now large-scale diplomatic work is beginning around the issue of Turkey's rejection from the USSR.

IX.

#### PLANS OF POLAND AND GERMANY IN REGARD TO LITHUANIA

The putsch in Lithuania took place quite unexpectedly for Warsaw in terms of time. It was a German work, the existence of which was known in Warsaw. Unexpectedly, this happened for Berlin as well. German work in Lithuania is carried out in coordination with Pilsudski. Colonel] Venda from Vilna, who was appointed to Ch. Army Inspectorate and serving there as an officer for especially important assignments.

\*Currently in Lithuania after the Polish-Soviet Protocol on May 5 this year. and as a result of the alleged "German danger" Polonophile currents are growing intensively\*.

A number of prominent politicians in Lithuania, such as: b. min. Bistras, prof. Romer, Gustanis, and others - established, with the knowledge of Smetona, contact with Pilsudski's people.

At the invitation of these people, Pristor, allegedly on private business, left for Lithuania, who will also talk with Smetona about the restoration of diplomatic relations between Poland and Lithuania.

ÿ Piysudski, having an already established military organization in Lithuania, which should at the right time make a coup there and proclaim the merger of Poland with Lithuania there, wants to conquer Lithuania without bloodshed and noise in Europe\*. This should happen in the following steps:

1) Restoration of diplomatic and economic relations; 2) Having a Polish embassy in Lithuania, carry out a palace coup and, with the help of a military organization, form a government that will proclaim the union of Lithuania with Poland. All actions and plans of Pilsudski are carried out with the knowledge and consent of Hitler, i.e. a "gentlemen's agreement" on the cession of the corridor to Germany after Lithuania was annexed to Poland was put into practice. To help Poland in this, Germany is now pursuing a policy of economic pressure on Lithuania: a ban on exports to Germany; prohibition of the transit of Lithuanian cattle through Germany, etc.

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Minister Lazaraitis, appointed by Smetona, is a member of Pilsudski's secret organization operating in Lithuania. He accepted the briefcase of the minister's affairs on the condition that he would be given the right to establish Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic relations.

x.

## POLISH-ROMANIAN RELATIONS

After Doumerga came to power and after an unsuccessful coup attempt in Romania, French influence again increased. Titulesco and the Romanian ambassador in Paris Cesiano now have a strong influence on the king. \*Both of them believe in the strength of Doumergue's cabinet\*. Titulesco was in 1931, 32. supporter of the Tardieu-Weigand group. It remains so even now, but it influences the king in the direction that Rumania should remain loyal to France and that Rumania should by no means allow herself to be drawn into the Polish-German bloc until a Franco-German rapprochement occurs. Titulesco does not allow Romania to join the Polish-German bloc, if one is created against the will and interests of France.

The king assured Beck that by the autumn he would appoint a Germanophile government and disperse parliament\*. Pilsudski was dissatisfied with the results of Beck's trip to Bucharest. Piysudski believes that one cannot count on the promises of the king, and therefore takes measures and organizes a palace coup in Romania in order to bring a cabinet to power with a focus on Poland and Germany. Under this plan, the king would be confronted with a fait accompli and would have to sanction the actions of the new government.

Pilsudski is now occupied by Lithuania and therefore pays less attention to Romania\*. Pilsudski considers the solution of the Romanian question easier than the Lithuanian question. The Polonophile organization in the Romanian army is strong, the Polish network in Romania is considered very strong. The temporal fluctuations of Rumania do not bother Pilsudski much.

Germany and Japan made an offer to Romania to arm its army on credit\*, but on the condition that the reorganization of the Romanian army would take place under the leadership of the Polish General Staff.

Romania's answer to this question is not yet known.

XI.

#### GOEBBELS' VISIT TO WARSAW

The arrival of Goebbels in Warsaw signifies a demonstration organized by Pilsudski in France, in connection with the emerging line in Geneva towards Franco-Soviet rapprochement, in which Piysudski saw the possibility of a Franco-Soviet alliance\*.

Pilsudski received Goebbels 2 times. For the first time officially in the presence of Beck and Moltke. The second reception was secret. In addition to Goebbels and Pilsudski, this time only Beck and Fabrytsy were present.

Piysudski was healthy, but information about his illness was deliberately given to the press. This was done for an even stronger demonstration.

"Negotiations with Goebbels led to the following \*:

a) Beck or another prominent minister will officially arrive in Berlin (presumably Prime Minister Kozlovsky will go, but

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min. trade and industry Reichman, but found it inconvenient, because. he is a baptized Jew).

b) \* The envoys of Poland and Germany will be elevated to the rank of ambassadors\*.

c) After the visit of Beck (or another minister), Hitler will arrive in Warsaw, and then Piysudski will officially arrive in Berlin.

d) \* At the request of Goebbels, Pilsudski promised to influence the Polish

press opposed to the Polish-German rapprochement\*.

e) Goebbels confirmed that Hitler fully shared Pilsudski's point of view on the Russian question; policy of crushing Russia.

f) \*Goebbels assured that Germany under no circumstances is thinking about revenge with France\*, and also about the Anschluss with Austria through armed clashes.

ÿ Goebbels made a strong and favorable impression on Pilsudski's entourage. Piysudski said of him "Smarty, but smart"\*.

XII.

#### ABOUT THE MEETING OF HITLER WITH MUSSOLINI

Warsaw was warned about Hitler's trip. It is known about the meeting and conversations between Hitler and Mussolini in Warsaw:

a) Hitler assured Mussolini that he was not thinking about the Anschluss.

b) Mussolini undertook to prevent the restoration of the Habsburgs in Austria.

c) A plan was developed for the decomposition of the Little Entente.

d) \*The question of merging the Polish-German bloc with the Italian-Australian-Stro-Hungarian grouping directed against the France-Little Entente-USSR bloc was discussed. Mussolini made England's consent to this an obligatory condition.

e) \*The question of intervention against the USSR was discussed. Hitler offered Italy the Crimea and the territories of Turkey if Turkey turned out to be an ally of the USSR\* in the war. Mussolini's attitude to this question is still unknown in Warsaw. However, \* it is known that Mussolini was very interested in Hitler's project to resettle 60 million people on the territory of the USSR who could not find work in Europe \*.

XIII.

#### PACT 4 and LEAGUE OF NATIONS

a) Intensive negotiations are currently underway between Germany, Poland, Italy and England on the renewal of the pact of 4 with Poland's participation in it and thus the creation of a pact of 5.

If France does not enter into the pact and firmly ties with the USSR, they plan to create a pact of 4 without France, leaving her the right to join it at any time. The pact of 4 or the pact of 5 should, according to the intention of the authors, replace the League of Nations with its authority and material strength of the participating states.

ÿThe pact of the 4th, and even more so the pact of the 5th, will ultimately be directed against the USSR.

b) In the event that the USSR joins the League of Nations, Poland will demand its return to the League of Nations (there is an agreement on this between Hitler, Musso-

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line and England), as well as granting not only Poland, but also Germany, permanent seats in the Council of the League \*.

c) Piysudski's entourage considers the Conference on Disarmament to be effectively over. \*According to the Polish findings, 3 groups were formed\*:

- 1) Germany, Poland, Italy, Hungary, Japan (aggressive group);
- 2) France, Little Entente, USSR (defensive group);
- 3) England and part of the small states of Europe (neutral group).

In connection with everything that has happened in this respect, Piysudski considers the war to be close.

## XIV.

### FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTIONS OF GERMANY AND POLAND

The foreign policy line of Hitler and Pilsudski, according to Beck's explanation, for the near future is presented in the following form:

- 1) \*Poland and Germany will seek to tear France away from the USSR, break the Little Entente, including France and Romania in the first group of states;
- 2) To achieve the benevolent neutrality of England in questions of intervention against the USSR\* and consider her an arbiter among the participants in the intervention.
- 3) The position of America should not be taken into account, because the neutrality of the latter is a foregone conclusion.

## XV.

### PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE AGENT

The agent, on the basis of personal impressions from conversations and meetings, concludes that, in his opinion, the possibility of intervention 'against the USSR has never loomed in such a real form as at the present time\*.

Polish diplomats highly regard the actions of Soviet diplomats, but argue that the latter often fall into error, basing their calculations on the fact that war is most likely to break out in the West. and Central Europe. Polish diplomats consider that a war between Germany and France, or between Germany and Austria, is completely out of the question for the next few years. Also, one should not take into account, according to Polish diplomats, the possibility of war between Japan and America. After the failure of the disarmament conference and the exceptional arms race that is taking place, the war can only be thought of as a war against the USSR. Its concrete possibility will come at the moment when the Franco-German agreement takes place.



Berman

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 187. L. 28-44. Script. Typescript.

The text on the first page contains handwritten notes: "T. Stalin. Ya. Agranov 49.VI.34"; "T.t. Molotov, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev. I advise you to read it in order to discuss it later with the participation of the NKID. I. Stalin. My archive. I. Stalin"; "Reading Molotov"; "Read Kuibyshev"; "TO. Voroshilov"; "Ordzhonikidze".

~~\* Underlined in pencil.

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No. 454

MESSAGE N.N. KRESTINSKY

I.V. STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOV

ON THE ARREST OF THE GERMAN SUBJECT P. SCHMIDT

Owls. secret July 3,  
1934

No. 5315

Dear comrade

In November 1933, the German embassy informed us that the German citizen Paul Schmidt had been arrested in Moscow. At the request of the NKID, the OGPU, with some delay, confirmed that the German citizen P. Schmidt had indeed been arrested and was being held accountable under Art. 58.6 \* of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and then, in a letter dated March 4, 1934, reported \* that by the decision of the Collegium of the OGPU, P. Schmidt was sentenced to forced labor camps for 10 years \*.

The condemnation of a German citizen to imprisonment in a correctional labor camp by a resolution of the OGPU is a direct violation of the contractual obligations between the USSR and Germany, since we (and the Germans) must either take the case to court, or, if for some reason we do not want to, expel from the USSR (or Germany).

Therefore, on May 25, I wrote to Comrade Artuzov that P. Schmidt should be returned from the camp and either put his case in court or be sent abroad. Before Rev. Artuzov received some answer, I received from the German Charge d'Affaires Tvardovsky a personal rather sharp note of protest about the administrative conviction of P. Schmidt. \*Then, on June 9, I turned directly to Comrade Yagoda on this matter, who explained to me that the administrative exile of P. Schmidt, who was associated with a terrorist group of Soviet citizens, was authorized in the PB and that, therefore, he himself could not make any changes to sentence of the OGPU \*.

In connection with this message from Comrade Yagoda, \*NKID asks the PB to propose to the OGPU - either to send the case of P. Schmidt to court, or to replace the punishment imposed on him with deportation from the USSR\*.

With comradely greetings

N. Krestinsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 245. L. 63. Original. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "T. Berry reported. 6.VII"; "For the replacement of punishment with expulsion. I. Stalin.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "t.t. Yagoda, Litvinov, Stomonyakov. \*—\*  
Underlined by  
hand in pencil.

No. 455

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT IRRESPONSIBLE ISSUANCE OF PASSES  
TO AIRCRAFT FACTORIES IN GLAVAVIAPROM"

July 15, 1934

No. 10, p. 124/107 - On the irresponsible issuance of passes to aircraft factories in Glavaviaprom.

1. Reprimand the head of Glavaviaprom, Comrade Korolev, for knowing about the measures taken by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to streamline the business of issuing passes,

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did not take care to eliminate the ugly state with the issuance of passes in the Glavka, allowed the continuation of this practice on the same scale after the meeting in the NKTP and in the Central Committee.

<...>

5. Instruct the OGPU (Comrade Yagoda) to withdraw all passes issued by Glavaviaprom within ten days.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 948. L. 28. Original. Typescript.

No. 456

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE APPROVAL OF THE DRAFT DECISION OF THE CEC OF  
THE USSR "ON THE FORMATION OF THE  
ALL-UNION PEOPLE'S COMMISSARY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS"

July 15, 1934

No. 10, p. 148/131 - On the formation of the All-Union People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

Approve the draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. See Attachment.

#### APPLICATION

to clause 131-def., pr. PB No. 10

#### ON THE FORMATION OF THE ALL-UNION PEOPLE'S COMMISSARY FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION SSR Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR

(Approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 10, 1934)

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decides:

1. To form the All-Union People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR with the inclusion of the United State Political Administration in its composition.
2. To assign to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR:
  - a) ensuring revolutionary order and state security;
  - b) protection of public (socialist) property.
  - c) registration of acts of civil status (registration of birth, death, marriages, divorces);
  - d) border guard.
3. As part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, form the following departments:
  - a) Main Directorate of State Security;
  - b) the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia;
  - c) Main Directorate of Border and Internal Guard;
  - d) Main Directorate of Fire Protection;
  - E) Main Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Camps  
leniya;
  - f) Civil Status Department;
  - \*) Administrative and economic management.
4. In the union republics, to organize republican people's commissariats of internal affairs, acting on the basis of the "Regulations" on the General

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Union People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and in the RSFSR to establish instead of the republican People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs the institution of the authorized NKVD of the USSR.

Organize departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the union republics in the autonomous republics, territories and regions.

5. The Judicial Collegium of the OGPU is to be abolished.

6. To the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and its local bodies, the cases on the crimes they are investigating, upon completion of the investigation, shall be sent to the judicial bodies according to jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by law.

7. Cases on the Department of State Security of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs shall be referred to the Supreme Court of the USSR, cases of such crimes as treason, espionage and the like, shall be referred to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court or Military Tribunals.

8. Organize a special meeting under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, which, on the basis of the "Regulations" on him, will be given the right to apply administratively expulsion, exile, imprisonment in forced labor camps for up to 5 years and expulsion outside Union of the SSR.

9. To instruct the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR to submit to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR the "Regulations" on the All-Union People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL

OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR M. KALININ

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL

OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR A. ENUKIDZE

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 948. L. 33, 92-93. Script. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated July 10, 1934.

No. 457

LETTER N.V. Krylenko I.V. STALIN AND I.A. Akulov  
about the People's Commissariat of Justice

July 19, 1934

No. 211

Owls. secret

Dear Joseph Vissarionovich!

I have already communicated to you my considerations against the project of comrade. Akulov about the separation of the prosecutor's office from the People's Commissariat of Justice. Now I have learned, to my surprise, that Comrade YAGODA submitted to the Central Committee a draft regulation on the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, in which he plans to remove from the system of the People's Commissariat of Justice not only contingents sentenced to imprisonment, regardless of the term, about which

we agreed with him. Akulov, on special instructions from Comrade. MOLOTOVA back in May of this year, but about the withdrawal from the People's Commissariat of Yus: the position of the entire system of correctional labor institutions in general, i.e. all those deprived of liberty, all investigators and all those sentenced to correctional labor without imprisonment, in other words, about the complete withdrawal from the People's Commissariat of Justice of one third of its system.

This is not enough. Introducing such an essential fundamental question for the discussion of the Central Committee, Comrade. YAGODA, in response to my proposal to send me a draft regulation on the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs so that I could tell the Central Committee my point of view in a timely manner, refused to do this, saying that he could not send me a draft before discussion in the Central Committee, and the Central Committee, they say, "You will be summoned ".

#### DOCUMENTATION

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Considering such a proposal, about which I wrote to you earlier, as a direct frustrating of the decision of the Central Committee to preserve the People's Commissariat of Justice, I am compelled to categorically object to it.

I kindly ask you to call me when discussing the issue and give me the opportunity to substantiate my point of view.

N. Krylenko

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 5. L. 38, 38v. Script. Typescript.

No. 458

NOTE I.A. Akulova and V.V. ULRIHA I.V. STALIN  
ABOUT THE TRIAL IN THE CASE OF KIM ZAEN

July 21, 1934

No. 176/lss

Sov. secret

The case of KIM ZAEN and other agents of the Japanese espionage and sabotage organization, referred by the decision of the PB for hearing in a closed court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, was considered, and the verdict was pronounced on July 19, 1934\*.

\*\*At the court session, all the defendants confirmed their testimonies during the preliminary investigation, fully admitting their guilt\*\*.

ýThe Military Collegium sentenced 8 people in this case. to the highest measure of criminal punishment - execution, 14 people. - to imprisonment for 10 years each and 1 person. - to imprisonment for 5 years \*.

Among those sentenced to death is KIM ZAEN (citizen of the USSR), who for 10 years was an active spy-saboteur and from 1932 headed the Japanese reconnaissance and sabotage organization on the railway. trans-

port and his closest assistants - Soviet civil servants - SLASGENIN, ALEKSANDROVSKY, KOZLOV, SVIRIBOV, BOROVSKY and MISHIN - who directly organized and carried out espionage and sabotage work on the railway for a number of years. transport and had their own agents, as well as a member of the CPSU (b) - the driver Muzanov, who organized the wreck of two trains on the instructions of KOZLOV and MISHIN.

ŸThe verdict was announced behind closed doors. Until further notice, copies of the judgment were not handed over to anyone\*.

We ask for your guidance on the following issues:

\*\*\*1. Is it permissible in the verdict to mention the employees of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow (the former secretary of the AMO embassy and now the secretary of SIMADA - see the verdict on page 5\*). [

2. Will it be possible to send to the press for publication a brief report on the elements of the crime, the results of the process (positions, names, punishment measures).

Attached is a copy of the judgment.

I. Akulov V.  
Ulrich

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 245. L. 79. Original. Typescript.

„ Underlined in pencil.

—\*\* Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

—\*\*\* Underlined in pencil and underlined in the margins with two lines. \*) Published without a copy of the verdict.

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No. 459

NOTE I.A. Akulova I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
DRAFT PRESS RELEASE ON THE  
RESULTS OF THE TRIAL IN THE CASE OF KIM ZAEN

July 21, 1934

No. 181 forest

Top secret Urgent

At the same time, I am enclosing a draft report in the press on the results of the trial of the spy-sabotage organization on the railroad. transport.

Appendix: mentioned on page 2

Sharks

COURT

# OVER THE SPY-DIVERSION ORGANIZATION ON THE RAILWAY TRANSPORT

Recently, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under the chairmanship of V.V. Ulrich examined the case of a spy-sabotage gang operating in some sections of our railway transport. \* The gang \* had two main tasks: 1. collecting information about the throughput and mobilization readiness of railways, in particular the roads connecting the center of the country with the Far East, about the state of the locomotive repair business in the USSR and 2. carrying out acts of sabotage on railway roads and locomotive repair plants, \*\* preparation \*\* of major sabotage in case of wartime.

This organization included individual Soviet civil servants who betrayed the interests of their homeland, both from the central apparatus of the NKPS and from its local bodies (Moscow-Sorting and Moscow-Passenger stations of the Moscow-Kazan Railway, Murom Locomotive Repair Plant etc.).

The organization was headed by a spy-saboteur who arrived from Manchuria, a Korean, a foreign intelligence agent, KIM ZAEN. For the rewards received from him, traitors to the motherland - intelligence agents launched extensive espionage activities to collect secret materials, committed a number of acts of sabotage on railway transport, both by organizing wrecks and by disabling depot equipment and locomotive repair plants.

So, for example, in terms of their severe consequences, the following crashes on the Moscow-Kazan railway should be noted: movement along the main track, b) Collision at st. Punks of two freight trains, c) The collapse of a suburban passenger train at the station. Specific and a number of others

All these crashes were organized by saboteurs Kozlov and Mishin (head of the Moscow-Sorting M.-Kaz. railway depot) and his deputy.

At the Murom plant, machine tools and machines\*\* were systematically put out of action (on orders from Aleksandrovsky and Fridov).

With their espionage and sabotage work, traitors to the motherland managed to inflict heavy damage on our railway transport.

23 people were brought to trial.

DOCUMENTATION

The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, taking into account that these agents of the \*\*\* spy \*\*\*-sabotage organization were also engaged in \*\*\* destructive work in one of the most important sectors of the state economy - the railway. transport, that all the agents of this \*gang\* were Soviet civil servants who committed a direct act of treason by their crimes, that the leaders of the organizers of tssionazh and sabotage of the most active spies should be subjected to the highest measure of criminal repression, - sentenced the head of the KIM organization ZAEN, his closest assistants, engineers of the locomotive department of the NKPS Slastenina A.A. and Aleksandrovsky S.V., head of the depot st. Moscow-Sorting M.-Kaz. railway Kozlov V.V., his deputy Mishin N.A.; head of the technical department of the Murom locomotive repair plant Sviribov L.T., head of the railway station st. Moscow-Passenger M.-Kaz. railway Borovsky E.S. and driver Muzanov A.V. as the organizers of espionage and destructive work and the most active spies and saboteurs - to the highest measure of criminal punishment - SHOOTING.

The rest of the defendants are the senior engineer of the locomotive department of the People's Commissariat of Transportation, M.M. railway Sretensky N.A. and others sentenced to imprisonment for \*\*\*\*10 years or less. \*\*\*\* (145)

APRF. F.Z. Op. 58. D. 245. L.93-95. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: Poskrebysheva "T. Stalin for (A.P.). Amendments to the text"; "Behind. Molotov.

\*—\* Inserted instead of the crossed-out "organization, -iya".

\*\*—\*\* Inserted instead of crossed out "preparing the organization".

\*\* Crossed out "including imported".

ÿ" \_ \*\*\* Inserted instead of crossed out "reconnaissance-".

\*\*\* Crossed out "espionage and \*.

\*!\*\*\*—\*\*\*\* IN WRITTEN instead of "for a long time".

No. 460

NOTE N. KRYLENKO L.M. KAGANOVICH ON  
OBJECTIONS TO THE DRAFT PROVISIONS ON  
A SPECIAL MEETING

AND CORRECTIONAL LABOR INSTITUTIONS (146)

August 3, 1934

No. L-21  
Owls. secret

I present my objections to 1) the draft Regulations on the Special Meeting under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and 2) the draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Union on correctional labor institutions.



I- On the draft of the Special Meeting under the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs

1) \*The draft does not contain the most important thing: an indication of the right of the Prosecutor of the Union, in case of disagreement with the majority of the Special Meeting\*, both on the issue of referral of the case (through the Special Meeting or to the court), and on the issue of the Reprisal Measure, to challenge the decisions of the Special meetings, adding them and transferring the issue for resolution by the Presidium of the CEC of the Union\*.

which the Procurator of the Union had in relation to the resolutions of the OGPU, should be all the more preserved in relation to the Special Conference.

right

Boards

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2) \* I propose to delete from the first paragraph the indication that the exiled Persons must live under "public supervision"\*. The draft Regulations do not establish what this "public supervision" should consist of. At the same time, mentioning it is superfluous, since no one forbids the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs to establish any form of supervision over the administratively exiled. \*The introduction of this term is generally politically inappropriate.

3) I object to granting the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs the right to single-handedly extend the period of exile \*, in accordance with paragraph "a" of Art. 3rd project, depending on the behavior of the exiled or prisoner. This is sheer arbitrariness. If, for one reason or another, it is necessary to extend the period of exile, \*the latter can be carried out either by way of a new resolution with the sanction of the Presidium of the CEC of the Union, or by way of restricting the right of free choice of place of residence to the person who has ended the term\*, but the procedure for such a restriction should be specifically stipulated pregnant.

II. About the draft Resolution of the CEC of the Union

about corrective labor institutions

I am categorically compelled to object to\* the draft resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of on the transfer of the entire correction system Labor Institutions from the NKJ under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs\*.

Until now, there was a distinction: those convicted for a term of more than 3 years came under the jurisdiction of the OGPU, and up to 3 years were left under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Justice. I agreed to the Commission in the composition - t.t. AKULOVA, YAGODA, KRYLENKO - to transfer to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs all those sentenced to deprivation of liberty, regardless of the term, but with the obligation that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs take them all in their entirety, regardless of age and state of health, and not just as it was until now, when the OGPU took away the healthy, and the People's Commissariat of Justice left the sick (both 10-year-olds and 5-year-olds, etc.).

In this case, the People's Commissariat of Justice would have remained investigative, cassation,

transit and corrective labor institutions for those sentenced to forced labor without deprivation of liberty, which the People's Commissariat of Justice held in their                      those. so-called coercion open corrective labor institutions.

The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs proposes to remove \*the entire\* system of correctional labor institutions from the NKJ. \*This means to abolish one third of the People's Commissariat of Justice\*.

If we add to this the actual seizure in the order of the operational management of the Prosecutor's Office of the Union for the Management of the Prosecutor's Office, because it is extremely difficult for two owners to manage one apparatus, the NKJ remains in charge of only the court, the leadership of which is claimed, according to the rights granted, by the Supreme Court of the Union. \*\* This is the actual abolition of the People's Commissariat of Justice, bypassing the decision of the Politburo that the preservation of the People's Commissariat of Justice is not subject to discussion \*\*.

\*I propose to remain with the previous decision, transferring all those sentenced to imprisonment to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs\*.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF JUSTICE (I. Krylenko)

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 5. L. 83-83v. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "From comrade Krylenko."  
\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*—\*\* Underlined in the margins with two vertical lines.

DOCUMENTATION\_ 549

No. 461

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT NAKHAEV" (147)

August 5, 1934

No. 11, p. 16 - About Nakhaev

Instruct t.t. Yagoda and Agranov personally carefully investigate the case in the barracks of the second regiment of the Proletarian Division and report to the Central Committee.

RGASPI. F.17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 136. Original. Typescript.

No. 462

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

RELATED TO THE DETENTION OF BRITISH CITIZENS

August 5, 1934

No. 11, paragraph 88/70 - Notice to the Consuls of the detention of British citizens.

1. Reply to the English note that the NKID will take measures to notify the British consuls of the arrests and to allow the consuls to meet with the arrested.

2. Propose to the NKVD to inform the NKID in advance of cases of detention of foreigners.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 141. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 25.VI.11.34.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Litvinov, Yagoda.

No. 463

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE GERMAN HUNGER CAMPAIGN"

August 5, 1934

No. 11, n. 94/76 - On the German famine campaign.

1. Commissions composed of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (comrade Krestinsky), the State Bank (comrade Arkus) and Torgsin to submit specific proposals on measures to delay the execution of money transfers from Germany.

2. To refute the statement of the Germans about the agreement with Torgsin in the press and on the radio.

RGASPI. F.17. Op. 162. D. 16. L. 142. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 25.VI.11.34.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Krestinsky, Arkus, Litvinov, Stashevsky, Kaganovich.

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No. 464

FROM THE LETTER OF I.V. STALIN L.M.  
KAGANOVICH ABOUT A.S. NAKHAEV

August 8, 1934

<...>

4) The Nakhaev case is a bastard case. Of course (of course!), He is not alone. It is necessary to press him against the wall, force him to tell - tell the whole truth and then punish him to the fullest extent. He must be a Polish-German (or Japanese) agent. Chekists become ridiculous when they discuss with him about his "political views" (this is called an interrogation!). A corrupt skin does not have political views - otherwise he would not be an agent of an outside force. He called on armed men to act against the government, which means that he must be destroyed. Apparently, not everything is going well in Osoviahim.

Hello! I. St.

Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 Sat. doc. S. 425.

No. 465

MESSAGE I.L. BULATA L.M. KAGANOVICH and V.M. MOLOTOV IN  
CONNECTION WITH THE DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON THE CREATION  
OF SPECIAL COMPOSITIONS OF COURTS AT  
CONCENTRATION CAMPS

August 9, 1934

No. 211

The Prosecutor of the Union and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR submitted for approval by the People's Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR a draft directive \*on the creation of special compositions of the Court at concentration camps\* to consider cases of crimes committed by prisoners in the camps.

The People's Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR categorically objects to this project for the following reasons:

1) The composition of the Court is proposed from the Chairman - a member of the regional (regional) court and 2 members - the Head of the Camp Administration or his deputy and a representative - a special authorized representative of the Administration of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the corresponding territory or region.

We believe that such a composition of the court is a deviation from the general principles of building the judiciary and therefore we consider it completely inappropriate to create Courts with such a composition.

2) This draft proposes: "In all cases in which a sentence with the highest social measure will be issued. protection - these Divisions of the Courts immediately report by telegraph to the regional (regional) prosecutor and the chairman of the regional court. In the absence of a protest from the prosecutor or suspension by the chairman of the territory (region) of the court, the verdict is given after 72 hours

into execution."

In no case can we agree with such a proposal, since the decision of the Central Committee has established a procedure in which all sentences with the highest measure of soc. defenses must be approved by the Politburo Commission.

Therefore, the People's Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR objects to such an order, which violates this decision of the Central Committee.

In order to expedite the investigation of cases of crimes committed in the camps and bring the judiciary closer to the camps, we propose:

- 1) To create field sessions of the regional (regional) court in large concentration camps.
- 2) This composition of visiting sessions should be formed from 3 people, members of the regional or regional court.
- 3) Cases in which a sentence with the highest measure of soc. defense, must necessarily be sent directly from these visiting sessions to the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, which must submit them for approval by the Politburo Commission.
- 4) In connection with the creation of special court compositions for concentration camps, we ask the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to increase the staff of those regional courts in which mobile sessions of the regional (regional) court are to be created.

CHAIRMAN OF THE RSFSR  
SUPERCOURT DEP. NARCOMJUST BULAT

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 5. L. 85, 85v. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "From Comrade Bulat."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

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SPECIAL COMMUNICATION G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. TO  
STALIN ON THE "SPY" ORGANIZATION AT THE STALIN  
METALLURGICAL PLANT

August 19, 1934

No. 30305

OWL. SECRET

At the beginning of 1934, the NKVD received undercover information that a group of employees of the Stalin Metallurgical Plant (ZSK) was conducting espionage work in favor of Japan.

The spy group was found to be composed of young engineers, some of whom had been associated with Japanese intelligence for a number of years.

The group is headed by the engineer of the blast furnace shop of the Kuznetsk plant LATKIN Nikolai Vasilyevich, born in 1904 (non-party), and it includes: DAVYDOV Georgy Savelyevich - senior engineer of the Central Bureau of Heavy Engineering of the People's Commissariat for Heavy Engineering (formerly working at the Kuznetsk plant), born in 1899, from peasants, b / p., served in the army of Kolchak; DAMPEL Leonid Nikolayevich, engineer of the blast-furnace shop of the Kuznetsk plant, born in 1902, unemployed, arrested in 1920 on charges of espionage and an attempt to go over to the Whites; Engineer SAROV Daniil Ivanovich - chief metallurgist of the second Kuznetsk plant, born in 1892. from employees, b / n.

The above persons, performing the tasks of Japanese intelligence, formed in the middle of 1933 an initiative group to create the so-called "Russian National Renaissance Party" (RPNV).

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The members of the group began to create cells of the organization in a number of places in the Union: Moscow, Leningrad and others.

In LATKIN's apartment during 1933, secret meetings were periodically held with the participation of all members of the group who were in Stalinsk at that time. Several peasant kulaks were involved in these meetings in order to expand the base of the organization at the expense of the kulaks, in particular, the kulaks were involved - the father and son of the CHEREPANOVs.

In 1934, members of the organization DAMPEL and SAROV left, the first for Leningrad to work at Lengiprometz and the second for the Makeevsky Metallurgical Plant.

It was established that after DAVYDOV moved to Moscow between him and LATKIN there was correspondence in encrypted form on the work of the organization.

Finally, agents obtained some documents confirming the counter-revolutionary activities of the RPNV, such as: photocopies of manuscripts on the issues of the RPNV program, letters on recruitment into the organization, etc.

Thus, intelligence information from the NKVD before the arrests in the case established that the RPNV is a direct agent of Japanese intelligence and that under the cover of the national secret formation, the Japanese residency is actually hiding.

April 26 this year DAVYDOV in Moscow, LATKIN, father and son CHEREPANOV in Stalinsk, and DAMPEL in Leningrad were arrested at the same time. P.V-s.g. SAROV was arrested in Makeyevka.

During a search at DAVYDOV's apartment, his encrypted correspondence with LATKIN on the activities of the RPNV was confiscated.

One of the discovered encrypted documents contains instructions from LATKIN about the need to create IVR cells at the plants of the southern industry and Leningrad.

From this correspondence it can be seen, in particular, that in the fall of 1934, at the Davydov's dacha near Moscow, it was planned to arrange a meeting of the leading staff of the RPNV.

During a search of LATKIN's apartment, the program and charter of the RPNV written by him personally, his correspondence with members of the RPNV on the creation of new cells of the counterrevolutionary organization, recruitment of members, etc., were confiscated.

At the direction of LATKIN, 2 bombs buried in the ground and one revolver with cartridges were confiscated.

Those arrested confessed in their testimony to the creation of a counter-revolutionary organization called the "Russian Party of the National

Vozrozhdeniye", which set itself the task of fighting the Soviet regime with the help of Japan, and showed that, under the guise of RPNV, they were preparing subversive activities during Japan's declaration of war on the USSR, in particular, sabotage in transport, defense enterprises

and so on.

The investigation established that the group set up an illegal printing press at Zima station; typographic fonts were withdrawn. For the members of the organization, monthly contributions were established in the amount of 10% of the salary.

As one of the methods of counter-revolutionary work, the group planned the widespread carrying out of terrorist acts against leading workers.

Back in 1924, a member of the RPNV SAROV, upon returning from Japan, where he was at work, was in the mountains. Vladivostok recruited for spying

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work in favor of Japan by the Japanese intelligence officer EJIRO RANZO, who came to Vladivostok allegedly to negotiate the purchase of oil (EJIRO RANZO is being established).

During his work as the chief engineer of the Ashinsky, and then the Nadezhdinsky metallurgical plants, from 1927 to 1929, SAROV was associated with the resident of Japanese intelligence in Sverdlovsk - Alexander Samoylovich ALEKSEEV (Alekseev is being searched and his identity is being established ), through which he transmitted to the Japanese materials on the work of these plants, and in particular, the shell shop of the Nadezhda plant.

For espionage work, SAROV recruited the construction technician of the shell shop of the Nadezhda plant IZLER (arrested, confessed) and the engineer of the Zlatoust plant KARAVAEV (prosecuted).

With the help of these persons, SAROV also collected and handed over to the resident of Japanese intelligence, ALEKSEEV, espionage materials on the military production of the Kotovilikha plant, on the development of edged weapons and shell production at the Zlatoust plants.

In 1930, after moving to the post of chief metallurgist of Kuznetskstroy, SAROV contacted engineer LATKIN, who came to him as a resident of Japanese intelligence.

From that time until the moment of transfer to work at the Makeevsky Metallurgical Plant in 1934, SAROV was engaged in intelligence activities in favor of Japan, transferring all espionage materials through LATKI NA.

For espionage purposes, Sarov recruited at the Stalin Combine: early. open-hearth shop engineer LISOCHKIN Boris Fedorovich (it was established that LISOCHKIN died in Novosibirsk on May 18, 1934 after an illness, he was not interrogated at all in the case) and the engineer of the rolling shop Georgy Savelyevich DAVYDOV (arrested, confessed).

On the instructions of SAROV, LISOCCHKIN, under the guise of a scientific mission, was sent to Leningrad and Ukraine, where he collected the following

materials: for the Obukhov plant, data on the production of guns and shells, on the production of armor by brand, and on the supply of the plant with raw materials and semi-finished products; for the Mariupol plant, data on the power of armor and sheet-rolling mills No. 2, 3, and 4, on the production of two-layer armor, etc.; according to the Kuntsevo Military Plant No. 95, which produces rolled products for the aircraft industry and cases for aerial bombs, information on the production of rolled military profiles for aviation and tank plants, etc.

For espionage activities, SAROV personally received from EJIRO RANZO when he was recruited in 1924, and also at different times from 1928 to 1934. through ALEKSEEVA and LATKIN cash reward in foreign and Soviet currency.

Part of the money was paid to them by persons recruited for espionage work.

The case was completed by the investigation and transferred to the Siberian Regional Court for hearing at the place where the Crime was committed.

APPENDIX: Protocols and copies of the documents seized during the arrest.

ZAM. PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR PROKOFIEV

\* On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Kaganovich. All those convicted of spying for the benefit of Japan must be shot. I. Stalin.

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INTERROGATION  
PROTOCOL engineer LATKIN Nikolai Vasilievich  
(former assistant head of the blast furnace shop at the KMK  
mine) dated May 4, 1934

Born in 1904, native of the Zima VSK station,  
Russian, unnamed, citizen of the USSR, mining  
engineer. In the past, he had a handicraft workshop with  
the use of hired labor. Arrested 30 April 1934

QUESTION: Do you plead guilty to the fact that you have been working on the creation of the  
"National Renaissance" party, which has as its goal the overthrow of Soviet power?

ANSWER: Yes, I plead guilty to the fact that, being in disagreement with a number of measures of the  
Soviet government, I, N.V. which set as its ultimate goal the overthrow of Soviet power and its  
replacement by another political system. According to the prevailing opinions, the leading core (I,  
DAVYDOV, DAMPEL) considered the fascist system to be the most acceptable.

\* DAVYDOV Georgy Savelyevich, engineer of the Central Bureau of Heavy Engineering



deniya, arrested in this case - confessed.

\*\*

DAMPEL Leonid Nikolaevich, engineer of Leningprometz, arrested in this case - confessed. (Note in the document. - Comp.)

QUESTION: When, where and on whose initiative did the RPNV organization come into existence and who was its leading core?

ANSWER: The beginning of the RPNV organization refers to the month of August 1933.

It arose on my initiative after, when, having met at my apartment in Stalinsk with the engineer of the KMK rolling shop Georgy Savelyevich Davydov and, having discussed the economic difficulties of the USSR, especially in the field of agriculture, I decided to create an organization to fight Soviet power .

Initially, the leading core of the RPNV included: I, Nikolai Vasilievich LATKIN, as the ideologist and inspirer of the initiative group, G.S. DAVYDOV, who later became the organizer of the RPNV cell in Moscow, and a little later Leonid Ni -

kolaevich.

QUESTION: What practical work on the creation of "RPNV" was carried out?

ANSWER: During its existence, the initiative group managed to carry out the following practical work:

1. The first outlines for the drafting of the charter and program of the "RPNV" were carried out.
2. A plan was drawn up for the ideological education of the members of the RPNV.
3. Initial work has been done to attract new members. In particular, Vladislav Semenovitch USPENSKY, an engineer of the KMK construction shop, and Nikolai Georgievich, an engineer of the blast furnace shop, were already involved.

In addition, an attempt was made to involve REGUSCH Alexander Fokievich, an engineer in the rental department, who refused to join.

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4. Preparatory work was carried out to create a printing house, in particular, through DAVYDOV in Moscow, two sets of font samples were purchased and in April 1934 I sent a letter with a request to send additional ones.

5. Subsequently, communication was established with the RPNV cells in Moscow and Leningrad.

QUESTION: In what ways was it practically planned to carry out the tasks

set before itself by the "RPNV", in terms of fighting the Soviet regime, overthrowing it, and replacing it with another political system.

ANSWER: In order to carry out its tasks, the "RPNV" focused on intervention, in particular, the intervention from Japan was meant.

Before the start of the intervention, as mentioned above, work should have been carried out to attract new members, create an extensive network of RPNV cells in other settlements of the Union other than Stalinsk, organize a printing house, ideologically educate members of the RPNV and work out program issues.

With the declaration of war, it meant, in order to disorganize the rear and help the interventionists, organize an insurrection, carry out acts of sabotage, both in transport and in industrial enterprises.

These questions have not been subjected to detailed discussion in the RPNV head during its existence, but, according to the program outlines of our party, they were meant.

QUESTION: How was the communication between the members of the "RPNV" carried out?

ANSWER: Communication between members of the "RPNV" was mainly carried out by visiting each other in apartments.

In addition, one of the forms of communication was underground meetings held in my apartment.

QUESTION: How many and when were such meetings of the members of the "RPNV" held and who personally attended them?

ANSWER: There were about 5 meetings of this kind. One of them was at my apartment in the second half of August 1933, at which I, G.S. DAVYDOV, were present. and those who came from Zima CHEREPANOV Alexander Vasilievich, a blast-furnace shop mechanic, and his father CHEREPANOV Vasily Dmitrievich, who is engaged in tar removal from the Sosnovsky state farm near Star

linsk.

\* CHEREPANOV Alexander Vasilyevich, a locksmith of the blast furnace shop of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant, was arrested by the ECO PP OGPU ZSK in this case.

\*\* CHEREPANOV Vasily Dmitrievich was arrested by the ECO PP OGPU ZSK in this case.  
(Note in the document. - Comp.)

The remaining meetings, about four, also took place at my apartment in the period October-November.

Those present at these meetings were L. N. DAMPEL, V. S. USPENSKY. and I, LATKIN N.V.

The meetings ended with the arrival from the village. The winters of my mother, who subsequently stayed with me.

QUESTION: What were the sources of funds for conducting the work of the party, how and by whom was it financed?

ANSWER: The only source of funds for the existence of the "RPNV" Should have been membership fees, the amount of which was established in

one of the meetings, equal to 10% of the salary.

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Subsequently, at the suggestion of DAVYDOV, contributions were supposed to be reduced, because they were considered too high.

QUESTION: How much and by whom was the membership fee paid?

ANSWER: During the existence of the "RPNV" membership fees were paid by me, LATKIN N.V., 130 rubles. (for two months), DAMPEL about 180 rubles. (for 3 months) and USPENSKY V.S. about 300 rubles. (for 3 months).

DAVYDOV did not pay membership dues, and he was in arrears.

QUESTION: In what way and through whom did RPNV communicate with foreign countries?

ANSWER: As far as I know, RPNV has not yet had established communication with foreign countries.

The search for opportunities to establish these links were. In particular, it was supposed to be used to link any of the members of the "RPNV".

The second moment for establishing this connection was the organization of an excursion to the Tien Shan, which meant the crossing of the Mongolian border and further penetration into European points.

Detailed indications will be given additionally.

Written down from my words correctly and read by me.

LATKIN

INTERROGATION: BEGINNING. 1 DEP. ECO BRULEVSKY

OPERA. UPOL. 1 DEP. ECO IVANOV

CORRECT: AUTHORIZED GUGB: SHTARKMAN  
INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

ENGINEER DAVYDOV G.S. IN THE CASE OF  
RPNV of April 27, 1934

DAVYDOV Georgy Savelyevich, born in 1899, a native of the Ural region, Maykerskaya vol. village Zuevo, from middle peasants, worked Art. engineer of the Central Bureau of Heavy Engineering NKTP. Not convicted, c. USSR, b / p, served in the Kolchak army as a private in the 3rd artillery division until 1920. Arrested on April 26 of this year.

QUESTION: On April 26, during a search in your apartment, documents were seized indicating that you were one of the organizers of the counter-revolutionary organization "Russian Party of National Revival". Tell us when this organization was born and the composition of its leading core.

ANSWER: In April 1933, while working as a senior engineer in the Office of the Chief Metallurgist of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine, I, having become better acquainted with the engineer of the same Combine, Nikolai Vasilyevich LATKIN, had several conversations with him on counter-revolutionary topics, which revealed the commonality of our views on questions of the policy of the Soviet government and the party, as well as on the measures necessary for the struggle against the Soviet government and the party.

\*

LATKIN Nikolai Vasil'evich - engineer of the blast furnace shop of the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine. ECO PP OGPU ZSK was arrested in this case. (Note in the document. - Comp.)

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Basically, at that time, these views were expressed as follows: both he and I expressed the opinion that there is famine in the country, part of the population is starving, the rest is malnourished, funds collected on the basis of hunger of the population are not used correctly, and all this is the result of shortcomings in the system itself. Soviet power, i.e. the absence of private property, which is an incentive for the development of productive forces. On the basis of these conversations, we agreed on the need for each individual to think through all these questions, and then, when we meet, to discuss possible measures to combat the existing system. Soon, having left for 3 months on vacation, I, having visited the Caucasus, got acquainted with the issues of the situation of the population of the North Caucasian Territory, in particular the situation of the Cossacks, believing that, despite the defeat of the kulak elite of the Cossacks by the Soviet government, there are still among them there are many people who can be guided in counter-revolutionary work aimed at overthrowing Soviet power.

While on vacation, I thought over a number of questions that were to form the basis for the development of the basic political provisions of our future party.

Returning from vacation in August 1933 in the city of Kuznetsk, I had several meetings with N.V. At this meeting, which took place in Kuznetsk at the apartment of N.V. In the first half of August, 1933, we discussed a number of questions, in particular the peasant question—of replacing the collective farms with private farming, and my report on my observations on the above question of the Cossacks (the names of the peasants present at the meeting are unknown to me).

Thanks to the efforts on my part and on the part of LATKINA N.V. a leading core was created, which served as the basis for the "Russian National Renaissance Party" that we were creating.

This core included: I, Nikolai Vasilievich LATKIN, Leonid Nikolaevich DAMPEL (involved by me), Daniil Ivanovich SAROV (involved in LATKIN) and Vladislav Semenovich, whose last name I don't know (also involved in LATKIN).

\* DAMPEL Leonid Nikolaevich - engineer of Lenzprom, in 1920 he was involved in spying for whites. Arrested by the ECU of the OGPU in this case.

\*\* Daniil Ivanovich SAROV, metallurgical engineer at the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works, in 1932 he was a consultant to the Japanese firm Tokata-Shokai (in Vladivostok); at 23-24 worked in Japan, Tsuruga. Arrested in the same case.

\*\*\* Vladislav Semenovich is established. (Note in the document. - Comp.)

QUESTION: In your answer to the first question, you named the leading core of the RPNV, tell us about the political and program guidelines of this organization.

ANSWER: The main political task of our Party is the overthrow of Soviet power and its replacement by a political system along the lines of fascism. The economic program was as follows: the liquidation of collective farms and state farms and their replacement by private farming.

In the field of industry, large-scale industry, transport, metallurgy, coal, etc. remain in the hands of the future state in the form of a state. capitalism, but medium and small organizations. The membership fee is set at about 200-250 rubles. per year from each member of the "RPNV". I was told about the installment of their contributions from Kuznetsk through Vladislav Semenovich.

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In the future, measures were taken to establish ties with foreign countries and from there to receive funding for the deployment of the work of the "RPNV". Measures to establish ties with foreign countries were taken by N. V. Latkin. and other members of the Kuznetsk group.

With the funds received from membership fees, we started to create a printing house for printing leaflets and other materials of the "RPNV", for this purpose I purchased two alphabets of gutta-percha fonts and, as samples, were sent to the city. Kuznetsk to LATKI NU, I also ordered eight alphabets of the same fonts in the stamp workshop on Teatralny passage, which I did not have time to buy.

The protocol of interrogation was written down from my words correctly and was read by me.

DAVYDOV

INTERROGATED: VR. BEGINNING 2 DEP. ECU OGPU BELOGORSKY

AUTHORIZED? DEP. ECU OGPU SHTARKMAN

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 246. L. 2-19. Script. Typescript.

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NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. STALIN

WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE DRAFT REGULATION ON  
THE NKVD OF THE USSR

August 24, 1934

At the same time, I am forwarding a draft regulation on the All-Union People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

In the event of a delay in the consideration of the regulation on the NKVD as a whole, I ask you to approve the regulation on the Special Conference, since in connection with the operations to clear cities and transport from socially harmful elements, a large number of arrested people have accumulated, the cases of which are awaiting consideration.

APPENDIX: draft regulations on the All-Union People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, on a Special Meeting at the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR and a draft resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the transfer of prisons and escort troops to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

BERRY

PROJECT

POSITION

ON THE ALL-UNION PEOPLE'S COMMISSARY FOR  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS

I

The main tasks of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs are:

- a) ensuring revolutionary order and state security throughout the territory of the USSR;
- b) protection of personal and property security of citizens;
- c) protection of the state borders of the USSR;
- d) protection of public (socialist) property;
- e) registration of acts of civil status.
- f) fulfillment of special tasks of the government of the USSR;

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II

As part of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs - formed:

1. The Main Directorate of State Security, whose task is

are:

a) the fight against treason, espionage, counter-revolution, terror, sabotage, sabotage and other state crimes throughout the territory of the USSR, in all sectors of the national economy, railway, water transport, in the army, sea and air fleet;

b) protection of state secrets;

c) taking all necessary measures to suppress state crimes.

2. Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia, whose task is:

a) protection of public order throughout the territory of the USSR;

b) conducting the fight against criminal crime;

c) protection of public (socialist) property;

d) protection of personal and property security of citizens;

e) issuance of passports and their registration, management of address desks.

The Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia consists of the following

departments:

1) Department of external service - whose terms of reference include ensuring public order and landscaping, protecting public (socialist) property and personal and property security of citizens;

2) the Department of Criminal Investigation - whose terms of reference include the fight against criminal crime on the territory of the USSR;

3) Passport Department - whose terms of reference include issuing passports to the population, registering passports, organizing and managing address desks;

4) Political Department - whose terms of reference include party educational work on the personnel of the police, the organization of the public to help the work of the police (brigadmits);

5) Command and combat department - the task of which is the selection and education of personnel and their combat and drill training;

6) Department of supply and weapons;

7) General department;

8) Special inspection - to investigate misconduct and crimes of police personnel and to analyze complaints.

3. The Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Guard, whose task is:

a) the protection of the state borders of the USSR and the fight against smuggling and

illegal crossing of borders;

b) protection of especially important objects of railway and water transport, industry and government facilities;

c) performance of special operational tasks.

The troops of the border and internal guards, being part of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army, are directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

The Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Guard consists of the following departments:

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1) Operations Department - whose terms of reference include the protection of borders and especially important objects of industry, transport and government buildings, operational service and the use of troops, the fight against smuggling and the maintenance of customs authorities;

2) Department of combat training - whose terms of reference include: combined arms, combat and school training of privates and commanding personnel and inspection on combat training;

3) Political department - whose terms of reference include the organization and management of party political and educational work;

4) Organizational and mobilization department - whose terms of reference include staffing with ordinary and junior commanding staff, deployment of units and protected objects and development of organizational, mobilization and staffing issues;

5) Command Department - whose terms of reference include the distribution of commanding staff and the recruitment of military schools;

6) Department of armaments - whose terms of reference include the organization and inspection of special troops and the supply of weapons to all troops of the border and internal security;

7) Supply Department - whose terms of reference include the procurement and supply of clothing, food and fodder allowances and the organization of a military artel economy;

8) the Sanitary Department - the terms of reference of which include the organization and provision of the sanitary service and medical control over the combat training of troops;

9) Engineering and construction department - whose task is to organize military construction and manage it;

10) Veterinary inspection.



4. Main Directorate of Fire Protection - whose task is:

- a) management of measures to prevent and fight fires;
- b) staffing the personnel of fire brigades and their command staff, instructing and disciplining them;
- c) instructing and monitoring the work of local councils in the field of fire management (fire prevention measures);
- d) organization of equipment for fire brigades;
- e) inspection and supervision of the activities of fire departments.

5. The Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps and Labor Settlements - whose task is:

- a) organization of corrective labor camps and labor settlements;
- b) protection, maintenance and correction by involving in the socially useful labor process offenders sentenced to camps and correctional labor institutions and evicted to labor settlements of the kulaks and the declassed element;
- c) organization and management of construction work and structures on special government assignments.

The Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps and Labor Settlements consists of the following departments:

- 1) Department of labor settlements - whose terms of reference include the organization and arrangement of labor settlements;
- 2) Prison department - whose terms of reference include the organization and management of correctional labor institutions (houses of detention, isolation wards, correctional labor colonies and forced labor bureaus).

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- 3) Production and construction department - the terms of reference of which include the management of construction work and operating enterprises organized by labor camps;

- 4) Cultural and educational department - whose terms of reference include the elimination of illiteracy and illiteracy, vocational training, supplying prisoners with newspapers, manuals and books, organizing all types of cultural and educational work and helping shock workers released from camps in their accommodation;

- 5) Accounting and distribution department - whose terms of reference include accounting and distribution of prisoners in camps and monitoring their correctness

use and timely release;

6) Security Department - whose terms of reference include the organization of camp security, the fight against escapes and crime in the camps;

7) Supply Department;

8) Sanitary department;

9) Personnel department - whose terms of reference include recruiting and distributing the staff of workers in corrective labor camps and labor settlements and developing organizational issues;

10) Control and Inspection Department - whose terms of reference include the preparation of production reports, uniform standards and meters for work carried out by camps and labor settlements.

6. Department of Civil Status - whose task is

organization of filing a file of civil status records (births, adoptions, marriages, divorces, deaths), ensuring their accurate recording.

7. Financial department - whose task is:

a) implementation, coordination of instructions of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, management of the financial work of the NKVD;

b) drawing up and carrying out estimates and plans in government institutions;

c) execution of estimates and financial plans;

d) survey and documentary audit of monetary funds and material assets of all organs of the NKVD and auxiliary enterprises.

8. Administrative and economic management - the task of which is:

a) organization of technical and courier communications and transport;

b) supply and organization (management) of auxiliary production and agricultural enterprises;

c) leadership of the commandant's service;

d) ensuring the material and domestic needs of personnel;

e) management of sanitary and medical institutions;

9. Personnel department - whose task is:

a) selection, verification, certification, appointment and reassignment of employees of the central apparatus of the NKVD;

b) selection, certification, personal accounting and appointment and reappointment of the leadership of the main departments and local bodies of the NKVD;

c) development of issues of service; legal, financial status and state. provision of NKVD workers;

d) development of organizational, mobilization and staffing issues.

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In the union republics, republican people's commissariats of internal affairs are being organized, acting on the basis of the regulation on the all-union people's commissariat of internal affairs, and in the RSFSR, instead of the republican people's commissariat of internal affairs, the institution of the authorized people's commissariat of internal affairs of the Union of the SSR is being established.

2. In the autonomous republics, territories and regions, departments of the people's commissariat of internal affairs of the union republics are organized.

3. The departments of the people's commissariat of internal affairs of the autonomous republics and regions that are part of the krai (oblast) or the union republic are directly subordinate to the corresponding higher krai (regional) or republican department of the NKVD.

4. In autonomous (national) and industrial districts, district departments of the people's commissariat of internal affairs are organized, subordinate directly to the higher department of the NKVD.

5. In administrative centers that have city councils directly subordinate to the krai (region) or republic, city departments of the people's commissariat of internal affairs are organized.

In administrative centers that simultaneously have both city and district councils, independently subordinate directly to the edge (region) or republic, a city and district department of the people's commissariat of internal affairs is organized.

In all other districts, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs organizes district branches of the NKVD.

City departments, city district departments and district departments of the NKVD, headed by the heads of city and city district departments and district departments, report directly to the higher department of the NKVD.

6. In order to combine the work of district and city departments. The NKVD in the fight against counterrevolution and other state crimes The NKVD organizes inter-district departments of the republican, regional (regional) departments of the NKVD, with operational subordination to these inter-district departments of the cities. and city district departments and district departments of the NKVD, determined by the relevant orders of the NKVD of the USSR.

IV

The states of the departments of local bodies of the NKVD, within the limits of the total number and appropriations approved by the government, are approved and distributed

are People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

V

1. People's commissars of internal affairs of the Union republics, heads of departments of the NKVD of the territories (regions), autonomous republics and autonomous regions, heads of district departments and heads of inter-district departments are appointed and dismissed by the people's commissar of internal affairs of the USSR.

2. Heads of city departments, heads of city district departments and heads of district departments of the NKVD are appointed and dismissed by higher heads of NKVD departments with the approval of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

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3. Heads of transport agencies (heads of road transport departments, water transport departments, departments of road transport departments, water departments of transport departments and operational points) and heads of special bodies (heads of special departments of districts, groups of troops, seas and flotillas, special departments of corps divisions, brigades, etc.) of the Main Directorate of State Security of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs are appointed and dismissed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

VI

In order to carry out the tasks assigned to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, it is granted the right to:

1. Carry out searches, arrests, investigations with the subsequent transfer of cases to the courts or to a Special Conference.

NOTE: Secret employees of the organs of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD, when hearing cases of crimes disclosed by them, are not subject to subpoena as witnesses in any case. All other employees of the Main Directorate of State Security are subject to summons only in cases where it is impossible in any other way to establish the data necessary for recognizing the crime as proven.

2. Information and search.

3. Registration of persons convicted or suspected of criminal activity, registration of those sentenced and exiled for state crimes and the implementation of special supervision over them.

VII

The procedure for investigating cases in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR and in its bodies is determined by the codes of criminal procedure and the instruction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated

8.V-1933

Prosecutorial supervision over investigations is carried out by the Prosecutor of the USSR, the prosecutors of the Union and Autonomous Republics, territories and regions in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of 8.V-1933.

VIII

The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs is granted the right, through a Special Conference with him, to deport such persons in respect of persons recognized as socially dangerous in the locality on the special instructions of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, with the obligatory residence of these persons in the localities indicated by him and with open supervision over them for a period up to 5 years, as well as to imprison them in forced labor camps for the same period and deport them outside the USSR.

IX

1. For the implementation of the specified in Ch. The 8th, under the people's commissar of internal affairs, a special meeting is organized under the chairmanship of the people's commissar and his deputies, consisting of:

- a) Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs;
- b) People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR;

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- c) People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the TSFSR;
- d) head of the NKVD department for the Moscow region;
- e) head of the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia;
- f) the head of the Main Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps and Labor Settlements;
- g) the prosecutor of the USSR or his deputy.

The decision on the exile and imprisonment in a forced labor camp of each individual must be accompanied by an indication of the reason for the application of these measures, the area of exile and the period.

2. The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs is granted the right to:

- a) depending on the behavior of those exiled or imprisoned in forced labor camps, based on the opinions of the relevant bodies of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, reduce the period of stay in exile or in a forced labor camp or extend this period within the period specified in the article;

b) exempt from further stay in special labor positions

villages.

3. For especially remote areas (Far Eastern Territory, Eastern Siberia and Kazakhstan), special commissions are organized consisting of the heads of the NKVD departments of these regions and prosecutors and heads of the relevant departments of state security departments.

These commissions are given the right to preliminary consideration of materials and cases on persons recognized as socially dangerous or declassified, with the determination of penalties within the rights of the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR and with the direction of their decisions for approval by the Special Conference of the NKVD of the USSR.

X

The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs has the right:

a) issue mandatory resolutions on the subjects of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs with the establishment of administrative penalties for violation of these resolutions;

b) arrests of up to 3 months in the disciplinary order of the NKVD officers for malfeasance.

XI

Employees of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, who are directly related to military and secret work, are equated with the approval of their lists by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR for rights and duties to persons in active military service.

The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR is allowed to equate in rights and duties with persons in active military service those employees of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs who are directly (immediately) related to military and secret work.

XII

The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs has its own estimate as part of the all-Union budget. The estimate and number are approved in a special order, and according to this estimate, all expenses for the maintenance of the central apparatus and local bodies of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs are carried out. Trance

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port, industry and communications reimburse the budget for troops,

guarding their facilities. The militia for the protection of industrial enterprises (departmental militia) is maintained at the expense of the latter (148).

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 5. L. 60-77. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Kaganovich. About the Special Meeting. I. Stalin.

\*\* Only the draft regulation on the NKVD is published.

No. 468

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION "UNION OF LIBERATION"

August 25, 1934

No. 12, p. 25 - Question of the NKVD.

a) All foreign citizens involved in the case of the fascist organization "Union of Liberation" (Pappe Harry, Pappe Walter, Pappe Clara, Jansen Eugene) and the fascist organization working under the guise of the German central newspaper - DCC (Fridaga Henry, Walter Varta, Kamphausen L.L., Radishtok P.B.), deported outside the Soviet Union.

b) Cases against Russian citizens involved in these cases should be heard at the Special Meeting of the NKVD (149).

APRF. F.Z. Op. 58. D. 245. L. 106. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 9.VII.34.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Comrade. Berry".

No. 469

CIPPHROTELEGRAM Y.S. AGRANOVA IN  
SOCHI I.V. TO STALIN ON THE CASE OF A.S. NAKHAEV

August 26, 1934

No. 2145

Top secret Cipher

The arrested chief of staff of the artillery division, Osoviahim Nakhaev, confessed that he made his speech at the Krasnoperekopsky barracks on the instructions of his former colleague at the Institute of Physical Education, former General Leonid Nikolaevich Bykov. Nakhaev was aware of Bykov's connections through the Estonian embassy in Moscow with his brother-soldier in the tsarist army, now working as chief of the Estonian General Staff. Bykov was developed by a special department on suspicion of espionage in favor of Estonia. Recently, Bykov was the head of the personnel sector of the Institute of Physical Education.

Today he is arrested by us. I send Nakhaev's testimony by mail.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 84. L. 15. Original. Typescript.

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 470

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE CASE OF A GROUP OF EMPLOYEES OF  
THE STALIN METALLURGICAL PLANT (WESTERN SIBERIA)

September 2, 1934

No. 13, p. 120 - On the case of a group of workers of the Stalin Metallurgical Plant (Western Siberia).

a) Instruct t.t. Vyshinsky, Prokofiev and Ulrich to send an offsite session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court to Novosibirsk.

b) All convicted of spying for Japan are to be shot.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 246. L. 1. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Vyshinsky, Prokofiev, Ulrich.

No. 471

MEMORIAL G.E. PROKOFIEVA L.M.  
KAGANOVICH ON THE CASE OF K. FUKS

September 9, 1934

No. 30483

Owls. secret

Copy

We have completed the investigation into the case of the residency of the German secret police and naval intelligence in Leningrad and Murmansk. The testimonies of the accused, witnesses and the documentary materials available in the case, confiscated during the arrest of the accused, established the following:

1) The German secret police in the person of the head. The Eastern Department of Nordmann recruited for military intelligence work on the Baltic coast a member of the German National Socialist Party, who was arrested in the present case Kurt Adolfovich Fuchs (German-subscribed, until November



In 1933, he worked under a contract at the Leningrad Meat Processing Plant, after the expiration of the contract he left for Germany, and subsequently tried to return to the USSR. Entry into the Union Fuchsu was closed due to compromising materials available on him at that time), working in the secret police under the nickname "Wolf".

2) Fuchs' tasks included collecting military intelligence materials from the state of the coastal defense of the Baltic coast, data on the work of the military industry and aviation, and obtaining plans for military enterprises, indicating the most vulnerable places, for the subsequent creation of a sabotage network.

3) To achieve these goals, Fuchs was introduced by the German secret police to the team of the German steamer Boltenhagen, regularly

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visiting the port of Leningrad. When traveling to Leningrad, Fuchs, disguised, went to the city to meet with the agents he had created.

4) Fuchs, as a resident of the German secret police, carried out his main work through Hans Frantsevich Kotgasser, who was arrested in this case (an Austrian citizen, an employee of Mursnabstroy, fully confessed to conducting intelligence work and betrayed his entire network), who in February 1934 He was recruited by him under the nickname "Rolly" and extended his activities both to Murmansk and Leningrad.

5) To expand intelligence work on Leningrad by Fuchs and Kotgasser in March of this year. LSPO fitter Bortsikovsky P. was recruited (Pole, citizen of the USSR, arrested, fully confessed to intelligence work). Bortsikovsky was asked to collect information about the deployment of military units in the Leningrad Military District and to get, in order to prepare for planting a sabotage network, plans for the Baltic Plant and the Bolshevik and Krasny Putilovets plants. In May of this year, continuing to expand the work of organizing military espionage, Fuchs K. recruited an Austrian citizen V.F. Kadlec. (a German, has been working under a contract since 1932 as an installer at Giprokhod, was not arrested as having filed an application with the NKVD immediately after recruitment), who during the investigation showed that he was asked to obtain materials about the Baltic Fleet, to draw up separate sketches of the location Leningrad power plants and gas plants and to present materials about the Pulkovo air town.

In the process of working in Leningrad, Fuchs and Kotgasser used Mikhelson A.G. (citizen of the USSR, unemployed, arrested at the time of arrest, confessed to involvement in intelligence work) and Mikhelson AND I. (citizen of the USSR, b / n, housewife, arrested, confessed to involvement in intelligence work).

6) To conduct direct intelligence work in Murmansk, Kotgasser G.F. were recruited citizens of the USSR, employees of Mursnabstroy Petrovsky A.Ya. (arrested, confessed to intelligence work) and Grinfeld P.K. (arrested, confessed to intelligence work), which brought him information about military construction on the Murmansk coast, about trawlers and the merchant fleet.

7) It was established that for communication Fuchs and Kotgasser used cryptography and secret safe addresses in Finland (corresponding documents

you are at our disposal).

Fuchs K. did not confess to conducting intelligence work and belonging to the German secret police, despite the presentation of incriminating documentary materials (a conditional letter written by him concerning the use of secret writing, reports and materials of an intelligence nature) and confrontations with other accused and an Austrian witness subjects V. Kadlec (non-partisan, working under a contract in Gipokholod since July 1932 as a repairman).

I consider it necessary to refer the case for judicial investigation to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. I ask for instructions (150).

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs  
of the USSR Prokofiev

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 246. L. 92-94. Script. Typescript.

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No. 472

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION G.E. PROKOFIEVA  
L.M. KAGANOVICH  
ABOUT THE CASE OF A.A. TRIFONOV

September 11, 1934

No. 30496

Top secret

In the autumn of 1933, military personnel, workers of the UNR, deserted to Manchuria from the territory of the 3rd section of the UNR (Office of the Chief of Works) 103 - Trifonov Alexander Alexandrovich, a boat mechanic; Eskov Vitaly and Morov Georgy - mechanics.

In the mountains To Lahassus, the fugitives came to the Japanese gendarmerie, declaring that they had crossed the border illegally, where they were arrested and sent by gunboat to Harbin at the disposal of the Japanese military mission.  
these.

During interrogation in the mission, the deserters gave detailed testimonies about all the secret information known to them regarding the defense construction of sector No. 103, after which they were released and sent to work in the mechanical workshops of the Manchukuo naval headquarters.

Trifonov Alexander, as the most well-established among the Japanese with detailed testimonies about defensive points on the border, after some processing was recruited for espionage and sabotage activities on our territory by the Japanese secretary of the SUDA, and on July 10, 1934, he was illegally transferred to the territory of the Soviet Far East.

Before the transfer, Trifonov received the following tasks directly from the Court:

- 1) Drive along the route - Sovetskaya Gavan, De-Kastri Bay, along the river. Amur to Nikolaevsk and Komsomolsk n / Amur. At all these points, collect data on the number of military units, their location and detailed numbering.
- 2) Carefully photograph the defensive points of the fortifications in De-Kastri Bay and Sovetskaya Harbor.
- 3) Get and bring to Harbin a piece of building material from which defense points are built.

For the expenses of the Court, he gave Trifonov 80 yen and, in addition, provided him with a small camera with 4 films.

For unhindered passage of the border, upon returning to Harbin, Suda handed Trifonov his business card with the following content:

"He is Russian Trifonov, seconded by our military mission in Suifynhe (Border), as evidenced. Suda Seikei. Harbin, military mission, telephone number 43-22 and 34-84.

On the front side of the card is a personal seal, on which is written: "Seikei Courts, June 23, 1934."

On the reverse side there is a round seal with the coat of arms of Japan, with the inscription in Russian "Japanese military mission, Harbin".

On the advice of the Court, Trifonov sewed a visiting card into the lining of his jacket.

#### DOCUMENTATION

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Upon arrival on Soviet territory, Trifonov immediately went to Vladivostok to carry out assignments, where, as a suspicious element, he was arrested.

During a personal search, Trifonov's business card was found sewn into the lining of his jacket.

During the investigation, Trifonov fully confessed.

The case has been completed by the investigation, we consider it expedient to send it to the Military Tribunal for hearing.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs  
of the USSR Prokofiev

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 246. L. 89, 90. Original. Typescript.

5473

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE CASE OF TRIFONOV and others."

September 23, 1934

No. 14, p. 67 - On the case of Trifonov and others.

Agree with the proposal of the NKVD to send the cases of Trifonov, Eskov and Morov to the military tribunal.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 246. L. 88. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The decision was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 20.IX.34 i.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Prokofiev, Agranov, you Shinsky.

No. 474

LETTER G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN  
ON PERSONNEL SHIFTS IN THE NKVD

September 1934

Comrade Stalin!

According to your instructions, upon returning from vacation, to check and thoroughly instruct the operational work of the regional apparatuses of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, I sent two groups of operational employees of the center - one to Western Siberia, led by Comrade. Prokofiev, and another - to Leningrad, headed by Comrade. Mironov.

The factual situation, discovered as a result of the check both in Novosibirsk and in Leningrad, convinced me that neither Alekseev (head of the West Siberian Department of the NKVD) nor Medved are absolutely capable of directing our work in the new conditions and ensuring that a sharp turn in the methods of work on the management of national security, Which is now needed.

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The restructuring of the apparatus of agents and investigative work in accordance with the directives of the Central Committee and my orders issued in follow-up to these directives has not been carried out in both areas.

The negative results of this have already affected.

So, Alekseev criminally overslept the phenomenon of sabotage of grain deliveries in the region

and not only did not lead the fight against the kulak saboteurs, but did not even signal this, because he did not see what was happening.

Not being able to organize the work of the department of state security of the region in a new way, Alekseev actually ugly weakened the fight against the counter-revolution, which is taking place in the West Siberian region.

Medved's situation is about the same as in Novosibirsk.

A number of serious lines of work, especially in the countryside and agent-operational protection of the borders from Finnish and other defectors and spies, as well as the organization of the fight against sabotage at enterprises, are in a completely unsatisfactory state.

This situation seems to me all the more unacceptable because neither Alekseev nor Medved, if they are left in their places, will be able to reorganize work in the future, to ensure that the apparatuses subordinate to them depart from those traditions of the past period, from which it is now necessary resolutely refuse, and also they will not be able to properly educate and retain the Chekist cadres we need.

In addition, I consider it impossible to leave unpunished the situation that was revealed by the inspection of work in Novosibirsk and Leningrad, since a decisive blow against the culprits - Alekseev and Medved - will pull up the rest of the heads of the regional and regional departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

Therefore, and also in order to ensure a sharp turn in the methods of work on the management of state security in the field and to force our heads of regional and regional apparatuses to work in a new way, to make them understand the need for a decisive rejection of those traditions in methods of work that were suitable to the conditions of previous years, but completely unacceptable in the current situation, so that they do not think that we have only "changed the sign", but understand the seriousness of the requirements that are presented for the restructuring of the methods of our struggle against enemies, on the other hand, they would not allow themselves to give up for a single moment in the face of the difficulties of the new situation and to any extent to weaken the blows against the counter-revolution - I consider it necessary to remove Alekseev and Medved from their positions.

This event would be published in the order of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs for the Union, explaining why exactly they - Alekseev and Medved - were removed.

At the same time, I would consider it expedient to appoint Vakovsky from Belorussia instead of Medved to Leningrad, an undoubtedly strong and capable operative worker who will be able to raise work in Leningrad to the proper level, and instead of Alekseev to appoint Karutsky to Novosibirsk, who is much higher than Alekseev, is a talented operative worker and has a lot of experience.

In Minsk, in place of Zakovsky, appoint Pilyar, who was released from work in Central Asia, who had already been the OGPU PD in Belarus, knows the situation in Belarus well and quite satisfactorily fulfills his duties there.

Lordkipanidze from Transcaucasia could be appointed to Kazakhstan, but I don't know if this combination will work and whether he will work with Mirzoyan.

DOCUMENTATION

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I would have thought to recall the bear to Moscow and use him in the central office of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, where to see at work whether he was still fit for work in the NKVD or had already completely worked out.

If you find my proposals correct, I will put them up for resolution.

I beg you to let me know your opinion.

CA FSB RF. F. 3. Op. 2. D. 9. L. 243-245. Copy. Typescript.

Published: Heinrich Yagoda. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. General Commissioner of State Security. Collection of documents. Kazan, 1997. S. 372-374.

No. 475

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"CASE OF FUCHS and others"

October 23, 1934

No. 15, p. 199. - Case of Fuchs et al.

Fuks \*sentence\* to 8 years in prison, Kotgasser to 6 years in prison, Bortsikovsky to be sentenced to death with subsequent replacement through the CEC with 10 years in prison; Petrovsky, Grishfeld and Golubchikov to be sentenced to 10 years in prison; Mikhelson (accused of non-information) to be sentenced to 1 year of forced labor, Mikhelson Annet to be acquitted for lack of evidence.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 246. L. 91. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 12.X.34.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten notation about the distribution: "Informed to Comrade Ulrich." \*—\*  
Underlined in pencil.

ÿ476

DECISION of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ON UKRAINE

October 31, 1934

P 1158 - Decision of the Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars on Ukraine.

1. Punish exposed Ukrainian nationalists and Trotskyists, including Kotsiubinsky.

2. Permit to send from 500 to 1000 families of individual farmers from the Ukrainian SSR border strip, obliging the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine to take measures to ensure that their places are occupied by reliable elements. Personal responsibility for performance - for t.t. Kosior, Postyshev and Balitsky.

3. To oblige the Central Committee of the CP(b)U and the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine to turn the town of Kamenetz-Podolsk into the foremost outpost of Soviet Ukrainian patriotism against the Polish pans and pilsudchiks within 6 months.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 30. D. 197. L. 23. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted without a protocol.

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No. 477

TELEGRAM FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN  
BERLIN ON THE FRENCH-GERMAN APPROACH,

DIRECTIONAL INO GUGB NKVD USSR I.V. STALIN

November 17, 1934

OWL. SECRET

French Republic Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs Department of Political  
and Commercial Affairs

25.10.34

No. 114

ÿHitler told our ambassador in Berlin that he wanted good neighborly relations with France\*.

He declared that as soon as the Saar question was settled, there would be no more ground for disagreement between France and Germany. Throughout the post-war period, the conclusion of a final Franco-German agreement was hindered by Poland. But now Poland can no longer keep France from concluding such an agreement.

As for the Little Entente, Yugoslavia and Rumania approve of this French-German rapprochement, and as for Czechoslovakia, which is under the threat of Poland and Hungary, it would not be difficult at all to win her sympathy for this agreement.

ÿHitler noted that the Franco-German agreement is much easier to implement than the Franco-Italian one, in view of the fact that Germany is ready to solemnly renounce any expansion to the West to the detriment of France\*, while Italy can only satisfy her ambitions in the conquest

French colonies in North Africa.

Without dotting the "and", Hitler seemed to want to suggest that we conclude an agreement to the detriment of Poland and Italy.

The French ambassador in Berlin evasively told him that until the Saar question was resolved, any diplomatic action for the purpose of French-German rapprochement was doomed in advance to failure.

Ÿ According to credible information, Hitler allegedly invited the Soviet ambassador Surits to agree to a German-Soviet rapprochement\*. He allegedly told him that in exchange for raw materials, Germany was ready to give the Soviets machinery and manufactured goods.

Ÿ The tactics of German diplomacy at the present time seem to be the following\*: to flirt with all states, thus arouse in them fears and suspicions towards each other and then set them against each other, using this position for themselves personally\*\*.

The announcement of negotiations being conducted with a view to a Franco-German rapprochement allowed Germany supposedly to put pressure on Mussolini, on the Soviets, on Poland and on the states of the Little Entente.

R.P.G

(information from the telegram of  
our ambassador in Berlin)  
Documentary  
Translation from French

DOCUMENTATION

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In addition, such news had the effect of frightening the anti-Hitlerites and the wavering elements in the Saar, who could, perhaps, rightly think that France was ready to leave them and sacrifice them to Hitler.

That's right: DEPUTY BEGINNING. INO GUGB BERMAN

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 187. L. 118, 119. Original. Typescript.

Ÿ On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Comrade. Stalin. 11/17/34 Prokofiev"; Stalin: "My archive. I. St.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\*  
It is underlined in the margins with two lines.

No. 478

W. BULLITT'S LETTER TO WASHINGTON  
ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION



OF THE SOVIET UNION, DIRECTED INO  
GUGB NKVD USSR I.V. STALIN

November 19, 1934

TOP SECRET

Moscow, September 18, 1934 Documentary

Translation from English

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
Washington

Sir,

Our reports on the question of debts missed each other on the way, which caused a misunderstanding, which I explain in the present report, although my telegram of September 15th, probably, has already clarified enough.

\*The Soviets continue to insist that an agreement on the question of loans and credits must be reached simultaneously and must be connected with the question of mutual obligations\*. Representatives of the Soviet government believe that the president can achieve an agreement

if only he so desires.

\* They assure that an agreement will be reached as soon as President Roosevelt can be convinced that the USSR cannot make further concessions, and they are sure that all important questions, after they have been discussed in advance in the commissions, are dictatorial permitted by the president\*. The Soviets do not believe that important decisions are made in accordance with democratic principles. This is exactly what I wanted to tell you in my cable of September 18th. If I was too brief at the expense of clarity and you get the impression that I am stating my personal point of view, then I apologize. In the future, I will be more careful.

I will be able to leave Moscow at the end of October. As soon as I know the exact date of Ambassador Troyanovsky's arrival here, you will receive a detailed report on my plans and route. All current work on the embassy will be entrusted to Mr. Wiley and Hanson, and Mr. Wiley will appear before the Soviet government as my deputy. The fact that Mr. Hanson knows Russian will be of inestimable benefit, and Mr. Wiley, as

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an older worker will be better able to follow all the tricks of Soviet policy.

I have taken note of your instructions regarding visas on passports. There will be no complications, since the Russian government does not make any special demands in this area. It, like the US government, asserts its right to refuse a visa or issue it under special conditions, which will be listed and submitted to the State Department for approval. I sent the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs proposals in writing regarding the settlement of the issue of passports, emphasizing their preliminary nature and indicating that these proposals should still be sent to the State Department for a window.

meaningful statement.

- The issue of patents is much more difficult. In the USSR they are accustomed to handle foreign inventions rather unceremoniously\*. Soviet trade delegations visit the largest plants and factories of the whole world, they are kindly given the opportunity to get acquainted with the work of these enterprises on the grounds that large orders are expected from the USSR, and the Soviets buy a small number of models on the free market, which are copied by suitable and necessary for applications and use in Russian conditions. There are laboratories in Moscow that are engaged with exceptional success in testing and applying foreign inventions to Russian conditions. \*I am personally aware of a whole series of American inventions in the field of machines, machine parts, etc., which are used by Soviet industry\*. Metals, leathers, textiles are used in forms and for purposes that would require patents in the United States and other countries, and these contingents of goods are only slightly modified (or even not modified at all) in order not to be immediately recognized by the incompetent. faces, while the trained eye of an expert immediately detects it. \*It will not be easy to agree on this issue with the Russians, the USSR is not bound by any international agreement on patents or copyrights\*. As soon as the question of the right to a patent is raised, the councils, to their own satisfaction, but not always to the satisfaction of the plaintiff, declare that the given invention was made in Russia and only coincidentally coincides with the invention of another country. A lengthy and costly investigation would have to be carried out with almost insurmountable difficulties. The proposal of the State Department that Russian claims for damages caused by the American military expedition should be countered by claims by American firms about the illegal use (not to use a stronger expression) by Russian state trusts, etc. American patents, has no chance of success. You can be sure that it will not be approved by the Soviet government, which believes that it has already shown excessive compliance on the issue of our post-war adventures in Murmansk. It would be wiser to abandon this idea altogether.

- The economic situation of the Soviet Union has not actually changed. Reports of the raging famine here are greatly exaggerated\*, but at the same time it cannot be denied that there are vast areas where the harvest was poor and where food shortages will be felt. This applies to the Volga region, rather vast territories in the Ukraine, and many other large grain regions. 'Russia will have to tighten its belt and cut grain exports\*. But a well-organized distribution system will save the day to a great extent. When familiarized with

DOCUMENTATION

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first of all with the rationing system by which the councils distribute food, \*it can be said that starvation among the population under normal conditions is already a thing of the past\*. This can become clear to their person, who knew Russia under the tsar, when even in the most fruitful years there were still areas where the population was starving. The fact that the planned economy of the Soviets and planned distribution in some way

brought the peasant population out of starvation is an achievement that cannot be underestimated.

In other areas, the prospects are also far from favorable, although industrial output is growing rapidly, it still does not correspond to the plans of the second five-year plan and in many cases does not even reach the minimum figures. Both in terms of technical expertise and labor productivity, Russia's performance falls far behind European and American standards, and this violates all the plans developed in government organizations. To a person familiar with Russian conditions, the fear of Russian competition felt by American industrialists seems completely incomprehensible. It will be decades more before the Soviets achieve a productivity that can be compared with the productivity of our industry.

\*<sup>3</sup>Here one senses considerable dissatisfaction among the rank-and-file Party members with the decision to once again postpone the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, although it does not manifest itself openly. Many party members are dissatisfied with the fact that the Soviet government has gone too far in terms of concessions to the capitalist countries\*. Obviously, the fear of the discontent of other countries forced the USSR to put aside the interests of the International, which proved once again that the world does not have to fear the idea of Marxism, no matter how much noise the propagandists of this idea raise. The Soviet Union wants a world revolution only in cases where it can be beneficial to Russian interests. It has long ceased to carry out work that meets the needs of the world proletariat.

WILLIAM BULLIT

That's right: ZAM. BEGINNING INO GUGB BERMAN

RGASPI. F. 558. Op.II. D. 187. L. 96-100. Script. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: Stalin's "My archive"; "Tov. Stalin. 11/19/34. Prokofiev.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 479

NOTE B.S. Stomonyakova I.V. STALIN AND V.M.  
MOLOTOV IN THE SCHVERZ CASE

November 19, 1934

No. 10134

Secret

Dear comrade,

The Estonian mission, on behalf of their government, again turned to us on the Schwertz case, insisting this time on his deportation from the USSR. At the same time, the Estonian mission refers to the fact that Shverts is 60 years old, that he is ill and will not live in Siberia for the 10 years to which he was sentenced. The mission points to

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that this sentence is too harsh, and draws attention to the fact that it was not issued by a regular court, but by the Collegium of the OGPU. Finally, the mission reports that in Reval they are offended by the unequal attitude towards Estonia, as to a small state, in comparison with large states, whose citizens are not administratively exiled, but are deported abroad, even when they are convicted by the court as was the case with Metro-Vickers employees.

Taking into account that negotiations over Schwertz with the Estonian government have been going on for about a year now, and especially considering the significant improvement in our relations with Estonia of late, the NKID considers it desirable to meet the request of the estpra and send Schwertz to Estonia.

The proposal was agreed with Com. Litvinov.

With comradely greetings, B. Stomonyakov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 246. L. 116. Copy. Typescript.

No. 480

NOTE G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. STALIN  
ABOUT THE GROUP "BATTLE COMMUNIST UNION"

(BCS) (151)

December 11, 1934

No. 31092

OWL. SECRET

Ph.D. was arrested in Leningrad. a terrorist group that called itself the "Combat Communist Union", consisting of junior topographers of the 3rd topographic detachment and former cadets of the military topographic school of the LVO.

The group had the task of fighting the Soviet regime not only by the method of counter-revolutionary propaganda, but also by terror. In the program, printed on a rotator (in Ukrainian), paragraph 6 says that the method of struggle of the "Combat Communist Union" is terror.

Members of this group produced leaflets calling for a fight against the policies of the party and the government. The slogan of the c.-r. The groups were: "Freedom of labour, speech and press", "cessation of export of products" and others.

Of the participants in this c.-r. group arrested 8 people.

1. Aleksey Vasilievich Golovkin (son of a kulak, his uncle is an officer in the Polish army), junior topographer of the 3rd topographic detachment. During a search at his apartment in the mountains. Leningrad, printed counter-revolutionary leaflets and explosives (80 pieces of detonators) were found. During the interrogation Golov

kin confessed that he organized the c.-r. a group of cadets of the military topographic school in Leningrad.

2. Polkanov Vasily Ivanovich, non-party, expelled from the CPSU (b) in 1933 for a right deviation, formerly a cadet of a military topographic school, currently an employee of the Leningrad office of Srednevolgstroy. During a search, 185 copies of the programs and leaflets of the "Combat Communist Union", a Gutenberg printing machine with a type set, and blank forms of the military topographic detachment were found and confiscated from him. Polkanov Vasily confessed to receiving from Golovkin A.V. k.-r. leaflets and programs of the "Combat Communist Union".

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3. Alexander Ivanovich Strobykin, born in 1908, member VKP(b), junior topographer of the 3rd military topographic detachment, confirmed Ph.D. agitation on the part of Golovkin and confessed to handing over the suitcase from the K.-r. leaflets, programs and a printing house from Golovkin for safekeeping to Vasily Polkanov.

4. Evgeny Leontievich Kalinovsky, born in 1912, a member of the Komsomol, a cadet of a military topographic school, testified that the presence of a Ph.D. of the "Combat Communist Union" group, he learned from A.V. Golovkin.

5. Polkanov Ivan Ivanovich, factory fitter.

6. Vladimirova Praskovya Ivanovna, born in 1896 (brother and sister of Vasily Polkanova).

7. Vladimirov Pavel Andreevich, born in 1889, unemployed, agent of the Glavkurort Snabtgorg, testified that they knew about the contents of A.V. Golovkin's suitcase, mentioned above, stored in their apartment.

8. Torganov Mikhail Tikhonovich, born in 1911, from the kr-n, non-partisan, moved from Leningrad to Moscow, as he was appointed to the Moscow Photo-theodolite detachment (arrested in Moscow on December 11 of this year).

Instructions were given on the arrest of three former cadets of the Leningrad Military Topographic School, who, according to A.V. Golovkin, were recruited by him into the K.-R. group of the "Combat Communist Union": Andrey Demyanovich Timofeev, born in 1910, candidate of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who distributed the K.-R. leaflets, located in the mountains. Smolensk, Yanovsky - in the mountains. Dnepropetrovsk and Luchinsky - in the mountains. Kyiv.

The investigation continues.

ZAM. PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

PROKOFIEV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 227. L. 169-172. Script. Typescript.

No. 481

PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION I.I. KOTOLYNOVA

December 12, 1934

Question: Since when has the c.-r. Zinoviev organization, of which you are a member?

Answer: "After the defeat of the Zinoviev-Trotsky bloc by the party, the Zinovievites continued to exist as an independent organization\*.

All of us, the Zinovievists, continued to maintain organizational ties and regarded all ZINOVIEV's declarations about the renunciation of our anti-Party views and of the struggle against the Party as a maneuvering tactic.

"A direct confirmation of this tactic is Zinoviev's written directive of June 30-28, about which I have already shown, which set out to deceive the party. Personally, together with other members of the organization, I hid this letter from ZINOVIEV from the party and subsequently put it into practice.\* In particular, at the time of my return to the party in August 1928, I, RUMYANTSEV, I. , were actually sent by KAMENEV, and the latter, after our information about negotiations with \*\*t. Yaroslavsky edited the final text of our application for admission to the party\*\*.

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Question: Who is the head of Ph.D. organizations?

Answer: \*\*The organization is led by ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV and associated with them EVDOKIMOV, BAKAEV, KHARITONOV and GERTIK.\*\*

Question: Who do you know from the composition of the Leningrad Ph.D. organizations?

Answer: \*\* V. RUMYANTSEV, S. MANDELSHTAM, A. TOLMAZOV, F. FADE EV, Y. TSEITLIN. At the industrial institute: ANTONOV, ZVEZDOV, NADEL M. I was connected with all of them. I was also associated with the Trotskyist SUROV, apparently exiled for the c.-r. activity. In addition, I was in touch with NATANSON before her deportation, and with BOGOMOLNYY.\*\*

"I know LEVIN as an active Zinovievist, I suppose that the members of the "23" group are grouped around him, in particular MYASNIKOV and ZELIK SON. \*

Question: Who else besides you kept in touch with the Moscow center of Ph.D. organizations?

Answer: \* Relations with Moscow were also maintained by RUMYANTSEV, who always

Yes, he was aware and informed me of the latest political news. \*\* In particular, in one of the meetings RUMIANTSEV told me about the removal of ZINOVIEV from the editorial staff of the Bolshevik magazine. RUMIANTSEV expressed regret at Zinoviev and dissatisfaction with the attitude of the party leadership towards him.\*\*

I remember that last year, before the purge of the party, RUMYANTSEV gave me instructions on the need to prepare for the purge, because, according to him, the purge would be used to punish the Zinovievists by creating artificial cases against them.

Question: What can you show about the terrorist attack on Comrade KIROV, a member of your C.R. organization L. NIKOLAEV?

\*\* Political and moral responsibility for the murder Answer: comrade KIROVA NIKOLAEV is borne by our organization, under the influence of which NIKOLAEV was brought up in an atmosphere of embittered attitude towards the leaders of the CPSU(b).\*\* (152)

I. Kotolynov

Interrogated: Deputy early SPO GUGB NKVD USSR Lyushkov Nach  
6 OTD. SPO GUGB NKVD USSR Korkin

APRF. F.Z.Op. 24. D. 198. L. 8, 9. Copy. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\*—"It was underlined in the margins with a pencil.

No. 482

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL OF L. NIKOLAEV

December 13, 1934

QUESTION: Do you admit that you were a member of the c.r. group of former oppositionists that existed in Leningrad in the composition of KOTOLYNOV, SHATSKY, YUSKIN and others?

\* Yes, I confirm that I was in group b. oppositionists in the  
ANSWER: the staff of KOTOLYNOV, SHATSKY, YUSKIN, and others, who conducted the c.r. work\*.

QUESTION: What political views did the band members adhere to?

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ANSWER: The members of the group were on the platform of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc. They considered it necessary to "replace the existing party leadership by all possible means".

QUESTION: Who authorized the murder of comrade. Kirov?

ANSWER: \*\*The murder of KIROV was authorized by a member of the group KOTOLYNOV and SHATSKII on behalf of the entire group.\*\*

QUESTION: What instructions did you receive from KOTOLYNOV, SHATSKY on the question of how to behave during the investigation?

ANSWER: \*\*I had to portray the murder of KIROV as a sole act in order to hide the participation of the Zinoviev group in it.\*\*

Written from my words correctly. The protocol was read to me. L. Nikolaev People's Commissar of the USSR Agranov

Beginning ECO GUGB NKVD USSR Mironov  
Pom. Head of IVF GUGB NKVD USSR Dmitriev

AGTRF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 198. L. 2. Copy. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

ÿÿ—ÿÿ Underlined in pencil margin.

No. 483

NOTE G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT  
THE GROUP "BATTLE COMMUNIST UNION"

WITH THE APP OF THE BCS PROGRAM

December 16, 1934

No. 31134

Top secret

In addition to the message of December 11 this year. No. 31092 on the arrest in Leningrad of a counter-revolutionary terrorist group of military topographers, who called themselves the "Combat Communist Union", we are transmitting the BKS program confiscated from the arrested topographer of the 3rd Military Topographic Detachment A.V. Golovkin .

In the city of Chernigov, the ninth member of this counter-revolutionary group, a student of the Putilevsky Vocational College Veremeenko, who was also recruited by A.V. Golovkin, was additionally arrested.

Deputy People's Commissar of  
Internal Affairs of the USSR PROKOFIEV

BATTLE COMMUNIST UNION (BCS)  
1932

After the death of the great revolutionary theorist and practitioner Lenin, a strong struggle began among the ruling head over the paths that should be followed towards communism, which eventually turned into a struggle over who should be in power. This struggle led to shameful distortions of the Leninist foundations of construction and fell heavily on the shoulders of the working people. going by this



way, we have come to a comprehensive progressive deterioration in the life of all working people, which signals the moment when the active organized action of the entire mass of the working population has become absolutely necessary.

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to return to the truly Leninist path of socialist construction evidence.

The BCS sets itself the task of organizing this mass demonstration by explaining the real situation of the country and fighting, both in theory and in practice, against the perversions of Leninism, using all possible methods of revolutionary action, not excluding terror.

Specifically, at the moment, the BCS puts forward:

I.

Thanks to the concentration of power in the hands of a small group that squabbles over portfolios, the basic principles of Soviet power given by Lenin are perverted.

To eliminate this and ensure truly proletarian leadership of the country, the BCS puts forward the following specific measures:

- 1) The entire state and economic apparatus is only elective and no changes from above are inadmissible; early changes are carried out only by general meetings and congresses, and voting in this case is secret;
- 2) In order to reduce the possibility of elective mutual responsibility, there should be no candidate lists prepared in advance at any gatherings. The electors themselves nominate candidates from among themselves at general assemblies;
- 3) No transfers to another job or to another district are inadmissible in relation to elected persons, if this is not the will of the general meeting of voters;
- 4) Only workers who have not stained themselves with any social crime have voting rights.

II.

With the aim of infallibly observing the basic socialist principle of voluntariness, which under the given conditions is almost everywhere replaced by coercion, the BCS fights for:

- 1) Any decision of the general meeting is not subject to any approval and changes by the authorities; only congresses can change and cancel;
- 2) No political and economic campaigns should have any connection with administrative bodies, and representatives of these bodies cannot be authorized to conduct certain campaigns;

3) Every worker has the right to do only what he has freely consented to do;

4) Associations of working people in the branch of economic cooperation are created only at the free will of those who unite.

Workers have the right to change the type and place of work, depending on their desire, and there can be no restrictions on this right in the form of free or unfree "reinforcements" in a particular job. Whoever violates the socialist principle of voluntariness in relation to the working people in their political and economic work is subject to imprisonment for a long time and even the death penalty, as socially harmful, as an enemy of communism, who works for the benefit of the exploiters.

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#### III.

In order to immediately improve the living conditions of the working people, the BCS is fighting for the even development of all branches of the national economy, placing as a basis the satisfaction of the daily vital needs of the working people, proceeding from the fact that really socialist construction should in no case be carried out at the cost of premature exhaustion and death of those who are building.

At the moment, BCS is fighting for:

1) The development of light industry at the highest rates, even if only at the expense of the general rates in the construction of socialist industry, not allowing the export of what the working people of our country are themselves not adequately provided with, completely rejecting any economy at the expense of the daily living needs of the working people.

2. The liquidation of surplus appropriations in the form of grain and other procurements, when under the guise of a planned economy even the subsistence minimum is taken from the village, which makes famine an abnormal phenomenon (Ukraine) and destroys agriculture.

3. Establishment of the "correct product exchange" (Lenin), opening the market and strengthening cooperation, because, as shown in 1931 and 1932, the "siege" of the capitalist economy (NEP) still prepared the ground too little for starting the assault again .

4. Exporting only the actual surplus of foodstuffs, providing the working people with a free cooperative supply.

#### IV.

Freedom of speech for working people has lately been only a word in the constitution, since one can speak and write only what is only a rehash or wholly confirms what Stalin said. To own

the body of the word has really become the driving force of socialist construction, the BCS puts forward:

1. Every worker has an unrestricted right to express his thoughts in public, both orally and in writing.
2. The press should reflect the real situation of the country, and not only give facts that are pleasing to the ruling center. The proletariat has the right to know what is going on in its state.

v.

In order to eliminate various social crimes, the BCS puts forward the following measures:

1. To create a "Cheka" for quick and immediate reprisals, as in the days of war communism, bearing in mind that the front of construction in this case is the same military front.
2. Widely apply the death penalty and long-term imprisonment for those who distort the basic principles and laws of Soviet power.
3. To widely apply the bringing to justice of general meetings of workers, thus placing the criminal in the hands of those against whom the crime was directly directed.

VI.

BCS, setting itself the main task of organizing a mass movement, at the same time, with the forces of the organization, is waging a struggle, using all active methods, including terror, against conscious perverts. Marxist

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the Leninist way of building socialism as a way to stop criminal activity, which is written into history with the blood and sweat of millions of working people. Under these conditions, the BCS is a conspiratorial organization, which consists of separate cells with a single, strictly conspiratorial leading center. The connection of the cells between themselves and the governing center is maintained by means of successive representation.

Each member of the BCS must:

- 1) Strictly observe discipline and unconditionally fulfill all tasks and duties assigned to him by the organization.
- 2) By the example of one's own life, unswervingly uphold the principles for the honor of which he is fighting.
- 3) Boldly go to any lengths, fulfilling the orders of the organization (even if at the cost of one's own life), firmly remembering that the cause of life of all workers in millions

times more than the life of a unit.

4) Do not enjoy privileges in meeting their needs, experiencing all sorts of difficulties on an equal basis with all working people. Each extra piece is a piece taken from the mouth of another worker just like you.

5) Every member of the BCS who, preaching the struggle for firm observance of socialist principles, violates them himself, is worthy of death as a deceiver of the working people, as a traitor, and must be punished by the verdict of the organization.

6) Every worker who shares the BCS program and fights to put it into practice can be a member of the Combat Communist Union.

Let us unite, forward to new battles against the traitors and enemies of communism!

Head of the Special Department of the  
GUGB NKVD of the USSR Guy

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 227. L. 173-179. Script. Typescript.

No. 484

#### MEMORANDUM Art. Kosiora I.V. TO STALIN ON FORTIFICATION OF THE BORDER STAND

December 23, 1934

In pursuance of the directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in relation to Kamenetz-Podolsk and the strengthening of the entire border strip of Ukraine, primarily the 11 specially designated border areas, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (b)U took the following main measures:

1. The secretaries of the district party committees and chairmen of the district executive committees of 11 border regions were selected from among the strongest and most trusted party and Soviet workers of the Ukrainian organization, including 4 members of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U.

In addition, the composition of secretaries of district party committees and chairmen of district executive committees and other border regions of the Kyiv region has been revised, and many of them have been replaced by stronger workers. We will finish the same work in the Vinnitsa region in the coming days.

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2. Work is underway to revise and strengthen the composition of the heads of district departments, inspectors through the NKVD, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat of Health, the People's Commissariat of Education, the People's Commissariat of Finance, the Procurement Committee and the People's Commissariat for Internal Trade. According to the NKVD, the composition of the heads of the district departments of the NKVD and

out of 11 districts, only in 4 former chiefs were left, and in 7 districts the heads of district departments were replaced by stronger workers.

3. Work has begun on revising the composition of school heads, chief physicians, senior agronomists, and postal managers in order to strengthen their composition and fully staff these districts with medical staff, trusted teachers, agronomists, veterinarians and livestock specialists.

4. Measures have been outlined to clear the border strip, and in the first place, areas and villages with a Polish and German population, from an unreliable and anti-Soviet element, namely:

a) Clearing the border areas of anti-Soviet elements along the lines of the NKVD and expelling them to the north (approximate number of about 2000 farms).

b) Resettlement to the eastern regions of Ukraine from the border areas of unreliable elements from among the individual farmers, as well as some collective farmers in a total of about 8-9 thousand households. Areas and villages inhabited by Poles and Germans will be especially thoroughly cleaned, primarily villages located near points of fortified areas and other objects of strategic importance (railway junctions, bridges, etc.).

5. The recruitment of 4,000 farms from among the best collective farmers and activists in the Kiev and Chernihiv regions (where conditions are most similar to the border strip) is planned to strengthen the border strip and replace those resettled deep into Ukraine.

In addition, we appeal to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with a request in 1935 to add 2,000 demobilized Red Army soldiers to the border areas.

6. For the practical implementation of points 4 and 5, we have planned:

a) sending 11 troikas to 24 border regions, led by members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, consisting of representatives of the NKVD and the military command. These troikas should outline the number and lists, on the one hand, of those evicted by the NKVD to the north, and on the other hand, they should outline the villages and the number, as well as lists of farms to be resettled from the border areas. In the three most difficult districts—Markhevsky and Novograd-Volynsky, with a dense Polish population, and Pulinsky, with German and Polish populations—it is planned to send individual troikas to each region.

b) 20 responsible workers were sent to the districts of Staroselytsina, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov region and the eastern part of the Odessa region to study the question of how many farms can be resettled in these areas and what measures are required to prepare this relocation

leniya.

In addition to these main activities, we carry out the following:

7. In view of the fact that in a number of villages with a majority of the non-Polish population, Polish village councils were created in the past, now 18 such Polish village councils in the Vinnitsa region have been reorganized into Ukrainian ones, and in the Kiev region - 7 Polish village councils into Ukrainian ones. Review is ongoing with a view to further reorganization.

Since Polish schools were artificially created in a number of villages among the population whose native language is Ukrainian, we are now reorganizing these schools.

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In the Vinnitsa region, out of 291 Polish schools, 135 schools were completely reorganized into Ukrainian ones or merged with existing Ukrainian schools; 29 schools were reorganized into Ukrainian ones with the preservation of Polish sets. Thus, 118 Polish schools and 9 Polish schools with Ukrainian sets remain in the region.

In the Kyiv region, out of 53 Polish schools, 70 schools were completely reorganized into Ukrainian ones or merged with Ukrainian ones, 6 schools were reorganized into Ukrainian ones with the preservation of Polish sets; left in the region - 70 Polish schools and 7 Polish schools with Ukrainian sets.

8. A number of measures have been taken to improve the sanitary condition of cities and improve communal services in them (holding a month of cleaning cities, organizing monitoring of the cleaning of yards and streets, putting fair and market squares in order, strengthening the transport of communal services, etc.).

In order to raise attention to the urban economy in Kamenetz-Podolsk and Proskurov, we decided to reorganize the Kamenetz-Podolsky and Proskurov District Executive Committees into city councils with their direct subordination to the Regional Executive Committee.

9. For 1935, appropriations for the municipal construction of these cities and regions are planned - in the amount of 10,200 thousand rubles. Including Kamenets-Podolsk - 3.435 thousand rubles, Novograd-Volynsk - 1.500 thousand rubles, Korosten - 1 million rubles, Proskurov - 765 thousand rubles, Mogilev-Podolsk - 530 thousand rubles, Shepetovka - 715 thousand rubles.

On this question we sent a special note to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR with a request to approve these appropriations.

10. Some measures are also planned for the development of industry in these 11 regions in 1935. So, for example, in Kamenetz-Podolsk, we approved 800 thousand rubles for industrial construction at the expense of capital investments in 1935. It is planned to organize furniture workshops in OIavut, Shepetovka and Korosten. Separately, we are now developing the question of the development of handicraft and trade cooperation in these areas.

To revive trade in these areas, it is planned to open 21 new exemplary department stores and grocery stores.

In the line of railway transport, a number of measures are now being taken to put the stations adjacent to these areas in order (the management of these stations is being reviewed and strengthened, measures are being taken to improve the sanitary condition of the stations, putting in order and equipping buffets at them, etc.). d.).

11. With regard to improving the cultural services of these cities, it is planned to increase appropriations for the equipment of schools, bringing in

order and staffing of libraries of district centers, repair and putting in order of cinemas and organization of a sound cinema in Volochisk.

We ask you to approve these planned activities.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 130. L. 162-166. Script. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 485

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. STALIN

ABOUT THE "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM" GROUP  
IN THE PHILHARMONIC WITH THE APPENDIX  
OF THE PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION I.M. SELIVERSTOVA

December 24, 1934

No. 26218s

Sending you the protocols of interrogation \*Seliverstov I.M., Seliverstov S.I., Dukhnitsky V.A., Vasilevsky M.V., Morozov I.M. and Viknerova N.V.\*; I inform you that these persons were arrested by us in connection with the reports of Volkova M.N.

"" "The investigation established that in the Leningrad Philharmonic there was a counter-revolutionary terrorist group, which included, in addition to those listed above, Tyulenev S.T., Adakhovsky S.V. and Morozov A.G., who also worked in the Philharmonic \*\*.

All members of the group are arrested\*. Their testimonies established that this group at their gatherings constantly discussed issues of combating Soviet power, and the members of the group Seliverstov S.I., Morozov I.M., Vasilevsky M.V. and Seliverstov I.M. repeatedly expressed their intention to commit terrorist acts against the main leaders of Soviet power.

APPENDIX: Interrogation protocols.

ZAM. PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

AGRANOV [signed by Yagoda]

\*—\* All surnames are marked with ticks.

\*\* \_ " The entire paragraph is underlined, the names are ticked.

\*  
The proposal is underlined.

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

Seliverstov Ilya Mikhailovich, born in 1881, unemployed, worked as a fitter at the Leningrad Philharmonic (father of Sergei Seliverstov)

From December 19, 1934

QUESTION: To whom and how did you explain the presence of guards in public places in special cases?

ANSWER: When they asked me why security was organized, I answered that it was to prevent terrorist acts, that firemen were present to put out a fire if they dropped a bomb. I spoke about this more than once, I remember well only the last case, when Sergei Seliverstov and Vasilevsky were present in the Philharmonic workshop.

QUESTION: What did you tell about the case when in the Philharmonic from the audience they shot at those sitting on the stage?

ANSWER: It seems that in October 1934, someone brought a newspaper to the workshop with a message about the murder of some political figure committed abroad. In this regard, I told a well-known to me, according to old-timers

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Philharmonic, a case when someone from the auditorium fired a shot and a bullet broke a decanter that was on the table on the stage. I also remembered Lunacharsky's speech at the Philharmonic, when, after reading the notes given to him backstage, he returned to the stage and said that one of the notes came from a White Guard sitting in the hall. I pointed out that this White Guard could take advantage of Lunacharsky's return to the stage to answer and kill him. In addition, I also recalled in this conversation an attempt on the life of a foreign diplomat in Moscow, known to me from the newspapers.

QUESTION: What was your purpose in saying all this?

ANSWER: I pointed out in the conversation that the leaders of the Soviet government, appearing in public places, expose themselves to the danger of being killed, since terrorists can penetrate into these public places and commit murder.

QUESTION: Do you admit that you called for the assassination of the leaders of the Soviet power?

ANSWER: No, I don't. I to the murder of the leaders of the Owls. did not call on the authorities. I admit that I was only telling an anecdote about how some sage said: the only way to surprise foreign countries and please the population of the USSR is by killing Stalin, and it will cost cheap, a bullet costs two kopecks. I heard this anecdote from someone, but I don't remember from whom, and I told it two or three times in the workshop and somewhere else; in the workshop they heard this anecdote: Sergei Seliverstov and Vasilyevsky, maybe there were Dukhnitsky and Adakhovsky, I don't remember exactly.



QUESTION: What influence did this anecdote have on Sergei Seliverstov?

ANSWER: I admit that for Sergei Seliverstov, due to his counter-revolutionary nature, the anecdote I told had an influence that caused the assassination of the leaders of the Sov. authorities.

QUESTION: Why then do you deny that you called for the murder of the leaders of the Sov. authorities?

ANSWER: I deny the call for terror because I did not do it directly, but told jokes about it.

QUESTION: The investigation is interested not only in the form in which you called for terror, but in the appeal itself.

ANSWER: I admit that I have repeatedly told the joke about the assassination of Stalin, but I deny that I had the intention to commit a terrorist act.

QUESTION: What about your other talk about terror?

ANSWER: In other conversations, when I said that the guards were called upon to prevent terrorist acts, that they could throw a bomb, that they could kill Lunacharsky, that the leaders of the Soviet power could be killed when they speak in public places - they did not have the character of a call on my part to terrorist acts, but were a reflection of what was.

Written down from my words correctly and personally read.

I. SELIVERSTOV

INTERROGATED: Deputy. Beginning 7 Dep. 00 GUGB NKVD  
PASSOV Room. Beginning 1 Dep. 00 GUGB NKVD BRICHCI

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 227. L. 181-184. Copy. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 486

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE WORK OF THE BODIES OF THE NKVD, THE  
POLICE AND THE PROSECUTION OF AZERBAIJAN" (153)

December 25, 1934

No. 17, p. 4 - On the work of the NKVD, police and prosecutor's offices of Azerbaijan  
jana.

Accept Comrade Akulov's proposal to send a special

commissions for a thorough check of the work and personnel of the NKVD, the police and the Prosecutor's Office.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 955. L. 4. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 15.XI. 34

No. 487

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON SCHVERZ"

December 25, 1934

No. 17, p. 46. - About Schwartz.

Satisfy the request of the Estonian government to expel Schwartz to Estonia.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 246. L. 115. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 23.XI.34.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Stomonyakov, Yagoda.

No. 488

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT UKRAINE"

December 27, 1934

No. 18, p. 33V - About Ukraine.

1. Relocate from the western regions of Ukraine to its eastern outskirts (Starobelsk, etc.) 7-8 thousand households of an unreliable element.

2. Oblige the NKVD to deport 2,000 anti-Soviet families from the western border regions as a form of repression.

3. Release additionally through the Kommunhoz for 11 border towns of Vinnitsa and Kyiv regions and the Moldavian Republic - 10 mil. rubles.

4. To allocate an additional 20 million rubles in excess of the already planned 5 million rubles for housing construction in Kyiv.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 174. L. 39. Copy. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Yagoda, Kosior - everything, Molotov

— p.p. 3, 4".

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No. 489

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT THE  
GROUP "BATTLE COMMUNIST UNION"

December 28, 1934

Top secret

No. 31211

In addition to notes No. 31092 of December 11 and No. 31134 of December 16, 1934 on the case of a terrorist group that called itself the "Combat Communist Union", I inform you:

The organizer of this group is Golovkin A.V. (born in 1907, non-party member, son of a teacher) shows that he came to the idea of creating this group in 1930 under the influence of his comrade Boris Santsevich (instructions were given to search for and arrest him) and the study of materials on the activities of the Trotskyist underground.

Golovkin then worked through these materials in an illegal self-education circle, organized by him together with Veremeenko (arrested), Vidny (instructions were given to search for and arrest him) and other students of a vocational school in the city. Putivl.

Golovkin A.V. shows about it:

"In 1930 ... at the end of a nine-year period in the city of Putivl, I met Boris Santsevich, who worked at a sugar factory, the son of a shot officer, a participant in the Yaroslavl uprising, and Dmitry Shafranov, the son of a priest (note: instructions were given about his search and arrest). We came to the conclusion that our political outlook required a great deal of theoretical polishing, and therefore it was decided to study questions of the philosophy and history of the revolutionary movement.

The circle that arose on this basis conducted classes in the order of individual preparation with the presentation of a report at the circle. In the circle classes, Santsevich shared with us his memories of the Yaroslavl uprising, talking about his military exploits during the uprising on the side of the White Guards, and expressed anti-Soviet views.

Then I came to the conclusion to engage in political self-training on modern material and the study of the history of the revolutionary movement, together with Lobunets, who studied with me at the vocational school (instructions were given on his search and arrest) and Vidny.

Thus, a second circle arose, in which, while condemning the policy and measures of the Soviet government, we came to the conclusion that the policy of the party on the peasant question and the supply of the working class was wrong. These conclusions prompted me to search for a way out of this situation. I saw a practical way out in the creation of an organization capable of leading the movement of the masses in the direction of opposing the policy of Soviet power.

My opinion was shared by Lobunts and Vidny, and by that time students of the vocational school Veremeenko Viktor, Protsedilo Alexander, Yaskov Dmitry ... were involved in the circle (note: instructions were given to search for and arrest Protsedilo and Yaskov).

... In this circle, individual articles and notes from the press about Trotskyism were discussed. Familiarization with Trotskyist and right-wing opportunist materials stimulated the counter-revolutionary aspirations of our

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circle in the struggle against Soviet power. Veremeenko and I decided to create an organization called the Combat Communist Union.

On the influence of Trotskyism on the organization of the BKS and the development of the program, Golovkin testified:

"Trotskyism for us, the organizers of the "Combat Communist Union", was the banner of the struggle against the Soviet power, in the presence of operating underground organizations.

The struggle of the Trotskyists against the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks stimulated, in turn, the organization of the underground printing house "BCS" and the publication of leaflets. Already in 1931, on a hectograph, I published the first series of leaflets in the Ukrainian language, under the title "No one will give us deliverance."

... In addition to what has been said, Trotskyism has also armed us to fight the Soviet regime and its intransigence, both in terms of the forms and methods of the struggle of the Trotskyites against the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)."

At the same time in Putivl, according to Golovkin's testimony, members of the BKS group discussed the use of terror as a means of fighting against Soviet power and included terror in the BKS program.

"The issue of terror was raised by Alexander Protsedilo, a member of the BCS, and after discussion by members of the BCS group, this item was included in the BCS program.

The following took part in the discussion of the question of terror: I, Protsedilo, Lobunets, Vidny, Veremeenko, Yeskov (instructions were given to search for and arrest Yeskov), i.e. the entire Putivl group. But even before that, the question of terror was put forward by Boris Santsevich, a member of the illegal self-training circle in Putivl.

The item on terror was included in the BCS program mainly for reasons of activating terrorist elements, even those not included in the "Combat Communist Union".

In principle, the organization accepted terror, believing that such acts and other actions against the Soviet regime would cause the masses to move against the state system. (Testimony of A.V. Golovkin.)

Leaving Putivl after graduating from school, the organizers of the "BCS" - Golovkin and Veremeenko - agreed to continue recruiting new members to the "BCS", to conduct counter-revolutionary propaganda and distribute leaflets on behalf of

nor BCS.

The first counter-revolutionary leaflet was, as indicated above, compiled by Golovkin back in 1931, printed on a hectograph and distributed personally by Golovkin and through Veremeenko. In Leningrad, Golovkin conducted the processing of cadets of the military topographic school in order to involve them in the "BCS".

"... In Putivl, I scattered leaflets on the streets and pasted them up, sent leaflets by mail to the addresses of second-year students of the Kyiv Institute of Public Education.

In the same way, leaflets were sent to students of the correspondence pharmaceutical institute at the Romenskaya pharmacy. I sent several leaflets by mail to the village of Vyazenko and the farm of Peshkov (Chernihiv region), without specifying the addressees.

(Note: Veremeenko also confirms the receipt of such leaflets from Golovkin in his testimony).

"... At the military topographic school, I trained and recruited Polkanov and Torgashin into the organization (note: both were arrested). In addition, I processed in the spirit of the BCS program provisions - Yanovsky, Luchinsko

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Go, Timofeev, Kalinovsky and others. (Luchinsky, Timofeev and Kalinovsky were arrested. Instructions were given on the search and arrest of Yanovsky.) (A.V. Golovkin's testimony)

This is also confirmed by Vasily Polkanov, a former student of the military topographic school, who was recruited by Golovkin into the BCS group and expelled from the CPSU(b) in 1933 for a right-wing bias:

"During one of the meetings with Golovkin at a school evening, Golovkin shared with me his impressions of the situation of the peasants in Ukraine.

According to Golovkin, in Ukraine there is famine, the peasantry is dying, and those who have retained their viability are fleeing, leaving for other regions of the USSR, that all these disasters fall on the Ukrainian peasant and stem from the policy of the party and Soviet power ... "

"... I received from Golovkin illegal leaflets in Russian and Ukrainian, printed on a machine. The leaflets were signed "BCS" - "Combat Communist Union" and were addressed to "comrade students." At the same time, I received from Golovkin a printed brochure of the 1932 edition in Ukrainian and one appeal in Russian, with an appeal "to the working masses." (Testimony of Polcanov Vasily).

With cadets expelled from the military topographic school due to political and moral incompatibility, Golovkin kept in touch by correspondence under agreed pseudonyms. For example, arrested according to

For some reason, a member of the BCS group, a former cadet Polkanov, signed his letters to Golovkin with the pseudonym "Willy".

For the transportation of counter-revolutionary leaflets and the execution of individual orders, Golovkin used a former cadet of the military topographic school, now topographer of the 3rd topographic detachment of Strobakin A.I. (Born in 1908, candidate of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, son of a postal official). In particular, in May 1934, on behalf of Golovkin, Strobykin sent V.I. Polkanov to the apartment. suitcase with flyers. (Strobykin was arrested and confessed).

Arrested cadet of the military topographic school in Leningrad Kalinovsky E.L. (Born in 1912, member of the Komsomol, employee) testified that Golovkin repeatedly had conversations with him in a counter-revolutionary spirit, for example:

"In the spring of this year, on one of the school evenings, Golovkin shared with me his impression of the vacation he spent after graduation in his homeland, in Ukraine. In gloomy tones, he told me that Ukraine has experienced an unprecedented famine over the past two years. The Ukrainian people are literally perishing from hunger, the population is dying out in whole villages, the situation is hopeless."

"This hopelessness, in his opinion, is due to the policy of the Soviet government. The top of power has become detached from the masses; the Center not only does not reflect the interests of this mass, it does not even enter into the essence of the necessary demands of these masses. This isolation testifies to the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat, as an expression of the will of the class, does not exist, but it, the dictatorship of the proletariat, is represented and expressed by the dictatorship of the party, where, in turn, the top also dominates.

He continued to develop the idea that the situation was intolerable and that a way out should be found. In his opinion, this way out consists in the need to overthrow the Soviet power. To do this, you need to unite in the organization

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all the best and most reliable part of the youth who feel the need to fight the Soviet regime.

Golovkin told me at the same time about the existence of the counter-revolutionary organization "Combat Communist Union".

Former cadet of the military topographic school, now topographer photo of the theodolite detachment in Moscow Torgashin M.T. (born in 1911, non-partisan, from wealthy peasants), recruited by Golovkin into the BKS group, testified about the activities of this group:

"I know the following about the counter-revolutionary activities of the members of the "Combat Communist Union" Golovkin, Polkanov, Luchinsky and others: Polkanov and Golovkin, being cadets of the military topographic school, systematically showed their counter-revolutionary views in conversations with cadets. Their conversations boiled down to the fact that, according to Golovkin, the situation of the working population is extremely bad, that this situation is worsening every day.

From the literature published by the BKS organization, I read counter-revolutionary

only proclamation "Appeal to students". I received this proclamation from Golovkin at the beginning of 1933. In its content, the proclamation called for an organized struggle against the Soviet power.

At a subsequent meeting, Golovkin asked my opinion on the leaflet. I declared that the results of the struggle against Soviet power could not be successful without the involvement of all sections of the population in this struggle.

Golovkin outlined the goals and objectives of the organization to me. The main point of his explanation was as follows:

- a) the unification of all elements hostile to Soviet power and the party;
- b) propaganda and agitation with the aim of corrupting the supporters of the existing regime.

The main goal is the struggle to overthrow the ruling head of the Soviet government and the party.

Veremeenko V.A. arrested in Chernigov (born in 1913, son of a former officer, now a teacher) confirmed his active participation in the work of the BCS.

Arrested additionally in Leningrad, Makarenko Olga, a draftsman of the cartographic department of the Headquarters of the LVO, confessed that she was recruited into the organization, familiarized herself with the charter and program of the BCS, and carried out communication between Golovkin and other members of the organization. In 1933, a printed font and a duplicating printing apparatus were sent to her address from Ukraine.

From the testimony of Olga Makarenko and the junior topographer of the photo-theodolite detachment, Torgashin, who was arrested in Moscow, it is clear that Golovkin carried out counter-revolutionary work on the Ukrainian community in Leningrad, being a member of the literary circle at the Ukrainian home enlightenment.

According to Golovkin's testimony, BCS cells were organized in Lugansk, the village of Olshan (Konotop district), at station. Osipovichi (BSSR).

Golovkin testified about this:

"At these points, Veremeenko worked on the creation of cells, and, as he informed me, he carried out work in the spirit of the BCS program, by individual processing of candidates."

According to Golovkin's testimony, in addition to the above-mentioned persons, the following are involved in the "BCS" and took part in its work:

ml. topographer of the UVO topoorder Luchinsky P.S. (born in 1911, member of the CPSU (b), from the peasants);

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ml. topographer of the 3rd topoorder LVO Timofeev A.D. (born in 1910, can

didat of the CPSU (b), from the peasants) - both were arrested;

ml. topographers of the topographic order OKDVA - Tselikov V.N. (born in 1907, member of the CPSU (b)) and Litvinov S.A. (born in 1911, non-party, from the workers);

ml. topographers of the 3rd topoorder Gribanov E.P. (born in 1907, member of the Komsomol, employee), Parfenov K.P. (born in 1909, non-partisan, employee);

Topographer of the Headquarters of the LVO Egorov S.A. (born in 1912, non-partisan, from peasants) and

A cadet of the military topographic school Kuchеров A.P. (Born in 1911, member of the Komsomol, from the workers). An order was issued for the arrest of this group.

In addition, according to the testimony of A. V. Golovkin, a number of civilians took part in the creation and counter-revolutionary work of the "BCS" group, of which 30 people have been identified to date. These persons are some of the former cadets of the military topographic school, expelled from that school due to political and moral inconsistency, some are acquaintances and comrades of Golovkin (and other members of the group) from study and work before the army. Most of them are located in various places in the USSR. Instructions were given on their search and arrest.

I am enclosing a list of those arrested in the case and a protocol of interrogation of Golovkin A.V. and others.

People's Commissar

Internal Affairs of the USSR YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 227. L. 203-211. Script. Typescript.

\* Published without minutes

No. 490

FROM THE CIRCULAR LETTER OF THE NKVD OF THE  
USSR TO ALL LOCAL BODIES OF THE USSR  
PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (154)

January 1935

MOST SECRET

PROJECT

The investigation into the case of the villainous murder of comrade KIROV, committed by Leonid NIKOLAEV, established that he was a member of the "Leningrad terrorist center" of the counter-revolutionary Zinoviev organization, which existed with impunity for a long time, prepared and carried out, according to a carefully developed plan, a terrorist chesky act.

How could it happen that our organs in Leningrad criminally overlooked the "existing terrorist group of Zinovievites" and failed to save the life of Comrade. Kirov, one of the largest leaders and the best



people of our party?

How could it happen that in one of the most important sectors of the struggle against the counter-revolution in Leningrad, where the

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Noah revolutionary, Chekist vigilance of our organs, the enemy fell out of the field of view of the Chekists and was able to carefully prepare and deal a heavy blow to the party and the working class?

The reasons lie in the following:

a) despite the obvious aggravation of the terrorist moods of the remnants of the unfinished enemy, a number of leading foreign terrorist centers [are trying] to penetrate precisely through these borders into our territory in order to commit terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and owls. Pra-

government.

And this at a time when Leningrad and the region are saturated with a large number of remnants of the former. aristocracy, tsarist officials and court servants, guards officers, fugitive kulaks who penetrated production, etc.

And this at a time when a significant number of b. participants of the Zinoviev-Trotskyist K.-R. block.

The leading officials of the UNKVD in the Leningrad region criminally ignored the directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of 8/V-1933, which says:

"The class enemy sees ... that the last days of his existence have come, and he cannot help clutching in despair at the most acute forms of struggle against the Soviet regime.

Therefore, there can be no question of weakening our struggle against the class enemy. On the contrary, our struggle must be intensified in every possible way, our vigilance sharpened in every possible way. It is, therefore, about intensifying our struggle against the class enemy.

And the leaders of the NKVD in Leningrad laid down their arms and fell asleep at the most important military revolutionary post entrusted to them by the party.

Where was the party organization of the UNKVD in the Leningrad region?

Why did the party organization fail to see the complacency, criminal complacency, dullness of class instinct and revolutionary vigilance, which bordered on opportunism, that gripped a number of communists?

Why did the party organization fail to notice the moral decay of individual sections of the apparatus, did it fail to notice that such untested, obviously dubious people as BALTSEVICCH were being placed in responsible posts in the fight against terror and espionage?

CA FSB. F. 3. Op. 2. D.7. L. 1-2. original. Typescript.

\*—\* It is written instead of the crossed out "branched k.-r. Zinoviev organization.

\* After this quotation, the following text is crossed out: "Leading officials of the UNKVD VKP(b) RaDSK ° Y ° ^ LaS for the leader of our party Comrade STALIN at the 17th Congress

"It is clear that a classless society cannot come in order, so to speak,  
gravity.

It must be won and built by the efforts of all the working people, by strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the

proletariat, by developing the class struggle, by destroying classes, by liquidating the remnants of the capitalist classes, in battles with enemies as internal,

as well as external.

The point seems to be clear.

Meanwhile, for those who do not know that the proclamation of this clear and elementary thesis

Leninism gave rise to considerable confusion in the minds and unhealthy moods among one part of the party members. The thesis about our progress towards a classless society, given as a slogan, they understood as a spontaneous process. And they figured: if there is a classless society, then it means that it is possible to weaken the class struggle, it is possible to weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat and, in general, to put an end to the state, which anyway must die out in the near future. And they came to the calf's delight in anticipation of what will not be soon

no way

classless - that means you can lay down your arms and go to the side - to sleep in anticipation of the advent of a classless society.

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No. 491

REPORT J. GRU ABOUT THE TALK

WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER HIROTA, INTERCEPTED  
INO GUGB NKVD

January 5, 1935

OWL. SECRET

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Tokyo November 17, 1934

Documentary  
Translation from English.

Sir,

Yesterday I had a rather lengthy conversation with Mr. \*Koki Hirota\*. The Foreign Secretary suggested that I should visit him at the first convenient opportunity for me, in order to talk about London's marine industry.

reading.

Mr. Hirota is very upset by the fact that we are unable to share Japan's point of view regarding the importance of maritime parity. He repeated all the arguments listed to you in my previous reports, especially emphasizing the internal political situation of the country, which makes the government insist on granting maritime parity on a par with Great Britain and the United States. I could only repeat what I have said on previous occasions, namely, that America cannot change its present position without endangering its security and commercial interests.

As I suspected from the very beginning, this whole part of the conversation was only an introduction, which was supposed to prepare the ground for the true purpose of our conversation. \*Mr. Hirota would like to know what position Washington would take if Tokyo decided to annul the London Agreement immediately?\* I replied that he must understand that I could not be expected to respond to such a hypothetical question. The instructions I have received refer only to specific provisions, not to unforeseen possibilities. Mr. Hirota, of course, expected such an answer and made a strategic digression, explaining that he hoped to get acquainted with my personal point of view on such a development of things. He always, he remarked, admired my unerring ability to anticipate in advance the possible reaction of the American government to any question.

Such a statement demanded an appropriate polite response from me. I noticed that my assumptions about the likely behavior of America in connection with this issue probably coincided with his own. It seems to me that Washington will have no choice. First, he will carry out the program developed by the congress. And then?.. The minister bowed his head in agreement. This is to be expected, he said. He would like to know how the annulment of the London agreement will affect relations between America and Japan? I replied that I could not answer such a question. All that I could say would be only a guess, dangerous to me and useless to him.

Mr. Hirota became extremely serious after that. Do I consider it possible that Washington will agree to an agreement with Japan,

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Maybe together with other European countries? I replied again that I must refrain from making conjectural opinions or assurances. I would be overjoyed to hear whatever he has to say to me so that I can immediately inform the State Department of his questions and suggestions.

Mr. Hirota remarked that he would probably have to speak. He asks, however, that these preliminary proposals be treated as strictly confidential. During such a period, publicity could have been fatal. I reminded him that the State Department always maintains strict secrecy for diplomatic purposes. I do not know of a single example when he betrayed the trust of the other side.

Mr. Hirota's response deserves serious consideration. First of all, he pointed out that the Japanese disapproved of agreements with other countries. Such agreements turn international relations into a crude farce and may drag the contracting countries into wars in which they have no interest and from which they can hardly get out without serious losses. But the development of events makes Japan, against her will, look for an ally. Western countries are returning to the old system of alliances. Agreements appear like mushrooms after rain. Despite the existence of the League of Nations, or perhaps precisely for this reason, Europe is again developing plans for a "balance of power", which is the inevitable harbinger of war. There is not a single country in all of Europe that is free to follow its own path in matters of international politics.

For Japan, this is, according to the minister, a serious issue. Will she be able to maintain her position of isolation? The Cabinet discussed this issue carefully and seriously and concluded that Japan, whether it wanted to or not, should follow the example of its European neighbors.

It was decided that the Foreign Office should proceed with the selection of an ally. The chosen country, first and foremost, should not have any specific interests in Asia. This category of countries \*could be approached by Russia and England\*. But the USSR as a possible ally is completely ruled out because of its aggressive position towards Japan and its interests. Great Britain should be treated differently, its interests in the Far East cannot be called absolutely hostile to the Japanese, and it does not take the position of an aggressor.

England has her legitimate interests in India and other colonial possessions. The second very important consideration is also the position of the alleged ally in relation to China. Japan should insist on timely guardianship of China's affairs, i.e. it must demand that its allies refrain from binding agreements with China or any part of China without the knowledge and consent of Tokyo. This would also include transactions \*for the sale in large quantities of weapons and ammunition and the conclusion of trade agreements\*. Finally, it would be necessary to agree that none of the signatory countries at that time could acquire territory in Asia, whether by occupation or conquest, without prior agreement with the other countries participating in the treaty. Japan, for its part, would undertake to refrain from any kind of interference in European affairs. It would go about its business in Asia on the basis and within the framework of those boundaries that would have been previously established.

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fiefs together with allies. With regard to China, this would mean refusing to conquer or occupy Chinese territories. Instead, the Japanese government demanded that it be granted the right to cooperate with the Chinese authorities in educating the Chinese people in a more military spirit and instilling in them the consciousness of their duty to protect the country from the encroachments of non-Asian countries. Finally, Manchu Zhou-Guo should have been recognized as a country ^ under the protectorate of Japan \* and as one of the parties to the agreement, enjoying the same rights as other countries.

Mr. Hirota made it quite clear that countries such as the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and several smaller powers were considered as possible allies, and that Japan would be preferred over all other countries of the USA. Japanese statesmen have always agreed that among the major powers, America is probably the least likely to come into conflict with Japan. The normal US sphere of influence is \*South and Central America\*. While fully acknowledging Britain's past sensitivity to Japanese rights, Tokyo believes that Britain's many interests in Asia will eventually lead to the impossibility of reaching a full agreement. France, in view of her close relations with Russia, could be taken into account only if she renounced all obligations towards the USSR in the event of complications in Asia. France, Mr. Hirota immediately added, is probably not in a position to give that kind of assurance.

As the last alternative, according to Mr. Hiroth, remains Germany. During the past years, relations between Germany and Japan have been invariably friendly. Japan and Germany are linked by a common destiny, an external sign of which was the withdrawal of both countries from the League of Nations. Both of these countries were hindered by the European powers to their own development. Between these two countries there is a friendly agreement based on specific treaties in those areas where their interests coincide. There is no formal agreement between these countries. The undoubted advantages of an alliance with Germany are nullified by shadow parties of great importance. In the event of a serious conflict in Asia, Germany could not give Japan any significant assistance, or even could not help her at all. Its sea power is not great, and transport issues would be a difficult problem to solve. Nevertheless, Japan might decide to make an alliance with Germany if all other possibilities proved to be impracticable.

Minister Hirota ended this unusual conversation with an open request for friendship with America. Tokyo, he said, had nothing to hide. The imperial government is guided by only one desire - to live in peace with everyone and maintain friendly relations with countries. But she must be ready for all kinds of possibilities, and for this she must look for allies.

For a long time, Tokyo has been sincerely striving to find an ally in the person of the United States, whose justice and impartiality are beyond doubt. If this turned out to be impossible, then Japan would have to look for an ally elsewhere.

I considered it possible to inform you in detail about this conversation. \*I consider this case one of the most unusual of all the time of my diplomatic career\*. Such excessive frankness on the part I betray

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I was astonished and even, I confess, touched by the present representative of a power which, by all accounts, is unfriendly and distrustful of our goals in Asia. I got the impression that the minister was not hiding anything and had no ulterior motives. It seemed to me that this Japanese diplomat, contrary to the custom of Eastern diplomats, was making an enormous effort to find a direct answer to the whole complex of complex questions in which Asia was so terribly entangled. I am convinced that Mr. Hirota is truly sincere in persuading the United States to join him in order to accomplish this important task.

I hope that my feeble attempts at reproducing a conversation of such great current importance have been lucid and impartial enough to enable you, Mr. Secretary, to form an objective opinion of Japan's foreign policy intentions.

Joseph Grew. Ambassador

Right Deputy. Beginning INO GUGB NKVD BERMAN

RGASPI. F.558. Op. 11. D. 188. L. 1-7. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Comrade. Stalin. 5.1.35 Agranov"; "My archive. So Hirota was having a hard time. Interesting. I. Stalin"; Poskrebyshev: "From comrade Prokofiev."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

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#### AGENCIES REPORT OF THE INO GUGB NKVD ON MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN GERMANY

January 9, 1935

TOP SECRET

\*INO GUGB received the following information about German military preparations\*:

1. Recently, all German newspapers published a message about a forced landing on German territory due to the fog of 3 Polish aircraft.

The reason, however, was not at all in the fog. \* In the month of October 1934 in

A Polish military delegation arrived in Berlin, before which secret military inventions were demonstrated. The delay of the car was shown on the Berlin-Zossen section \*, where there is a special installation for this, and the engine of the aircraft was turned off from the ground in the air. By agreement with the Germans, the Poles sent three of their aircraft to test this invention, which were lowered near Elbing. In Elbing, ordinary antennas of an ultra-short-wave installation, intended for

aircraft descent.

\* In connection with this invention in Germany, work is being carried out at an accelerated pace in the field of replacing conventional aircraft engines with diesel engines \*.

2. Underground structures are erected in Halsberg and heavy guns are installed.

3. Shipyards in Shihau produce barbed wire, grenades and cartridge cases in large quantities. Work is also underway there to design light warships.

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4. \*Underground storage facilities for fuel and oils have been built in Pilau, fully meeting the needs of the German fleet, hydroaviation on the Baltic Sea\*.

5. In the border zone of East Prussia, the construction of locks and dams should ensure, if necessary, the flooding of large areas.

6. From 15.XI.34 to 15. II. 35, the Reichswehr will be in a state of combat readiness, for the same period all holidays are canceled.

DEPUTY CHIEF INO GUGB BERMAN

RGASPI. F. 588. Op. 11. D. 188. L. 55, 56. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "For members of the KO. 13.1" and a handwritten note: "Comrade. Stalin. Prokofiev. 9.1.35.

\*—\* Underlined by hand in pencil.

No. 493

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE DEPARTURE FROM THE USSR OF THE FRENCH  
PILOT J.V. POINTISA

January 11, 1935

Top secret

No. 55101

Ex. pilot, instructor of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the Red Army PUANTIS Zhan Wilhelmovich, demobilized, according to our materials, \* on the 14th \* of this year. received permission to leave for France to leave the USSR. assumes from the Red Army,

POINTIS - French, b. in 1900, from 1918 to 1925 he served in the French air force as an officer-pilot. In 1923 he joined the French Communist Party. In 1925, PUANTIS deserted from the army, fled to Belgium, from where he got to the Soviet Union through the MOPR. The reason for the desertion, he said, was mainly the severity of discipline in the French army.

\*\*From 1925 to 1929 PUANTIS served as a pilot in various parts of the Red Army Air Force, and from 1929 to 1934 he worked as a blind flight specialist at the Red Army Air Force Research Institute. Since the day of his arrival in the USSR, POINTIS has been in regular correspondence with France\*\*.

\*\*While working at the Research Institute POINTIS, he published a work on blind flights and wrote another book, which he intends to publish in France. On the eve of the purge of the party organization, NII PUANTIS told the secretary of the cell that, being in the service of the Red Army, he deliberately remained in French citizenship and intended to leave for a while to France. The Purge Commission expelled PUANTIS from the RCP(b) as having nothing in common with the Party\*\*.

At the same time, taking advantage of his stay in Moscow in the autumn of 1933, b. French Minister of Aviation Pierre Côte, POINTIS turned to him with a request to make it easier for him to return to his homeland as a repentant deserter, promising to atone for his guilt upon his return to France. Since that time, POINTIS has been systematically visiting the French embassy.

\*\* The development of PUANTIS did not obtain documentary evidence of his espionage activities, but intelligence data indicate that PUANTIS transferred to the embassy secret materials known to him about the state of the air forces of the Red Army \*\*.

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This is confirmed by the cipher sent by the embassy to Paris after Pierre Côte's departure, in which "in addition to personal negotiations" it was recommended to satisfy the request of POINTIS. When visiting the French embassy, POINTIS was received in private by the 1st secretary of the embassy PAYARD or the 2nd secretary of CHARPENTIER.

During his stay in the USSR, PUANTIS led a solitary life, did not get along with the Russians at all, rejected all attempts of rapprochement with his colleagues, and categorically forbade his wife to visit even his flatmates. At the same time, POINTIS maintained suspicious acquaintances with French citizens, which he carefully concealed, as well as a visit to the embassy. The only close acquaintance of POINTIS is a certain BRUNI, a former officer and pilot of the tsarist army. BRUNI after the October Revolution took the priesthood, which he served until



1927, then worked as a handicraftsman and translator. POINTIS' meetings with BRUNI take place in a conspiratorial setting.

**\*\*According to our information, BRUNI compiled a document on the life and situation of the Soviet Union, which PUANTIS undertook to smuggle abroad\*\*.**

Having declared to the command of his desire to go to France, PUANTIS expressed his desire to be useful to the Soviet Union at work abroad - in an embassy or trade mission.

In addition to verbal information about PUANTIS' visits to the French embassy, the command of the Air Force Research Institute of the Red Army, on 19/11-34, he raised a question with the UPVS of the Red Army about the demobilization of PUANTIS.

PUANTIS was demobilized on November 13, 1934. There are no formal grounds for banning PUANTIS from leaving the USSR.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER  
OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 203. L. 19-21. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "Let him leave."

\*\_\* Underlined in pencil.

It is underlined in the margins with two lines.

No. 494

SPBTsSOOBShCHENIE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN  
ON THE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY GROUP" IN THE KREMLIN (155)

January 20, 1935

Top secret No. 55173

I am sending you the protocols of testimony:

\*1. ZHALYBINA-BYKOVA M.S. from 20.1 - this year 2) MISHAKOVA E.S. from 20.1. this year 3) AVDEEVOY A.E. from 20.1. s.g. \* and 4) protocol of confrontation between A.E. and MISHAKOVA E.S. from 20.1. With. d. Based on the materials of the preliminary investigation, it is established that, in addition to A.E. A. KONSTANTINOVA, KATYNSKAYA and others are participating in anti-Soviet statements and spreading provocations, who will be arrested today

baths.

People's Commissar of  
Internal Affairs of the USSR Yagoda

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

# PROTOCOL OF CONFERENCE

between Anna Efimovna Avdeeva and Efrosinia Semyonovna Mishakova

dated January 20, 1935

QUESTION TO [TO] MISHAKOVA: You have just shown about one conversation in which Avdeeva made anti-Soviet statements, made lies and provocations against comrade. STALIN. Repeat your statements.

ANSWER MISHAKOVA: We were sitting - I, AVDEEVA and ZHALYBINA-BYKOVA on the 1st floor of the government building in a small room and drank tea. AVDEEVA began to say that our life was bad, our bosses were drinking and eating well, but we were eating very poorly. And I told her that I now live better than I lived before. Then AVDEEVA began to say that Stalin was not Russian, he divorced his first wife, and, they say, shot his second. I said it wasn't true, we don't know. This conversation ended, and we all went to work.

QUESTION [TO] AVDEEVOY: What can you show the investigation on this issue?

ANSWER TO AVDEEVOY: I affirm that I didn't say everything that MISHAKOVA said. All this was said by ZHALYBINA.

Recorded from our words correctly and read to us by Mishakov, Avdeev.

Interrogated: Molchanov

Pauker

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 231. L. 1.14. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Protocols are not published

No. 495

NOTE I.A. Akulova I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV and V.V. KUIBYSHEV  
WITH CRITICISM NOTES IN THE NEWSPAPER

"Izvestiya" ON EXILE AND EXPIRY (156)

January 25, 1935

No. 33/Is

Secret

On January 15, 1935, the Izvestia newspaper published an article stating that the Commission of Soviet Control suggested that the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs expel representatives of a number of organizations involved in illegal activities from Moscow. It follows from the note that Narkovnudel is the technical executor of the decisions of the KSK.

Meanwhile, the right of exile and expulsion, in accordance with the current laws (section VIII of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the formation of the NKVD, paragraph 9 of section V of the Regulations on the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the Regulations on a special meeting under the NKVD), is granted, in addition to the judiciary, only to a special meeting under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs which includes the Union Prosecutor or his deputy.

I do not dispute the essence of the above decision of the KSK; but, proceeding from the fact that the publication of this kind of decrees not only contradicts the law, but also creates a very undesirable impression of the multiplicity of administrative bodies that have the right to exile and exile, the Union Prosecutor's Office asks that the Bureau of the Commission of Soviet Control be given appropriate instructions.

I. Akulov

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 5. L. 123. Original. Typescript.

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No. 496

NOTE by Ya.S. AGRANOVA I.V. TO STALIN ON  
NEW ARRESTS AMONG THE STAFF IN THE KREMLIN

February 2, 1935

No. 55270

Top secret

In addition to No. 55173 of January 20, 1935, I inform you that the investigation has so far revealed the involvement of the following persons in spreading provocations in the Kremlin:\*

1. AVDEEVOY A.E., aged 22, bp, cleaner in the Kremlin; 2. KOCHETOVOY M.D., aged 20, member of the Komsomol, telephone operator of the Kremlin; 3. KONSTANTINOVOY A.M., aged 35, bp, cleaner in the Kremlin; 4. KATYNSKY B.Ya., aged 50, bp, cleaner in the Kremlin; 5. A. A. ORLOVOY, aged 22, member of the Komsomol, clerk at the post office in the Kremlin; 6. ROSENFELD N.A., aged 49, bp, from the family of the princes Bebutovs, \*\*librarian of the government library;\*\* 7. RAEVSKOY E.Yu. 31, bp, born Princess Urusova, \*\*librarian of the government library\*\*;

All these people have been arrested.

AVDEYEVA A.E., who at the beginning denied her involvement in the spread of provocations, testified that she passed on to the cleaners ZHALYBINA N.S. and MISHAKOVA provocative rumors that she became aware of from the Kremlin telephone operator KOCHETOVA M.D. \*

KOCHETOVA M.D. acknowledged counter-revolutionary conversations with AVDEEVA, but so far does not give frank testimony.

KONSTANTINOVA A.M. testified that Katynskaya B.Ya. conducted anti-Soviet conversations with her.

Katynskaya B.Ya. so far only recognized participation in counter-revolutionary

conversations with A. M. KONSTANTINOVA, is exposed by the testimony of M. S. ZHALYBINA.

ORLOVA A.A. admitted that she spread provocations, which she reported to the cleaning lady ZHALYBINA M.

ROSENFELD N.A. so far he denies his guilt, is exposed by the testimony of SINELOBOVOY K.AND.

RAEVSKAYA E.Yu. While he denies his guilt, he admits participation in conversations of an anti-Soviet nature. Exposed by the testimony of SINELOBOVA K.I.

SINELOBOVA K.I. acknowledged that she had spread provocative rumors among government library staff and Kremlin cleaners and testified that she had passed on provocative rumors to the following individuals:

A.I. KONOVA, L.E. BURKOVA, E.O. SIMAK, E.Yu. RAEVSKOY, P.I.

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As a participant in counter-revolutionary conversations SINELOBOVA K.I. also calls Art. librarian ROSENFELD N.A.

Thus, it was established that one of the sources of the spread of provocation among the employees of the government library and cleaners was SINELOBOVA K.I.

ŸSINELOBOVOY K.I. in turn, her brother A.I. SINELOBOV, aged 35, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1930, who was on assignment under the commandant of the Kremlin\*, reported provocative rumors.

Arrested SINELOBOV A.AND. testified that he was associated with the Trotskyist V. G. DOROSHINY, aged 40, a member of the CPSU (b), an assistant to the commandant of the Kremlin, who had conversations with him of a counter-revolutionary nature directed against the leadership of the party.

I enclose the protocol of interrogation SINELOBOV A.I. dated January 31, 1935. I consider it necessary DOROSHIN V.G. to arrest.

ZAM. PREV. OGPU AGRANOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 231. L. 15-17. Script. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: Poskrebyshchev: "From comrade Agranov", Stalin: "14B".

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE  
PROGRESS OF THE INVESTIGATION IN THE KREMLIN CASE

February 5, 1935

No. 55290

TOP SECRET

In addition to Nos. 55173 of 20/1 and 55270 of 2/II-1935, I inform you that we additionally arrested:

1. Vasily Grigorievich DOROSHIN, aged 40, assistant commandant of the Kremlin, member of the CPSU(b) since 1918;

2. GAVRIKOV Ivan Demyanovich, 35 years old, head of the chemical service of the 2nd regiment of the Moscow proletarian rifle division, member of the CPSU (b) since 1919.

Doroshin V.G. holding on very tenaciously. At the first interrogation, he admitted only the systematic dissemination of slander against the leadership of the party and testified that for slanderous purposes he distorted the so-called testament of Lenin in the Trotskyist spirit.

Doroshin's testimony is attached.

GAVRIKOV has not yet pleaded guilty.

LUKYANOV Ivan Petrovich, 37 years old, head of the Grand Kremlin Palace, member of the CPSU (b) since 1920, and

KOZYREV Vasily Ivanovich, 36 years old, student of the 4th year of the Military Chemical Academy, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1919 - we are arrested.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF  
THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR, YAGODA

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INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

DOROSHIN Vasily Grigorievich dated February 4-5, 1935

DOROSHIN V.G., born in 1894, ur. d. Po Yarkovo, Mikhailovsky district, Moscow region, employee, member of the CPSU (b) since 1918, before his arrest - pom. Commandant of the Kremlin and student of the Evening Military Academy.

QUESTION: Do you know Vasily Ivanovich KOZYREV?

ANSWER: KOZYREV is my fellow villager. After a long break, I restored contact with him, either in 1929 or 1930. At present, KOZYREV

student of the Military Chemical Academy, member of the CPSU (b).

QUESTION: Tell us about the political conversations you had with KOZYREV?

ANSWER: I met KOZYREV quite often at his apartment on Sredne-Kislovskiy Lane, 3, apt. 9 and in my apartment in the Kremlin.

KOZYREV is hostile to the policy of the Soviet government and the party. In conversations with me, he expressed dissatisfaction with the policy in the countryside, said that collectivization was carried out hastily to the detriment of the interests of the peasantry.

In our conversations, KOZYREV pointed out that inner-Party democracy has been replaced by the policy of suppression and the dictatorship of Comrade. STALIN.

\* I also spread slander about Comrade. STALIN, referring at the same time to the so-called testament of LENIN, which he announced in the Trotskyist spirit. I gave the will to KOZYREV for reading\*.

QUESTION: With whom, besides KOZYREV, did you have counter-revolutionary conversations?

ANSWER: I passed on slander about comrade. STALIN, who was also on assignment under the commandant of the Kremlin, A.I. SINELOBOV. I also gave him the so-called testament of LENIN\* to read.

QUESTION: Where did your conversations with SINELOBOV take place?

ANSWER: I gave him my will in 1933 while on duty at the commandant's office. This is where our conversations took place this year.

QUESTION: You show that in conversations with KOZYREV and SINELOBOV you passed on slander about Comrade. STALIN. Were you aware of the decisions of the party in connection with the Trotskyist attacks on comrade STALIN?

ANSWER: I knew that comrade. STALIN, after the 14th Party Congress, twice asked to be relieved of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. I also know that in both cases the party categorically insisted that comrade. STALIN remained in the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks\*.

QUESTION: How to explain that you, a party member and commander of the Red Army, knowing this, nevertheless spread slander about the leader of the party?

ANSWER: This is due to my connection with anti-Soviet people like KOZYREV and SINELOBOV. The incessant talk about the incorrect policy of the party, about oppression, the lack of democracy, and that the party leadership is the culprit for all this, led to a situation where I turned into a slanderer in relation to the party leadership\*.

QUESTION: Do you plead guilty to this.

ANSWER: Yes. I plead guilty.

QUESTION: Who else passed slanderous rumors to you and to whom did you tell about them?

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ÿ ÿ ANSWER: Slander spread in connection with the death of N.S. HALLELUE WAIL. The former secretary of the party cell of the commandant's office of the Kremlin, now head of the Grand Kremlin Palace, Ivan Petrovich LUKYANOV told me about. the second day after the death of N.S. ALLILUEVA that the commandant of the Kremlin comrade. PETERSON gathered a group of comrades and declared that ALLILUEVA had died an unnatural death. After that, I had a conversation about this with SINELOBOV, who told me that ALLILUEVA had been poisoned. I think I talked about this with KOZYREV, I don't remember exactly\*\*.

QUESTION: That's not all. You also spread slander about the leadership of the couple ti.

ÿ ANSWER: Yes, I also spread slander about comrade. STALIN. During the graduation of a special group from the Military Academy in the Kremlin, a banquet was held with the participation of comrade. STALIN and members of the Politburo. I was guarding the palace. Among those issued was the commander - cavalryman GORYACHEV. I told someone from the guards, just a little, I don't remember now that on the Tsaritsyno front Between comrade. STALIN and GORIACHEV had a skirmish during which GORIACHEV almost killed comrade. STALIN with a saber \*.

Written down from my words correctly, read by me. DOROSHIN

INTERROGATED: BEGINNING. SECR. POLIT. DEPARTMENT OF THE GUGB G.  
MOLCHANOV BEGINNING. 2 DEP. SPO GUGB KAGAN

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 231. L. 22-26. Script. Typescript.

\* \_ \* Crossed out in the margins with one line.

\*\*\_\_\*\* It is underlined in the margins with two lines.

No. 498

PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION I.P.  
LUKYANOV (KREMLIN CASE)

February 7, 1935

LUKYANOV I.P., aged 36, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1920, military man, commandant of the Grand Kremlin Palace.

QUESTION: You spread slander against the leaders of the CPSU(b). Do you acknowledge this?

ÿ ANSWER: I admit that I was aware of the spread of counter-revolutionary slander directed against Comrade STALIN\*.

QUESTION: Name the investigators who are the distributors of slander against Comrade. STALIN; list where they work and how long you

know them?

ANSWER: Participants in a slanderous conversation directed against Comrade. STALIN, were working in the commandant's office of the Kremlin DOROSHIN Vasily Grigorievich - assistant to the commandant of the Kremlin, member of the CPSU (b), PAVLOV Ivan Efimovich - assistant to the commandant of the Kremlin, member of the CPSU (b), ÿ POLYAKOV Pavel Fedorovich - head of the administrative and economic department of the commandant's office Kremlin, member of the CPSU (b). This conversation was conducted after the 16th Party Congress in the building of the commandant's office of the Kremlin, in the room of the commandant's assistant on duty. During this conversation, DOROSHIN or POLYAKOV (I don't remember exactly) their counter-revolutionary slanderous attacks against

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comrade STALIN was supported by references to the so-called testament of LENIN\* that they had.

I have known Doroshin since 1924 at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school, where he was a company commander; PAVLOVA - since 1925, also in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school, and POLYAKOV - since 1929, working in the commandant's office of the Kremlin.

QUESTION: Did you personally spread slander about the leaders of the CPSU(b)?

ANSWER: No, I didn't.

QUESTION: What other slanderous facts do you know?

ÿ ANSWER: On the day of death of N.S. Alliluyeva Commandant of the Kremlin comrade. PETERSON gathered in his office me, the secretary of the party organization of the commandant's office of the Kremlin, VERKUNICH Ivan Evdokimovich, and the rest of the members of the bureau of the party collective of the commandant's office, whose names I do not remember now, and told us in confidence that ALLILUEVA died an unnatural death \*.

QUESTION: Have you passed this on to anyone else and when?

ANSWER: No, I didn't.

QUESTION: The testimony of the arrested assistant to the commandant of the Kremlin, DOROSHIN, established that you personally conveyed to him the slander related to the death of N.S. ALLILUEVA. Do you acknowledge this?

ANSWER: I don't remember exactly whether I told Doroshin about this, but I admit that I could have told him.

QUESTION: Do you know the decision of the party in connection with the c.r. Trotskyist attacks on Comrade. STALIN?

ANSWER: I know that comrade. STALIN asked to be relieved of the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and I know and knew that the Party categorically insisted that Comrade. STALIN remained General Secretary of the Central Committee.

QUESTION: Did you inform your immediate superior Comrade. PETERSON about the counter-revolutionary slanderous conversation conducted by the employees of the Kremlin commandant's office you named?

ANSWER: No, he did not.



QUESTION: How can you explain to the investigation that you, a member of the CPSU(b) and commander of the Red Army, knowing the decision of the party, did not report the counter-revolutionary slander against the leaders of the party?

ANSWER: I admit my guilt in that, knowing about the slander of the Trotskyites DOROSHIN, PAVLOV and POLYAKOV in relation to the party leadership, I hid it from the party\*.

QUESTION: You call DOROSHIN, PAVLOV and POLYAKOV Trotskyists, why do you call them Trotskyists?

ANSWER: I call them that because the slander against Comrade. STALIN, which I heard from them, coincides with the counter-revolutionary slander that the Trotskyists spread against the leaders of the party.

QUESTION: Since DOROSHIN, PAVLOV and POLYAKOV are Trotskyists, they, hiding their counter-revolutionary Trotskyist convictions from the Party, used their stay in the Kremlin commandant's office for counter-revolutionary purposes. Do you admit that you were aware of this?

ANSWER: I deny it. I do not know anything that the named persons used their stay at work in the Kremlin in the k.r. purposes\*.

QUESTION: The investigation knows that DOROSHIN, PAVLOV, POLYAKOV and others were members of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist group, of which you were also a member. Do you acknowledge this? Also tell the investigation what you know about the composition of the c.r. group and its activities?

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ANSWER: No, I don't. I am not aware of the existence of a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist group.

QUESTION: The testimony of the accused DOROSHIN and your personal confession established that you were a participant in a counter-revolutionary slanderous conversation directed against the leaders of the CPSU(b), which you yourself characterize as Trotskyist. Meanwhile, you deny the existence of a Trotskyist group and your participation in it. The investigation states that your testimony contradicts the factual side of the case, and insists on a truthful answer to the question about your belonging to the c.r. Trotskyist group.

ANSWER: I affirm that I know nothing about the existence of a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist group.

QUESTION: The investigation has evidence that you systematically participated in counter-revolutionary slanderous conversations directed against the leaders of the party conducted by the above-named members of the group.

Do you acknowledge this?

ANSWER: No, I don't.

QUESTION: Do you admit that the systematic counter-revolutionary Trotskyist slanderous conversations among the employees of the Kremlin commandant's office you named with your participation created an atmosphere of embittered attitude towards the leaders of the party?

ANSWER: I admit that the counter-revolutionary slanderous conversation of the employees of the commandant's office of the Kremlin named by me with my participation kindled embittered moods towards the leadership of the party and to comrade. STALIN\*.

Written down from my words correctly, read by me.

LUKYANOV

INTERROGATED: BEGINNING. SECR. POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE GUGB G. MOLCHANOV

ZAM. BEGINNING SECR. POLIT. DEPARTMENT GUGB LYUSHKOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 231. L. 32-36. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

No. 499

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL E.K.  
MUKHANOVA (KREMLIN CASE)

February 10, 1935

MUKHANOVA E.K., 36 years old, noblewoman, born Kuibyshev, from 1931 to 1934 she worked in the government library. Prior to her arrest, she worked in the library of the film factory. Husband (separated in 1934) KIZYUN Damety Simonovich, member of the CPSU (b), deputy. editor of the magazine "Red International of Trade Unions".

QUESTION: Who recommended you to serve in the government library?\*

ANSWER: From my friend ZhURAVLEVA Anna Vasilievna (former socialist-revolutionary, recently worked in the library of the 1st Moscow State University), \* I learned that workers are required in the government library and that you need to contact the PRESENT. I contacted him and was enrolled in the staff\*.

QUESTION: Why did you leave there?

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ANSWER: Officially, I left of my own free will; in fact, I was offered to submit a letter of resignation in connection with a statement received against me about my alleged service in the Czech counterintelligence.

QUESTION: Why does the official and unofficial version appear in your departure from the government library?

ANSWER: Head of the Secretariat of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Comrade. TEREKHOV and the head of the library SOKOLOV believed me that I did not work in the Czech counterintelligence, so this was the way I chose to leave the library.

QUESTION: And what, was a special check carried out on this issue?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: Who announced your service in counterintelligence?

ANSWER: ZHURAVLEVA.

QUESTION: Why didn't you bring her to justice for slander, since you deny your service in counterintelligence?

ANSWER: This is my big mistake.

QUESTION: Maybe you decided to hush up this case because in reality you served in counterintelligence?

ANSWER: No, I deny it.

QUESTION: With whom from the staff of the government library did you continue to meet after leaving there?

ANSWER: Only with N.A. ROSENFELD.

QUESTION: How do you know her?

ANSWER: \* I know that she is from the family of the princes BEBUTOV, that she is the wife of brother Kamenev, that her son was a Trotskyist. ROSENFELD herself, according to my impressions, is a Soviet-minded person\*.

QUESTION: This is not true; You are well aware of the anti-Soviet sentiments of ROSENFELD. In conversations with you, she did not hide them.

ANSWER: She sometimes expressed to me dissatisfaction with material conditions, lack of food and other everyday issues.

QUESTION: That's not all. What counter-revolutionary conversations did ROSENFELD have with you; Did she convey to you slander against the leadership of the party and government?

ANSWER: Yes, ROSENFELD told me that she knew (from whom, I don't know) that the official version of ALLILUEVA's death as a result of an illness did not correspond to reality, that in fact ALLILUEVA committed suicide.

ROSENFELD also told me that the suicide of ALLILUEVA it was caused by her disagreement with the political course pursued in the country, as a result of which the village was supposedly brought to impoverishment by collectivization; in the city, the population lacks food, etc. \*

QUESTION: What other counter-revolutionary conversations did ROSENFELD have with you?

ANSWER: She spread vile slander against Comrade Stalin, said that the old and closest students of Lenin - Zinoviev and Kamenev

removed from political life, that there are no elements of democracy in the country and in the party.

QUESTION: What else did ROSENFELD tell you about Zinoviev and Kamenev?

ÿ ANSWER: She praised Zinoviev and Kamenev, believing that they have all the data to be with the leadership. From a series of conversations on this issue with ROSENFELD, I concluded that she was embittered towards Comrade Stalin\*.

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QUESTION: And after that you claim that ROSENFELD is Soviet-minded?

ANSWER: No. In fact, ROSENFELD is definitely counter-revolutionary.

QUESTION: Did anyone else besides you know about the counter-revolutionary sentiments of ROSENFELD?

ANSWER: According to my observations, this should have known: DAVYDOVA, BURAGO and Comrade ENUKIDZE TRESCHALINA, who works in the Secretariat.

QUESTION: What do you know about these people?

\* ANSWER: DAVYDOVA - a noblewoman, works in a government library, anti-Soviet; BURAGO is a noblewoman, also anti-Soviet. Both of them conveyed to me slander in connection with the death of ALLILUEVA, similar to the one that ROSENFELD transmitted to me.

TRESCHALINA is close to ROSENFELD. She herself is the daughter of a merchant. The name of TRESCHALINA is associated with the slanderous rumors spread by ROSENFELD and DAVYDOVA about the personal life of the leaders of the party and government. TRESCHALINA patronizes comrade. ENUKIDZE, who, according to her, treats her like a father\*.

I know from her words and from the words of ROSENFELD that TRESCHALINA often visits Comrade ENUKIDZE at the dacha.

QUESTION: How is it known ROSENFELD?

ANSWER: ROSENFELD herself visited ENUKIDZE's dacha.

QUESTION: One?

ANSWER: No, with an employee of the Kremlin library RAYEVSKAYA, nee Princess URUSOVA, and TRESCHALINA.

. TRESCHALINA informed ROSENFELD that A.S. ENUKIDZA took a liking to RAYEVSKAYA and asked her to bring her to his dacha. I received a similar invitation from ENUKIDZE through TRESCHALINA and ROSENFELD. This invitation was accepted, and the trip to the dacha took place\*.

QUESTION: What do you know about RAEVSKAYA?

ÿ ANSWER: I know that this woman is of easy virtue; to work in

It came to the Kremlin thanks to cohabitation with the late AKOPOV. While working in the library, RAEVSKAYA was in intimate relations with a number of Kremlin employees (GUBERMAN, UVAROV). BURAGO\* told me about all this.

QUESTION: Did ROSENFELD know that RAYEVSKAYA was a woman of easy virtue?

ANSWER: I knew.

QUESTION: Well, ROSENFELD was in this case a supplier of live goods?

ANSWER: Since ROSENFELD knew what RAEVSKAYA was like, this is so.

QUESTION: How long has ROSENFELD been in this profession?^

ANSWER: I cannot answer this question, but I know from TRESCHALINA that there were more such cases.

QUESTION: What else do you know about RAEVSKAYA?

ÿ ANSWER: I know that after visiting A.S. She received an invitation to Enu kidze and was in the government box of the Bolshoi Theater, and also received tickets to Red Square\*.

QUESTION: To whom did you convey the slanderous rumors that spread among your acquaintances and about which you conveyed above.

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ANSWER: I passed them on to my brother and in the library either KULAKOVA, or NELIDOVAYA, perhaps both.

QUESTION: Do you have connections with foreigners. List those connections.

ÿ ANSWER: Yes, I kept in touch with Nina Konradovna, an employee of the British Embassy in Moscow, BENKSON. I met her in the holiday home of the Bolshoi Academic State Theater of the USSR in Makopse (between Tuapse and Sochi) in 1933\*.

After my arrival in Moscow from the rest home, I visited BENKSON four times during 1933-34; Once she was at my apartment.

ÿÿ QUESTION: How do you, an employee of the Kremlin library, and BENKSON, an employee of the British consulate, have any relation to the Bolshoi Theater and why did you rest in the rest house of the Bolshoi Theater?\*\*\*

ANSWER: BENKSON and I have nothing to do with the Bolshoi Theatre. We bought tickets to this holiday home by accident.

QUESTION: What conversations did you have with BENKSON in Moscow in 1933-34?

ANSWER: With BENKSON, we often talked on the phone, even when I worked in the Kremlin library. She called me in the Kremlin, I called her consulate. I remember that I once took the English VOK magazine for TRESCHALINA from BENKSON.

BENKSON told me about the composition of the English consulate and the embassy (about the aftermath, the consul, other employees of the British embassy and consulate), gave me names that I don't remember, about her position there, but I didn't tell her anything.

QUESTION: How do you explain that BENKSON told you about her place of service, but you did not tell her anything?

ANSWER: She was less curious than me.

QUESTION: You are showing a lie. We have information that you told BENKSON about your service, about your acquaintances in the service, about the order of passage to the Kremlin, security, etc.

ANSWER: I really told BENKSON about my service and acquaintances in the service. I didn't tell her anything more.

QUESTION: What phone number did you use to call BENKSON at the consulate?

ANSWER: I called BENKSON at 4-54-12.

QUESTION: Which of your acquaintances does BENKSON know?

ANSWER: BENKSON and I are acquainted with an employee of Aniltrest - DENISOV Tamara Pavlovna and her friend Sofya Zinovievna (I don't remember her last name), who also works in Aniltrest. DENISOVA has kept in touch with BENKSON until recently.

QUESTION: Did BENKSON make any suggestions to you?

ANSWER: I have never done any.

QUESTION: With your participation, books of special storage were stolen from the Kremlin library. Was one of these books found in your possession during a search? What is the connection between this fact and the requests that BENKSON addressed to you?

ANSWER: Indeed, during the search, a book was found in my possession, which ROSENFELD, at my request, gave me for temporary use. This has nothing to do with BENKSON.

QUESTION: When did ROSENFELD give you this book?

ANSWER: More than six months ago.

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QUESTION: If you borrowed a book from ROSENFELD, why didn't you return it within six months?

ANSWER: I forgot.

QUESTION: Why is there no library inventory number on the book?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: According to the investigation, together with ROSENFELD, and after your departure from the library, ROSENFELD, you systematically stole from the Kremlin library a number of special books. The German book "Storm - Iber Russland" found in your possession during a search was also stolen, among others.

Do you know this, and also tell us for what purpose you carried out the theft of books.

ANSWER: I am not involved in the theft of books.

MUKHANOV

INTERROGATED: DEPUTY. BEGINNING SECR. POLIT. DEP. GUGB Lyushkov

BEGINNING 2 SPO GUGB Kagan

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 230. L. 67-75. Script. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "No. 7".

\*\*

The sentence is underlined in pencil.

\*

\* Crossed out in the margins with one line.

\*\*

There is Stalin's handwritten note in the margin: "Who did you buy from? Who gave the tickets?"

No. 500

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL K.I.  
SINELOBOVOY (KREMLIN CASE)

February 10, 1935

SINELOBOVA K.I., born in 1906, non-partisan, born in Vereya,  
Moscow region, librarian of the Government Library in the Kremlin.

QUESTION: When did you start working in the Kremlin?

ANSWER: From February 1929, I began working as a cleaner in the government building - first in the corridor on the 3rd floor, \*then as a cleaner\* in the Government Library. Since October 1930 I have been working at the Government Library as a \*librarian\*.

QUESTION: How did you get a job in the Kremlin?

ANSWER: I was arranged by my brother A.I. SINELOBOV through Pyotr Ivanovich OZEROV, commandant of the government building, our countryman. Brother ne

I spoke with him and after 2 weeks he told me that I could go to work. QUESTION: Who recommended you?

ANSWER: I was not asked for recommendations, and it seems that they were not needed at all then, then many worked without recommendations; some employees were hired from the labor exchange. When I went to work, no one spoke to me, they didn't ask me anything. The duty officer gave me a questionnaire to fill out in the lobby, and that was all.

QUESTION: You are accused of spreading slanderous rumors and provocation against the leadership of the party. Do you plead guilty to this?

ANSWER : Yes, I do\*\*.

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QUESTION: What slanderous rumors and provocations did you spread?

ANSWER: I said that N.S. ALLILUEVA did not die of appendicitis, but that Comrade \*poisoned her. STALIN\*.

QUESTION: Why did you do it?

ANSWER: I heard this slander from my brother, a member of the CPSU (b), an employee of the commandant's office of the Kremlin, A. I. SINELOBOV, who told it to my friend, also a member of the CPSU (b), the commander of the Red Army, I. D. According to him, without a specific purpose, I passed this slander to a number of people.

QUESTION: What other provocations have you heard from your brother?

\*\* ANSWER: I don't remember, at the same time or another time, my brother talked with me GAVRIKOV about the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet authorities. During this conversation, the brother told vile gossip and provocations about the personal life of t.t. STALIN, MOLOTOV, VOROSHILOV and KALININ\*\*.

I did not listen to my brother's other conversations with his friends, because usually in the event of the arrival of one of them, the brother asked me to leave the room.

QUESTION: Why did your brother remove you from the room while talking to his TTs?

ANSWER: I think that the brother had some secret conversations with his comrades and did not want me to hear them.

QUESTION: Which of your brother's friends have been to his apartment?

\*\* ANSWER: This is ID GAVRIKOV, about whom I have already spoken, he visited his brother about once every 10 days. Then M. I. MYSLIN, a heating engineer, works in the Grand Kremlin Palace, and also visited us often; DOROSHIN - pom. commandant of the Kremlin, visited his brother 1 or 2 times; EFIMOV and PAVLOV, employees of the Kremlin commandant's office, visited my brother several times. All these persons visited my brother until my arrest\*\*.



QUESTION: \*Who else is your brother friends with?\*

ANSWER: With OZEROV, the commandant of the government building, with POLYAKOV, it seems, assistant. commandant of the Kremlin; BORISOV - works in the pass desk at the Trinity Gate; ZHELTOV - an employee of the commandant's office, ZHEROMSKY - an employee of the commandant's office, who lives with us in the same apartment.

QUESTION: To whom did you tell the provocations you heard from your brother?

ANSWER: I only spread slander in connection with the death of N.S. ALLI LUEVOY. I told it to the staff of the Kremlin Library A.N. KONOVA, L.E. BURKOVA, E.O. SIMAK, E.Yu. RAEVSKAYA, P.I. and cleaner Korchagina A.

QUESTION: What kind of conversations did you have with the library worker RAEVSKAYA after Comrade Kirov's murder?

ANSWER: I remember a conversation with the participation of RAEVSKOYELO. - daughter of Prince URUSOVA, ROSENFELD NA. - noblewoman, BURAGO N.I. - a noblewoman and DA - VIDOVOY Z.I. - also, it seems, a noblewoman, who took place in the premises of the library.

The conversation took place in connection with a change in the route of our passage to the Kremlin and the establishment of a route only through the Spassky Gates.

\*\* I don't remember exactly who, RAYEVSKAYA or ROSENFELD, said that under the old order it was easy to kill comrade. STALIN\*\*.

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After a while, RAYEVSKAYA asked me if I had heard that we would again be allowed to walk through the Trinity Gate. I told her that I had not heard, and asked her from whom she had heard it. She refused to tell me the person who told her this.

\*\* ROSENFELD and RAYEVSKAYA always asked me and other employees where and how Comrade. STALIN and leaders of the party and government\*\*.

In 1933, KONOVA and I worked on transporting the library of Comrade BUKHARIN, who was moving to the b. comrade STALIN's apartment. An employee of the commandant's office who was on duty told us that Comrade BUKHARIN would move into the vacant apartment in the Government House. STALIN; KONOVA and I told some library staff about this\*\*.

RAEVSKAYA and ROSENFELD were especially interested in this.

QUESTION: For what purpose they were interested in the apartment of comrade. STALIN?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: How did the persons whom you named above as having taken part in anti-Soviet conversations get to work in the library?

\*\*

ANSWER: BURKOVA got a job in the library through her acquaintances, friends lived with PRESENT (former library secretary); GORDEEVA - through her mother, who worked in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, it seems that Comrade. KISELEVA; SIMAK - through her sister, who worked in the Council of People's Commissars; RAEVSKAYA was arranged by AKOPOV (he died, then he was the chairman of the local committee). From BURKOVA, I know that RAEVSKAYA cohabited with AKOPOV\*\*.

QUESTION: What other assistance did AKOPOV RAEVSKAYA provide?

ANSWER: I don't know about AKOPOV, but RAEVSKAYA generally tried to make connections that would help her strengthen her position. In conversations with me, she referred to the fact that she has influential friends who assist her in various matters. \*\*Among them named A.S. ENUKIDZE, BURKOVA told me that RAEVSKAYA was cohabiting with A.S. ENUKIDZE and goes to his dacha. Through him, she received an apartment and a ticket to Red Square in 1934. Other library workers also advertised their connections with ENUKIDZE\*\*.

QUESTION: Who exactly?

ANSWER: ROSENFELD, who, as I have already shown, took part in anti-Soviet conversations, constantly talked about her close acquaintance with A.S. ENUKIDZE.

QUESTION: Which of the a / s-minded employees of the library worked in the apartments of the leaders of the party and government?

\*\*

ANSWER: BURAGO and ROSENFELD worked in a personal library comrade MOLOTOV; BURKOVA, SIMAK and I - at comrade. KUIBYSHEV; KONOVA, BURKOVA and I - at Dr.\*\*

Written down from my words correctly, read by me.

SINELOBOVA

APRF. F.Z. Op. 58. D. 231. L. 54-59. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil. There is a litter in the margins: "Ha-ha-ha. Cleaning lady-bible tutor?

\*\*—\*\*" Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 501

MEMORANDUM L.M. ZAKOVSKY G.G. YAGODA ABOUT  
"FORMER PEOPLE"

February 16, 1935

No. 26092

TOP SECRET

Operational accounting data of the NKVD GB in the Leningrad Region (far from complete) establishes a serious contamination of enterprises, universities, and especially institutions in the cities. Leningrad, the remnants of the defeated bourgeoisie, the major officials of the former. state apparatus (including the police), relatives of executed terrorists, saboteurs, spies, and even prominent representatives of the former tsarist aris

tocracies, generals and their offspring.

On the operational account consists of:

1 .

Families of executed terrorists, spies, saboteurs, members of other k.-r. formations

- 941

2.

Former aristocracy (former princes, barons, counts, columnar and hereditary nobles)

- 2360

3.

Former military officials and officials (former generals, colonels, officials of ministries, the general staff, etc.)

- 1545

4.

Former large landowners, merchants, homeowners and speculators

- 5044

5.

Former officials of the police (employees of the Gendarme Directorate, secret police, prison institutions, etc.).

- 620

6.

Middle and higher clergy who are not in the states of the active church

- 585

TOTAL

- 11 095

As a general characteristic, it should be noted that:

a) part of the former people, who had previously survived the defeat, did not leave Leningrad and live in their former apartments;

b) having settled in various enterprises, institutions, universities, these people restored previously interrupted ties with each other and with numerous relatives and acquaintances who are abroad; organized the so-called "salons", in which the measures of the Soviet government are discussed and criticized in an anti-Soviet spirit and, in essence, a general direction of counter-revolutionary activity is developed;

c) this category of people, as a rule, is not engaged in any useful activity and lives in Leningrad only because these people are local natives and have the right to a passport. In essence, their stay in Leningrad is harmful;

d) members of the families of the executed spies, saboteurs and terrorists, as indirect participants, were not held accountable. In a number of cases that have now been liquidated, their active c.-r. activity. This ka

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tegoria represents people who are embittered and capable of all sorts of counter-revolutionary actions;

e) some of the persons from this category were previously repressed by our bodies for active counter-revolutionary activity; she served her sentence in exile and camps, but, having family ties, returned to Leningrad and resumed her counter-revolutionary activities;

f) a significant part - maintains contact with foreign countries and foreign consulates and receives material assistance.

Here are some examples of these people:

1. The former Baroness GREVENITZ is the wife of Baron GREVENITZ, who was shot in Leningrad for counter-revolutionary activities. Lives in the apartment she occupied before the revolution; the whole setting has been preserved.

The brother is a well-known general of the Ministry of Mines, who suppressed the Moscow uprising of 1905. GREVENITZ's apartment has a whole gallery of portraits of MINA.

The two sons of GREVENITZ are engineers at the Izhora plant, who graduated from Soviet universities with the assistance of professors.

The baron's sister, Sophia GREVENITZ (daughter of the Vilna governor-general) is a teacher of foreign languages.

Sofya GREVENITZ's brother lives in Finland and is reportedly associated with the ROVS.

2. Former prince and large landowner, who owned estates in the Smolensk and Pskov provinces - MESHCHERSKY.

With the support of Professor OSIPOV, who was later convicted of counter-revolutionary sabotage, MESHCHERSKY created a reputation for himself as a major specialist in flax growing, but was exposed in the press (TsO Pravda) and forced to move from Siberia to Leningrad.

In Leningrad, with the assistance of the vice-president of the Academy of Sciences Komarov, he got a job at the All-Union Institute of Plant Industry. He stands on the point of view that for the revival of flax growing it is necessary to abandon large areas under crops. In this matter, he meets support in the person of Academician VAVILOV.

One son of MESHCHERSKY was repressed by the NKVD for participating in a counter-revolutionary organization.

The second son lives abroad and provides financial assistance to his father.

3. Former colonel and company commander of the 2nd Cadet St. Petersburg Corps GERVE.

The following systematically gather at his apartment: the former general VINSHNYAKOV; former major official of His Majesty's office - PETROV and others. Their children are also present at the gatherings.

Gervais himself is reportedly writing memoirs, of which he says that they cannot be published at the present time "for reasons of censorship", but that they will play "an enormous role" when there is "freedom".

The intelligence files being worked out and the cases on which the investigation has been completed and are still being investigated at the present time confirm the very active counter-revolutionary work, mainly of a terrorist nature, by the so-called former people.

For example:

1. The case of USTRUGOV. MAYER and AFANASIEV

A counter-revolutionary terrorist group whose members were from large landowner-noble families.

DOCUMENTATION

Members of the group planned to carry out terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU(b). The investigation established that the members of the group were actively preparing for the commission of terrorist acts, expressed in systematic exercises in shooting.

All the accused were shot by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court.

2. The case of MORDOVIN, KLODT and friend.

A counter-revolutionary terrorist group associated with the ROVS. The members of the group are former guards officers and representatives of the highest aristocratic circles.

The group set itself the task of carrying out terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the government in order to overthrow the existing system.

The investigation established the arrival from Paris in 1934 of the daughter of the former large horse breeder KAYTON to establish contact between this group and the representative of the ROVS, General KUSONSKY.

3. The AFANASIEV case. CHUKHLANTSEV and friend.

A counter-revolutionary terrorist group of fascist youth - children of hereditary nobles and merchants.

The members of the group, who were sharply hostile to the Soviet government, practically discussed the issues of preparation for the commission of a terrorist act against comrade. STALIN.

The open hatred and anger of the members of the group was expressed by the testimony of the accused AFANASYEVA, who stated during the investigation:

"I, AFANASIEVA, Nina Nikolaevna, frankly declare that before my arrest I was a sworn enemy of the Soviet government and will always remain. Only physical destruction will stop my struggle with the Soviet power."

4. The case of TIKHOMIROV and friend.

The counter-revolutionary group, which consisted mainly of former career officers, some of whom took an active part in the civil war on the side of the whites.

The investigation established that the head of the group TIKHOMIROV, an engineer of the Stalprommekhanizatsiya trust, who worked in counterintelligence for the Whites, since 1930 recruited people close to him from among the engineering and technical personnel into the counterrevolutionary organization of a fascist nature that he was creating.

The practical activity of the group was to train personnel for sabotage and espionage activities by the time war was declared on the Soviet Union.

5. The case of KLEIN, OCHERETENKO and others.

A counter-revolutionary terrorist group whose members are

were former disfranchised and rear militias.

Based on the commonality of their counter-revolutionary convictions, the members of the group at the end of 1933 began recruiting and formalizing the group.

Recognizing the impossibility of creating a mass k.-r. organizations, members of the group outlined as their practical activity the preparation and implementation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) - as "the only method of struggle against Soviet power."

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#### 6. Case of SAMSONENKO, SMIRNOV et al.

A counter-revolutionary church group of a fascist-terrorist nature, led by active churchmen.

The group consisted of members of the illegal brotherhood of "Archangel Michael".

The practical activity of the group was directed towards the education of personnel capable of carrying out terrorist acts. The members of the group took the main stake on the youth, instilling in them a sharp hatred for the leaders of the party and government and instilling the need for an active struggle through the use of terror.

Based on the foregoing, I consider it absolutely necessary in order to clear the mountains. Leningrad to relocate to remote places of the Soviet Union 5,000 families of former people of the above categories in the following order:

1. All adult males should be arrested and subjected to rapid operational and investigative processing.
2. Lists with detailed characteristics to be considered at a special meeting of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and by the decision of the latter, some of the most malicious ones should be imprisoned in concentration camps, the rest sent into exile. The property of both those and others is to be confiscated.
3. Administratively suggest that families leave Leningrad as soon as possible (10-20 days), banning residence in all large cities of the Union and the border strip.

BEGINNING NKVD  
DEPARTMENT FOR LENINGRAD. REGIONS ZAKOVSKY

#### TABLE

former people registered with the NKVD departments (according to selective materials)

1. Families of executed terrorists, spies, saboteurs, members of other k.-r. formations

2. Former aristocracy (former princes, barons, counts, columnar and hereditary nobles)
3. Former military officials and officials (former generals, colonels, officials of ministries, the general staff, etc.)
4. Former large landowners, merchants, homeowners and speculators
5. Former officials of the police (employees of the Gendarme Directorate, secret police, prison institutions, etc.)
6. Middle and higher clergy who are not in the states of the active church

TOTAL:

BEGINNING UNKVD DEPARTMENT by LO ZAKOVSKY

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 174. L. 42-49. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "Sent to comrade Kaganovich, MoLO' Tov, Voroshilov.

941

2360

1545

5044

620

585

11 095

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 502

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON VERIFICATION OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE APPARATUS OF THE CEC OF THE USSR AND  
THE VTsIK OF THE RSFSR"

February 22, 1935



RSFSR.

Instruct the commissions as part of t.t. Yezhov (chairman), Belenky Z. and Shkiryatov to check the personnel of the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, bearing in mind the presence of elements of decomposition in the apparatus and ensuring the complete secrecy of all documents of the Central Executive Committee and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 231. L. 88. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 11.11.35.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yezhov, Belenky 3., Shki

ryatov.

No. 503

#### NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE OPERATION TO PURGE LENINGRAD

February 26, 1935

No. 50229

Comrade Zakovsky proposes that Leningrad be purged by a campaign through mass arrests and mass deportations.

This method could unnecessarily provide food for a foreign slanderous campaign in the press against the Soviet Union, all the more so many of these persons are closely connected with circles of scientific and technical intelligentsia both in the Soviet Union and abroad.

I would consider it reasonable:

1. Arrest all persons against whom there are materials on counterrevolutionary work, conduct an investigation and consider cases at a Special Conference

research institutes

2. Carry out the expulsion of all families from Leningrad, in which members of the families were shot according to the decisions of the courts and the Collegium of the former OGPU, forbidding them to live in Moscow, the border zone, Tiflis, Kiev.

3. Narkompros to carry out the cleaning of educational institutions from socially alien elements.

To carry out all these activities in the shortest possible time, but not at once, but by stretching them for two to three months.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER  
OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR Yagoda

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 174. L. 41. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains Stalin's handwritten notes: "Archive. Stalin"; Poskrebyshchev: "From Comrade. Berry".

\*\* Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 are crossed out in the margins with one line.

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No. 504

PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION P.I.  
GORDEEVOY (KREMLIN CASE)

March 1, 1935

GORDEEVA P.I., born in 1907, from the workers, member of the Komsomol since 1929, until the arrest of art. government library librarian. Works in the Kremlin since 1926. Father Ivan Gordeev, military officer, employee of the expedition of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

Question: During the interrogation on February 10 this year, pointing out the spreaders of slanderous rumors about the leaders of the party and government, you hid from the investigation a number of persons who spread slander and provocative fabrications, do you confirm this?

\* Answer: Yes, and besides the ROSENFELD, SINELOBOV and MUKHANOVA named by me, I also know other persons who spread slanderous rumors. \*

Question: Name these people.

\* Answer: In a conversation that took place in the government library in the presence of me, SIMAK, BURAGO and SINELOBOVA, a library employee KONOVA told us slander that N.S. ALLILUEVA died an unnatural death\*.

Question: When did this slanderous conversation take place?

Answer: It was on the day the coffin with the body of ALLILUEVA was transferred to the building of the former. GUM.

Question: You just called SINELOBOVA a participant in a group slanderous conversation, but she personally passed on to you the slander about Comrade STALIN.

Answer: Yes, in addition to the general conversation, SINELOBOVA personally conveyed to me the slander that N.S. ALLILUEVA died an unnatural death, and connected this with the name of comrade. STALIN\*.

Question: Did SINELOBOVA tell you from whom she heard this slander?

Answer: No, she didn't.

Q: Did you ask her about it?

Answer: I asked SINELOBOVA who told her this slander. She did not answer me directly, but I got the impression that SINELOBOVA

She transmitted this slander from the words of her brother, who worked in the Kremlin commandant's office.

Question: Who told you the slander connected with the murder of comrade. KIROVA?

Answer: After the publication of the first government report on the murder of comrade. KIROVA Vera Alexandrovna, secretary of the consultative part of the secretariat of the Central Executive Committee, ELCHANINOVA, a member of the Komsomol, came to see me in the library. She told me that the murder of Comrade. Kirov is not of a political nature, but is the result of personal revenge. ELCHANINOVA explained that the message she had given me was reliable and kept a great secret\*\*.

Question: Did YELCHANINOV tell you the source of this provocative fabrication?

Answer: ELCHANINOVA said that a well-informed person told her about this, but she did not name him \*\*.

DOCUMENTATION \_ 619

Question: To whom did you pass on the provocative fabrication communicated to you by YELCHANINOVA?

Answer: I didn't tell anyone about it.

Question: And what kind of talk in connection with the murder of comrade. KIROVA were in the government library?

\*Answer: Among the library staff there was talk that the murder of Comrade. KIROVA committed on the basis of personal accounts. In the very first days after the murder, an employee of the library BURAGO repeatedly turned to me with persistent questions about whether the murderer was comrade. KIROVA a member of the Party or a non-Party\*.

Question: For what purpose did BURAGO seek this information?

Answer: I don't know.

Question: What kind of library staff were spreading provocative fabrications about the murder of comrade. KIROVA?

\* Answer: KONOVA told me that such conversations were taking place among the library staff, but she did not name who exactly. Personally, I observed that ROSENFELD and RAEVSKAYA are gloating about the murder of comrade. KIROVA\*.

Question: What exactly was it expressed in?

Answer: The entire period of time from the moment of the murder of Comrade. KIROV, before the publication of the announcement of the disclosure of the "Leningrad center" of the Zinoviev organization ROSENFELD, was in a very elevated and joyful state, usually completely unusual for her. ROSENFELD was whispering all the time with BURAGO and DAVYDOVA, and immediately after the conversation with ROSENFELD, they went to NELIDOV\* and PETROVA\*, who were working on issuing books. After the publication of the message about the disclosure of "Leningrad"

center" Rosenfeld's mood changed dramatically, the former joy and elation disappeared. The unusual behavior of ROSENFELD and her entourage, which in the library was called the "noble nest", was so conspicuous that I talked about it with the head of the library SOKOLOVA.

Question: Who exactly did they mean when talking about the "noble nest"?

Answer: By the "noble nest" they meant all the employees who were grouped around ROSENFELD from former people with anti-Soviet attitudes: BURAGO, RAYEVSKAYA, DAVYDOVA, NELIDOV \*, PETROVA \* and the dismissed BARUT, SHARAPOVA \* and MUKHANOVA; MUHANOVA and BURAGO were especially close to ROSENFELD.

I personally read the protocol, my testimony was recorded correctly.

GORDEEVA

INTERROGATED: POM. BEGINNING 00 GUGB GENDIN

ZAM. BEGINNING 7 DEP. 00 GUGB PASS

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 232. L. 31-34. Script. Typescript.

4 \*

\*—\* Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

\*Also; in addition, in the margins in the circle marked "+". Surnames are circled.

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No. 505

DIRECT LINE MESSAGES N.G. Nikolaeva G.G. YAGODA ON  
THE PROGRESS OF THE OPERATION ON "FORMER PEOPLE" (157)

March 2–5, 1935

Leningrad

Owls. secret

I report that on the night of February 27th to February 28th and from February 28th to March 1st of this year. operations were carried out on the former people of Leningrad. 330 people were arrested, of which: former princes - 21, former barons - 32, former counts - 9, former nobility (senators - 3, pillar nobles, etc.) - 48, former generals - 13, former colonels - 26, 11 former employees of the police and gendarmerie, 17 former bankers, large merchants. activities - 46. Most of the arrested nobles. All those arrested were passed through a check and preliminary investigation.

Searches confiscated: illegally stored firearms - 44 units, live ammunition - 410, copies of monarchist literature, royal portraits, orders, officer uniforms. Values seized. As a result of the investigation, 42 people were transferred to operational departments for in-depth study. The primary data of the investigation gave a number of promising applications for the opening of the c.-r. spy cases.

Among those arrested are the following:

- 1) Andrey Leonidovich KOMENDANTOV, born in 1873, gendarmerie colonel, was the head of the gendarme railway. departments in Batumi, Kyiv, assistant to the head of the Gendarme department in Sveaborg, Helsingfors, police chief in Omsk, Nizhny Novgorod. His brother Alexander KOMENDANTOV was shot for wrecking. KOMENDANTOV's daughter is a non-returner, lives in Berlin, her niece lives in New York, in 1934 she came to the USSR as a foreign tourist. He received foreign currency from his daughter and niece. \*Before his arrest, he hid his service in the gendarmerie of COMMENDANTS\*.
- 2) NIKOLAEV Vsevolod Vladimirovich, born in 1904, son of a general. His wife is the daughter of a prominent dignitary. During a search, an illegally stored Browning revolver with cartridges was seized from Nikolaev. NIKOLAEV is a relative of the said gendarmerie colonel A.L. KOMENDANTOV, sharply Ph.D. configured.
- 3) LUTOKHIN Anatoly Nikolaevich, born in 1877, colonel of the old and white armies. LUTOKHIN was arrested in 1932 for his connection with the German consul, on suspicion of espionage. \*LUTOKHIN testified that until recently, systematic illegal gatherings of former officers had taken place in his apartment\*. His son has connections with the German consulate in Germany.
- 4) LOSHKAREV Vadim Evgenievich, born in 1903, a native of Kyiv. Nobleman, son of a prosecutor. University Research Fellow. During the search, a significant number of typewritten theosophical and a/c works were confiscated, indicating the presence in Leningrad of an organized theosophical group conducting a/c work with connections in other cities.
- 5) POBEDONOSTSEV Vladimir Dmitrievich, born in 1904, researcher at the Hydro-reclamation Institute, son of the Riga executioner LAMAN, who was shot under Soviet rule. Sharply k.-r. configured. \*During a search, the following were confiscated from Pobedonostsev: 2 Parabellum and Nagant revolvers, which were stored illegally\*.
- 6) UVERSKY Vasily Vasilyevich, born in 1895 During interrogation, he confessed that in 1915 he was an assistant to the head of the Petrograd house of preliminary

DOCUMENTATION

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conclusion and that while the English expeditionary force was in Arkhangelsk, he fought against the Reds on the side of the British, being an officer. \* UVERSKY hid his past \*.

- 7) BOGDANOV Nikolai Yakovlevich, born in 1880, testified during interrogation that he was

He was the head of the Petrograd transit prison (Crosses) and the Shlisselburg fortress. BOGDANOV has extensive a/c connections among the court nobility living in Leningrad.

8) GARIN Nikolai Pavlovich, former senator and assistant minister of war. During interrogation, he testified about his connections among foreign specialists living in Leningrad, especially German ones.

9) PAPPE Lev Fedorovich, German. Previously arrested on suspicion of spying for Germany and belonging to the K.-r. officer group. During a search of PAPPE, valuables worth 25,000 gold rubles (according to official estimates)\* were found. These valuables were walled up in PAPPE's apartment.

Some of the arrested, prominent former people who are state pensioners, a search found currency, gold and Torgsin bonds.

\* BULOVSKAYA Sofya Lvovna, a prominent noblewoman, pensioner, was found to have 919 rubles, torgsin bonds and 16 dollars. Bulovskaya enjoyed a monthly pension of 35 rubles. AT NEKLYUDOV, a nobleman, a relative of Comrade. Minister of the Interior, retired, gold and currency were found, with a total value of up to 200 rubles in gold \*.

10) KOLYSHKO Julius Iosifovich, 32 years old, son of a landowner, nobleman. Father of a White émigré, head of a terrorist group, editor of the White Guard magazine "Nabat" in Bulgaria. He confessed that in 1925 he established an illegal connection with his father through the German subjects FERMAN and FRIDRIP who arrived from Berlin. Through the latter, he received letters and parcels from his father. KOLYSHKO Julius in Leningrad is connected with a group of former people.

11) The former Major General of the General Staff, before his arrest, a civilian military teacher of the Leningrad technical colleges - KAMENSKY Mikhail Pavlovich testified that he was connected with a group of former colonels and generals living in Leningrad. Periodically arranged a / c gathering of group members.

12) \* The former chairman of the city government in Krasnodar with the Whites, before his arrest, the economist of the Institute of Measures and Weights NIKIFORAKI Sergey \* confessed that until December 1934 he received from Poland from his acquaintance through a sender known to him in foreign currency. NIKI FORAKI is connected with former people in Leningrad.

13) \* The son of the former prosecutor with the Whites in Arkhangelsk - ZELENETSKY Vasily Alekseevich, planning engineer of the Krasnogvardeisky Lespromkhoz \* testified that in 1933 he established an illegal connection with his father, who fled to Germany in 1919, through foreign tourists who came from Germany. ZELENETSKY's brother, a former white officer, is also in Germany.

14) \* Civilian assistant to the beginning. quarters of the Naval Academy named after Comrade Voroshilov \* - VOY K Fedor Fedorovich confessed to serving in the tsarist secret police in the former Petrograd. In 1933, with the assistance of a friend of the supply manager of the same Academy, he received a passport. \*VOIK testified about 29 employees of the security department\*.

15) \* Former Baron STERN-FON-GVYAZDOVSKY Nikolai Ivanovich, former Colonel of the Guard \*. Before the arrest, the accountant of ZhAKT. During the investigation, after being exposed by documentary data found during the search, he confessed that in 1905, commanding a guards unit, he actively participated in the suppression of the December uprising. During a search at GVYAZDOVSKY's, a number of royal portraits were found, including a group photograph, on

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

which he was photographed in the group of Nicholas 2nd. GUYAZDOVSKY keeps in touch with his relatives living in Germany and Poland.

16) A former lieutenant colonel of the white army, at the time of his arrest, unemployed LESUNOV Boris Mikhailovich, during interrogation, testified that he was in touch with a number of white emigrants living in Germany, Yugoslavia and Poland. In Leningrad, he is connected with fellow-soldier ORLEANSKII, in whose apartment c.-r. element.

17) The former adjutant of the Cossack Life Guards Regiment Dmitry Alexandrovich SERDYUKOV and his wife, during interrogation, showed about the a / c gatherings in their apartment of the former nobility, officers of the General Staff.

18) The former Baron TIPPOLD Alexander Alexandrovich, before his arrest, a learned proofreader for the publishing house "Academy", confessed that in 1922, when leaving with his wife abroad, he contacted his brother, a former white naval officer, other white émigrés in Paris, in particular with son of the Vologda governor LADYZHINSKY. TIPPOLD's wife remained in Paris, where she lives.

ZAM. US. UNKVD LO NIKOLAEV

March 3, 1935

Top secret

"I report that on the night of March 1 to March 2, a third operation was carried out on the former people of Leningrad. 164 people were arrested, of which: 76 former nobles, 19 officers, 4 barons, police and gendarmerie 5, previously repressed for crime activities 52, manufacturers 8. Most of those arrested are nobles. All those arrested were filtered and interrogated. During the searches, the following were confiscated: firearms 21 \*, cold steel 19, cartridges 1662, separate copies of literature. As a result of the investigation, 12 people were transferred to operational departments for in-depth analysis. ZILBERT\*, a member of the German consulate in Leningrad, visited the salon and suggested that GENVAET establish an illegal correspondence with his brother GENVEIS, a white émigré in Berlin. 2) Alexander Nikolaevich DENISIEV, hereditary nobleman, state councilor, without specific occupations. He showed about a group of former nobles and high-ranking officials who were gathering and discussing the policy of power in a harsh spirit. 3) OLENEV Oleg Lvovich, born in 1865, nobleman, state councilor, official of the Office of the Finnish Governor General. Member of a group of former people. The apartment where he lives is entirely inhabited by former nobles and officials. Among them is the daughter of the general commandant of the Peter and Paul Fortress, the wife of the former. General PRAVOTOROV and others. OLENEV hid his past and worked in the Leningrad industry as a watchman. 4) FILIPPOV-SOBIN Alek ~

Sandr Filippovich, nobleman, former Colonel, no fixed occupation. Since 1919, after the murder of Uritsky, he lived under false documents in the name of FILIPPOV. 5) PFAFFIUS von BERNHARDT Andrey Evgenievich, nobleman, state councilor, former. Comrade Minister of Education, maintains contact with r-minded former high-ranking officials, including GOREMYKIN's son, senators SURIN, RUSIN and others. Gathered at the PFAFFIUS apartment. 6) MAKARSKY Stanislav Fe

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Litsianovich, nobleman, former officer, Pole, worked at the Pyrometer plant, without special education, in the position of head. chief mechanic, connected with the Italian consul, whom he introduced to the affairs and workers of the military industry. 7) Vyacheslav Grigorievich JAKOBS, born in 1900, nobleman, son of the arrested captain. Associated with a number of ex. officers, nobles, the Polish consulate in Leningrad. 8) NOLKEN Alexander Stanislavovich, a former baron, worked as a buffet porter at the Moscow railway station, brother of the governor of Mogilev who was shot, all relatives are former high-ranking military men and officials in emigration, with whom he corresponds, from whom he receives money. 9) YAKUBOV Konstantin Mikhailovich, born in 1882, nobleman, formerly. pom. early prison, brother gendarmerie officer, shot in 1918, worked as a digger at Lenpromstroy. The past hides, has a connection. 10) BALKOVSKY Yuri Nikolaevich, born in 1908, nobleman, son of a colonel, worked as a head. the state stables of the hippodrome. He showed the presence of a group of former nobles, landowners and horse breeders working at the hippodrome, including horse breeders ZOTOV, SOROKIN, Baron STENGEL and others.

#### ZAM. BEGINNING UNKVD LO NIKOLAEV

March 4, 1935

Top secret

I inform: on the night of March 2nd to 3rd, an operation was carried out on the former people of Leningrad. 168 people were arrested, of which: 10 barons and princes, 10 gendarmes, 84 nobles, 26 bankers, manufacturers and merchants, Bel. officers - 30. Most of those arrested are nobles.

During the initial investigation, new a/c connections were revealed among former people up to 200 people, according to the results of the investigation, 19 cases were transferred to operational departments for in-depth investigation.

During the searches, 59 weapons were seized, of which: 32 firearms and 27 cold ones, the following were seized: the regimental banner "Memory of Azov", anti-Soviet literature, secret documents of the Military Veterinary Department, officer uniforms, royal orders.

Among those arrested, we note the following.

1. BASHNIN N.P., lieutenant colonel of the tsarist and Kolchak armies. He testified that in 1924-25. worked as a draftsman at the headquarters of the Japanese



bathing troops on Sakhalin. In 1925, he handed over to the Japanese the secret plan of the Vladimirsky mine, at the same time BASHNIN showed that more than 15 former people were working with him in the Hydrographic Directorate of the Northern Sea Route. tsarist and white officers arranging an a / c gathering in the apartment of the former colonel NORKHIN, also an employee of the Hydrographic Department. Together with BASHNIN and NORKHIN, the former. Colonel SHESTAKOV and Lieutenant GRIGORIEV, members of this group, who maintain contacts with foreign countries.

2. SAVICH A.K. Stalin. According to SAVICH, in 1919, being hostile to the Soviet power, he entered the Red Army in order to save his property. Social concealed the position until recently. SAVICH's brother, a former lieutenant, was killed while crossing the border. During the search of SAVICH, a revolver, revolver and live ammunition, notes on the location and number of units of the Red Army, as well as detailed information on the location and capacity of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy enterprises were seized.

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3. VESELOVSKII A.M., the son of a landowner, now a wrestler-tourist, has extensive connections among the K / R element, admitted to the K.-R. moods. In the course of the investigation, the c.-r. a group whose members cultivated terrorist tendencies, in particular the fighter SAPOGOV, spoke out about the need for an act against Comrade Stalin.

4. V. S. LASHIN, former captain, son of a timber merchant, Estonian wife, daughter of Colonel von DESENGAUZEN. Maintains contact with foreign countries. During the search, maps of Moscow were found with the location of military units, as well as a 3-page layout of Leningrad and Kronstadt.

5. TRUBINKOV A.V. - a nobleman, has extensive connections among the K.-R. element. During a search, the regimental banner "Memory of Azov" was found on him.

6. POPOV N.V. - a nobleman, a former staff captain, now a technician at the Electroapparat plant, his brother a Wrangel officer. Associated with k.-r. a group of officers. During the search, carefully hidden revolvers, 28 cartridges, 7 flares, and 28 blank forms of the 1st Leningrad School of Drivers were found.

7. MIKHAILOV A.V. and MIKHAILOV V.V., hydrologists, former nobles, who maintain extensive ties with the white émigré circles in Finland and France, who receive foreign currency through the Finnish consulate in Leningrad, testified that they belonged to the K.-R. grouping of former officers, barons, princes and lyceum students, numbering 17 people. The participants of Ph.D. groups regularly held gatherings at which they discussed political issues, approving terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b). During the search, two Browning revolvers were seized from the MIKHAILOVS, in addition, four more members of the group were found to have weapons. 4 people were arrested.

8. Osten-Saken A.A., a former baron, has been in contact with the Latvian and German consulates in Leningrad since 1922, receives from abroad

foreign currency, negotiated with the Latvian consulate for assistance in traveling to Latvia.

9. ZHOGOV S.I. activity. ZHOGOV testified that during the period 1919-1920 he served in Yudenich's counterintelligence and participated in the executions of the Reds. Subsequently, once on the territory of the Soviet Union, he hid his work in counterintelligence and until recently kept in touch with the former counterintelligence officers ANDREEV, GROMOV, and POSTAREV, who lived in the Leningrad region.

10. GREBNER V.V. - Tour guide at the State Museum. In Finland, he has three sisters and a cousin, SOLSKOY Semyon, in America. His brother SOLSKY Alexander was a terrorist, killed in 1931 while crossing the state border of the USSR with terrorist assignments. He has connections among the former officers. He admitted that during lectures at the museum he made a number of a/c statements and interpretations.

11. GREKOV M.N., nobleman, captain of the tsarist army and his son - GREKOV N.M., ex. an officer of the tsarist army, have connections with Germany, through the son-in-law of MERTS Alfred, who until 1935 was in Leningrad on business of the German company Unfans. GREEKS are hostile. We suspect MERTS connections of a spy nature.

Deputy Beginning UNKVD by LO NIKOLAEV

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March 5, 1935

TOP SECRET

I inform: on the night of March 3rd to 4th, the fifth operation was carried out on the former people of Leningrad. 164 people were arrested, including: 1) barons and princes - 16; 2) senators, gendarmes and prosecutors - 8; 3) nobles - 63; 4) former officers - 31; 5) k.-r. of the repressed element - 48. All those arrested were passed through the filtration and preliminary investigation. Based on the results of the investigation, 13 cases were transferred to the operational departments for a more in-depth investigation. During the searches, the following were confiscated: 27 weapons, of which 13 firearms and 14 cold ones; cartridges 1.187. Among those arrested are:

1) LEBEDEV Mikhail Nikolaevich, former senior assistant to the chief of counterintelligence in Leningrad, searched Vladimir Ilyich LENIN's house. He testified about the residence of other counterintelligence officers in Leningrad.

2) KOSMAN Anatoly Mikhailovich, son of those who were repressed for participating in the k.-r. organizations. He testified about the presence of k.-r. groups, gatherings of noblemen in the apartment of KOSMAN to restore the organization. 3) Georgy Andreevich KONDRAT'EV, hereditary nobleman, former Privy Councilor, served in the Ministry of the Interior, dispossessed, associated with manufacturers and merchants. A search seized weapons, foreign currency. 4) BATUEV Nikolai Nikolaevich, nobleman, officer, brother-white officer, emigrated to Czechoslovakia, where he participates in a terrorist organization. BATUEV has connections with foreign

tsey. 5) Nikolai Valentinovich POGANUTSI, a nobleman, his wife was a hereditary noblewoman, actively participated in Denikin's army, a member of the defeated K.-R. organization of the Union for the Liberation of the Kuban from the Bolsheviks. In 1923 he changed his surname. In 1930, at the plant. 2nd Five-Year Plan was created by K.-R. grouping of technical workers. In the apartment of POGANUTSI, gatherings of the candidate-r. groups with sharp criticism of the policy of owls. authorities. 6) ERGEL Vitold Eduardovich, a nobleman, the son of a colonel of the Cossack troops, was close to the royal court. He testified about his connections with the Polish consulate, he is suspected of espionage. 7) BURTSEVA Praskovya Demyanovna, daughter of a prominent merchant, husband is a state councilor. She testified about connections with agents of the Finnish secret police during her visit to Finland. Suspected of espionage. 8) POLYANSKY Vsevolod Petrovich, nobleman, court adviser, ex. colonel. Associated with former officers, princes, barons. Gatherings are arranged in POLYANSKY's apartment, with the statement of K.-R. character and criticism of government measures. 9) KHODOLEI Tatyana Grigorievna, daughter of a colonel who emigrated abroad. Brother Khodoley Boris Grigoryevich, an officer, works as a driver in Belgrade in the English embassy. KHODOLEI Tatyana has connections at the English consulate in Leningrad. Suspected of espionage.

ZAM. BEGINNING UNKVD LO NIKOLAEV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 174. L. 60-73. Script. Typescript.

\*

On the first page of the document there are handwritten notes: "T. Stalin. G. Yagoda"; "To all members of the PB (and candidates, both control bureaus, to all heads of regional departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, secretaries of regional committees, comrade Vyshinsky. I. Stalin."

\*\*

All names under the numbers are underlined in pencil.

\*\_\_\* \*\*

Underlined in pencil.

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No. 506

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL K.K.  
MUKHANOV (KREMLIN CASE)

March 8, 1935

MUKHANOV K.K., born in 1903, ur. Kuibyshev, b. nobleman, b / n, Russian, before arrest art. Research Fellow Center. Research Institute Prom. Structures. Sister MUKHANOVA E.K., who worked in the Government Library in the past, was arrested by the SPO GUGB for terrorist activities. MUKHANOV's wife, IP PROKOFIEV, engineer of the Scientific and Tractor Institute.

QUESTION: When did you last see your sister Ekaterina MUKHANOVA?

ANSWER: The last time I saw Ekaterina MUKHANOVA was on February 6 of this year. Prior to this, I had been on vacation in Essentuki for a month and returned to Moscow on February 2. On February 6, Ekaterina was at my house, and later, on February 11, I became aware of her arrest.

QUESTION: What kind of conversation did you have with Ekaterina MUKHANOVA at the last meeting, i.e. February 6th?

ANSWER: She came to me agitated and showed unusual anxiety. To my questions about the reasons for her condition, Ekaterina replied that she was afraid of her arrest.

QUESTION: Did you ask your sister what caused her fears?

ANSWER: Yes, I was interested in this question; she replied that a close friend of hers, a former colleague at the Government Library, Nina Alexandrovna ROSENFELD, whose apartment she had visited, had recently been arrested.

When I asked Ekaterina whether she had any special reason to fear arrest, apart from the very fact of her acquaintance with ROSENFELD, Ekaterina replied: "We had many different conversations, at ROSENFELD I met many people."

QUESTION: Specify what kind of "different conversations" were you talking about?

ANSWER: Catherine did not specify the nature of her conversations with ROSENFELD. Previously, she repeatedly spoke of ROSENFELD as a cultured and developed woman, with whom she has interesting, meaningful conversations, in particular on literary topics.

Judging by the fact that Catherine at various times told me jokes of anti-Soviet content, I believe that during meetings with ROSENFELD they exchanged similar jokes and that this gave Catherine reason to fear her arrest.

QUESTION: The investigation knows that Ekaterina MUKHANOVA spread slanderous fabrications against the leaders of the Party and the Soviet Government. What can you show about this?

ANSWER: Catherine passed me slanderous fabrications about the leaders of the Party and the Soviet Government and various gossip about their personal lives. In particular, she said that ALLILUEVA died an unnatural death, that she was poisoned, and connected this poisoning with the name of STALIN.

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I also remember that Catherine spoke slanderously about KALININ and KUIBYSHEV.

QUESTION: And what did Catherine tell you about Comrade Kirov's murder?

ANSWER: Ekaterina did not tell me anything about this. Someone told me that the murder of KIROV was committed by Nikolaev on personal grounds and that it was not of a political nature. From whom I heard this, I cannot remember.

QUESTION: To whom did you personally convey this fiction?

ANSWER: I passed this on at home to my wife, her father, Professor PROKOFIEV Ivan Petrovich, and mother, Galina Vladimirovna PROKOFIEVA.

QUESTION: To whom did you pass on the slanderous fiction about the leaders of the party and government, which was communicated to you by Ekaterina MUKHANOVA?

ANSWER: I conveyed this to my wife Irina and sister Maria. I clarify that I passed on slander about KALININ to them.

QUESTION: To whom else did you convey this slander?

ANSWER: Nobody else.

QUESTION: Who was present during your conversations with Catherine concerning slanderous fabrications about members of the government and leaders of the party?

ANSWER: No one else was present during these conversations.

QUESTION: Your sister Yekaterina MUKHANOVA has systematically expressed counter-revolutionary views, tell the investigation everything you have about this is known.

ANSWER: I admit that my sister Ekaterina MUKHANOVA is a supporter of the bourgeois system, in conversations with me she constantly expressed anti-Soviet views, and showed a hostile attitude towards the Soviet authorities.

Concerning the policy of the Soviet government, E. MUKHANOVA argued that collectivization leads to starvation and the extinction of the peasantry, to the death of agriculture, that the intelligentsia, which does not have special knowledge, is doomed to a beggarly existence, and part of the engineering and technical intelligentsia innocently rushes into prisons.

Arguing that the Soviet government used mass terror against the peasantry and intelligentsia, MUKHANOVA declared that the majority of the population, mainly the peasantry and even part of the workers, was hostile to the Soviet government and in the event of war, not only would not defend this government, but would oppose it. her in arms, raising uprisings in the rear of the Red Army.

In the period 1931-33, MUKHANOVA declared that the policy of the Soviet government was directed against the interests of the vast majority of the population, concluding from this that the country was heading for ruin.

I personally read the entire protocol and wrote it down correctly. K. MUKHANOV

INTERROGATED: POM. BEGINNING OO GUGB  
GENDIN ZAM. BEGINNING 7 DEP. OO PASS

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 232. L. 103-106. Script. Typescript.

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No. 507

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL B.N.  
ROSENFELD (KREMLIN CASE)

March 11, 1935

ROSENFELD B.N., born in 1908, non-member of the party, born Leningrad, for belonging to the Trotskyist opposition in 1927 he was expelled from the Komsomol. Prior to his arrest, he worked as an engineer at the Mosenergo heat and power plant.

Father, ROSENFELD N.B. (brother of L.B. Kamenev), artist, mother, N.A. ROSENFELD, who worked as a librarian in the government library, was arrested by the SPO GUGB for terrorist activities.

QUESTION: During the interrogation from 2/Sh of this year. You denied your participation in terrorist activities and claimed that you had no terrorist sentiments. Meanwhile, the investigation has established your participation in the terrorist struggle with certainty. Once again, we invite you to give truthful testimony on this matter.

\* ANSWER: I admit that during the interrogation from 2/Sh I showed a lie. In fact, I had terrorist sentiments, and I was aware of the terrorist sentiments of N.A. ROSENFELD, E.K. MUKHANOVA and N.B. ROSENFELD\*.

QUESTION: How and when did you become aware of the terrorist sentiments of the persons you named?

\* ANSWER: For the first time the question of the need for a terrorist struggle against the leadership of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks arose in 1932 in connection with the expulsion of Kamenev to Minusinsk. ON THE. ROSENFELD, as I testified to 2/Sh, declared in my presence, in a state of passion, that she was ready to kill Stalin. I did not cut her off, as I showed 2/Sh, and did not object to her\*.

QUESTION: So, even then you agreed with N.A. ROSENFELD on the question of the use of terror against the leadership of the CPSU (b)?

\* ANSWER: Yes, in fact, I began to share the views of N.A. ROSENFELD on this issue since that time. I painfully accepted the repressions against L.B. Kamenev, believed that they were the result of settling accounts with him by Stalin, and came to the conclusion that the way out of the situation was to fight by terror\*.

QUESTION: And when did you first learn about the terrorist intentions of N.B. ROSENFELD?

ANSWER: It was later, in my opinion, in 1933, after Kamenev's return from exile. My father, N.B. ROSENFELD, had a conversation with me about

Kamenev. He told me that Kamenev's return from exile did not solve the question of him, that Kamenev felt oppressed, because he was excluded from political activity, to which Stalin would not allow him. According to N.B. ROSENFELD, as long as Stalin is in leadership, one cannot count on Kamenev's return to political activity. My father's whole conversation with me reflected the mood of Kamenev, with whom my father had conversations on this subject. \*\*In conclusion, my father told me that he and Kamenev had come to the conclusion that it was necessary to eliminate Stalin\*\*.

QUESTION: N.B. ROSENFELD by this time knew about your terrorist moods?

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\* ANSWER: Yes, my father knew about my terrorist moods, his statement about the need to eliminate Stalin was in fact an indication of the need to prepare a terrorist act \*.

QUESTION: When did you return from N.B. ROSENFELD to this question?

ANSWER: In addition to individual conversations that took place in our apartment, which I will show later, a special conversation with my father on this issue took place at the beginning of 1934 in my apartment.

\* The conversation arose on my initiative. I reminded N.B. ROSENFELD about the first conversation and asked him if he still adheres to his opinion about the need to commit a terrorist act against Stalin. My father told me that nothing had changed and work in this direction should be carried out\*.

QUESTION: What kind of conversations did you have after 1932 on this\* issue with N.A. ROSENFELD?

ANSWER: After 1932 this question was not raised until Kamenev's return from exile. After that, there were a number of conversations in which, apart from me, N.A. ROSENFELD, E.K. MUKHANOV and N.B. ROSENFELD.

ON THE. ROSENFELD believed that any change in the existing situation could be carried out only by removing Stalin. She was less restrained than N.B. ROSENFELD, or rather, was more embittered and several times declared her personal readiness to kill Stalin.

QUESTION: You show that N.A. ROSENFELD expressed her readiness to personally kill Stalin. How did she think to do it?

ANSWER TO. ROSENFELD until recently worked in the Kremlin, had many acquaintances there, was a member of the personal libraries of members of the Politburo (Molotov's library). I know that she tried to get a job in Stalin's library. In this situation, she had the opportunity to directly commit a terrorist act.

QUESTION: What is MUKHANOVA's role in this matter?

ANSWER: First of all, about MUKHANOVA herself. She comes from a well-born noble family, one of her family members took an active part in the white movement, she herself hates Soviet power with every fiber of her soul. \* Her anger against the existing system was so sharp that she was ready to take any steps. MUKHANOVA believed that the only way to fight the Bolsheviks was through terror. I believed that the terrorist intentions of N.A. ROSENFELD, to a certain extent, were the result of propaganda of terror by MUKHANOVA\*.

QUESTION: In what ways did MUKHANOVA intend to wage a terrorist struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b)?

ANSWER: MUHANOVA was ready to take part in the terrorist attack on comrade. Stalin and had the same opportunities for this as N.A. ROSENFELD.

QUESTION: Who do you know of the persons who took part in the preparation of the terrorist act against comrade. Stalin, together with MUKHANOVA and N.A. ROSENFELD?

ANSWER TO. ROSENFELD and MUKHANOVA maintained close contact with a number of people who worked in the Kremlin library. Of these, I know: SHARAPOVA A.F., DAVYDOVA Z.I., BURAGO N.I. Whether they took a direct part in the preparation of the terrorist act, I do not know.

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QUESTION: You showed that at the beginning of 1934 N.B. ROSENFELD told you that the preparations for the terrorist struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b) must be continued. What have you personally done in this direction?

ANSWER: Even before this conversation with my father, I had a number of conversations with my comrade NEKHAMKIN L.Ya. - a Trotskyist. NEKHAMKIN retained his Trotskyist convictions until recently.

In 1932 or 1933, in one of our conversations (where it took place, I don't remember now), NEKHAMKIN told me that the struggle against the leadership of the CPSU (b) in the present conditions should be carried out following the example of the struggle of Narodnaya Volya against tsarism, i.e. .e. through terror.

After a conversation with my father, at the beginning of 1934, I had 2 more meetings with NEKHAMKIN. During one of them, I conveyed to him what N.B. had told me. ROSENFELD, and asked his opinion on this matter. He told me that he remained in his old positions and fully shared the terrorist intentions that I had expressed to him\*.

QUESTION: How did you and NEKHAMKIN intend to practically prepare a terrorist act against comrade. Stalin?

ANSWER: Before my arrest, we did not take specific measures in this direction.



QUESTION: This is incorrect. The testimonies of those arrested in your case established that you organized surveillance of Stalin and practically prepared the implementation of a terrorist act.

ANSWER: It didn't happen. The matter did not go further than the selection of people and an agreement on the need to commit a terrorist act\*.

QUESTION: You are again insincere. You show not everything you know about this issue.

ANSWER: I can't show you anything else.

QUESTION: Did you know MUSIC F.I., b. Secretary L.B. Kamenev?

ANSWER: I know. N.B. ROSENFELD has repeatedly told me about him as a person to whom he treats well. The last time I saw MUSIC after the murder of comrade. Kirov, at a high-pressure thermal power plant, where he was doing an internship, and I worked as an engineer. MUSIC told me that the persecution of Kamenev and Zinoviev was beginning, referring to articles in Pravda. I answered him that the assassination of Kirov was a convenient excuse for Stalin to organize persecution against Zinoviev and Kamenev. He is with me

agreed.

QUESTION: What did MUSIC have to do with the preparation of a terrorist act against comrade. Stalin?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: You again show a lie. N.B. ROSENFELD shows that MUSIC has long been terrorist-minded.

ANSWER: I remembered that N.B. ROSENFELD told me that MUSIC is a desperate person and in a state of excitement is capable of extreme actions\*.

QUESTION: In connection with what N.B. ROSENFELD, that MUSIC is capable of extreme measures?

ANSWER: I told N.B. ROSENFELD about his conversation with MUSIC KOY and suggested that MUSIC would probably be arrested. At the same time, I proceeded from the fact that MUSIC is aware of Ph.D. activities of Kamenev.

From my father's statement about the personal "qualities" of MUSIC, it became clear to me that he was a terrorist by conviction\*.

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QUESTION: During the interrogation of 2/3/2 you testified that M.V. took part in the counter-revolutionary conversations that took place in your apartment. KOROLKOV.

What else do you know about him?

ANSWER: Talk about M.V. KOROLKOV only in connection with the c.-r. conversations with we can't.

In reality, the situation is as follows:

\*M.V. KOROLKOV is a terrific counter-revolutionary, is in close relations with M. N. PROKHOROV, who owned some enterprise before the revolution, a notorious Black Hundreds and White Guardsman; POPOV - the son of a tea manufacturer; Inkizhikov V.I. — film actor, non-returner\*.

Since KOROLKOV's political moods were known to us, we had full confidence in him.

Terrorist views of N.B., N.A. ROSENFELD, MUKHANOVOY and my KOROLKOV shared.

B. ROSENFELD

INTERROGATED: BEGINNING. SECR. POLIT. DEPARTMENT GUGB G. Molchanov  
DEP. BEGINNING SPO GUGB Lyushkov

BEGINNING 2 DEP. SPO GUGB Kagan

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 232. L. 168-176. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

\*\*—\*\* In the margins marked "xx".

No. 508

PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION M.V.  
KOROLKOVA (KREMLIN CASE)

March 11, 1935

KOROLKOV M.V., born in 1887, unregistered, director, before his arrest he worked in the office of artistic self-activity of the MOSPS, served in the Red Army from 1919 to 1921, was not under trial and investigation,

married.

Question: Name the persons with whom you have the closest relationship? Answer: Nina Aleksandrovna ROSENFELD and POPOV Nikolai Konstantinovich.

Question: How long have you known N.A. ROSENFELD?

Answer: From about 1907, I met her in Munich, where she studied at Gollashi's studio.

Question: How often did you meet with her in Moscow?

Answer: About once a week.

Question: Who did you meet at N.A. ROSENFELD?

Answer: Her ex-husband N.B. ROSENFELD, MUKHANOV E.K., SHARAPOV A.F.\* , ESAEV N.\* , brother N.A. ROSENFELD\* , wife of ESAEV, KAPANOV A.KH\* . - an employee of the Lenin Library, BEBUTOVA P.A.\* . (former prince), a relative of N.A. ROSENFELD\* , wife of brother N.B. ROSENFELD (I don't know her last name, but I remember that her name is Liza), GARNIER\* - an employee of the Kremlin library.

Question: Which of these people did you meet most often?

Answer: MUKHANOV, N.B. ROSENFELD - recently, and somewhat earlier to SHARAPOV.

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Question: The investigation has accurate data that in the circle of ROSENFELD N.A. counter-revolutionary conversations were systematically conducted, in which you were also present. What can you say on this issue?

Answer: I confirm this fact.

Question: Who was the initiator of these conversations?

Answer: Usually N.A. ROSENFELD and B.N. ROSENFELD. N.B. ROSENFELD behaved more cautiously in these conversations, nevertheless, he also revealed his counter-revolutionary convictions.

Question: Tell me about the main content of these counter-revolutionary conversations.

Answer: The main content of these conversations was a sharp criticism of the leadership of the party, and in particular and especially comrade. STALIN\*.

Questioner: Can you expand on this testimony by stating specifically what the criticism was?

Answer: ROSENFELD N.A., Boris ROSENFELD, N.B. ROSENFELD stated that there is a clampdown on democracy in the country, that STALIN is a dictator and is leading the country to destruction. It was said that STALIN was brutally cracking down on his opponents and that he carried out an act of personal political reprisal against KAMENEV and ZINOVYEV, just as he had previously done against TROTSKY.

Question: The investigation has accurate data that the ROSENFELDS did not confine themselves to counter-revolutionary talk, but also showed their terrorist intentions. Do you confirm this?\*

Answer: I confirm.

Question: Who was the initiator of these terrorist intentions?

Ÿ Answer : N.A. ROSENFELD, Boris ROSENFELD and N.B. ROSENFELD.

Question: Against whom were these terrorist intentions directed?

Answer: Against STALIN.

Question: Who declared his personal readiness to commit a terrorist act against comrade. STALIN?

Answer: Nina Alexandrovna ROSENFELD \*.

question: You have known her for about thirty years, you are close to her. Do you personally think that NAROSENFELD could have committed this terrorist act?

Ÿ Answer: Knowing Nina Alexandrovna ROSENFELD for so many years, I think that with her straightforwardness, excitability and intolerance, she could have committed this terrorist act - personally or through Nikolai Borisovich ROSENFELD.

Question: Who inspired terrorist sentiments among Nina Aleksandrovna, Nikolai Borisovich and Boris Nikolayevich ROZENFELDOV?

Answer: Lev Borisovich KAMENEV \*.

Question: Please justify this answer.

Answer: The repressions to which KAMENEV was subjected were regarded as an act of STALIN's political reprisal against his opponents. ROSENFELD DYS always opposed STALIN KAMENEV as a person who stands above him and is a truly statesman.

I remember that even when KAMENEV was dismissed from work at the LENIN Institute, the ROSENFELDS (Nina Alexandrovna and Boris Nikolaevich) told me that STALIN did not fulfill LENIN's will and even removed KAMENEV from the development and preservation of LENIN's literary heritage, because STALIN is afraid of publishing all of LENIN.

The final impetus for the formalization of the terrorist intentions of the ROSENFELDS was the exposure of the Moscow center of the Zinoviev-Trotskyist organization and the imprisonment of KAMENEV in the isolation ward.

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Question: What do you know about the specific measures to prepare for the assassination of comrade. STALIN, which were carried out by ROSENFELD, and in particular by N.A. ROSENFELD.

Answer: I was aware of the terrorist intentions of ROSENFELD DOV, but I do not know anything about their specific activities.

Question: Who from the ROZENFELD entourage was involved by them to carry out a terrorist attack on comrade. STALIN?

Answer: I don't know.

Question: "I don't know" or "I don't want to say"?

Answer: I don't know at all.

Question: And if you ask about your assumptions about who might be involved?

Answer: I can't name anyone from Nina Alexandrovna's acquaintances, but I admit that one of Boris ROSENFELD's personal connections could be involved in this, since I know, from the words of his mother, that he participated in the past in illegal work as a Trotskyist.

Question: What do you know about N.A. ROSENFELD and her associates with foreigners?

Answer: I know that N.A. ROSENFELD received from the ex-wife of "Zhenya" ROSENFELD - \*\*3inaida ABAZA\*\* money from America.

ÿABAZA, a US citizen, came from America to Moscow in 1932, where she met with N.A. ROSENFELD. Last time N.A. ROSENFELD received money from America from ABAZ in December 1934\*.

The technique of obtaining this money N.A. ROSENFELD disguised it, because she gave a signature at the place of her service that she had no connections with foreigners.

Question: What did N.A. spend on? ROSENFELD this money?

Answer: According to her, for the maintenance of "Zhenya" ROSENFELD.

Question: And how old is this "Zhenya" ROSENFELD and what does he do?

Answer: He is probably forty years old. He was an economist at some Leningrad institution, and now he probably lives on a pension.

Question: What else do you know about the connections of ROSENFELD and her associates with foreigners?

ÿ Answer : N.A. ROSENFELD told me that MUKHANOVA met an Englishwoman at some resort, who made a good impression on MUKHANOVA.

I remember that this Englishwoman was connected with the British embassy in Moscow. I don't know her last name and never saw her.

Question: Did N.A. ROSENFELD from the Kremlin Library foreign literature - White Guard and foreign.

Answer: Yes, I did. In particular, I received from her \*\*\* German fascist newspapers "Volkische Beobachter" \*\*\* and other illustrated magazines. She gave them to me so that I could compile bibliographic indexes based on these materials: "Sovetika", which, according to her, she needed because of the nature of her work in the library.

Question: Did you make these reviews at your home?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What other "literary" assignments did ROSENFELD give you?

Answer: About last year or a little earlier, on her behalf, I compiled an index on the state of our transport, based on materials from Soviet newspapers.

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Question: Did you receive money from ROSENFELD for this work and in what amount?

Answer: Yes, about 60 rubles.

Question: Did you give ROSENFELD a receipt for this amount?

Answer: No.

Question: What was the purpose of these reviews?

Answer: According to the explanations of N.A. ROSENFELD, these reviews were compiled for members of the government.

Question: And not for foreigners?

Answer: I don't know.

Question: The investigation established precisely that anti-Soviet literature, in particular Trotskyist literature, was handed over from the Kremlin library to counter-revolutionary circles.

What can you say about this issue?

\*Answer: I know that N.A. ROSENFELD supplied her son Boris with novelties of Trotskyist literature. There is no doubt that N.B. ROSENFELD also received this literature, which N.A. ROSENFELD took from the Kremlin Library \*.

Question: What did N.A. ROSENFELD on the state of the Kremlin guards and on the system of passes to the Kremlin?

Answer: Recently, N.A. ROSENFELD complained to me that the security in the Kremlin is becoming stricter than it was before. However, N.A. ROSENFELD told me that she could always arrange a pass to the Kremlin for her acquaintances, since it was enough for her to call \*\* by phone MINERVINA, and the pass would be issued \*\*.

Question: What else did N.A. tell you? ROSENFELD about the Kremlin?

\*\* Answer: She talked about the carousing that ENUKIDZE arranged at his dacha with the Kremlin employees \*\*.

Question: What do you know about N.A. ROSENFELD's connections? with the protection of the Kremlin?

Answer: About the connections of N.A. ROSENFELD I don't know anything about the Kremlin guards, but I know for sure that she was well acquainted \*\* with the commandant of the Bolshoi Theater, who, according to her, could always arrange for her a pass to the theater \*\*.

Question: Did Boris ROSENFELD have any connections with the Bolshoi Theatre?

\* Answer: Boris ROSENFELD, as N.A. told me. ROSENFELD, at a party at MUKHANOVA's, I met some ballerinas from the Bolshoi Theatre\*.

Question: Who was at this party?

Answer: I don't know.

Question: What do you know about the possibilities of N.A. ROSENFELD receive passes to Red Square on the days of parades and celebrations?

Answer: I know for sure that N.A. ROSENFELD somehow could easily get passes to Red Square. I personally received two letters from N.A. ROSENFELD passes for his friend POPOV.

Question: Tell us what POPOV is.

\* Answer: POPOV Nikolai Konstantinovich is my classmate at the gymnasium. In the past, he is the adopted son of the famous tea merchant Popov. N.K. POPOV, chemical engineer, now arrested in connection with the explosion at the factory. Krasin, where he worked as head of the graphite shop\*.

I was in Munich with POPOV in 1906-7. In the period from 1912 to 1914, POPOV lived in England, as his adoptive father was going to make him a specialist in the tea trade.

Question: Give a political description of POPOV.

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Answer: I think that POPOV is a Soviet-minded specialist, but some idealistic moods are sometimes noticeable in him, so I jokingly called him a Menshevik\* in conversations with him.

Question: Did he have connections with the Mensheviks?

Answer: POPOV met with Kirik LEVIN.

Question: Besides Kirik LEVIN, with which of the Mensheviks did POPOV have connections?

Answer: I do not know, but I admit that before the revolution he met closely hung out with the Mensheviks.

Question: What slanderous rumors did N.A. ROSENFELD

about the leaders of the party and government, and who took part with her in spreading these rumors?

Answer to. ROSENFELD spoke in the presence of me and my wife that ALLILUEVA died an unnatural death and that STALIN was responsible for her death.

She also told us that people in high positions have their favorites.

About tov. She told KIROV that \*\*he was killed on personal grounds, because of NIKOLAEV's wife, and that Nikolaev's wife, according to her, a beautiful woman, after the murder of KIROV remained to live in Leningrad and was not repressed\*\*.

I also know from the words of N.A. ROSENFELD and according to N.B. ROSENFELD that the latter is engaged in drawing counter-revolutionary lampoons on Comrade. STALIN, among his other libels, in the Zinovievist-Trotskyist spirit.

Question: You showed that the ROSENFELDS were carrying out counter-revolutionary work and preparing the assassination of comrade. STALIN. Do you recognize yourself as their accomplice?

Answer: I was not an accomplice to them, but I plead guilty to not informing the authorities that the ROSENFELDS are clearly counter-revolutionary and hate STALIN, even to the point of raising the question of his murder \*.

Question: The ROSENFELDS did not confine themselves to just posing the question of the murder of comrade. STALIN, but, as the investigation proved, they took practical measures to implement their terrorist plan.

Answer the same question: do you plead guilty to being a member of a counter-revolutionary terrorist organization that prepared the assassination of comrade STALIN?

Answer: No, I was not a member of this counter-revolutionary organization, but I believe that I deserve an appropriate punishment for the crime that I committed against the Soviet government.

Written down from my words correctly and read to me. Mich. KOROLKOV

Interrogated: POM. BEGINNING 2 DEP. INO GUGB SLAVATINSKY  
BEGINNING. 6 DEP. INO GUGB SMIRNOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 232. L. 177-187. Script. Typescript.

\* Surnames are circled.

\*—\* Crossed out in the margins with a single line.  
Marked with an "x" in the margins.

\*\*\* \_ \*\*\* Underlined by hand.



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No. 509

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL V.A. ELCHANINOV  
(KREMLIN CASE)

March 13, 1935

ELCHANINOV V.A., born in 1910, ur. Moscow, Russian, member of the Komsomol, from 1927 until her arrest she worked as a secretary of consultants. part of the secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Member of the Leninsky District Council, Secretary of the Komsomol Committee under the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

QUESTION: At the interrogation on March 8, you named a number of people working in the government library and the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee Secretariat as anti-Soviet-minded, what else do you know about them?

ANSWER: The typist of the Secretariat of the SKOLKOV Central Executive Committee told me that Irina GUGUA "scolds the Soviet government at all costs" because her father (a well-known Menshevik GUGUA) was repeatedly arrested by b. OGPU.

In addition to the description given by me (in my testimony of 8.III) of the senior secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee, AVSENEVA (a former white officer), I show that the head. The general part of the Secretariat, BUDKIN (a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks), in a conversation with me about the wrecking attitude towards the AVSENEV case, stated that he tells me only a tenth of what he knows about AVSENEV.

Among the previously named alien persons working in the apparatus of the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee, I also include an employee of the secret information department AVKSENTYEVA. She, according to BURKOVA, is the sister of a former white officer.

In addition to the employees of the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee I have named, who cohabited with ENUKIDZE (MINDEL, ROGACHEVA, RAEVSKAYA, VORONETSKAYA and BAMBUROVA), Elza EMSIN, IVANOVA (an employee of the government library) and ISCHU KOVA Elizaveta, an employee of the academic committee, also entered into cohabitation with ENUKIDZE.

For these women ENUKIDZE brought from abroad (from Berlin, where he went to be treated) berets, jumpers, coats.

Thus, the established relations with ENUKIDZE gave these persons the right to ignore their immediate superiors at work and, in general, all persons below ENUKIDZE, which they practiced and which could not but affect the discipline and condition of the apparatus.

KOROTKY (a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, consultant to Comrade ENUKIDZE) told me that during the purge of the party organization of the Central Executive Committee in 1933, an article was written for a wall newspaper about the clogging of the apparatus of the government library. In the note, the names of alien employees were named. But ENUKIDZE forbade publishing this article.

QUESTION: Tell us what you know about the terrorist intentions of the anti-Soviet persons you named.

ANSWER: Nothing is known. BURKOVA in October or November of this year. she told me that an assassination attempt was being prepared on STALIN and that, as a result, measures were taken to strengthen the protection of the Kremlin.

QUESTION: From what sources is this known to BURKOVA?

ANSWER: I don't know, she didn't say.

QUESTION: Did you ask BURKOVA about the sources?

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: Why?

ANSWER: I was confused by such a message from BURKOVA and did not ask.

QUESTION: Where, in your opinion, could BURKOVA have information about the assassination attempt? You, as a close friend of hers, cannot but know her connections.

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ANSWER: I think that KAGANOVICH's driver Peter (I don't know his last name) told her about this. I know that they were often together, Peter looked after BURKOVA.

QUESTION: What other talk about terror was there?

ANSWER: I haven't heard anything more about terror. KOROTKIY V.I. he told me that one of the artists (surname unknown to me) had painted the painting "STALIN on Guard of Honor at the Coffin of Kirov". In the picture, next to STALIN, death was depicted, holding out its hand to STALIN. KOROTKY said that the artist had been summoned by POKREBYSHEV and confessed to him that he painted the picture on a specific assignment.

QUESTION: Tell us what you know about the anti-Soviet activities of the government library employee PETROVA?

ANSWER: PETROVA was grouped with BURAGO and DAVYDOVA. They could be seen together at a meeting, in a cooperative, in a canteen. In the service, they usually whispered. PETROVA expressed dissatisfaction with the supply. She always had a negative attitude towards the Komsomol youth.

QUESTION: Tell us what else you know about k.r. activity, spreading k.r. slander and persons guilty of k.r. activities. Until now, you have not told everything you know about this and about your role in the spread of k.r. slander.

ANSWER: Everything that I knew, I told at the interrogation on March 8th.

I can't show you anything else.

I have read the transcript of the interrogation. Recorded correctly:

V. ELCHANINOV

Interrogated: Pom. Beginning 5 Dep. SPO GUGB A. GOLUBEV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 233. L. 46-49. Script. Typescript.

No. 510

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. TO STALIN  
ON THE MANUFACTURING OF BUTTONS WITH FASCIST SYMBOLS

March 15, 1935

No. 55620

\*At the button factory. Balakirev trust "Mosplastmass" since December 1934, the production of buttons with the image of the Nazi swastika began.

The style of these buttons was developed by master Novichkov in agreement with Rogachev, the former sales manager of the factory. \*Both are arrested\*.

This style of buttons was approved in agreement with the factory technologist Elender, a German citizen working at the factory under an agreement with the Mosplastmass trust.

In total, from December 1934 to March 1935, 120,000 buttons with the Nazi swastika of various sizes were produced.

By the intervention of the UNKVD of the Moscow Region, the further production of these buttons was stopped, and measures were taken to withdraw them both from sewing knitwear enterprises and from the distribution network.

The case is under investigation.

Report of the UNKVD of the Moscow region.

Beginning ECO GUGB NKVD USSR Mironov

APRF. F.Z. Op. 58. D. 203. L. 30.

\* The text contains handwritten notes: "T. Molotov. Well, unclear. I. St.", "Chit. Molotov, T. Stalin. Prokofiev 15.3.1935.

1 \* Underlined in pencil.

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No. 511

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL R.G.  
MINDEL (KREMLIN CASE)

March 16, 1935

MINDEL R.G., born in 1906, Jewish, daughter of a small handicraft shoemaker from the mountains. Gomel, with an incomplete secondary education, was not on trial and investigation. Prior to her arrest, she worked in the Kremlin, holding the position of secretary of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and an assistant for protocol matters; worked in the Kremlin since 1926.

QUESTION: In what year did you move permanently to Moscow?

ANSWER: In 1926

QUESTION: And immediately went to work in the Kremlin?

ANSWER: Yes.

QUESTION: Who got you a job in the Kremlin?

ANSWER: ITIN, a member of the CPSU (b), who worked at that time in the Narkomfin, who after that became my husband.

QUESTION: To whom did you directly report in the course of your work?

ANSWER: Senior referent TRESCHALINA, head. Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR TEREKHOV and his deputy SOTSKOV.

QUESTION: Why did you divorce ITIN?

ANSWER: Because I began to cohabit with SOTSKOV, who at the same time cohabited with me and with Irina GUGUA, an employee of the Budget Commission of the CEC \*.

QUESTION: By the nature of your work, did you have access to the secret materials of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR?

ANSWER: Yes, I also had the right to use the state seal and facsimile, etc. KALININ, ENUKIDZE, MEDVEDEV, TADZHIEV, TEREKHOV and SOTSKOV\*.

QUESTION: The investigation has evidence that, while working in the Kremlin, you were in a circle of suspicious persons who had nothing to do with the Kremlin, visited restaurants together with them, participated in drinking parties with them, etc. Do you confirm this?

ANSWER: I categorically deny it. I admit that the rumors about my visits to restaurants are explained by the fact that I lived in the Metropol.

QUESTION: Who visited you at the Metropol?

ÿ ANSWER: ENUKIDZE very rarely, three times during my entire stay at the hotel; once, together with ENUKIDZE, I had GUGUA, who also lived in the Metropol; besides ENUKIDZE there were: my sister with her husband, brother, ITIN with his friend MAGIDIN, SOTSKOV, TRESCHALINA, KHVOSHCHEVSKAYA, ROGACHEVA, EFIMOVA and others\*.

QUESTION: So you deny the fact that you participated in drinking bouts with suspicious persons who have nothing to do with the Kremlin?

ANSWER: Yes, definitely.

QUESTION: In that case, I show you a photograph showing you in the company of obviously suspicious people and in a state of obvious intoxication. What can you say about this?

ÿ ANSWER: On this photograph I was taken together with SOTSKOV visiting Dr. BESSONOV\*, a friend of SOTSKOV\*.

QUESTION: BESSONOV is a party member?

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ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: Does he have anything to do with the Kremlin?

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: And the rest of the faces on the photograph are related to the Kremlin?

ANSWER: No. I don't know who they are or their names. One of them is some petty Soviet employee.

QUESTION: I am presenting you with another photograph showing you with the Order of the Red Banner. What can you say on this issue?

\* ANSWER: On this photo I was taken with AVANESOV. The order belonged to him. He put the order on me as a joke\*.

QUESTION: And why did you keep several copies of this picture?

ANSWER: I had one copy, the rest were given to me from the AVANESOV archive after his death.

QUESTION: The investigation has evidence that you spread rumors among non-party employees of the Kremlin about your closeness to responsible officials. What can you show on this issue?

ANSWER: I deny it. In particular, I carefully concealed my closeness to Sotskov from everyone. However, rumors did indeed circulate about me.

hee that I am the "favorite" of ENUKIDZE.

\*In particular, these rumors were spread about me by an employee of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR HAMILTON, who was subsequently fired. Irina GUGUA told me about it. Indeed, ENUKIDZE's outward attitude towards me gave rise to assumptions that ENUKIDZE lived with me. In particular, such rumors began to spread about me after I traveled with ENUKIDZE in his carriage from Moscow to Leningrad. In addition to me and ENUKIDZE, the following employees of the Secretariat went on this trip: KHVOSHCHEVSKAYA, Galina MAKAROVA, KUZNETSOVA and KOCH. We went to the session of the Central Executive Committee. I add that I personally repeatedly pointed out to ENUKIDZE that his external attitude towards me compromised me. I remember that back in 1927, when ENUKIDZE arrived at the Tetkovo rest house of the Central Executive Committee, where I was resting at that time, I told him that his arrival was extremely unpleasant for me and gave rise to gossip about our relationship with him. \*.

QUESTION: The investigators have evidence that you spread various slanderous rumors of anti-Soviet content among non-party employees of the Kremlin. What can you say about this?

ANSWER: I categorically deny it.

QUESTION: And which of the so-called former people among the Kremlin employees do you know?

\*\* ANSWER: Exclusively on official business, I came across such persons as: KOTLYAREVSKY - in the past b. minister, consultant to the Budget Commission of the CEC; IGNATIEV - former Minister of the Northern Government, editor-consultant at the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee; NA ROSENFELD, whose mother comes from some princely family, is a worker in the Kremlin library; PANTOVICH\*\*\* - former Menshevik or Socialist-Revolutionary, consultant of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee; HAMILTON - daughter of b. royal prosecutor, typist of the Secretariat; Irina GUGUA - technical secretary of the Budget Commission, daughter of a Menshevik who was repeatedly arrested under Soviet rule; ROGACHEVA O. M. \*\*\* - Secretary of the secret part of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the CEC, in

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in the past, the daughter of a manufacturer or merchant and the wife of an officer of the tsarist time; EFIMOVA - consultant of the Commission on Citizenship Affairs, sister of ROGACHEVA; AVSENEV - in the past an officer of the tsarist army, senior assistant of the award commission; RAEVSKAYA - b. princess, an employee of the Kremlin library, a woman of easy virtue; MINERVINA - daughter of a priest, personal secretary to ENUKIDZE; DAVYDOVA - sister b. Minister IGNATIEV, an employee of the Kremlin Library.

QUESTION: During your work in the Kremlin, did anyone from the party part of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee raise the issue of clogging of the apparatus?

ANSWER: This question was raised by MASHCHENKO.

QUESTION: And what did he achieve?

ANSWER: MASHCHENKO was fired from his job and left the Kremlin.

QUESTION: With which of the above Kremlin employees did you have anti-Soviet and slanderous conversations?

ANSWER: I have never had such conversations with anyone.

QUESTION: And what do you know about the anti-Soviet sentiments of these individuals?

ANSWER: Nothing is known. But I heard rumors that all sorts of gossip was circulating among non-partisan Kremlin employees.

QUESTION: Please develop this testimony.

ANSWER: These gossips mainly closed in the sphere of domestic and everyday issues. There was gossip about who lives with whom, who takes advantage of the opportunities to get the best rations, apartments, vouchers to holiday homes and resorts, and so on.

QUESTION: You are clearly trying to deceive the investigation. We know for sure that among the anti-Soviet elements among the non-party employees of the Kremlin, in addition to gossip, slanderous rumors of a counter-revolutionary nature were circulating, in the dissemination of which you also took part.

ANSWER: I categorically deny my participation in the dissemination of any kind of counter-revolutionary rumors. About gossip, I can add the following: Elizaveta ISCHUKOVA\*\*\*\*, a pretty young woman, works as a typist in the apparatus of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. ENUKIDZE treated her well, and she visited him at home in Moscow and at his dacha. ISCHUKOVA advertised ENUKIDZE's attitude towards her in every possible way. In general, she was distinguished by talkativeness, therefore, as KhVOSHCHEVSKAYA told me about this, ISCHUKOVA went so far as to openly tell on the tram that she visited ENUKIDZE at home, danced the foxtrot there, and so on. On this issue, I spoke personally with ENUKIDZE. I told him that I was talking to him about ISCHUKOVA not out of jealousy, but because his authority was dear to me, and ISCHUKOVA was clearly compromising him. After that, ENUKIDZE ceased to receive ISCHUKOV. I also know the following fact: GVILDIS \*\*\*\* and BUTOVSKAYA \*\*\*\*, both Komsomol members, employees of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, also advertised their acquaintance with ENUKIDZE and openly talked about the fact that they visit ENUKIDZE at the dacha and have fun there. One of them is GVILDIS, she is a Voroshilov shooter, ENUKIDZE presented a small-caliber rifle. About these Komsomol members, GVILDIS and BUTOVSKAYA, I said to CRASHING NOY in this form: "These girls talk too much about our old man." As a result, ENUKIDZE also stopped receiving GVILDIS and BUTOVSKAYA at his home.

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I also remember such a case. ISCHUKOV said that she was obliged

will effectively receive an apartment in the new building of the Governmental Cooperative, making it clear that "our old man" will arrange the apartment for her, i.e. ENUKIDZE.

I immediately reported this to ANOTHER CRASHING, who abruptly interrupted ISCHUKOV's gossip with her remark on the phone.

Gossip also spread from the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, among whose typists there are women whom we heard rumors about as prostitutes. One of these is DMITRIEVA.

QUESTION: The investigators are interested in data on anti-Soviet activities and anti-Soviet sentiments known to you through your joint work with them by non-partisan employees of the Kremlin.

What can you show on this issue?

ANSWER: Once again I categorically deny any participation in these conversations.

QUESTION: Were there such conversations?

ANSWER: I know nothing about such conversations.

QUESTION: N.A. ROSENFELD You know?

ANSWER: I know.

QUESTION: What can you say about her?

ANSWER TO. ROSENFELD is very nervous, twitchy and irritable. She is a very strange person. She is an angry person. I have such an impression about her that her whole life is closed in the question of her son.

QUESTION: And the political person N.A. ROSENFELD?

ANSWER: I don't know. I met her very rarely.

QUESTION: Do you know MUKHANOVA?

ANSWER: No. I know that MUKHANOVA works in the library, but I don't know her personally and I don't bow to her.

QUESTION: ROSENFELD suggested that you meet a foreigner?

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION: List all your foreign acquaintances, indicating where you are got to know them.

ANSWER: I categorically declare that I do not have and never had a single foreigner I know.

QUESTION: What else can you add to your testimony?

ANSWER: I believe that the source of gossip in the Kremlin, in particular about ENUKIDZE and the women who visited him at home, is EGOROVA Shura. EGOROVA works together with ROSENFELD in the Kremlin library. She lives in the Kremlin, as her husband is \*\*\* head of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee \*\*\*.



VORONETSKAYA, who visited ENUKIDZE at home, personally told me that in the Kremlin library and in general among the Kremlin employees it becomes known who visits ENUKIDZE. According to Voronetskaya, this is due to the fact that the cadets of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school, standing at posts in the lobby of the house where ENUKIDZE, KALININ and other members of the government live, tell Egorov about who visits members of the government, and in particular ENUKIDZE. Egorov, according to Voronetskaya, blurted this out to his wife, who, in turn, passed it on to her colleagues in the Kremlin library and other Kremlin employees.

Thus, the Kremlin employees found out about who came to ENUKIDZE's apartment and when those who came to him left him.

QUESTION: Do you personally know Egorova?

ANSWER: No. She has been working with us recently, approximately since the spring of 1934.

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QUESTION: With whom of the employees of the Kremlin library was EGOROVA closest?

ANSWER: As far as I remember, with RAEVSKAYA and BURKOVA, as well as with GORDEEVA.

QUESTION: ROSENFELD N.A. Did I talk to you about EGOROVA?

ANSWER: No, never.

QUESTION: Which of the employees of the Kremlin Library, besides EGOROVA, had connections with the Kremlin guards?

ANSWER: I don't know.

QUESTION: In general, from the employees of the Kremlin apparatus?

ANSWER: I know that the typist of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the SKOLKOV CEC lived with Ivan Andreevich POLYAKOV, an employee of the Commandant's Office. This was discussed in our Secretariat.

QUESTION: How long has SKOLKOVA been working in the Kremlin and what do you know about it?

ANSWER: She has been working in the Secretariat of the Presidium for four years, before that she worked in the reception room of Comrade. KALININA, in general, she has been working in the Kremlin for 10 years. SKOLKOVA was engaged in the dissemination of gossip of the same order as ELCHANINOVA, BURKOVA and others, i.e. she talked about who lives with whom, said that ENUKIDZE has a weakness for women, and so on. SKOLKOVA worked in the Secretariat of the Presidium as a secret typist. She is close to NIKITINSKII.

QUESTION: And what is POLYAKOV?

ANSWER: Someone, I don't remember who exactly, told me that POLYAKOV b. officer, I don't know him.

QUESTION: Did SKOLKOVA spread slanderous anti-Soviet rumors?

ANSWER: I have not heard of this.

QUESTION: Throughout the investigation, you are clearly trying to disorient the investigation. You assert that in all your time in the Kremlin you have never heard of a single anti-Soviet speech emanating from among those non-Party employees of the Secretariat, whom you mentioned above. You claim that you did not take part in anti-Soviet conversations either. The investigation states that you are giving false testimony. Can you add anything to what you have shown?

ANSWER: No.

The testimony was written down from my words correctly and read by me.

R. MIN DEL

INTERROGATION: POM. BEGINNING INO GUGB SLAVATINSKY

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 233. L. 131-142. Script. Typescript.

\* \_ \* It is crossed out in the margins with one line and in the margins is Stalin's handwritten note: "Hamilton. Gugua. To figure out".

\*\_\*\* Underlined in the margins with two lines.

\*\*

In the margins is Stalin's handwritten note: "There is a secretariat of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and there is also the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Central Electoral Commission."

\*\*\*

Surnames circled; in addition, in the margins there are Stalin's handwritten notes: "Pantovich arrested? To figure out"; opposite the rest of the names in the paragraph: "Too."

\*\*\*\* The surnames are circled and in the margins, opposite the indicated surnames, the numbers are affixed: "1), 2), 3)", as well as "xx, x".

\*\*\*\_\*\*\* Circled, and in the margins there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Who is this. Surname?"

\*\_\*\*\*\*Circled, and in the margins there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Check",

also put "xx".

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 512

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL D.S.  
AZBELA (KREMLIN CASE)

March 17, 1935

AZBEL D.S., 1911 erysipelas, born Chernigov, until the age of 8 he was brought up in the family of his grandfather - a merchant, from 1925 to 1927 he was a member. Komsomol, expelled for organizing a strike at school, in 1929 was arrested  
b. About GPU.

Aunt SHLAFSTEIN I.E. in exile in the Narym Territory. Prior to his arrest, he worked as a graduate student at the Polygraphic Institute.

Question: When and why were you expelled from the members of the Komsomol?

Answer: I was expelled from the VLKSM in 1927 for organizing a strike at the school.

Question: Who else was expelled along with you for organizing a strike?

Answer: LEVENSON Yevgeny Mikhailovich, who is currently a student at the Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army, was expelled along with me.

Question: What views did you share at that time?

Answer: I shared the Trotskyist views.

Question: And now what views do you share?

Answer: I was a Trotskyist right up until my arrest.

Question: And Levenson?

Answer: LEVENSON in 1927 spoke openly with me in defense of Trotskyist views. I know that he is now hiding his past connection with Trotskyism from the Komsomol organization\*.

Question: LEVENSON hides his past connection with Trotskyism, since he is still a Trotskyist?

Answer: I don't know.

Question: How can you explain Levenson's obviously double-dealing behavior?

Answer: It is clear to me that he is a double-dealer, but whether he is connected with the Trotskyites, I do not know.

Question: This is not true. The investigation knows that LEVENSON shared Trotskyist views even after 1927. You were connected with him by personal friendship until recently and could not but know his Trotskyist views.

Answer: I repeat that I do not know.

Question: Do you know Lev Yakovlevich NEKHAMKIN?

Answer: Yes, I know well and met with him until recently.

Question: What are NEKHAMKIN's political views?

Answer: He is a Trotskyist, and on this basis I was connected with him until my arrest\*.

Question: What practically counter-revolutionary Trotskyist work did you do?

Answer: I thought that the regime of repression in the party and the country had made it almost impossible to carry out any serious mass work.

\*As a result of this regime, all dissatisfied elements in the country, on which one could rely, are intimidated. These dissatisfied elements can be aroused to an active struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b) only through the use of terror. I saw all the evil in STALIN and therefore believed that by killing him, as the most influential decisive figure in the party and the country, it would be possible to cause confusion among the current leadership of the party and rouse all elements dissatisfied with the existing regime to fight. In my opinion, at this moment, those who have crystallized over the entire period of illegal work, as the most persistent and

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cadres devoted to Trotskyism, a small part of the Trotskyists who are in prisons and exile, hidden Trotskyists who have survived in the Party and formally departed from Trotskyism, but in fact retained their views\*.

Question: Under whose influence did you come to the conclusion that it was necessary to kill Comrade STALIN?

Answer: Hatred of STALIN was a consequence of my Trotskyist views and beliefs that the elimination of STALIN would change the existing regime in the country. My terrorist plans were formed and strengthened under the influence of a number of circumstances. I had to observe extreme bitterness against STALIN not only among the Trotskyists, but also among the rightists, with whom I at one time associated. \*\* So, in 1930, after the 16th Party Congress, I was at the apartment of Alexander SLEPKOV, where Andrei SVERDLOV, Dmitry OSINSKY, Viktor BELOV, Dmitry MARETSKY had gathered and where BUKHARIN had come. He told those present that he had just been to the bureau of the NTU cell of the Supreme Economic Council, where he was forced to express his attitude to the decisions of the 16th Party Congress. BUKHARIN boasted that he had "twisted the fools around his finger," essentially telling them nothing about his real attitude to the decisions of the congress\*\*.

\*\*At the same time, BUKHARIN spoke in a viciously mocking tone about STALIN. When we (I am AZBEL, Andrei SVERDLOV, Dmitry OSINSKY and Viktor BELOV) left SLEPKOV's apartment and walked along Granovsky Street, Andrei Sverdlov, under the direct impression of BUKHARIN's conversations about STALIN, declared the following: "Kob needs to be kicked." This idea of Andrei SVERDLOV met with our general sympathy\*\*.

In 1933 I met Olga Danilovna, the wife of the famous Trotskyist SOSNOVSKOGO. She and I became close friends, since she was a Trotskyist.

In the future, my terrorist intentions against STALIN intensified under the influence of OD. SOSNOVSKAYA.

Question: You discussed with SOSNOVSKAYA the specific possibilities of killing stva comrade. STALIN?

\*\*Answer: Yes, I talked about this with Sosnovskaya twice in 1933 in the autumn. Both conversations were at her apartment.

After OD. Sosnovskaya repeatedly in conversations with me gave an extremely hostile assessment of the situation in the party and the country, accompanying her with vicious attacks against STALIN, under the influence of these conversations I directly put before her the question that STALIN should be killed.

She reacted sympathetically to my proposal and declared that it would be good to do this not by the hands of the Trotskyists, since politically this would be unprofitable for the Trotskyists\*\*.

Question: What preparatory work did you do to carry out your terrorist plans.

Answer: I did not conduct practical work on carrying out a terrorist act, the matter was limited to mere intentions.

Question: With whom else did you discuss the issue of the murder of comrade. STALIN?

Answer: In the winter of 1933, I went to my old comrade NEHAMKI NU L.Ya., whom I knew as an evil-minded Trotskyist. Together with NOT Khamkin, we left his apartment and went to Tverskoy Boulevard. On Boulevard NEKHAMKIN started a conversation about the role of the individual in history, then moved on to a Trotskyist counter-revolutionary assessment of the existing situation in the country and the role of STALIN in this, declaring that the assassination of STALIN would drastically change the existing situation. I supported this idea of NEKHAMKIN and developed before him my terrorist principles set forth in

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beginning of the present testimony. I stressed that the assassination of STALIN would clear the way for Trotsky\*\*.

Question: You discussed with NEKHAMKIN the question of the murder of comrade. STALIN not only in 1933, but also later?

ÿÿAnswer: Yes, I confirm that besides this incident, NEKHAMKIN and I had two more conversations about the murder of STALIN. The last conversation was in February 1935, again on Tverskoy Boulevard, when NEKHAMKIN again raised the question of the murder of STALIN\*\*.

Question: Apart from the incident in 1930, about which you testified, did you and BELOV Viktor still have any talk about the murder of Comrade STALIN?

ÿÿAnswer: Yes, there was another conversation in 1933, at the beginning of the year, at his apartment. There were two of us, the conversation began with my question, how does he live

Andrey SVERDLOV, then switched to reminiscences, recalled SVERDLOV's statement about the need to assassinate STALIN, and together with BELOV stated the need to carry it out\*\*.

Question: Who else have you talked to on the same topic?

Answer: I did not speak with anyone else about the need to kill STALIN.

Question: This is incorrect. Once again, we propose to name the persons with whom you discussed the issue of the murder of Comrade STALIN.

Answer: I repeat that I have not spoken about this to anyone else.

Question: Do you know Boris ROSENFELD?

Answer: I don't know him personally, but I know from NEKHAMKIN that he is his friend.

Question: Do you know, and from whom, that the father of Boris ROSENFELD is the brother of L.B. KAMENEV?

Answer: This is the first time I hear about it.

Question: What did NEKHAMKIN tell you about the moods of Boris ROSENFELD?

Answer: NEKHAMKIN did not tell me anything about this.

Question: NEKHAMKIN participated with B. ROSENFELD in the preparation of the assassination of Comrade STALIN. With you NEKHAMKIN repeatedly, as you have shown, discussed the question of the need to kill Comrade. STALIN. What did NEKHAMKIN tell you about this?

Answer: NEKHAMKIN did not tell me anything about this.

Question: Tell me what you said to O.D. SOSNOVSKOY about NEHAMKI NOT in connection with his terrorist sentiments?

Answer: Did I say anything at all to SOSNOVSKAYA about NEKHAMKIN, I don't remember.

Question: You evade the truthful answer to the question posed. c

Answer: About the terrorist moods of NEKHAMKINA I SOSNOVSKY didn't say anything.

Question: What do you know about O.D. SOSNOVSKAYA?

Answer : O.D. SOSNOVSKAYA told me that she was meeting with SIRTISOV. From the stories of O.D. SOSNOVSKAYA about her meetings with SYRTSOV, it was clear to me that SYRTSOV remained in his positions hostile to the Party. O.D. SOSNOVSKAYA told me that SYRTSOV was not satisfied with his position and that he was generally in "difficult moods." SYRTSOV asked Olga Danilovna to convey to SOSNOVSKY his advice to apply for a renunciation of his views\*.

Given the mood of SYRTSOV, which I indicated, this proposal was clearly double-dealing.

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Question: How did O.D. SOSNOVSKAYA her husband's statement from the political isolator about his rejection of Trotskyist views?

Answer: She did not give an assessment of SOSNOVSKY's statement, but said that she had some comments on this statement. Me from conversations with O.D. Sosnovskaya knows that, while remaining on the Trotskyist position, she went on a date with SOSNOVSKII in order to persuade him to apply for a renunciation of Trotskyist views\*.

Question: Did O.D. Sosnovskaya to her husband about your moods?

Answer: Apparently, she did, although I don't know for sure.

Question: What about your terrorist intentions?

Answer: I don't know.

Question: Did you meet with SOSNOVSKII after his return to Moscow, and what conversations did you have with him?

Answer: I met with SOSNOVSKY. I did not have conversations on political topics with SOSNOVSKII.

Question: You evaded a direct answer to all the questions put to you about the practical preparations made by you and your accomplices for the assassination of comrade. STALIN. We insist on a truthful answer.

\*\*Answer: I admit that I was promoting terror directed against STALIN. Apart from this, I did no other practical work\*\*.

Written down from my words correctly and read by me.

David Semenovich AZBEL

INTERROGATED: BEGINNING. SECRET-POLIT. OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GUGB G.  
MOLCHANOV DEPUTY. BEGINNING SECRET-POLIT. DEPARTMENT OF THE  
GUGB LYUSHKOV FOR SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS AT THE BEGINNING. SPO GUGB GORBUNOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 233. L. 80-87. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

\*\*—\*\* Crossed out in the margins with two lines.

No. 513

PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION I.V. BOLSHIKH (KREMLIN AFFAIR)

March 17, 1935

BOLSHIKH I.V., born in 1903, ur. Moscow, Russian, daughter of a hereditary honorary citizen, b/n, before her arrest she worked as a control executor in the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. The husband of BOLSHIKH - ALEXANDROV N.S., b. Soyuzmargarin employee, sentenced to 5 years in prison under the law of 7/VIII. 1932 \*Brother Kapiton, b. pilot of the air force of the Kyiv garrison, in 1930 he was sentenced in the case of "UVO" to 5 years in a concentration camp. Brother Eugene works as a chauffeur for a correspondent for the newspapers Tai and Petit Parisien\*.

QUESTION: When did you join the Kremlin?

ANSWER: January 13, 1922.

QUESTION: What job were you hired for?

ANSWER: Initially, I worked as a typist in the affairs department of the Council of People's Commissars. Then I was until 1928 at various jobs in the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars. From 1928 to 1931 inclusive, she held the position of secretary of the industrial group of the Secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In 1931, she was sent to work in the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR as an internal controller of the secretariat.

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QUESTION: When did you start working at the Central Executive Committee of the USSR?

ANSWER: In 1932 I was transferred to work in the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR as an external and internal controller. Since 1934, I was listed as the executor of control, and my duty also included receiving mail from the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

QUESTION: Who recommended you to work in the Kremlin?

ANSWER: My friend Sergey Kuznetsov, who in 1922 worked as head of the financial department of the Council of People's Commissars, helped me get a job.

I received written recommendations from Alexander MUSHTAKOV, a member of the CPSU (b), a military worker, and SHUMAKOV - head. secretary of the head of the Central Control Center of the Red Army, whom I knew from my work in the Central Control Center until 1922.

QUESTION: Did you inform the administration of the institution where you worked that your brother and b/husband, with whom you kept in touch until the moment of your arrest, were convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes?

ANSWER: No, she didn't.

QUESTION: Why?

ANSWER: I hid it, since these circumstances compromised me  
wali.

In addition, I received a letter from my brother in which he asked me to



I didn't say anything about condemning him.

QUESTION: What else did your brother write about in this letter?

ÿ ANSWER: The letter in which my brother asked me not to tell anyone that he had been convicted and was in a concentration camp had a counter-revolutionary slanderous character\*.

QUESTION: Tell us in more detail what was the content of this letter.

ANSWER: The content of my brother's letter was mainly directed against the OGPU, it reported that torture was allegedly used on those arrested. It also contained a counter-revolutionary attack on STALIN.

QUESTION: We are presenting you with a document taken from you during the search.

ANSWER: This is a letter from my brother Kapiton, about which I showed.

QUESTION: To whom did you introduce your brother's letter?

ÿ ANSWER: This letter was read by AGRANOVICH Fedor Semenovich, secretary of RUDZUTAK. I cohabited with AGRANOVICH from 1930 to 1934 inclusive, and I maintain good relations until recently. F.S. Agranovich I also knew about the correspondence between me and my ex-husband N.S. ALEXANDROV, who is in a concentration camp\*.

QUESTION: You showed that your brother BOLSHIKH E.V. currently working as a chauffeur for a correspondent for the newspapers "Tan" and "Petit Parisien". When and where did he start this job?

ANSWER: At the end of 1934, he moved from plant number 39, where he also worked as a driver.

QUESTION: Did you tell the Kremlin that your brother is working for a foreign citizen?

ANSWER: No, she didn't.

QUESTION: Why?

ANSWER: I gave a signature in the Kremlin that I would not have contact with foreign subjects. Therefore, not wanting to compromise myself in the Kremlin, I decided to hide where my brother Yevgeny works.

QUESTION: After your brother Yevgeny started working for a French correspondent, did you keep in touch with him?

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ANSWER: Yes, I saw him four times. Once (24/11-35) we met

stayed with my sister Elena, where Agranovich F.S. was with me.

QUESTION: You are accused of spreading counter-revolutionary slander against the leadership of the CPSU(b). Do you acknowledge this?

ANSWER: Yes, I do.

QUESTION: What kind of counter-revolutionary slander did you spread?

\*\* ANSWER: Shortly after the murder of S.M. Kirova Agranovich F.S. I was told that the murder was committed by NIKOLAEV on the basis of personal accounts, since KIROV was close to Nikolaev's wife, and the latter killed him out of jealousy, and the government report does not correspond to reality \*\*.

QUESTION: To whom did you convey this slander?

ANSWER: I conveyed this slander to my sister Elena Vasilievna KURYEVA, who, as I have already shown, works in the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.

QUESTION: You don't say everything. The investigation insists that you say everything that was connected with your spreading slander against the leadership of the CPSU(b).

\* ANSWER: I didn't say everything. I don't remember well from which of the Kremlin workers I heard that ALLILUEVA N.S. died an allegedly unnatural death, and committed suicide, to which STALIN brought her. I told F.S. Agranovich about this. and my sister Elena\*.

QUESTION: You have not yet shown everything about the spread of slander against the leadership of the CPSU(b). To whom did you convey the slander, other than the persons you indicated?

ANSWER: I can't show you anything else.

Correctly written, read by me.

I. BOLSHIKH

INTERROGATION: FULL. 4 DEP. SPO GUGB SOKOLOV N.

APRF. f. 3. Op. 58. D. 233. L. 126-130. Script. Typescript.

\*—\* Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

»\* \_\*\* Also> in addition, four "x"s are marked in the margins.

No. 514

COVERING NOTE YA.S. AGRANOVA I.V. TO STALIN WITH THE  
PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION L.B. KAMENEV  
(KREMLIN CASE)

March 21, 1935

No. 55681

TOP SECRET

I am sending you the interrogation protocols:

1. KAMENEV Lev Borisovich, dated 20/III-1935,
2. BURKOVA Lyudmila Emelyanovna, dated 20/III-1935,
3. KOCHETOVA Maria Dmitrievna, dated 20/III-1935,
4. MUKHANOV Konstantin Konstantinovich, dated 20/III-1935,
5. SOSIPATROVA Alexei Maksimovich, dated 19/III-1935,
6. GUSEV Abram Makarovich, dated 20/III-1935

Us on March 20 this year. arrested IGNATIEV Vladimir Ivanovich, born in 1887, nee. mountains Leningrad, formerly member of the Central Committee of the Labor People's Socialist Party; was a member of Tchaikovsky's government in Arkhan

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gelsk; ex. active participant in Ph.D. movements in Siberia in 1918-1920. ex. consultant of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, currently a member of the Board of Defenders.

We are checking and will arrest the GUGUA Irina Kalistratovna, born in 1904, the daughter of the famous Menshevik GUGUA, working as the technical secretary of the Budget Commission of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

Named in the testimony of KOCHETOVA M.D. - SMOLTSOVA is being established and will be arrested.

Named in the testimony of KOCHETOVA M.D. the kulaks DYACHKOVA and KASATKINA, who are hiding in Moscow, are being identified and will be arrested.

DEPUTY] PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR INTERNAL  
AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR AGRANOV

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

KAMENEV Lev Borisovich dated March 20, 1935

Question: What do you know about the political sentiments of your brother N.B. ROSENFELD?

Answer: I did not consider him a person with principled views on political issues. I saw on his part only personal sympathy for me, which I explained not by some deliberate political views, but by narrow-minded family feelings.

Question: Your brother shows that he shared your political views, which you defended in the fight against the party.

Answer: I was not specifically interested in his political views, but I admit that my personal authority could influence the formation of his political views similar to mine.

Question: What do you know about the counter-revolutionary activities carried out by your brother N.B. ROSENFELD?

Answer: I only know that in the era of our open struggle against the Party, he drew several drawings - libels on the leadership of the Party, in particular on STALIN.

Question: Do you know that he distributed these libels in the city and among whom?

Answer: From his words in 1934, I know that he gave these libel drawings to his friend the artist ETINGER. He also gave me these drawings. Whether he gave them to anyone else, I don't know.

Question: Your brother N.B. ROSENFELD was arrested by us for terrorist activity. During the investigation, he admitted that he participated in the preparation of the murder of comrade. STALIN, and showed that his terrorist intentions were formed under your influence.

What can you show on this issue?

Answer: About the fact that N.B. ROSENFELD participated in the preparation of the assassination of STALIN, I do not know. ROSENFELD visited me from time to time, I helped him financially. Visiting me, he was present at the conversations that took place in my apartment and at the dacha in Ilyinsky. These conversations were mainly conducted with Zinoviev. In these conversations with ZINOVIEV we criticized the activities of the Party and the Central Committee and made attacks on STALIN. At various times, with more or less poignancy, we talked with Zinoviev about our position, and the conviction was expressed that we were not ready for an active political life.

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will allow. In some cases, we reacted to the hopelessness of our situation with vicious attacks on STALIN.

The counter-revolutionary conversations that we had with Zinoviev under N.B. ROSENFELD, brought up from the last enemy of the Soviet government and the party and kindled in him bitterness towards STALIN. I admit that N.B. ROSENFELD, who was embittered by my deportation to Minusinsk and reacted extremely painfully to this, feeding on the counter-revolutionary conversations that I later had with Zinoviev, in particular with regard to STALIN, could reach terrorist intentions.

Question: What conversations did you have with ZINOVYEV in connection with the counter-revolutionary documents issued by Trotsky abroad?

Answer: Zinoviev got acquainted with the so-called bulletins of the opposition at the Lenin Institute. On the content of these counter-revolutionary documents

Comrade Trotsky, he informed me, expressing his positive attitude on certain questions of Trotsky's assessment of the situation in the party and in the USSR. I did not object to Zinoviev and did not tell anyone about his counter-revolutionary views on this issue until my arrest.

Question: So you agreed with his counter-revolutionary views?

Answer: I did not read these documents myself, I did not express my assessments to him, but I did not object to his counter-revolutionary views.

Question: What kind of conversations did you have with ZINOVYEV in connection with the arrests carried out after the murder of comrade. KIROVA?

Answer: After the arrest of Bakaev and Evdokimov, ZINOVIEV came to me, extremely agitated, and informed me of these arrests. I did my best to reassure him. Nevertheless, he was extremely agitated and threw out to me the phrase that he was afraid that the case of the murder of KIROV would not turn out the same picture as in Germany on June 30, when, during the reprisal against REM, SHLEICHER was also destroyed.

This parallel had an unacceptable counter-revolutionary character. I attributed it to Zinoviev's exceptionally excited state and repented him.

The protocol was written down from my words correctly and was read by me.

L. KAMENEV

BEGINNING SECRET-POLIT. DEPARTMENT OF GUGB G. MOLCHANOV

INTERROGATED: DEPUTY. BEGINNING SPO GUGB LYUSHKOV

BEGINNING 2 DEP. SPO GUGB KAGAN

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 234. L. 1-6. Script. Typescript.

\*

\*\* On the first sheet there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Stupid interrogation of Kamenev". The text contains a typewritten note about the mailing: "Dispatched: comrade Molotov, vol.

Ka

Ganovich, comrade Voroshilov, comrade Yezhov.

No. 515

LETTER N. OSINSKY I.V. TO STALIN IN  
CONNECTION WITH THE ARREST OF THE SON (158)

March 26, 1935

My son, Vadim Osinsky, was arrested yesterday. The reason for this arrest is clear to me - 6 days ago Andrei Sverdlov, Vadim's acquaintance since childhood, when they played together in the courtyard in the Kremlin, was arrested 6 days ago.

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But the grounds for arrest are not only not clear to me, but I affirm that they cannot be. I know my children well, I carefully educate and consider myself responsible for them.

I know that Vadim could not do things for which one should have covered both him and me with the stain of arrest. I also know that Vadim is not a decomposed undergrowth who is trying to make a lousy counter-revolutionary "policy" with us, but an honest good guy, one of the best students of the Academy of Motorization, Mechanization of the Red Army and that for the last three years he has been working days

and nights.

I think that if the NKVD needed to interrogate him about his relationship with Andrey Sverdlov, which is quite simple, then it was not difficult to call him to the appropriate place, just as the NKVD could at least notify me of his arrest without forcing me to call hospital them. Sklifosovsky and the police about the missing son.

I insistently ask, Comrade Stalin, and I believe that I have the right to do so, as a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, about the following:

1) Propose to the NKVD to inform me not in a general form, but precisely and specifically, for what exactly my son was arrested; 2) Offer the NKVD to acquaint me with the original protocol of his interrogation; 3) Allow me to meet with him in front of witnesses, in order to question him myself about what he is accused of.

Of course, I do not intend to complicate the investigation of the NKVD in any case. I insist on the above, both because I am firmly convinced of the innocence of my son, and because this arrest hurts and stains me politically.

With communist greetings, Osinsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 234. L. 203. Original. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "To Ordzhonikidze, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich. I propose to satisfy Comrade Osinsky's request. I. Stalin. Molotov

"for", Ordzhonikidze - "for", Kaganovich - "for", Voroshilov - "for". "Comrade Agranov and Osinsky reported.

Poskrebyshev. 26.3."

No. 516

DOCUMENTARY MATERIALS OF THE  
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT OF THE GUGB NKVD OF THE  
USSR ON THE VISIT OF A. Eden TO PARIS

March 26, 1935

TOP SECRET

INO GUGB NKVD received from Paris on the basis of "documentary materials of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs" the following telegraph messages dated March 25 and 26, 1935:

I

Eden arrived in Paris on a mission to obtain authority from France\*\* to \*negotiate with Hitler on the return of Germany to the League of Nations\*, as well as on the basis of a future arms limitation convention. France refused to grant such powers. Laval formally announced

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Eden that France retains the right to a final decision and will speak out only after reading the proposals that will be made to Simon Hitler. Eden, having received a refusal to this proposal of his, asked France to change the draft Eastern Pact\*\*. Eden conveyed Simon's opinion that the Eastern Pact should not take the form of a disguised treaty of military alliance, as this might push Germany to a desperate step. Simon believes that the return of Germany to the League of Nations and the Conference on Disarmament should be achieved, and to achieve this goal it is necessary to avoid irritating Germany with threats of encirclement. Simon is by no means \*not asking France to finally abandon the mutual assistance pact with the USSR\*, Simon only asks to postpone it, \*conclusion of the pact until Germany returns to Geneva\*. Until the moment of Germany's return to Geneva, France could confine itself to a consultative non-aggression pact, which Germany would also be ready to sign. Laval replied to Eden: “\*France could wait a few more months, but the Little Entente and the USSR\* demand the immediate signing of a mutual assistance pact. France has already tried to persuade the USSR to temporarily settle for a consultative non-aggression pact, but the USSR refuses to sign such a pact, which does not clearly define the military obligations of the signatories in the event of an attack. The USSR and the Little Entente demand that France express itself on this question as soon as possible, and these countries interpret France's vacillation as a treacherous maneuver. Laval told Eden that France could refuse to help the Little Entente and the USSR only if England decided to sign a treaty on a Franco-British military alliance.

Eden's unconvincing argumentation impressed Laval that the British government itself no longer believed in the success of its current policy towards Germany. English policy towards Germany is determined by the following considerations: the forthcoming elections; the striving of leading British politicians to make concessions to the extent possible in order to avoid war; and a new tendency to indulge in political play on the contradictions between the USSR and Germany.

Eden intends in Moscow to personally convince the leaders of the USSR of the need to temporarily abandon the draft pact on mutual assistance and to be content with a consultative non-aggression pact or some other treaty\*\*.

II.

Responding to the criticism of parliamentary circles for the policy towards the USSR, Laval said: "The government's policy is cautious, and this is dictated by the complexity of the problem. Some demand the immediate signing of a Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance in response to Germany's unilateral annulment of Part 5 of the Treaty of Versailles. England strongly persuades France not to sign the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact. England asks France to wait in order to put things in order and smooth over sharp corners and not make a hostile challenge to England. Britain wants to make an attempt to bring Germany to Geneva and get Germany to sign a convention on the limitation of armaments. For all

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it must be obvious that France cannot refuse England the short time she demands. On the other hand, some demand the signing of the Western Pact, leaving the USSR on the sidelines. Such a policy would also be dangerous, primarily because the guarantee offered by England was never unconditional and completely reliable. France has repeatedly declared to England that she is ready to renounce all Eastern alliances, subject to other guarantees of French security in the form of a Franco-British military alliance\*\*. It is also necessary to reckon with the possibility of war in England's overseas possessions, which would lead to a significant reduction in the value of England's help in a European war. Finally, it is completely wrong to regard the USSR and Hitler's Germany\*\* as holding each other in fear, thus allowing the Western powers to peacefully take advantage of their hostility. German-Soviet hostility is by no means an invariable factor in international politics on which one could base politics for a long time. It even seems that in this hostility there is a certain calculation that Germany is trying to draw France into a bargain in which the USSR would be left to Germany.

Having obtained free hands from France in relation to the USSR, Germany could very well come to an agreement with the USSR to the disadvantage of France. The command of the Reichswehr, the real master of Germany, is a supporter of just such a policy. Hitler, of course, is an enemy of the Soviets, but he often suddenly changes his attitudes, and besides, the Reichswehr has an ever-growing influence on him. It is also necessary to take into account the well-known tendency of the USSR, the Small and Balkan Entente to form an independent political bloc\*\*, independently of France and to play on the lack of balance between Germany and the Western powers. Judging by some of the recent negotiations that took place between Japan and Turkey, it can even be considered that Japan also takes into account the possibility of such a combination in the more or less near future \*\*, in which Germany, having risen against Italy, France and, perhaps, even against Poland, would enjoy the neutrality of the bloc consisting of the USSR, the Lesser and Balkan Entente. The policy of Berlin is evolving very quickly\*\*, and one cannot base oneself on its current political line and on the frequently changing attitudes of its current leaders, whose power may turn out to be \*\*short term\*\*. This danger must also be avoided. The ideal solution to the problem would be a formula that satisfies, at least temporarily, both Germany and the USSR\*\*. England is now busy searching for such a formula. France provides English



mu government the initiative to try their luck. France is compelled to refrain from participating in these searches\*\*. France must reckon with the distrust of her current policy on the part of the USSR and the Little Entente.

Deputy early INO GUGB Slutsky

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 188. L. 74-78. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Important. (Believable.) My archive. And Stalin.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\* The numbers from 1 to 10 are handwritten in pencil on the left margins.

\*\*—\*\* Circled

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 517

SPECIAL MESSAGE L.M. ZAKOVSKY G.G. YAGODA ABOUT  
THE RESULTS OF THE OPERATION TO REMOVE "FORMER PEOPLE"

March 31, 1935

Top secret

1. About the result of the operation to evict the "former people".
2. The result of the operation for March 21-27, 1935.

No. 139628

The overall result of the operation

For 28 days of the operation, 11,702 people were seized from the city of Leningrad and convicted by the Special Meeting of the NKVD, of which 4,833 were heads of families, and 6,239 were family members.

The social background of the seized former people (only heads of families) is characterized by the following data:

Ex. nobility and nobility

of them:

ex. princes

ex. counts

- ex. barons
- ex. manufacturers
- ex. large landowners
- ex. big merchants
- ex. large homeowners
- ex. ministry officials
- ex. royal and white officers
- ex. gendarmes and guards
- clergymen

- 1434 people
- 67 people
- 44 people
- 106 people
- 208 people
- 370 people
- 276 people
- 246 people
- 393 people
- 1177 people
- 511 people
- 218 people

According to the current position, the seized cadres of former people are distributed:

- No specific activities
- pensioners
- Employees
- clergymen
- Researchers

handicraftsmen

Doctors

Techniques

Engineers

- 1060 -  
186

- 2844

- 89

- 75

- 45

- 32

- 326

- 77

Among those seized:

Previously repressed by the NKVD from 1 to 5 times,  
former white  
officers Worked for whites in  
counterintelligence and took part in punitive detachments

- 994 people

- 936 people

- 119 people

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Seized during a search of weapons, ammunition and poisons:

Rifles and modern combat carbines - The same and ancient  
guns -

Revolvers and automatic combat pistols modern -

Revolvers and pistols of different -

Small-caliber and hunting rifles - Hunting rifles -

Combat loaded grenade -

Combat cartridges -

Melee weapons (blades, daggers, daggers) modern -

The same different

Poisons: sublimate -

strychnine -

9

40

85

119

129

340

3

4857

696

56

100 gr. 50  
gr.

The counter-revolutionary activity of the seized cadres of former people revealed by the investigation is distributed:

1. Terrorist activity in connection with counter-revolutionary elements in the USSR and abroad, participation in counter-revolutionary groups and counter-revolutionary gatherings - 114 cases.
2. Spy activities and communications - 348 cases.
3. Distribution of counter-revolutionary literature (old), monarchist, pogrom-anti-Soviet literature and its own authorship (printed and handwritten copies of counter-revolutionary literature were confiscated during searches) - 318 cases.
4. Communication with the White Guard emigration - legal and illegal - 1846 case.

5. Receipt of material resources from foreign firms, White Guards, acquaintances, former colleagues and relatives - legally and illegally - 711 cases. (seized during searches - torgsin.bon - 3841 rubles 27 kopecks, American dollars - 769, Germans, marks - 285, francs - 175, pounds sterling - 52, crowns - 1000).

6. Systematic anti-Soviet communication with former White Guards, officers, nobles, former colleagues - 2113 cases.

During the operation, about 6,000 petitions were received to leave Leningrad, both from the deportees themselves and from individual institutions and works.

nicknames.

During the analysis of these petitions, 127 families were left in Leningrad, the points of expulsion were changed - 78.

The result of the operation for March 21-27 inclusive.

Over the past seven days, operations on "former people" from March 21 to March 27 of this year. inclusive - NKVD in the Leningrad Region seized and sent by order of the Special Meeting under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs to concentration camps (families in exile, exile and evicted, together with their families) - 3627 people, including heads of families - 1637 people. ...

Here are brief characteristics of typical figures of "former people" identified during the operation during the reporting period.

Former know:

Volkonsky V.D. - a former prince, the son of a white émigré prosecutor, concealed his social origin, clerk of a dairy plant.

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Gagarina E.V. - the daughter of the prince-chamberlain. She graduated from the Smolny Institute, had connections with the former nobility and with relatives abroad. Prior to his arrest, he was the secretary of the faculty of the 1st Leningrad Medical Institute.

Golitsyna M.K. - the daughter of the former vice-governor of St. Petersburg. She had connections with foreign countries, through Torgsin she received currency from London. Received a personal pension.

Maslova N.S. - former Princess Volkonskaya. Retired since 1923.

Urusova O.V. - former princess - landowner. No specific activities.

Alferaki M.A. - former princess, daughter of the chamberlain of the royal court. Single artist working from home.

Mol V.F. - a former count, owned an estate in the Sebszhsky district. Having hidden his past, he got a job as a worker in the architectural and planning department of the Leningrad City Council.

Tatishcheva E.V. - Former Countess Instructor of the Institute of Visual Aids.

Drizen F.V. - former baron In 1931 he was sentenced to 3 years in a concentration camp under Art. 58. Without certain occupations.

Taube VV - former baron. Hid the social origin when applying for a job and when obtaining a passport. Accountant at the Optical Workshop of the Mutual Assistance Fund for the Disabled ....

Taube V.N. - former baron Accountant JAKTA.

Former punishers, guards, gendarmes:

Ber N.I. - Former Procurator of the Senate. Under Kerensky, he was a senator of the judicial department. Legal adviser of the plant "Ilyich".

Mishuk E.F. - former personal nobleman, former head of the detective police in Kyiv, Riga and Samara for 18 years. Had connections with foreign countries. No specific activities.

Moderov A.E. - in 1908-1917. prosecutor of the Kaluga and Warsaw district courts. Foreign language teacher at the Institute of Ing. water transport and at the military medical academy.

Sladkov P.G. - former chairman of the district military court at Kolchak. Agricultural school accountant.

The counter-revolutionary activities of the "former people" seized over the past 7 days are characterized in the past by:

1. Participated in the white movement - 262 people, incl. punishers - 21.
2. The VChK, OGPU and NKVD were repressed for counter-revolutionary activities from 1 to 5 times - 314 people ....

Here is the most striking factual material on the counter-revolutionary activities of the seized "former people":

Terrorists:

Mukhin A.G. - a former volunteer in the Denikin army. He testified that after the murder of Comrade. Kirov, he had terrorist intentions in relation to comrade. Stalin. Mukhin also confessed that the terrorist intentions towards Comrade. Stalin first arose with him immediately after the Gorgulov case.

Pokrovsky is a former white officer of the Markov division. Abroad is his brother, a white émigré, a relative of the head of the EMRO, General Shatilov. Pokrovsky hid his past, graduated from a naval technical school and, swimming in foreign waters, established contacts with white émigrés.

Yatlov - a doctor, a former prominent figure in the AKP, an active participant in the Kronstadt rebellion. Among the environment, he conducts counter-revolutionary agitation,

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approving the murder of comrade. Kirov. Associated with a group of counter-revolutionary 'former people'.

Peters A.S. - the brother of a White Guard terrorist who was shot in 1927, whom he sheltered and assisted in his terrorist activities, for which he was convicted in Solovki. Maintained contact with the counter-revolutionary element. Photographer of the Vyborgsky District Museum.

Palibin is a former nobleman, the son of a prominent official of the Senate, who was shot for counter-revolutionary activities among the Whites. Researcher at the Academy of Sciences. He was associated with a number of foreign subjects. Palibin admitted that he systematically conducted counter-revolutionary agitation of a terrorist nature.

Espionage:

Kantor-Shvedova N.L. - Waitress at the cafe at the Philharmonic. In 1923, she legally traveled abroad, where she married a fugitive from the USSR. In 1927, she was summoned to the Helsingfors Okhrana and recruited, after which she legally left for the USSR for espionage activities in favor of Finland.

Bulazel is a former hereditary noblewoman, typist. She had a connection with the German consulate in Leningrad, through which she maintains contact with relatives abroad - former white officers. Maintained contact with an employee of the Persian consulate in Leningrad. A person who arrived from abroad and brought her a letter and money from relatives came to Bulatzal's apartment. Bulazel refused to name this person and indicate his address.

Karapetov is a former hereditary honorary citizen, ensign. According to personal testimony, he is an enemy of Soviet power. During the search, secret documents of Dvigatelstroy were confiscated from him.

Kozminskaya M.N. - former noblewoman, typist of the regional plan. She testified about her connection with the Estonian consulate, from which she regularly received "financial assistance" for a long time.

Semenovich-Semenchuk N.L. - a former nobleman, a technician at Transsignalstroy, during a search, correspondence with the Norwegian consulate was seized, indicating that Semenovich-Semenchuk received regular financial support.

Biserov V.V. - former lieutenant colonel, former chairman of the naval court under the government of Kolchak, continued to maintain contact with the counter-revolutionary-minded officers of the government of the Far East and Kolchak and Chinese subjects.

Mavrus d'Eske - former count, colonel of the General Staff, accountant of the Fruit and vegetable industry. His mother in Vilna has a large estate and a mansion. Brother Dmitry fled abroad and lives in Warsaw. He is sharply anti-Soviet, has connections in the Polish embassy.

Tomashinskaya is a former noblewoman, head of a school for handicapped children. Tomashinsky's brother is the famous priest Usas. Tomashinsky had connections with Poland.

Appendix: photographs of military weapons seized over the past 7 days, typical photographs of "former people", orders and medals.\*

Head of the NKVD Department for the Leningrad Region Zakovsky

Published: Heinrich Yagoda. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. General Commissioner of State Security. Collection of documents. Kazan, 1997, pp. 465-476.

Published without application

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 518

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT THE APPARATUS OF THE CEC OF THE USSR AND TOV. YENUKIDZE"

April 3, 1935

No. 23, p. 168 - On the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and comrade. Yenukidze.

Approve the draft report of the Politburo of the Central Committee, developed by comrade vol. Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Yezhov "On the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and comrade. Yenukidze".

Secret

About the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and comrade. Yenukidze

Message from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to members and candidates of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the commissions of party and Soviet control.

By the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Comrade Yenukidze A.S. a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was removed from the post of secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, which he held for many years, and transferred to a smaller job as one of the chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of Transcaucasia, and the representation of the Transcaucasian Federation in the Central Executive Committee of the USSR as one of the chairmen of the latter was left behind Musabekov.

The real motives for this transfer could not be officially announced in the press, since their publication could discredit the highest body of Soviet power - the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. However, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to inform about all the facts that caused the removal of comrade Yenukidze from the post of secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and his transfer to a smaller position.

At the beginning of this year, it became known that among the employees of the government library and employees of the commandant's office, systematic counter-revolutionary persecution was carried out against the leaders of the party and government, especially against Comrade Stalin, with the aim of discrediting them. During the closest investigation by the NKVD bodies of the sources of this harassment, it was



Recently, several interconnected counter-revolutionary groups have been discovered that set as their goal the organization of terrorist acts against the leaders of the Soviet government and the party, primarily against Comrade Stalin.

The organs of the NKVD uncovered: a) a terrorist group in the government library.

Employees of the government library N.A. Rosenfeld, nee Princess Beibutova, ex-wife of brother L.B. Kamenev, and the active White Guard deyka Mukhanova, a former noblewoman, the daughter of a Kolchak officer who served in the Czech counterintelligence, created a terrorist group from the former noblewomen Davydova, Burago, Raevskaya, and others who had made their way into the Kremlin library.

According to the testimony of brother Kamenev N.B. Rosenfeld and his ex-wife N.A. Rosenfeld, their terrorist sentiments were inspired by L.B. Kamenev, who told them more than once that the removal from the leadership and the destruction of Comrade Stalin was the only way to change the policy of the Party and to make their way to power for the Kamenev-Zinoviev group.

These instructions L.B. Nina Rosenfeld and Nikolai Rosenfeld accepted Kamenev as a direct directive to commit a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin.

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In order to more successfully organize the assassination attempt on Comrade Stalin, the Rosenfeld-Mukhanova group enlisted the former Kremlin librarian Barut, who created a terrorist group in the Kremlin Armory.

Mukhanova, as a member of the named terrorist group, was connected with an employee of the embassy of one of the foreign states in Moscow, from whom she, in turn, received instructions to prepare the organization of the assassination of Comrade Stalin.

b) Terrorist Trotskyist group in the commandant's office of the Kremlin

This group was organized as part of the employees of the Kremlin commandant's office - assistants to the commandant Doroshin, Polyakov, Lavrov and employees Sinelobov, Lukyanov and others. Doroshin, who led the group, was organizationally connected with the Trotskyist terrorist group outside the Kremlin, which consisted of several commanders of the Red Army and was headed by Kozyrev, a student of the Military Chemical Academy.

According to the investigation, it was established that the Trotskyist groups of servicemen set as their goal the organization of a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin. The Rosenfeld-Mukhanova terrorist group was connected with the Doroshin terrorist group through Sinelobov, who was one of the persons directly responsible for guarding the premises in which the Politburo of the Central Committee usually meets.

c) Terrorist group of Trotskyist youth

On behalf of N.A. Rosenfeld, her son Trotskyist B. Rosenfeld created an independent counter-revolutionary group of Trotskyist youth outside the Kremlin, which included the Trotskyists Nekhamkin, Sedov (son of Trotsky), Azbel, Belov and others. This group led the preparations for the assassination of Comrade Stalin outside the Kremlin.

All counter-revolutionary groups achieved their goal in different ways, considering, however, the most convenient plan was to break into Comrade Stalin's apartment.

For these purposes, Mukhanova and Rosenfeld, through the secretary comrade. Yenukidze - Minervin tried to enter Comrade Stalin's apartment as librarians. Only thanks to the fact that Comrade Stalin categorically refused the services of librarians, whom the Kamenev-Rosenfeld-Mukhanova group tried to send to him through Minervina, was it possible to prevent the terrorists from carrying out their villainous plan.

All these groups, apparently, were a counter-revolutionary bloc of Zinovievists, Trotskyites, agents of foreign states, united by the common goal of terror against the leaders of the party and government.

The penetration and settling of these counter-revolutionary elements in the apparatus of the CEC of the USSR (the secretariat of the CEC of the USSR, the commandant's office of the Kremlin, the Government Library, the Armory) was facilitated by the fact that a peculiar, having nothing in common with the principles The Soviet power system of selection of workers. Employees and employees were admitted to the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR not on business grounds, but on the basis of acquaintance, personal connections, and often by the willingness of the accepted employee to cohabit with one or another of the senior officials of the CEC secretariat.

The direct result of such a system of selection of workers was that the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR turned out to be extremely clogged with elements alien and hostile to the Soviet state, who carried out their subversive work, hiding behind the rank of an employee of the secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. Along with low qualifications, randomly and through personal connections, selected jobs

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kov, declassed elements, the descendants of the nobility - former princesses, noblewomen, etc., penetrated the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

The degree of contamination of this apparatus is evidenced by the fact that when checking the employees of the secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR by a specially appointed Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a commission of 107 people, it was possible to leave only 9 people to work in the Kremlin, the rest were either subject to dismissal or transfer to work outside the Kremlin.

It must be said that many of the participants, and in particular the participants, of the Kremlin terrorist groups (Nina Rozsnfeld, Nikitinskaya, Raevskaya, and others) enjoyed the direct support and high patronage of Comrade. Yenukidze. Many of these employees Comrade. Yenukidze personally recruited, cohabited with some of them.

It goes without saying that Comrade Yenukidze did not know anything about the impending assassination attempt on Comrade Stalin, and he was used by the class enemy as a person who had lost political vigilance and showed a craving for former people unusual for communists.

However, Com. Yenukidze bears political responsibility for all this, since in the selection of workers he was guided by considerations not related to the interests of the cause, thereby contributing to the penetration of terrorist elements hostile to Soviet power into the Kremlin. Comrade Yenukidze's guilt is aggravated by the fact that he entrusted his personal secretary, the non-party, now arrested Minervina, to send to the apartments of Politburo members in their personal libraries the employees of the government library, among whom were terrorists.

When discussing the issue of moving comrade. Yenukidze, the data given here on the activities of these terrorist groups were not known, which is why the above relatively mild decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted in relation to Comrade. Yenukidze. In connection with these new materials that have come to light, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers it necessary to discuss at the next Plenum of the Central Committee the question of the possibility of leaving comrade. Yenukidze as a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 234. L. 47-53. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 21.11.35.

No. 519

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROVISIONS ON THE NKVD AND THE GUGB NKVD OF THE USSR

April 3, 1935

No. 23, item 273 - a) Regulations on the NKVD, b) Regulations on the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD.

Submit Comrade Yezhov for consideration. (159).

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 5. L L 39. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 31.11.35.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yezhov, Yagoda.

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No. 520

AGENCIES REPORT OF INO GUGB NKVD ON  
THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUSION

## JAPANESE-AMERICAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT

April 17, 1935

Top secret

Documentary  
translation from German

INO GUGB NKVD received from New York from an agent associated with American government circles, the following message is for February 27, 1935.

\*\*Japan, through its ambassador Saito, invited the United States to begin negotiations on a non-aggression pact\*\*. He declared on behalf of his government that this attempt would be the last. Japan does not feel like a beggar who comes to Washington with outstretched hand to beg. She repeats her policy in order to once again give proof of her absolute peacefulness, and also in order to find a way out that would put an end to the constant deterioration of relations between Japan and America. He considers it his duty to point out that the reason for this was largely the attitude of the American government towards the Japanese protectorate government of Manchukuo, as well as the often emphasized refusal of the United States to recognize this legally organized government, which makes this deterioration in relations permanent. character. In addition, he is compelled to state that the American armaments manufacturers have recently been serving China with special attention and, contrary to established custom, are sending their representatives there, who establish trade relations not only with the Central Government of the Republic of China, but also with communist gangs. in China\*\*. The Japanese government believes that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the United States will put an end to such abnormalities.

\*\*Deputy Secretary of State Phillips responded extremely harshly to these undiplomatic threats and Japan's warning. He declared that he was not authorized to state to the representatives of the imperial government the complaints that the US government could present to the Japanese government, and, in the opinion of the US government, there are many more of them and they would be more serious than the complaints of Tokyo. . However, he may declare that a possible non-aggression pact can under no circumstances, and he especially emphasizes this, affect the commercial relations of American firms in China\*\*. To date, Washington is not aware of the ROC granting or empowering the Japanese government to decide on its trade relations with Japanese firms. In view of this, he is compelled to categorically refuse to take note of such unheard-of violations of the rights of the United States and China\*\*.

This ended the conversation. It ended in the most unfriendly way and can by no means be regarded as the beginning of a friendlier

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feisty Japanese-American relations. \*\* Washington is extremely dissatisfied with Ambassador Saito. He talks too much and in too aggressive a tone.\*\* He is considered a Japanese propagandist, but not a diplomat.

Deputy early INO GUGB NKVD Slutsky  
RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 188. L. 71-73. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet of the document there are handwritten notes: "From Comrade Agranov", "T. Stalin. Ya. Agranov. 17.GV.35", "My archive. I. Stalin.

\*\*—"Underlined in the margins with a single line.

No. 521

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE PROHIBITION OF PAYMENTS IN CASH AND IN-KIND IN THE  
ORDER OF PATRONAGE TO PARTS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE RKKA AND NKVD

April 26, 1935

N ° 24, p. 187 - On the prohibition of monetary and in-kind extraditions from state bodies and economic organizations to units and institutions of the Red Army and the NKVD in the order of patronage.

Approve the following resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR:

1. Prohibit all state institutions, economic organizations and enterprises to issue, and units, formations, educational institutions and institutions of the Red Army and the NKVD - to accept from state institutions, economic organizations and enterprises sums of money and material values (gifts) in the order of patronage .

2. To propose to the People's Commissar of Defense and the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs to cancel all orders and orders that contradict this resolution.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 962. L. 47. Original. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 23.IV.35.

No. 522

AGENCY MESSAGE FROM BUCHAREST ON THE  
ATTITUDE OF POLAND AND GERMANY TO  
THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE USSR WITH ROMANIA

May 5, 1935

INO GUGB NKVD received a telegraph message from Bucharest from an agent closely associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland:

1) Poland and Germany are taking every measure to disrupt negotiations between the USSR and Romania on mutual support. On April 20, the Poles, under the threat of breaking the Polish-Romanian alliance, proposed to Romania to abandon the policy of Titulesco and take a course towards rapprochement with Germany.

The Romanian king told the Poles that he would not conclude a pact with the USSR without Germany and Poland, in connection with which he decided to remove Titulesko in the near future.

The king intends to pursue a policy of active rapprochement with Germany; if the Romanian government circles oppose this, he will call Vaida to power.

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2) A convention directed against the USSR was concluded between the Polish and German general staffs.

3) Romania gave Poland orders for 50 fighters and 150,000 rifles.

4) Goering in Warsaw raised the question of Ukraine and agreed on joint actions in this matter after the settlement of relations in the West.

5) According to Beck and the Japanese ambassador in Bucharest, Japan will not sign a non-aggression pact with the USSR. Japan's immediate task is to eliminate the communist regime in China and seize Eastern Turkey.  
kestan.

Deputy Head of INO GUGB NKVD USSR Slutsky

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 188. L. 93, 94. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet of the document there are handwritten notes: "From Comrade Agranov", "T. Stalin. Ya. Agranov", "My archive. I. Stalin.

No. 523

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE MEASURES OF PUNISHMENT  
FOR PARTICIPANTS OF "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY"  
GROUPS (KREMLIN CASE)

May 12, 1935

TOP SECRET

I. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM GROUP IN  
THE KREMLIN GOVERNMENT LIBRARY

Bring to trial the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR:

1. ROSENFELD Nina Alexandrovna, born in 1886, unnamed, librarian of the Government Library.

2. MUKHANOV Ekaterina Konstantinovna, 36 years old, unemployed, librarian of the Cinema Complex.

3. ROSENFELD Nikolay Borisovich, born in 1886, unnamed, artist.
  4. DAVYDOVA Zinaida Ivanovna, born in 1892, unemployed, librarian of the Government Library.
  5. Natalya Ivanovna BURAGO, born in 1894, unsigned, librarian of the Government Library.
  6. SHARAPOVA Antonina Fedorovna, born in 1896, unnamed, former employee of the Government Library.
  7. RAEVSKAYA Elena Yuryevna, born in 1913, unsigned, librarian of the Government Library.
  8. Klavdiya Ivanovna SINELOBOVA, born in 1906, unsigned, librarian of the Government Library.
  9. KOROLKOV Mikhail Vasilievich, born in 1887, unemployed, teacher for mass work in the Park of Culture and Recreation.
  10. Vladimir Adol'fovich BARUTA, born in 1899, b/p, senior researcher at the Museum of Fine Arts.
  11. KHOSROYEV Leon Evgrafovich, born in 1885, unemployed, worked at the 4th stud farm, a rider by profession.
- SENTENCE ALL TO 10 YEARS OF PRISON\*

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Consider cases at the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR:

12. MUKHANOV Konstantin Konstantinovich, born in 1903, unnamed engineer Stalmost.
13. Makariy Amvrosiyevich PROKHOROVA, born in 1888, unnamed, artist.
14. DENISOV Tamara Pavlovna, born in 1902, unnamed, Anilproekt employee.
15. RAEVSKOY Sergey Petrovich, born in 1907, b/p, researcher at the Institute of Steel im. comrade Stalin.
16. URUSOVA, Yuri Dmitrievich, born in 1878, unemployed, manager of a team of developers.
17. Konstantin Evgenievich DUBOVSKOY, born in 1895, b/p, responsible executor of the Veterinary Administration of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR.
18. Vladimir Karlovich KLEIN, born in 1883, unnamed, deputy director of the Kremlin Armory.
19. PRESENT \*\* Mikhail Yakovlevich, born in 1898, in 1917 a former member of the POR, b / n, editor of the State. Litizdat.

- \*\* SENTENCE EVERYONE TO 5 YEARS OF CONCENTRATION CAMP \*\*.

20. LAKIDA Ekaterina Ivanovna, born in 1897, b/p, head. Library and reference department of the editorial office of the Pravda newspaper.

21. Polina Ivanovna Gordeeva, born in 1907, member of the Komsomol since 1929, librarian of the Government Library.

22. ZHASHKOVA Lidiya Pavlovna, born in 1912, unsigned, employee of the Government Library.

23. Anna Ivanovna KONOVA, born in 1909, member of the Komsomol since 1927, librarian of the Government Library.

24. NELIDOVA Anna Alexandrovna, born in 1885, unsigned, librarian of the Government Library.

25. Ekaterina Aleksandrovna PETROVA, born in 1892, unnamed, librarian of the Government Library.

26. PELIPEYKO Lyubov Konstantinovna, born in 1901, unemployed, former employee of the Government Library.

27. Georgy Karlovich VEBER, born in 1876, no record, researcher at the Komakademiya library.

28. BASHKIROV Sofia Alexandrovna, born in 1887, unnamed, housewife.

29. SOLOV'EVA Evgenia Grigor'evna, born in 1891, unemployed, researcher at the Komacademy.

30. Maria Viktorovna DUBOVSKAYA, born in 1900, unemployed, employee of the All-Union Office for Sales and Supply of River Shipbuilding.

31. SIMAK Elena Osipovna, born in 1911, member of the Komsomol since 1934, employee of the Government Library.

32. MINERVINA Vladimir Vladimirovich, born in 1898, b/p, senior librarian of the Military Sector of the Library. Lenin.

33. LOPATINSKY Boris Lvovich, born in 1881, without color, artist.

34. IGNATIEV \*\*\* Vladimir Ivanovich, born in 1887, since 1906 a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, from 1917 to 1919 a member of the Central Committee of the Labor People's Socialist Party, a member of the Moscow Collegium of Defenders.

- \*\* ALL TO SENTENCE TO 3 YEARS OF LINK \*\*.

35. BURKOVA, Lyudmila Emelyanova, born in 1905, unsigned, librarian of the Government Library.

- SEND.



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## II. TO JUDGE THE MILITARY BOARD OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNION OF THE SSR

36. KAMENEVA \*\*\*\* Lev Borisovich, in view of the opening after the trial in the murder of comrade. Kirov new circumstances, which established that KAMENEV was the organizer of the preparations for the murder of comrade. STALIN.

## III. COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY TERRORIST TROTSKIST GROUP OF MILITARY WORKERS

Bring to trial the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR:

37. Vasily Grigorievich DOROSHINA, born in 1894, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1918, assistant] to the commandant of the Kremlin.

38. KOZYREVA \*\*\*\* Vasily Ivanovich, born in 1899, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1919, student of the Military Chemical Academy.

39. CHERNYAVSKY, Mikhail Kondratievich, born in 1901, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, employee of the Intelligence Department of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

40. IVANOV\*\*\*\* Fyodor Georgievich, born in 1901, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1919, student of the Military Chemical Academy.

41. NOVOZHILOVA\*\*\*\* Maxim Ivanovich, born in 1897, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, mechanical engineer at TsAGI.

42. Alexei Ivanovich SINELOBOV, born in 1899, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1930, for assignments at the Commandant's Office of the Kremlin.

- \*\* SHOOT EVERYONE\*\*.

Consider cases at the Special Meeting of the NKVD:

43. Alexei Maksimovich SOSIPATROV, born in 1897, member of the CPSU(b), student of the Military Academy.

44. LIBERMAN Grigory Borisovich, born in 1900, ex. A member of the CPSU (b), which is at the disposal of the Directorate for the command staff of the Red Army.

45. BENET\*\*\*\* Raisa Solomonovna, born in 1899, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1927, employee of the Intelligence Department of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

46. ROKHINSON Vladimir Matveevich, born in 1896, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, assistant to the head of the Chem. Directorate of the Red Army and the head of the Scientific Research Institute of the Red Army.

- \*\* SENTENCE EVERYONE TO 5 YEARS OF CONCENTRATION CAMP \*\*.

47. RYABININA\*\*\*\* Matvey Nikolayevich, born in 1889, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1919, deputy head of the 1st Department of the Intelligence Department of the People's Commissariat of Defense.

- SENTENCED TO 3 YEARS OF LINK.

## IV. COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY TERRORIST GROUP OF WHITE GUARDS

Bring to trial the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR:

48. SINANI-SKALOV Georgy Borisovich, born in 1896, former member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from 1919 to 1935, head] of the Secretariat of the countries of South America of the ECCI.

49. SKALOV Nadezhda Borisovna, born in 1898, former candidate of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from 1925 to 1929, proofreader of the editorial board of the journal Literary Heritage.

50. GARDIN-GEIER, Alexander Alexandrovich, born in 1895, unnamed, editor-consultant of the newspaper For Industrialization.

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51. Alexander Ivanovich SIDOROV, born in 1897, unemployed, engineer of the Mashtekhproekt.

52. PERELITEIN Lidia Ivanovna, born in 1900, b/p, librarian of the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin.

yy SINANI-SKALOVA G.B. and GARDIN-GEYER A.A. - SHOOT.

Skalov N.B., SIDOROV A.I. and PERELITEIN L.I. SENTENCE EVERYONE TO 10 YEARS IN A CONCENTRATION CAMP\*\*.

Consider cases at the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR:

53. MIKHAILOV Mikhail Mikhailovich, born in 1896, b / n, doctor of the hospital. Botkin.

54. GOLOVSKOY Vladimir Yanovich, born in 1895, b/p, student of the construction institute.

55. IVANOVA Galina Maryanovna, born in 1900, unnamed, housewife.

56. RUDNEVA, Sergey Aleksandrovich, born in 1895, unpaid, accountant of the Dispensary Association. Semashko.

57. Evgenia Pavlovna RUDNEV, born in 1893, unemployed, librarian of the All-Union Academy of Light Industry.

58. CHERNOZUBOVA Lyudmila Anatolyevna, born in 1896, unnamed, artist.

59. MUKHANOV Maria Konstantinovna, born in 1902, unnamed, housewife.

60. Leonid Alexandrovich VORONOV, born in 1899, without a record, artist.

- \*\*

SENTENCE EVERYONE TO 5 YEARS OF CONCENTRATION CAMP \*\*.

61. CHERNOZUBOV Evgeniya Emilyevna, born in 1901, b/p, economist of the Central Administration of National Economic Accounting.

- \*\*

SENTENCE TO 3 YEARS OF CONCENTRATION CAMP \*\*.

62. ALEKSEEV, Nikolai Alekseevich, born in 1888, b/p, head] of the photographic laboratory of the Research Institute of Horse Breeding.

- \*\* SENTENCED TO 5 YEARS OF LINK \*\*.

63. BLOKHIN Nikolay Petrovich, born in 1901, b/p, student of the Moscow Veterinary Institute.

- \*\* SENTENCED TO 3 YEARS IN LINK\*\*.

#### V. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY TERRORIST TROTSKIST GROUP IN THE KREMLIN COMMANDER'S OFFICE

Consider cases at the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR:

64. LUKYANOV Ivan Petrovich, born in 1899, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1920, commandant of the Grand Kremlin Palace.

65. PAVLOV Ivan Efimovich, born 1900, member of the CPSU(b) since 1919, head of the special guards and assistant commandant of the Kremlin.

66. POLYAKOV Pavel Fedorovich, born in 1900, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1919, head of the Administrative and Economic Department of the Office of the Commandant of the Kremlin.

67. Ivan Demyanovich GAVRIKOV, born in 1900, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1919, head of the chem. Services of the 2nd Regiment of the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division.

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68. Abram Makarovich GUSEV, born in 1898, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Deputy] Head of the Light Industry Department of the Moscow Region.

- \*\* SENTENCE EVERYONE TO 5 YEARS OF CONCENTRATION CAMP \*\*.

69. ZHIROMSKY Pavel Ivanovich, born in 1896, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, former head of the Air Defense of the Kremlin.

70. MISHCHENKO Nikolai Nikolaevich, born in 1901, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1925, head of the Secret Department of the Office of the Commandant of the Kremlin.

71. MYACHINA Alexandra Ivanovna, born in 1892, unnamed, housewife.

- \*\* SENTENCE EVERYONE TO 3 YEARS OF A CONCENTRATION CAMP\*\*.

72. SINELOBOVA Maria Fedorovna, born in 1904, unnamed, housewife.

- \*\* SENTENCED TO 3 YEARS IN LINK\*\*.

#### VI. COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY TERRORIST GROUP OF TROTSKIST YOUTH

Bring to trial the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR:

73. ROSENFELD, Boris Nikolaevich, born in 1908, unnamed engineer, Mosenergo.

74. NEKHAMKIN Lev Yakovlevich, born in 1909, unnamed, medical student.

75. AZBEL David Semenovich, born in 1911, non-partisan], post-graduate student of the Polygraphic Institute.

76. BELOV Viktor Grigorievich, born in 1912, unemployed, temporarily not working at the time of his arrest.

- \*\* SENTENCE EVERYONE TO 10 YEARS OF A CONCENTRATION CAMP\*\*.

Consider cases at the Special Meeting of the NKVD:

77. SEDOV, Sergei Lvovich, born in 1908, (son of TROTSKY), unemployed, engineer.

78. MUSIC by Feodosy Ivanovich, born in 1896, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1928, student of the Moscow Energy Institute.

79. ZHITOMIRSKY, Semyon Moiseevich, born in 1906, unemployed, planner-economist of the Moscow City Planning Committee.

80. ZHITOMIRSKY, Sergey Moiseevich, born in 1909, nominee, senior consultant of the 4th Mechanical Factory.

81. VAKHTIN Boris Borisovich, born in 1907, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, executive secretary of the Molot newspaper.

- \*\* SENTENCE EVERYONE TO 5 YEARS OF CONCENTRATION CAMP \*\*.

82. PALIKHIN Vasily Sergeevich, born in 1906, b/p, employee of the Park of Culture and Rest named after. Gorky.

83. POKATILOVSKY Isaak Mikhailovich, born in 1909, member of the Komsomol since 1928, student at the Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature.

- SENTENCED TO 3 YEARS OF A CONCENTRATION CAMP.

Cases against employees of the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR to be considered at a Special Meeting under the NKVD of the USSR:

84. NIKITINSKAYA Anna Ivanovna, born in 1904, unnamed, housewife.

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85. GUGUA\*\*\*\*\* Irina Kalistratovna, born in 1904, b/p, technical secretary of the Budget Commission of the CEC.

- \*\* SENTENCE TO 5 YEARS OF CONCENTRATION CAMP \*\*.

86. NIKITINSKY Ivan Nikolaevich, born in 1893, b / p, professor of the Institute of the Red Professors.

87. APUSHKIN, Yakov Vladimirovich, born in 1899, no-name, writer.

- \*\* SENTENCE TO 3 YEARS OF CONCENTRATION CAMP \*\*.

88. MINERVINA\*\*\*\*\* Lyubov Nikolaevna, born in 1895, unnamed, employee of the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

89. MINDEL \*\*\*\*\* Raisa Grigorievna, born in 1906, no record, referent of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

90. ELCHANINOV \*\*\*\*\* Vera Alexandrovna, born in 1910, member of the Komsomol, employee of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

91. BOLSHIKH Irina Vasilievna, born in 1903, unnamed, employee of the Secretariat of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

92. AGRANOVICH \*\*\* Fedor Semenovich, born in 1903, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1920, consultant of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

93. KUNYEVA Elena Vasilievna, born in 1897, b/p, secretary of the Administration of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.

- SENTENCE ALL TO 3 YEARS of exile.

Cases against cleaners of the Kremlin institutions will also be considered at a Special Meeting under the NKVD of the USSR:

94. Alexandra Gavrilovna KORCHAGINA, born in 1905, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1931, cleaner of the Government building.

95. DYACHKOV, Alexei Petrovich, born in 1910, unnamed, building storekeeper.

96. Ilya Matveyevich POPOVA, born in 1875, unemployed, at the time of his arrest, was unemployed.

97. DOLGOVA Ilya Kiryanovich, born in 1912, unnamed, student of the Moscow Institute of the Fishing Industry.

98. NEVEROV Ivan Filippovich, born in 1883, unnamed, builder-pilytsik.

99. DYACHKOV, Ivan Andreevich, born in 1885, unnamed, driver in the greenhouse of Timiryazevskaya S.Kh. Academy.

- SENTENCE ALL TO 5 YEARS OF A CONCENTRATION CAMP.

100. Maria Dmitrievna KOCHETOVA, born in 1915, unpaid, telephonist at the Kremlin telephone exchange.

101. AVDEEV Anna Efimovna, born in 1913, b/p, cleaning lady of the building of the Government evidence.

- SENTENCED TO 3 YEARS OF A CONCENTRATION CAMP.

102. KATYNSKAYA Bronislava Yakovlevna, born in 1885, unemployed, cleaner of the Government building.

103. KONSTANTINOVA Anastasia Mitrofanovna, born in 1900, unemployed, cleaner of the Government building.

104. MESCHERIAKOVA-TIMOFEEVA Maria Vasilievna, born in 1911, unemployed, cleaner of the Government building.

105. ORLOVA Antonina Alekseevna, born in 1913, b/p, cleaning lady of the building of Pra-  
government.

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106. SMOLYDOVA Darya Georgievna, born in 1896, unemployed, who until 1933 worked as a doorman at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school.

- ALL SENTENCED TO 3 YEARS OF LINK.

107. SIMAK Yuzefa Osipovna, born in 1904, unnamed, cleaner of the government building.

- MINUS REGIME CITIES.

108. GLEBOV-KAMENEVA Tatyana Ivanovna, born in 1895, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from 1923 to January 1935

109. Olga Davidovna KAMENEVA, born in 1883, a member of the RSDLP since 1902, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1917, who worked in the Directorate of Cinematography of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR as chairman of the Research Council and head] of the department ] film propaganda.

- SENTENCED TO 3 YEARS OF LINK.

Arrested:

BY. Elena Seliverstovna MELNIKOVA, born in 1888, unemployed, cleaner of the Government building.

111. ZHUKOVA Nadezhda Sergeevna, born in 1884, b/p, cleaning lady at the Government House.

112. DAVYDOVA Veronika Abramovna, born in 1901, b / p, secretary of the local committee under the Central Broadcasting Administration.

- we consider it necessary to RELEASE due to unproven charges.

Of the 112 arrested in the case, the following are subject to consideration:

Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR,

sentenced to death. 9 people

Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR

with a sentence of 10 years in a concentration camp. 17 people.

Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. 1 person

Special Meeting at the NKVD of the USSR with condemnation:

a) by 5 years in a concentration camp. 38 people.

b) by the 3rd years of the concentration camp. 10 people.

c) to 5 years of exile. 1 person

d) by the 3rd years of exile. 31 people.

d) send. 1 person

f) with the prohibition of residence in sensitive cities. 1 person

g) are exempt. 3 people

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 237. L. 37-49. Script. Typescript.

\* In the document on the first page there is a handwritten note by Poskrebyshv: "From Comrade. Berries". \*  
—'The  
word was entered by Stalin instead of the one crossed out: "concentration camps, with the exception of Rosenfeld  
N.B., who will be shot."

There are Stalin's handwritten notes on the margins:

"Opposite the names is inscribed: "10 years of k.l."

"—" It is underlined in the margins with two vertical lines.

"\*  
Opposite the names is inscribed: "5 years of Ph.D."

"Opposite the names is inscribed: "10 years in prison."

\*\*\*\*\*  
Opposite the names is inscribed: "Release".

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No. 524

MESSAGE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOV  
ON THE RESULTS OF CLEARING LENINGRAD FROM FOREIGN  
ELEMENTS

May 13, 1935

No. 162 I/s

I consider it necessary to inform you about the results of the participation of the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR in the work of the NKVD bodies to cleanse the city of Leningrad from alien elements.

This operation was carried out from February 28 to March 27, 1935, and during this time 2,237 complaints were received about the wrong actions of the NKVD. This number also includes 178 complaints directly referred for investigation to the Leningrad Regional Prosecutor's Office by order of the Prosecutor of the USSR.

As of May 1, 1,983 complaints were considered, of which 1,719 (86.6%) were left unsatisfied, decisions on 264 complaints (13.4%) were protested and canceled.

Despite the end of the operation, complaints continue to be received and considered by the USSR Prosecutor's Office with the subsequent transfer of protests, in appropriate cases, to the consideration of the Special Meeting of the NKVD. It should be noted that until approximately March 15, the Leningrad Regional Prosecutor's Office did not take part in this work due to objections from the Leningrad NKVD.

This abnormal phenomenon was, at my protest, eliminated by Comrade. Yagoda, and since mid-March, the Leningrad Prosecutor's Office, together with employees of the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR (comrades Pruss and Lurie) specially seconded to Leningrad, began to supervise the operation to clean up the city of Leningrad in full.

In all cases when the complaints of those evicted from Leningrad were found to be sufficiently substantiated, the Prosecutor's Office of the Union carried out a special additional verification of the case. In a number of cases, depending on the specific situation, the Prosecutor's Office sought to replace remote points of exile with closer areas, and in the case of eviction from Leningrad, send them to areas where they would have the opportunity to work in their specialty.

While the operation to purify Leningrad was carried out quite satisfactorily on the whole, the latter revealed a number of gross errors and blunders, which were explained mainly by haste, short duration and mass character.



Among such shortcomings should be included the numerous cases of decisions to evict the family of the deportee, which in themselves were not discredited in any way and were not socially dangerous, in some cases even materially not connected with the so-called "heads of families".

There are some examples of this:

a) VISHNYAKOVA V.A., daughter of a former colonel, she is currently 24 years old. Has nothing to do with his father. In 1920, after the death of her mother, she was sent to an orphanage.

2 years ago she married a worker, member. Komsomol. Vishnyakov's father was sentenced to exile, and with him his daughter. Vishnyakova's husband is not being expelled. At the request of the Prosecutor's Office, Vishnyakova's expulsion was cancelled.

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b) KORCHMAREK Z.P. As a teacher in one of the Leningrad schools, she adopted a distant relative FYODOROVA, 62 years old, as her dependent. FEDOROVA is the wife of a former consul in China, and therefore she was sentenced to exile ("15"). But since she was unable to move, Korchmarek was sent along with her as a niece. On the proposal of the Prosecutor's Office, both Korchmarek and Fedorov were left in Leningrad.

c) ABUGOV P.M. 35 years. My father was a merchant in the Pale of Settlement. In 1920, the son left his parents for the Red Army, worked in various institutions and has good reviews. Now in the 5th year of the construction institute. He was subject to eviction as a member of the family of the former merchant. At the request of the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR, the expulsion was suspended.

d) MAKSIMOVA-FILIPPOVA A.P. Father was a worker, died; mother is a worker, VKP(b). A year and a half ago Maksimova-Filippova got married. Her husband's mother was sentenced to exile, and her daughter-in-law Maksimova-Filippova was also included in the list of family members to be deported along with her mother-in-law. On the proposal of the Prosecutor's Office, the issue was revised, Maksimova-Filippova was left in Leningrad.

e) Izmestieva T.P. Subject to eviction as the daughter of a general. Upon verification, it turned out that the father of the deportee was indeed a former general who had gone over to serve in the Red Army from the first days of the October Revolution. He died in 1925, has great merits in the training of personnel of the Red Army.

Izmestieva's mother still receives a personal pension. At the suggestion of the Prosecutor's Office of the USSR, Izmeteva was left in Leningrad.

I consider it necessary to report that specialists (engineers, technicians, doctors, researchers) expelled from Leningrad are denied employment in their new places of residence by enterprises and institutions, which puts them in a completely hopeless situation, not to mention the fact that they could be used in their specialty.

In order to settle this case, I, by agreement with Comrade Yagoda, gave appropriate instructions, but this issue remains unresolved to this day, since the heads of individual economic, scientific and administrative institutions often refuse to hire people who submitting certificates of his expulsion or exile.

For my part, I would consider it expedient to instruct the NKVD to work out, together with the Prosecutor's Office of the Union, measures for the employment of persons exiled or exiled in an administrative order.

A. VYSHINSKY

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 174. L. 84-86. Script. Typescript.

No. 525

NOTE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT THE  
CORRESPONDENT OF THE POLISH NEWSPAPER\*

May 21, 1935

No. 50706

Top secret

\*May 17th p. Ota, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, telegraphed the Japanese ambassador in Xinjiang about the departure of the correspondent of the Polish newspaper Nash Psheglond (an organ of the Jewish bourgeoisie) from Moscow to Birobidzhan

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Azno-Zionist direction, sympathetic to Pilsudski) Bernard Singer.

In this telegram, Ota indicates that Singer is going to get acquainted with the Soviet Far East, and in particular with Birobidzhan. After that, he will leave for Manchukuo for the same purpose.

According to this report, \*Singer is connected\* with the Japanese correspondent in Moscow of the Osaka-Osahi newspaper, whereby Ota points out the possibility of obtaining information from Singer about the military situation in the Far East and asks for full cooperation by connecting him confidentially with a representative Manchukuo in Harbin.

\*Singer is known to us as a person associated with the 2nd department of the Central Headquarters\* (personally with the chief of counterintelligence, Colonel Meyer, the head of work to combat the Communist Party of Poland). \* Outwardly, Singer pretends to be a sympathizer of communism, has connections among legal communists - Jewish writers. Along with this, Singer occasionally gives information to TASS about the work of the Sejm.

Singer came to the USSR in 1927, 30 and 33. This time, Singer entered on a local visa of the USSR embassy in Warsaw without coordination with the center.

**\*\***Since May 19, we have given a telegraph instruction to the PGPU DVK about careful monitoring of Singer in order to identify connections, and at the same time the NKID has raised the issue of banning Singer from entering the USSR in the future.**\*\***

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 245. L.36, 37. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a handwritten note by A.P. Poskrebyshv: "From. Comrade Yagoda.

\*—\* Underlined with one line.

**\*\***—**"**It is underlined in the margins with two lines.

No. 526

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES AND A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. TO STALIN  
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE DRAFT CIRCULAR  
DECISION ON THE USE OF  
PERSONS EXILED OR EXPIRED BY ADMINISTRATIVE  
ORDER (160)

May 31, 1935

56167

OWL. SECRET

In pursuance of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks from\_on the development of

We ask you to approve the draft of the attached circular order to the bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office regarding the use of those exiled or expelled in the administrative order.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR YAGODA  
PROSECUTOR OF THE UNION OF THE SSR VYSHINSKY

DOCUMENTATION

673

Owls. secret

Project

On the use at work of persons exiled and deported in the administrative order  
Circular order of the NKVD and the  
USSR Prosecutor's Office

TO ALL PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONERS OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS

AND PROSECUTORS OF THE UNION REPUBLIC

In view of the observed cases of refusal to use exiles or administratively deported at work, it is proposed that henceforth be guided by the following:

1. Administratively expelled or exiled persons may not be denied employment in institutions and enterprises solely on the grounds links or exiles.

Those expelled or exiled are not allowed to work at defense enterprises. An exception to this rule is possible only with the permission of the NKVD.

2. Exiled and exiled specialists, such as: engineers, technicians, doctors, accountants, etc., as well as skilled workers, must be used in their specialty in institutions and enterprises in the area in which they are allowed to reside, with the exception of those cases when, by a decision of the Special Conference, these persons are deprived of the right to practice their profession in places of exile or exile.

The heads of enterprises and institutions have no right to refuse to employ these persons in their specialty merely on the grounds of their exile or expulsion.

3. Scientific workers, as well as teachers expelled from the capitals, industrial centers and the border strip, if they were expelled only in order to clean up these areas, and not in connection with any specific crime, can be used to work on his specialty.

4. Students expelled or exiled from the capitals, industrial centers and the border strip, not in connection with a specific crime, but in order to clear these areas, are subject to admission to educational institutions at the place of their new residence.

5. When deported or exiled are declared the decisions of the Special Conference of the NKVD on exile or expulsion, the NKVD bodies are obliged to explain to the deported or exiled their right to work in their specialty in places of exile or expulsion, with the issuance of an appropriate certificate to them.

6. Propose to the local bodies of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office to establish the strictest supervision over the exact execution of this circular order.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yagoda

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 174. L. 92-94ob. Script. Typescript.

\*

The text on the first page contains Stalin's handwritten notes: "And the state pays something to those who are expelled or exiled. We need to discuss. I. Stalin", "Delay to  
ows.

I. Stalin.

LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

No. 527

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN  
BSSR BORDER PROTECTION»

June 12, 1935

No. 27, p. 61 - On measures to strengthen the protection of the border of the BSSR.

3. Carry out the following activities to clean up the border districts and regions of Belarus:

a) Arrest and exile an active hooligan-hostile element suspected of espionage, making arrests only if specific material is available.

b) Relocate 2,000 families of an unreliable element from the border strip with their deportation outside Belarus.

The resettlement is to be carried out on the same conditions that are established for the resettled in Ukraine.

APRF. F.Z. OP. 58. D. 174. L. 88. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 12. VI. 35

No. 528

MEMORIAL G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT THE  
LATVIAN SCOUT OFFICER V. PERSHTEIN  
DETAINED IN OUR TERRITORY

June 13, 1935

No. 56249

TOP SECRET

In April 1935, the NKVD of Belarus received information indicating the involvement \* in the intelligence activities of a commercial agent for the transfer of brigades of the Latvian railways \* PERSHTEIN Voldemar Yakovlevich, born in 1908, a Latvian citizen who regularly visits Soviet territory with Latvian trains.

On June 2 this year, during the next visit to PERSHTEIN st. Bee Gosovo, on the basis of the available verified data on the presence of intelligence materials, PERIITEIN was detained and searched. \*\*A search revealed two genuine reconnaissance assignments compiled by the head of the Latvian reconnaissance post, BERGMANS, to collect espionage information by PERSHTEIN during his trips to the USSR\*\*.

The assignments provide for the collection of information about the composition of the Polotsk garrison, airfields, motorized mechanized units of the Red Army and artillery.

Having been convicted by these documentary data found during the search, PERSHTEIN at the very first interrogation confessed that he really was an agent of the Latvian intelligence. \*\*According to the testimony of PERSHTEIN, he was involved in intelligence work against the USSR in October 1934 personally by the head of the Indra post of the Latvian intelligence BERGMAN

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COM. This circumstance is confirmed by the fact that a note signed by BERGMANS\*\* is attached to the tasks found at PERSHTEIN's.

The investigation established that PERSHTEIN systematically received material rewards for his intelligence work in favor of Latvia against the USSR. At the end of 1934, he was registered as a permanent agent of the Latvian intelligence service.

ÿÿIt is noteworthy that, according to the testimony of PERSHTEIN-BERGMANS, there is a network of his agents among the railway servants visiting Soviet territory. PERSHTEIN points to 3 persons who are also connected with the Latvian intelligence.

The investigation into the case ends. Upon agreement with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the case is referred to the court\*\*.

People's Commissar of  
Internal Affairs of the USSR Yagoda

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 247. L. 94, 95. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet is Poskrebyshv's handwritten note: "From Comrade Yagoda."

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\* \_ "It was crossed out in the margins with one line.

No. 529

MESSAGE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY AND V.V. ULRIHA I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE END OF THE INVESTIGATION IN THE CASE  
OF THE "SPY" ORGANIZATION OPERATING IN THE SYSTEM OF  
ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES

June 13, 1935

Top secret

The other day, an investigation was completed in the case of a spy organization uncovered by the NKVD in 1935, which had been operating since 1928, the main

at once in the system of energy-industrial enterprises in the city. Leningrad, Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Rostov-on-Don.

In addition to collecting and transferring secret military and economic information to German intelligence agencies through the German consulate in Leningrad, the organization also prepared acts of sabotage at power plants in the Urals.

17 defendants were involved in the case. Chief among them is Vedrikh G.I. (former representative of Glavenergo and Uralenergo in Leningrad, a Czechoslovak citizen), who created the entire spy organization and directed its activities from 1928 to the day of his arrest in 1935. The remaining 16 were recruited by him and received about 30,000 rubles from him. and 500 American dollars responsible civil servants of the energy industry and other enterprises, Soviet citizens: Vladimirov A.V., Markov I.A., Altman A.I., Seitz I.F., Fedorov S.V., Kiselev A.M., Shavarsky A.M., Vorobyov A.N., Kilpie A.A., Tikhonov F.K., Lieberstein J.S., Krestmein E.S., Popov M.D., Ivantsov I. S., Bat V.L. and Zhilkin V.S.

10 defendants (Vedrich, Fedorov, Altman, Shavarsky, Vladimirov, Kilpie, Markov, Krestmein, Popov and Bat) pleaded guilty. Their testimony completely reveals all the others.

We plan to hear the case in the next few days in a closed court session of the visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in Leningrad.

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With regard to the head of the espionage organization Vedrikh and his most active agents who were engaged in espionage for 2-3 years: Vladimirov, Altman, Fedorov, Kiselev, Shavarsky and Markov (the latter, in addition, created his own agents, having himself recruited 4 .) - we consider it necessary to apply capital punishment - execution, and the remaining 10, as less active spies, to be sentenced to imprisonment for various terms.

On the issue of considering the case of Vedrikh, as a Czechoslovak citizen, the opinion of the NKID was requested. Tov. Krestinsky, in his reply, points to the undesirability of condemning Vedrikh to be shot.

We ask for your guidance on:

- 1) on the measures of punishment to be applied to the accused and
- 2) about the possibility of publishing in the press the corresponding message about the verdict.

A. Vyshinsky

B. Ulrich

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 247. L. 97, 98. Copy. Typescript.

No. 530

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE APPROVAL OF THE DECISION OF THE SNK OF THE USSR AND THE CC OF THE VKP(B)

"ON THE ORDER OF ARRESTS" (161)

June 21, 1935

No. 27, paragraph 157-0 of the procedure for making arrests (decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks).

Make the following decision (see appendix).

APPENDIX to paragraph 157 of PB No. 27

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decide:

1. By changing the instructions of May 8, 1933, arrests in all cases without exception can be carried out by the NKVD bodies only with the consent of the relevant prosecutor.

2. If it is necessary to make an arrest at the scene of a crime, officials from the NKVD authorized to do so by law are obliged to immediately inform the relevant prosecutor about the arrest in order to obtain confirmation.

3. Permission to arrest members of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics is given only upon receipt by the prosecutor's office and the NKVD of the consent of the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or the chairmen of the Central Executive Committees of the Union Republics, according to their affiliation.

Permits for the arrest of senior employees of the People's Commissariats of the Union and the Union republics and equivalent central institutions (heads of departments and heads of departments, managers of trusts and their deputies, directors and deputy directors of industrial enterprises, state farms, etc. ), as well as engineers, agronomists, professors, doctors, heads of educational and research institutions serving in various institutions - are given in agreement with the relevant people's commissars.

4. Permission to arrest members and candidates of the CPSU(b) is given in agreement with the secretaries of the district, regional, regional committees of the CPSU(b), the Central Committee

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National Communist Parties, according to their affiliation, and in relation to communists holding leading positions in the people's commissariats of the Union and equivalent central institutions - upon receipt of the consent of the chairman of the Party Control Commission.

5. Permissions for the arrest of military personnel of the highest, senior and middle commanding staff of the Red Army are given in agreement with the People's Commissar of Defense.

6. Permits for arrests are given in the district by the district prosecutor, in autonomous republics - by the prosecutors of these republics, in territories (regions) -



regional (regional) prosecutors.

In cases of crimes in railway and water transport, permits for arrests are given by district prosecutors, traffic prosecutors and prosecutors of swimming pools according to their affiliation; on cases under the jurisdiction of military tribunals, prosecutors of military districts.

Permissions for arrests carried out directly by the people's commissariats of internal affairs of the union republics are given by the prosecutors of the republics.

Permissions for arrests carried out directly by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR are issued by the Prosecutor of the Union.

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR MOLOTOV

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE AUCP(b) I. STALIN

APRF. F.Z. Op. 58. D. 5. L. 144,145. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated July 17, 1935.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "To the regional committees, regional committees, nat. Central Committee, allied people's commissariats, vol. Yagoda, Vyshinsky, Yezhov, Miroshnikov, Akulov, Sulimov, Krylenko.

No. 531

M.M.'s NOTE Litvinova I.V. STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOV ABOUT THE  
RADIO IN THE GERMAN EMBASSY (162)

June 21, 1935

197/I

Secret

Regarding the note Comrade. Berries  
about the radio in the German embassy

There are radio receivers in almost all embassies and missions in Moscow, as they are in our Embassies abroad. We require embassies and missions to register with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs the devices they have, and this requirement is being met. By letter dated April 12 this year. The German embassy informed us about the apparatuses available both in the embassy itself and in the possession of individual employees of the embassy, and of the types\* of these apparatuses.

We are talking, of course, about radio receivers, and not about transmitters. We could, of course, tell the German ambassador that, according to the information we received, there was a radio transmitter in the embassy that was not registered with the NKID. In doing so, we should have referred to the testimony of the arrested Grepler. There is no doubt, however, that the ambassador will deny the existence of a radio transmitter. We cannot demand the admission of our representatives to inspect the premises of the embassy or individual apartments of the employee.

kov embassy.

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Our position would, however, be firmer if we could present copies of the intercepts originating from the radio set in the German embassy. I am not an expert on radio installations, but it seems doubtful to me that our powerful stations were deprived of the possibility of intercepting the transmissions of any Moscow private station. It seems to me necessary, therefore, to instruct our radio stations to establish special surveillance of the German transmitter and to present us with intercepts with which we can convict the embassy. Without this, our statement to the ambassador may be useful in the sense that he will know about our knowledge of the location of the apparatus in his possession, but will not give the desired results in the sense of ridding us of the apparatus itself.

LITVINOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 247. L. 99, 100. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "1-2 tons to Stalin, 3 tons to Molotov, 4 t. Krestinsky, 5 comrade. Stomonyakov, 6 v. Litvinov, 7 archive.

No. 532

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"QUESTION OF THE PROSECUTION OF THE USSR"

June 21, 1935

No. 27, p. 124 - Question of the USSR Prosecutor's Office.

Propose to the Supreme Court of the USSR in the case of a spy organization in energy-industrial enterprises to give Vedrikh and 6 of his most active agents 10 years in prison, and the remaining 10 participants - 8 years each.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 247. L. 96. Copy. Typescript.

\* The resolution was adopted by a poll of the Politburo members dated June 15, 1935.

\*\* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Vyshinsky, Vinokurov, Yagoda.

No. 533

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE REMOVAL OF THE COUNTER-  
REVOLUTIONARY ZINOVIEV-TROTSKYIST LITERATURE"

June 21, 1935

No. 27, paragraph 139 - On the seizure of the counter-revolutionary Zinoviev-Trotskyist

Russian literature (OB dated 14.VI.35, pr. No. 31 p. 30 g.s.).

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks notes that during the removal of Trotskyist-Zinoviev literature from the library, in fact, an uncontrolled and undirected "cleansing" of libraries is carried out, theft and damage to library funds.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides:

a) to propose to party organizations, party committees, chief litas, and so on. stop the general cleaning of libraries and the continuous removal of books from them;

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b) to propose to the Glavlits and the NKVD to withdraw Kist-Zinoviev literature from the libraries and warehouses of the k/r trots, according to the attached list (see appendix);

c) the withdrawal of these books is carried out for each library by the district commissioner of Glavlit together with the authorized representative of the NKVD.

An act is drawn up for the seized books; books are sealed and sent with an act of seizure to the regional and regional departments of the NKVD;

d) leave two copies of the withdrawn publications in the special collections of the libraries of the following institutions: the Central Committee and the Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Academy of Sciences, IMEL, as well as the library. Lenin (Moscow), Saltykov-Shchedrin (Leningrad), libraries of the NKP, Communist universities in Moscow and Leningrad, central libraries of the main cities of the Union republics, territories, regions and university cities and the Government Library under the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 965. L. 30. Original. Typescript.

Published: Tje Koab io Tegtop Ziaaip anpsi ýbe zeýg eeyatsýýop oG ýýý Býýýýýrýkz 1932-1939 / L. Ars Senu apsi 01ýš ýchaitoý  
vaie Shýýýrzýýu Prezz, p. 181-182.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated July 16, 1935.

\*\*

Printed without attachment.

No. 534

MEMORIAL G.E. PROKOFIEVA I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT THE CASE  
OF JAPANESE DIVERSANTS I.V. KOBYLKINA AND EL.  
PERELADOVA

July 11, 1935

No. 56423  
Sov. secret

The investigation into the case of the arrested Japanese saboteurs Kobylkin and Pereladov (reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. 56121 dated 23/V-1935), conducted in Moscow, fully established that Colonel Kobylkin I.V. and cornet Pereladov E.L. transferred illegally to Soviet territory by the Japanese military mission in Harbin.

The arrested Colonel Kobylkin Innokenty Vasilievich at the time of his throwing into Soviet territory was an official employee of the Japanese-Manchurian police as a warden at the Chzhalaynor station of the Chinese Eastern Railway (9 kilometers from the Soviet border).

Kobylkin testifies that he went to Soviet territory on the direct instructions of the secretary of the Japanese military mission in Harbin - the Court to communicate with the counter-revolutionary organization existing in the territory of Transbaikalia, which the Japanese considered it necessary to switch to the implementation of terrorist and sabotage acts. For these purposes, Kobylkin was supplied by the Japanese military mission with weapons (2 large Mausers and 70 cartridges for them and 1 Browning with 24 cartridges) and 2 Termite incendiary shells (seized during arrest).

To carry out a wide propaganda of counter-revolutionary ideas on the territory of Eastern Siberia, Kobylkin brought with him 4,769 various leaflets published by the well-known terrorist organization abroad, the Brotherhood of Russian Truth (BRP).

Yevlampy Lukyanovich, a cornet arrested in this case, who arrived illegally on Soviet territory earlier than Kobylkin, shows

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He believes that he was recruited for Japanese intelligence by Kobylkin, on whose behalf he went illegally to Soviet territory for personal participation in terrorist and sabotage acts that were supposed to be carried out by an existing anti-Soviet organization in Transbaikalia. When Pereladov was arrested, 2 Browning guns with cartridges and 8 Termit incendiary shells were found on him.

Along with this, Pereladov shows that before his departure for the USSR, being a member of the so-called Krasnovsky branch of the "BRP" (Shanghai department), he visited in Harbin a representative of this branch, Nikolai Ivanovich Kurochkin, who instructed him to start creating small, but well-hidden and unrelated BRP cells on Soviet territory.

The anti-Soviet organization, for which Kobylkin and Pereladov came from Japanese intelligence, actually consists of a small group of persons specially set up by us to intercept the activities of Japanese intelligence in Transbaikalia.

Due to the fact that the arrest of Pereladov and Kobylkin was carried out in secret

but, Japanese intelligence, believing that they were at large, transferred to Kobylkin's disposal on the night of May 28, 1935 in the area of the Daursky border detachment (East Siberian Territory) an armed group of terrorists consisting of 3 people - Kustov Vladimir (emigrant, engineer, member of the "BRP") and Oleinikov Mikhail and Viktor (brothers, citizens of the USSR, sons of a priest, without any specific occupation, recruited by Japanese intelligence, repeatedly illegally crossed the border).

Faced with a reserve detachment of our border guards in the area of the village of Abagaytuy (Daursky border detachment, VSK), the terrorists opened fire, as a result of a firefight, Kustov Vladimir and Oleinikov Mikhail were killed by return fire. Viktor Oleinikov, who had escaped during the skirmish, was detained the next morning on his way to the city of Chita. Letters from the Japanese agent Timofeev and members of the "BRP" in Harbin, Kurochkin and Petunov, addressed to Kobylkin and Pereladov, were found among the dead.

The detainee Viktor Oleinikov confessed that he had been cooperating with Japanese intelligence for a year and, on its instructions, had repeatedly illegally violated our border. Oleinikov's last visit to Soviet territory was connected with the direct task of the Japanese military mission in Harbin, which instructed him to hand over letters to Kobylkin and assist him in carrying out terrorist and sabotage acts. According to Oleinikov's testimony, the terrorists (Kustov and Mikhail Oleinikov) who came out with him, like him, were armed with Brownings with a box of spare cartridges for each. (All weapons seized). Oleinikov is escorted to Moscow.

Given that Kobylkin and Pereladov are active agents of Japanese intelligence, being simultaneously members of the monarchist White Guard organizations, such as "ROVS" (Russian All-Military Union) and "BRP", and the fact that Kobylkin, before entering Soviet territory, was an official employee of the Manchurian police, I consider it expedient to transfer this case to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR for a public hearing.

The process should be carried out from the angle of exposing the activities of Japanese intelligence agencies on the territory of Manchukuo, feeding and widely using members of various White Guard organizations.

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missions to carry out terrorist and sabotage activities on our territory.  
only acts.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs agrees with the open formulation of this trial, considering it only necessary to hold it in Irkutsk.

I ask for instructions.

Deputy People's Commissar of Internal  
Affairs of the USSR Prokofiev

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 247. L. 105-107. Script. Typescript.

No. 535

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON MEASURES OF PUNISHMENT IN THE KREMLIN CASE

July 17, 1935

No. 30, p. 82 - Question of the NKVD.

1. All the defendants in the case Ph.D. terrorist groups in the Kremlin, sentenced to 10 years in concentration camps, to imprisonment for 10 years.

2. Accused Chernyavsky to be shot.

3. The accused Kameneva O.D. sent to a locality of her choice, with a ban on living in Moscow and Leningrad.

4. The cases of the most guilty (up to 30 people) should be sent for consideration by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, sentencing them to terms of 2 to 10 years.

5. Conclude the rest in concentration camps and exile.

6. L.B. Kamenev was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 238. L. 1. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on July 10, 1935.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yagoda, Vyshinsky.

No. 536

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE TRANSFER TO THE COURT OF THE CASE OF JAPANESE SABOTERS

July 17, 1935

No. 30, p. 114 - Question of the NKVD.

To agree with the transfer of the case of the arrested Japanese saboteurs Kobylkin I.V. and Pereladova E.L. to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR for a public hearing in the city of Irkutsk.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 247. L. 104. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated July 15, 1935.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yagoda, Vinokurov, Ulrich, Stomonyakov", as well as a handwritten note: "T. Vyshinsky. Return after use niya".

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No. 537

P.P. Postysheva I.V. TO STALIN ON THE NEED TO RESETTE  
"COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY"  
ELEMENTS

July 31, 1935

Copy

MARHLEVSK (border) district of the Kyiv region, considered the national Polish region, was the most infested area with anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary elements.

In the spring of 1935, in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 1,188 households of anti-Soviet and unreliable elements were evicted to remote places of the Union and resettled in regions of Ukraine remote from the border and additionally resettled in the Markhlevsky district, in order to strengthen the border, 745 farms, proven Ukrainian collective farmers, shock workers, selected in the southern regions of the Kiev region.

These measures yielded significant results in strengthening the Markhlevsky district.

However, the spring resettlement and eviction from Ukraine did not give a full result, since the number of farms for eviction and resettlement from the Markhlevsky district was given in the spring was limited. In eleven village councils of the Markhlevsky district, no resettlement or eviction was carried out at all. There are still a large number of former members of gangs, white armies, Polish legionnaires, former smugglers, persons who had connections with previously uncovered spy organizations, former kulaks and dispossessed Polish nationalist elements in the Markhlevsky district.

An additional study of the NKVD in 20 settlements revealed 350 farms, of which 300 farms should be relocated to other regions of Ukraine and 50 farms should be evicted to the north. Among these 350 households, according to the social and political past, there are: former kulaks and dispossessed - 129, former nobles - 14, bandits and members of the White armies and Polish legionnaires - 75 people, former smugglers - 45 people, suspected in espionage - 37 people.

The regional committee and the regional executive committee ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks:

To permit the resettlement of 300 households of hostile and unreliable elements from the Markhlevsky District to other regions of Ukraine, in addition to those already resettled this spring, and the eviction of 50 households of the most dangerous anti-Soviet elements outside Ukraine to the north.

Resettlement and eviction should be allowed to be carried out in the same order as in the spring, which was established by the decision of the Central Committee of the KShchb) U of January 23, 1935, and also allow the eviction of family members from the Markhlevsky district to their heads, who had previously been convicted and expelled for active anti-Soviet and harmful activities.

Secretary of the Kyiv Regional Committee of the Communist Party Postyshev

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 131. L. 106, 107. Original. Typescript.

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No. 538

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE SENTENCE ON THE WHITE GUARDS

September 3, 1935

No. 33, item 15 - Question from Comrade Ulrich.

Approve the verdict of the visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in relation to the White Guards Kobylkin, Pereladov and Oleinikov.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 247. L. 157. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo dated 3.1X.35.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Ulrich, Vyshinsky, Vi-Nokurov."

No. 539

NOTE by Ya.S. AGRANOVA TO I.V. STALIN  
WITH A COPY OF THE ANONYMOUS LETTER ABOUT  
A.S. ENUKIDZE

September 5, 1935

No. 56896

TOP SECRET

I am sending you a copy of a letter signed by an unknown G.

The name of the addressee on the first page of the letter was torn off.

On the final page of the letter there is the following inscription in pencil: "The decision on ENUKIDZE says that he is a traitor, so is "G",



therefore, I do not give them an answer and send this letter to the MK of the CPSU (b), where I ask them to sort it out, leaving me aside, alone.

The letter was enclosed in an envelope bearing the following address: "MK VKP(b) personally to KHRUSHCHEV."

The letter contains some points that make it possible during the investigation to reveal both the author and the addressee. For example:

1) unknown G. writes that an employee of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade. BROWN was at his dacha;

2) the addressee of the letter was previously close to Natalya, an employee of the Reception CEC of the USSR.

I found out that a typist by the name of Natalya works in the Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR: Natalya Osipovna KHVASHCHEVSKAYA. Until recently, she was Commission Secretary. KHVASHCHEVSKAYA, originally from Poland, has been working in the apparatus of the Central Executive Committee since 1918, and has now joined the group of sympathizers of the CPSU(b).

Husband KHVASHCHEVSKAYA - STEFANOVSKII Sergey Nikolaevich, works as the head of the planning and technical economic bureau at the plant No. 1 named after. Aviakhima in Moscow, is in a group of sympathizers of the CPSU (b).

KHVASHCHEVSKAYA was well acquainted with ENUKIDZE, and after his removal from the Central Executive Committee of the Union, she visited him at the Metropol Hotel, where he lived.

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Kuzma Karpovich PEREPELKIN, mentioned in the letter, former head of the archives of the secretariat of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, former member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1925, was arrested by us and in April 1934 sentenced by the former collegium of the OGPU to 3 years of exile for association with a terrorist.

In 1934, the investigation into the case of Ph.D. group of anarchists, it was established that the anarchist EFIMOV, who led the group, in order to prepare a terrorist act against comrade. STALIN, contacted PEREPELKIN. EFIMOV tried to use PEREPELKIN to infiltrate the Kremlin to work.

PEREPELKIN provided EFIMOV with a pass to one of the sessions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and during his visit to the Kremlin, EFIMOV found out from PEREPELKIN where the apartment of comrade. STALIN.

I consider it necessary to immediately begin a thorough verification and investigation of all the facts and circumstances indicated in this letter.

I ask for your instructions.

DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION SSR AGRANOV

Spelling preserved

4/VI.

"Hello t.

I am sending this letter in response to your inquiry about many questions that are not entirely clear to you. Considering that you can say "ours", I will try to tell you everything, even more than \* Alexey Semenovitch \* can give you, especially since I was in the thick of these cases and was close to Avel Sofronovich before leaving Moscow. True, he devoted me to many things. The whole plan is to take out that \*\*odious figure\*\* that is now blocking even the sun. Abel often told me that despite his antipathy \*\* to the old man \*\*, it would still be better to agree to see him as a better president of the Republic than this \*\* cook \*\* would sit and poison the existence of the best revolutionaries. Of course, the old man, who, as you know, is very ambitious, will not refuse such a tempting offer - he has been secretly dreaming about it for a long time: to become a Russian Roosevelt. This is quite real: behind him are millions of peasants, plus the workers and all the old Bolsheviks, with whom he maintains a great friendship. Our people work around him, through whom we have full influence - these are KHRZHONCH, SAVELYEV and NATALIA (for whom you seem to still hit in 1929). They all sit in their places, they were not touched, since the old man protected them all. It's a matter of his personal prestige - you understand!! At least they removed only one of Orleans. The reception is generally working well so far. Sofa, SULA-PETROVSKAYA, went to the south, where she would be busy with our affairs in the resorts, she promised to visit our people in Rostov and Kharkov, and maybe Kyiv. Abel himself is sick ... and as I know, under this pretext, he will try to go abroad. You must understand how important this last case is to us. Of course, they will try to hinder him greatly in this, despite all the measures of the Kremlin professors, who thoroughly help us (our comrade BOROVSKY is entirely indebted to them, otherwise he would have been in a half department, district, etc. a long time ago. ). But if Abel's maneuver fails, then you will have to be content with the courtesy of ELIAVA, who is also now thoroughly offended and is making every effort

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to the fight against ... After all, what a vile indeed, because to this day nothing has been said about the death of LOMINADZE either to the people or to the party. Why? Because this new tyrant is entirely to blame for this death. I am very afraid that Abel, because of his vehemence, will not stand it and commit suicide, but we all try to keep him, despite all the provocations. Precisely provocations, because how else would you call the fact, my friend, that MINERVINA and the library workers were arrested by the NKVD. They want to demoralize us with this, which they will not succeed. All these maras are beginning to revolt even the workers of the Central Committee. It may turn out that the beast will find a grave in its own lair, in the apparatus of the Central Committee. One of these days there to comrade. BROWN was visited by SHORT Nikolai Ivanovich, you know him, according to "Cross, gas.", so he says that B.N. outraged by this stupid comedy and that such is the opinion of the majority of the apparatus of the Central Committee. Will it not turn out such a thing that by purging our Central Executive Committee, they will "lose" the Central Committee ... BROWN

I invited him to my dacha, he stayed with me the whole day and spoke in detail about the mood of the workers of the apparatus and his negative opinion in  
with respect to the new section.

And the cut is in full swing. They cut left and right. PEREPELKIN ("Our PLEKHANOV") received minus 5 and is in Perm, but remember how Mikhail Ivanovich loved him. Sotsky was removed and taken to Siberia. VERBITSKY too, TEREKHOV has been removed, they will probably be driven away to Kazakhstan ZAYTSEV is being removed not today, then tomorrow, and after all TEREKHOV and ZAYTSEV are the best workers, Abel's best support: these are his hands. They removed PETEKHIN, CAT LYAREVSKY, and others. They removed our youth tribune, the nominee PETUKHOV, and wanted to send him to the district; through a certain SEDELKOVSKY, she keeps in touch with Inst. Owls. Builds. — Tversk. Boulevard, 10 (Educational kit), where there is also a group of ours. MALINOVSKAYA organizes the old Bolsheviks, these old p.v. we now need

to organize, all the more so that it is necessary to use their dissatisfaction with the dissolution of the Society. MOSHKAROV organizes work in Len. library and archive. IGNATIEV among lawyers and specialists, so he organized a fairly solid group, which includes professors known to you from Kom. academy (Prof. PERETERSKY, Prof. RAEVITCH, GURVICH). \*\*\* In the SNK apparatus, ARBUZOV is still wrapping up, but unsuccessfully, there are no changes \*\*\* ... In Narkomtyazhprom, our influence has not been at all until now, but through BLIZNICHENKO they began to deploy our group there. As you can see, a big org has been done here. work that may even affect the constitution of the whole country and its administration. On the periphery, work is also in full swing. All those sent from the Kremlin to the regions and territories are doing their job. The representative of Stalkrai at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, comrade. SINYAEV, you should know him from Kursk and Saratov, is "working" among the representatives of all regions and republics, which will also have their weighty say.

Yes, I also forgot to tell you the good news, Ivan Akimov returned from the political department exile and also plunged into the work, if he stays, then it's good, because he alone can replace ten.

You know Mikhail Vasilievich KOTOMKIN is working in the Moscow region, he can not forgive today's "Master" that his former. before, the provincial executive committee is kept like a clerk, despite the fact that

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he has been in the party since 1904: before all these Khrushchevs and Zhdanovs he joined and now he must be a scoundrel with them.

Of course, it is your duty, as our "companion", to see the matter through to the end. As you can see, \*\*\*the apparatus of the CEC is not your opposition and other nonsense, it is the government\*\*\*. This is a power that will not be so easy to take on urya! And in order to ensure our success, you must organize around you at least a small group of people who support further normalization and democracy.

tization of the life of the country at the head of those people about whom I spoke. All your excuses and references are not solid, you must do it, especially since you gave Abel and me your word of honor that you would do it. Letters always came with a courier, because otherwise they would be read at the post office, and although we all would not get there, because We don't have lists, but you'll be risking a lot. When you arrive in Moscow, don't come to see me right away—always call ahead of time at home or service (Lidochka) and if I'm in Moscow, they'll tell you, "Lelya is seriously ill, the doctors forbade visiting her."

Well, enough, I wrote a lot. Enough! If you write the answer, then they went with the same courier (she is quite trustworthy, since her husband is with us).

Warm, friendly greetings to your spouse. She is so nice with you, and you caress her so badly, carried away by politics. It is necessary, brother, to combine all this. After all, LENIN loved life in all its versatility, and you should do the same.

Well, everything. Your G.

On the last page of the letter, there is a note in pencil:

"The decision on YENUKIDZE says that he is a traitor, so is "G", so I do not give them an answer and send this letter to the MK of the CPSU (b), where I ask him to sort it out, leaving me aside, alone." (163)

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 238. L. 86-93. Script. Typescript.

\*

The text on the first page contains handwritten notes: "For Kaganovich, Yezhov, Molotov. I. Stalin"; "Read. Molotov"; "L. Kaganovich"; "Yezhov".

On the left side of the margin there are Stalin's handwritten notes:

\*\_\* "Who?"

\*\*\_\_\*\* "Stalin?"

\*\*\* \_ "y" "Ha ha."

No. 540

M. GORB'S SPECIAL REPORT  
ON THE "SPY" ACTIVITIES OF Z.L.  
MIKHAILOV-SHOFMAN

September 9, 1935

No. 56972

In our note of 1 1.VII. 1935, No. 56425, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was informed \* about the active work of American intelligence in the USSR in the person of HIRST's assistant press representative in the USSR - MIKHAILOV SHOFFMANA Z.L.\*

As a result, the espionage activities of \*\*MIKHAILOV-SHOFMAN\*\* were completely \*confirmed\*.

DOCUMENTATION

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Arrested MIKHAILOV-SHOFMAN Z.L. - Soviet citizen, non-partisan, son of a Polish merchant, was a Menshevik before the revolution, emigrated abroad during the imperialist war, was already exiled in 1925 for espionage.

\*\*\*MIKHAILOV-SHOFMAN testified that the HIRST press is in fact a cover for the work of American intelligence, that the current representative of the HURST press in Moscow PARROT Lindsay, like his predecessors DOYS and WELLS, is an employee of American intelligence\*\*\*.

MIKHAILOV-SHOFMAN confessed that, under the guise of his official position as a representative of the English Central-News agency and assistant to the press representative of HIRST in Moscow, he carried out intelligence work.

\*\*\* In particular, MIKHAILOV-SHOFMAN Z.L. confessed that he had given PARROT for American intelligence espionage information about the construction of the submarine fleet in the Far East, about the designs of submarines and their radius of action, about the construction of a strategic railway line along the river Cupid and about the counter-revolutionary moods that took place in the ranks of the Red Army.

In addition to the above information, MIKHAILOV handed over to PARROT slanderous, counter-revolutionary materials about comrade. Stalin, which were published and used by the HURST press for the anti-Soviet campaign in America\*\*\*.

\*This information and the materials MIKHAILOV-SHOFMAN received through his agents in the person of: 1) \*\*KHACHATUROV\*\* Mikhail Ivanovich - a non-party, Soviet citizen, without fixed occupation, who was serving a sentence for counter-revolutionary activities (arrested and confessed); 2) \*\*BERNSHTEIN-YANTAREV\*\* Efim Lvovich, a non-partisan, Soviet citizen, night editor of the newspaper Sovetskaya Torgovlya (arrested and confessed); 3) \*\*SCHENBERG\*\* Pavel Eduardovich - a non-partisan, Soviet citizen, without fixed occupation, who was exiled together with MIKHAILOV for espionage in favor of Japan (arrested and confessed); 4) \*\*AGATOV\*\* Dmitry Petrovich - a non-party, Soviet citizen, without fixed occupation (left for the Crimea - an order was given for arrest).

\* MIKHAILOV systematically paid these persons in foreign currency and Soviet signs for their espionage work \*.

These persons were charged with treason.

APPENDIX: minutes of interrogation of Mikhailov-Shoffman and Bernshtey-on-Yantarev.  
~<sup>TM</sup>

Deputy Head of the Special Department of the GUGB NKVD USSR GORB

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 247. L. 165, 166. Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Stalin. Ya. Agranov. 9.IX.35"  
Published without protocol.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\*—\*\* All surnames are marked with a tick.

\*\*\*—\*\*\* It is crossed out in the margins with one line.

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No. 541

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN  
ABOUT THE ESCAPE OF THE ARRESTED G. GAI (164)

October 23, 1935

No. 57421

Copy

Through Comrade Volovich

October 22 this year at 7 pm, by passenger train No. 64 in a special compartment from Moscow, Gai (Bzhishkyan) Gai Dmitrievich, sentenced by the Special Conference to 5 years, was sent to the Yaroslavl prison.

Gai was accompanied by a special convoy consisting of: E.P. Ryazanov, commissar of the operational department of the GUGB NKVD, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1932; an employee of the GUGB of the NKVD since 1923 and two Red Army soldiers of the 3rd regiment of a separate special-purpose division of the NKVD Vasiliev and Sereda (both members of the Komsomol).

The convoy in Moscow was carefully briefed and warned of Guy's possible escape attempts.

At 22:35 on October 22 this year. 3 kilometers behind the Berendeyevo station of the Northern Railways (Ivanovo-Industrial Region), Guy escaped from custody.

Upon receipt in Moscow of a message about the escape, a task force headed by the head of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB comrade went to the place. Molchanov and Deputy Head of the Operational Department of the GUGB Comrade. During Lovich.

According to Comrade. Molchanov, who interrogated the escorts, Guy fled under the following circumstances: before reaching the Berendeevo station, Guy asked to go to the restroom, where he was called, accompanied by the escort and the commissar.

The escort Vasiliev was stationed at the door of the dressing-room, while Commissar Ryazanov was also in the corridor. Taking advantage of the fact that the convoy remained in

corridor of the car, Guy broke the glass with his shoulder, knocked out the window frame and jumped out on the move of the train with such speed that the convoy did not have time to fire.

The train was stopped by the convoy 250-300 meters from the place of escape, but Guy could not be found.

Operational groups were thrown into the area of the Berendeyevo station, the area was cordoned off, barriers were organized, with the task of detaining Gai.

Local communists, collective farm assets.

In view of the fact that, according to the testimony of the convoy, Guy jumped out of the window from a train traveling at a speed of 40 kilometers per hour, no traces of blood were found either on the wall of the car, or on the window frame, or on the second tracks of the railway bed where he jumped out. . We believe that he fled under different circumstances than the convoy shows. It can be assumed from the circumstances of the case that someone assisted him in escaping.

The convoy has been arrested.

The investigation is underway. As a result of the measures taken, Guy should be detained in the near future. To the scene of the incident, on my assignment, Comrade also left. Prokofiev and comrade. Frinovsky.

Berry

RGASPI. F.558. Op.11. D. 92. L. 69, 70. Original. Typescript.

Published: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 S. 614.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 542

CIPPHROTELEGRAM I.V. STALIN V.M. MOLOTOV,

L.M. KAGANOVICH, G.G. YAGODA IN CONNECTION WITH THE ESCAPE OF G. GAY

October 25, 1935

No. 1987

From the circumstances of Guy's escape and his capture, it is clear that the Chekist part of the NKVD does not have a real leadership and is going through a process of decomposition. It is not clear on what basis Guy was sent to the isolation ward in a special compartment, and not in a prison car? Where is it heard that a person sentenced to a concentration camp was sent in a special compartment, and not in a prison car? What are these orders? The version of escape through the window at full speed of the train, in my opinion, is unlikely. Most likely, the prisoner changed his clothes and went out to the station, missed by one of the escorts. Guy and his friends, it seems to me, have their own people in Cheka. They arranged for him to escape.

Even more monstrous is the situation after Guy's capture. It turns out that in order to catch one brat, the NKVD mobilized all 900 commanders of the border school, all NKVD employees, party members, Komsomol members, collective farmers and created a ring, probably, of several thousand people with a radius of 100 kilometers. The question is, who needs the Cheka and why does it exist at all, if it is compelled every time and at every trifling occasion to resort to the help of the Komsomol, collective farmers and, in general, the entire population? Does the NKVD understand what noise such mobilizations create for the government? Finally, who gave the NKVD the right to self-mobilize party members, Komsomol members and collective farmers for their departmental needs? Isn't it time to ban the NKVD organs from such, so to speak, mobilizations?

It is important to note that all this mess would have been excluded if Guy had been sent in a prison car.

I think that the KGB unit of the NKVD is suffering from a serious illness. It's time let us take care of her.

Stalin

RGASPI. F.558. Op.11. D. 92. L.66. Script. Manuscript.

Published: Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 pp. 613-614.

No. 543

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION G.G. YAGODY I.V. TO STALIN  
ABOUT THE "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY" GROUP (165)

Owls. secret  
November 1, 1935

No. 57490

\* GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR on suspicion of preparing a terrorist act were arrested on October 26 of this year.

1. Engineer Vitrin Karl Karlovich, born in 1906 in Riga, citizen of the USSR, non-partisan, senior laboratory assistant of the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute\*.

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2. Engineer Starokadomsky Konstantin Georgievich, born in 1912, citizen of the USSR, non-party member, laboratory assistant at the All-Union Electrotechnical Institute.

The interrogated Vitrin Karl Karlovich testified that he was a member of a counter-revolutionary group that was preparing to commit a terrorist act during the celebration of the 18th anniversary of the October Revolution.



\*\* In addition to the persons indicated, this group includes loganson Eduard Reingoldovich, born in 1881, from the Russified Germans, a citizen of the USSR, a non-party member, an engineer of Glavenergoprom, who is both the inspirer and organizer of the group \*\*.

Vitrin shows that in order to carry out a terrorist act, he, together with Starokadomsky, had to make a projectile in a metal clip, stuffed with an explosive mixture of considerable strength according to a recipe developed by them.

In order to test the action of the projectile, Vitrin and Starokadomsky on October 18 of this year. at Vitrin's apartment at Moscow, Starosadsky per., 8, apt. 2 \*\*experimented: having made up an explosive mixture according to a developed recipe, which included red phosphorus, bertolet salt, mercury fulminate and other chemicals, they made from it small balls wrapped in paper, which, upon mechanical shock, gave a strong explosion\*\*.

Interrogated Starokadomsky also confirmed this preparation.

\*\*Vitrin testified that he was going to carry out a terrorist act on November 7th during a demonstration when he passed by the mausoleum\*\*.

In addition, Vitrin was going on November 6 in the evening to personally be on duty on Red Square and in the evening, getting mixed up in the crowd, to wait for the passage of a government car, so that in the event of a meeting with any of the leaders of the CPSU (b) known to him, he would throw a bomb or shell.

ÿÿThe meetings of this group took place at the apartment of Karl Karlovich Vitrin's father, engineer Karl Eduardovich Vitrin (citizen of the USSR, from Russified Germans, non-partisan)\*\*.

During the arrest of Vitrin Karl Karlovich and Starokadomsky Konstantin Georgievich, a search revealed the presence of a significant amount of potassium chemicals, from which the group was going to prepare an explosive mixture for a projectile.

loganson Eduard Reingoldovich and Vitrin Karl Eduardovich are being arrested today.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER  
OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 230. L. 1-3. Script. Typescript.

\* The text contains handwritten notes: "To Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich. I. Stalin": "This fascist bastard is now the most dangerous terrorist, it must be exterminated. K. Voroshilov"; Molotov read. Read Kaganovich.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\*—"It was crossed out in the margins with one line.

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No. 544

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO  
STALIN ON THE NEED TO ARREST SOVIET GERMANS

November 1, 1935

No. 57495

Top secret

Intelligence and investigative data established \* that the doorman of the German embassy, a citizen of the USSR A.I.

In 1933, 1934 and 1935 in Moscow and Saratov, a number of fascist groups created by Schultz were liquidated. \* Counter-revolutionary groups carried out terrorist propaganda on behalf of Schultz and delivered to him counter-revolutionary slanderous information about the situation in the USSR \*.

It has been established that Schultz continues counter-revolutionary work until recently.

\*At present, we have arrested two fascist groups created by Schultz in Moscow and Saratov\*. The investigation fully confirms the leading role of Schultz in the creation of fascist cadres and espionage.

\*According to our information, the German embassy suggested that Schultz take steps to obtain detailed information about "forced" labor in the USSR\* (deployment of forced labor camps, letters from the camps, photographic material, etc.). The fact that the German embassy had such assignments from Berlin was documented.

\*In this regard, we are arresting a network of Schultz's confidants\* (German kulaks recruited by him) in forced labor camps and places of exile.

At the same time, it was established that A.V. Shtrek, a citizen of the USSR closely associated with Schulz, is conducting similar counter-revolutionary work, pastor of the Lutheran Church "Peter and Paul" (Moscow).

The formation of fascist cadres and the collection of counter-revolutionary slanderous information about the situation in the USSR is carried out by Streck on the instructions of the regional leader of the National Socialist Party in the USSR, Hansel (Secretary of the German Embassy).

We had previously arrested a number of people who carried out espionage and fascist work on behalf of Streck.

At present, two fascist groups created by Shtrek in Moscow and Saratov have been liquidated. Investigative materials have proved Streck's leading role in the counter-revolutionary work.

\*\* I ask you to allow the arrest of Germans, citizens of the USSR Shultz A.I. and Shtrek A.V.\*\*

People's Commissar of  
Internal Affairs of the USSR Yagoda

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 248. L. 10, 11 Original. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Do not arrest anyone. I. Stalin.  
"Molotov"; "Kaganovich", "Comrade Yagoda reported. Poskrebyshev.

\*—\* Underlined in pencil.

\*\* Underlined in pencil and underlined in the margins with two lines.

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No. 545

REFERENCE L.M. Kaganovich I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE WORK OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT

November 12, 1935

A group of engineers and professors argued:

- 1) that the transport works "at the limit" and does not have [the ability] to load more than 56 thousand wagons - a maximum of 60 thousand wagons.
- 2) That the commercial - sectional speed, achieved in 1934 - 14.2 kilometers per hour, is the maximum possible.
- 3) That the technical speed of a freight train with an E-type locomotive cannot exceed 23 kilometers.

In fact, as you know:

- 1) Railway transport now loads not 56,000-60,000 wagons a day, but 73,000-75,000 wagons.
- 2) Commercial - the sectional speed of a freight train rose from 14.2 kilometers per hour on average in 1934 to 18.6 kilometers per hour in October 1935, i.e. increased by 4.4 kilometers per hour.
- 3) The technical speed of a freight train increased from 22.5 kilometers per hour on average in 1934 to 27.4 kilometers per hour in October 1935, i.e. at 4.9 kilometers per hour.

These are the facts that exposed the reactionary group of engineers and professors, who justified the poor performance of railway transport with their quasi-scientific standards.

L. Kaganovich

APRF. F. 3 Op. 58. D. 375. L. 57. Original. Typescript.

\*

There is a handwritten note in the text: "T. Stalin! I am sending you the exact information on your question. L. Kaganovich.

No. 546

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON ASSIGNMENT OF SPECIAL RANKS TO  
THE LEADING STAFF OF THE GUGB AND GUPVO NKVD OF THE USSR (166)

November 26, 1935

No. 34, p. 400 - On the assignment of special ranks to the leadership of the Main Directorate of State Security and military ranks to the command and political staff of the Main Directorate of Border and Internal Security of the NKVD of the USSR.

Approve the assignment of the following special ranks to the leadership of the Main Directorate of State Security and military ranks to the command and political staff of the Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Guards of the NKVD of the USSR:

a) Commissar General Comrade Yagoda Genrikh Grigorievich

b) COMMISSIONER of the 1st RANK - t.t.:

1. AGRANOV Yakov Saulovich;

2. Vsevolod Apollonovich BALITSKY;

3. DERIBASU Terenty Dmitrievich;

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4. PROKOFIEV Georgy Evgenievich;

5. REDENS Stanislav Frantsevich;

6. ZAKOVSKY Leonid Mikhailovich.

c) COMMISSIONER of the 2nd RANK - t.t.:

1. GAYU M.I. - Beg. Special Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR;

2. Goglidze S.A. — Beg. Directorate of the NKVD for the ZSFSR and the People's

Commissioner Vnudel ZSFSR;

3. ZALINA L.B. — Beg. administration of the NKVD for the Kazan ASSR;

4. KATSNELSON Z.V. - Deputy early Directorate of the NKVD for the Ukrainian SSR and Deputy. People's Commissar Internal. affairs of the Ukrainian SSR;

5. CARLSON K.M. — Beg. Directorate of the NKVD in the Kharkov region. Ukrainian SSR;

6. LEPLEVSKY I.M. — Beg. Directorate of the NKVD for the BSSR and the People's Commissar Internal. affairs of the BSSR;

7. MOLCHANOV G.A. — Beg. Secret political department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR;

8. MIRONOV L.G. — Beg. Economic Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR;

9. PAUKERU K.V. - Beg. Operations Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR;

10. Slutsky A.A. — Beg. Foreign Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR; I. SHANIN A.M. — Beg. Transport department of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR;

12. BEL'SKY L.N. — Beg. Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia of the NKVD of the USSR;

13. PILLYARU R.A. — Beg. Department of the NKVD in the Saratov region.

d) KOMKORA - t.t.:

1. FRINOVSKY M.P. — Beg. Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Guard of the NKVD of the USSR.

e) CORPORATION COMMISSIONER - vol.:

1. ROSHALYu L.B. - Deputy early Head Office and Head. Political Department of the Border and Internal Guard of the NKVD of the USSR.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 972. L. 86, 87. Original. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of members of the Politburo on 25.XI.35.

No. 547

COVERING NOTE N.F. GIKALO I.V. TO STALIN WITH THE APPENDIX OF  
THE MEMORIES OF I.M. LEPLEVSKY ON THE "SPY" WORK OF THE  
POLES THROUGH THE CHANNELS OF THE KPZB AND KSMZB  
(167)

December 3, 1935

SERIES "K"

I am sending you a memorandum from the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BSSR comrade. LESHIEVSKY about the active work of the Poles, carried out through the channels of the KPZB and KSMZB\*.

In addition, I inform you that the decision of the Central Committee of 1/XII on the western border of the USSR, regarding the closure of special crossings across the border, was carried out by us on 2/XII on the day we received the decision of the Central Committee.

SECRETARY OF THE CC CP(b)B GIKALO

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"3" December 1935

No. 1344/s

TOP SECRET

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC  
CP(b)B Comrade. GIKALO

Our materials on cases of party provocation in the CP and KSM of Western Belorussia reveal the exceptionally active work carried out by the Poles through the channels of the KPZB and KSMZB.

The agents of the Polish political police, introduced for corrupting and provocative work in the KPZB, from year to year are transferred to the Soviet Union under the guise of political emigrants for active counter-revolutionary work and espionage, linking in their practical activities in Belarus with Nazi elements.

ÿ THE WORK CARRIED OUT BY THE POLES THROUGH THESE CHANNELS  
TAKES THE MOST SERIOUS PLACE IN THEIR ACTIVE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED  
AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION\*.

If in 1935 we detained 104 agents of the POLISH INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES who were directly transferred from Poland and confessed to carrying out espionage and insurrectionary work, and LIQUIDATED 30 SPY AND DIVERSION-REBELLION RESIDENCES OF THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE FOR THE MAIN STRATEGIC AREAS administrations and in fortified areas, with a total of 226 participants, then ALONG WITH THIS \*WE HAVE ARRESTED 42 MEMBERS OF THE KPZB AND KSMZB, WHO CARRIED OUT A LOT OF PROVOCATIONAL WORK IN THE PARTY AND ENTERED THE SOVIET UNION VIA THE SO-CALLED PARTY ROADS FOR THE COUNTERREVOLUTION WORK  
\*.

The party provocateurs arrested in 1935 are distributed according to their party functions in the KPZB as follows:

ÿMembers of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KPZB. - 2 people.

Instructor of the Central Committee of the KSMZB. - 1 person.

Workers of central technology.- 1 person.

Secretaries of Okruzhkoms of the KPZB and KSMZB. . . - 3 people

Secretaries of the City Committee of the KSMZB. - 1 person.

Instructor O.K. KPZB.- 1 person.

Members O.K. KPZB.- 2 people.

Secretaries of the RK KPZB and KSMZB. - 6 people.

Members of the RK KPZB and KSMZB. - 4 people.

Road workers.- 4 people.

Secretaries of cells of the KPZB. - 4 people.

Ordinary members of the KPZB and KSMZB. - 13 people \*.

On the basis of our materials, it becomes quite obvious how much the Polish political police are aware of the activities of the KPZB and KSMZB and what serious corrupting work they are doing in the Party through their agents.

WE HAVE ALSO ESTABLISHED THAT A SERIES OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PARTY CROSSINGS OF THE KPZB WERE ENTIRELY IN THE HANDS OF THE POLISH POLITICAL POLICE\*.

#### DOCUMENTATION

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Arrested by us in November, the ferryman of the party road Vilno-Zaslavl-Minsk, organized by the regional equipment of the KPZB, RYABUSHKO\*\* Nikolay, AFFORDED THAT HAS BEEN CONNECTED WITH THE CHIEF OF THE YOUNG POLITICAL POLICE TIKHOTSKY, WITH WHOSE ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE KPZB TO THE SOVIET

UNION.

\* RYABUSHKO names up to 40 people involved in the party crossings of the KPZB and whose work was intertwined with each other. ALL THESE PERSONS, ACCORDING TO HIS TESTIMONY, ARE AGENTS OF THE DEFENSIVE AND WERE SYSTEMATICALLY SUBSTITUTED BY THE KPZB AS TRANSPORTERS.

Among others along this provocative road to the Soviet Union was

a member of the KPZB, EPSHTEIN\*\* Lyuba, was transferred, whose brothers, EPSHTEIN-DUBOVSKII\*\* and EPSHTEIN-BERGMAN\*\*, were arrested by us as provocateurs. EPSTEIN-DUBOWSKY was the secretary of the Bialystok District Committee of the KPZB, and then worked in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KPZB, KPP and ŷSHZU, and EPSHTEIN-BERGMAN also worked in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KPZB and supervised the central technique \*.

Another "party" crossing in the Dokshitsy (Poland) was carried out by a member of the KPZB - D. M. KAPLAN \*\*.

Being arrested by us, KAPLAN confessed that he was an agent of the Glubokoe political police, AND DURING 1934 AND PART OF 1935, TRANSFERRED TO THE SOVIET UNION, WITH THE LEAD OF THE POLITICAL POLICE, ABOUT 15 MEMBERS OF THE KPZB.

The testimonies of those arrested reveal the methods of police provocation in the KPZB, which are of great interest, and the use of party channels by the police to transfer their agents to the Soviet Union.

The most typical of them are:

\* Arrests and detention of their agents in prisons to raise their authority in front of party organizations and for subsequent promotion along the party line WITH INTRODUCTION IN CENTRAL

PARTY BODIES.

The police gives the most valuable agents the opportunity to actively express themselves in party work, UP TO THE ORGANIZATION OF RAYCOMS AND DISTRICT COMMISSIONS.

Then the defender organizes the transfer of such agents to other areas and liquidates the party organizations created or studied by them \*.

The police arrange fictitious searches of their agents in order to create for them a visible threat of arrest, after which the latter, on the instructions of the defiance, seek before the Central Committee to transfer them to the Soviet Union.

The member of the Negnevichi District Committee of the KPZB, ZHARSKY\*\*, who was arrested by us, testifying about his provocative work in the KPZB, indicates that the Head of the Investigation Department of the Novoirudsk Defense Department, sending him to the Union, told him that in the event of his arrest, the police would arrange so that THROUGH the Central Committee of the KPZB there would be REHABILITATION NOTICE SENT TO THE SOVIET UNION\*.

Arrested by us in the spring of 1935, who arrived at the party congress of the KPZB in Minsk, a member of the Novogrudok OK KPZB - BURLYKO \*\*, confessed that he was an agent of the Novoirudsk political police, gave her a number of district and district party organizations and, ON THE POLICE INSTRUCTIONS, CREATED

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IN THE POCHAPOVSKY DISTRICT THE DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY WAS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE.



All the so-called "national liberation organizations of Western Belorussia", such as the Zmagannya Club, the Association of the Belarusian School, etc. \*WIDELY USED POLY-

THE TIC POLICE FOR DISCOVERY WORK IN THE KPZB, THE  
INTRODUCTION OF NAZTSEMO FASCIST ELEMENTS INTO THE KPZB  
AND THROUGH IT INTO SOVIET BELARUSIA FOR COUNTER-  
REVOLUTIONARY NATIONAL DEMO WORK\*.

The entire leadership of these organizations consists of active national democrats and major police agents who carry out all their work under the direction and under the directives of the political police.

How deeply these agents of the political police infiltrated the apparatus of the KPZB and KSMZB can be seen at least from the fact that, according to the testimony of the instructor of the Central Committee of the KSMZB TOVPEKO Vladimir, who was arrested by us, the TROYA / VILLAGE  
DEPARTMENT UNDER THE VILNA DISTRICT COMMITTEE, the  
KSM ALL CONSISTED OF ACTIVE NATIONAL DEMO AND DEFENSIVE  
AGENTS.

TOVPEKO, according to his testimony, from 1926 to 1929, on the instructions of one of the leaders of the "Zmagannya Club" and a major agent of the defensive - STETSKOE HIV, Felix DELIVERED  
22 PEOPLE TO THE SOVIET UNION UNDER THE guise of POLITEMIGRANTS.  
ALL THESE PEOPLE WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE POLITICAL POLICE  
AND SENT TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR ACTIVE NADTSEMOV'S  
WORK.

In total, OVER 300 PEOPLE WAS TRANSFERRED AT DIFFERENT TIMES TO THE SOVIET  
UNION UNDER POLITEMIGRANTS, OVER 300 PEOPLE, through the Zmagannya Club and  
other nationalist organizations of Western Belarus associated with the  
defensive.

Of great interest are the testimony of TOVPEKO that \*in 1929, on the instructions of the senior commandant of the Vilna political police BLESMA NOVICH, with the assistance of a member of the presidium of the bureau of Komsomol cells - TARASYUK, also a police agent, he organized a protest strike in the Vilna secondary educational establishments demanding the release of Hromada's ambassadors - RAK-MIKHAILOVSKY and others\*.

According to BLESMANOVICH, this was necessary in order to MASK THE RELATIONSHIP  
OF THE GROUPS MEMBERS WITH THE POLITICAL POLICE AND  
PRESENT THEIR RELEASE  
ALLOWING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MASS.

As we have already pointed out, the agents of the Polish political police, in addition to the exceptionally serious provocative and corrupting work that they carried out in the KPZB, WERE DEFENSIVELY VIA  
PARTY CHANNELS TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR TERRORISM, COUNTER-  
REVOLUTIONARY, NATIONAL DEMO AND SPY RADIATION

BOTS.

TOVPEKO Vladimir at the beginning of 1935, together with members of the KPZB, who were also police agents, HAPPY-STEPSON (arrested by us) and KABUSHKO Vladimir, who was simultaneously connected with the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" monarchist organization, discussing the possibility

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the importance of active work in the Soviet Union and having come to the conclusion that THERE IS NO GROUND FOR MASS WORK, WE DECIDED TO WALK HERE TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AUCP(b) AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT\*.

In 1935, through a major agent of the defensive, GINZBURG, TOVPEKO contacted an officer of the Vilna intelligence service, SKOTNITSKY, who arranged for him to be transported to the Soviet Union under the guise of a political emigrant. TOVPEKO received from SKOTNITSKY the task to establish in the Union a connection with the former ambassador of the Seim - KRINCHIK, a member of the "Zmagannya Club" KURYANKO and to assemble from the NAZTSEMS, who settled in the SOVIET UNION under the guise of POLITEMIGRANTS, a GROUP OF THE MOST FIGHTING PEOPLE CAPABLE OF TERRORIST ACTIONS.

Arrested by us after being expelled from the party during the check of desks and documents, the former member of the KPZB Alexander STEFANOVICH, editor of the newspaper Bolshevik Borisovshchina and chairman of the regional organization of the MOPR, confessed that he was connected with the Polish political police.

At the same time, STEFANOVICH was a member of the Zmagannya Club, carried out active nationalist work in various regions of Western Belarus, and WAS SENT TO THE SOVIET UNION BY THE PROMINENT NATIONAL DEMO AND THE AGENT OF THE DEFENSIVE Dvorchanin to carry out active nationalist work.

STEFANOVICH was transferred to the Soviet Union through the "party" crossing of the KPZB, organized by the defenders.

A member of the Novogrudok District Committee of the CPZB - BURLYKO, according to his testimony, WAS SENT BY THE POLITICAL POLICE TO THE SOVIET UNION TO ORGANIZE DIVERSION-REBELLION CELLS IN BELARUS FOR THE PERIOD OF THE WAR. At the same time, he also had to carry out espionage work.

A member of the KPZB, PROKOPENYA, who was arrested by us, did provocative work in the KPZB, AND THEN WAS SENT BY THE POLITICAL POLICE TO THE SOVIET UNION TO CARRY OUT ACTIVE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WORK AND CREATE A REBELLION SKY CELLS.

A member of the Negnevichi District Committee of the KPZB - ZHARSKY Ivan testified that he had received an assignment from the head of the investigative department of the Novogrudok defenziva, after leaving him to live in the USSR, TO SET UP IN MINSK OR MOSCOW, TO COLLECT INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, DEPOSIT OF TROOPS, ESPECIALLY TECHNICAL IC AND AVIATION PARTS.

According to the instructions of the police, if ZHARSKY was offered to enter the school of propagandist instructors in the Union, he had to agree to this, and then return to Poland for illegal work and immediately contact the defiance.

Some agents were given instructions by the political police after their arrival.

to the Soviet Union to settle in Minsk in the house of political emigrants, after which she will be able to easily find them and establish contact with them.

The Polish police supplied a number of their agents provocateurs of the KPZB with weapons during their transfer to the Soviet Union.

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On October 1, 1935, on the party road, the secretary of the Zhabinsky District Committee of the KPZB, Dmitry SEMENYUK, arrived from Poland to the Union. SEMENYUK came from Poland with a revolver and had a party cipher, which he tore at the border.

WHEN BEING ARRESTED, SEMENYUK CONFESSED THAT HE IS AN AGENT OF THE KOBRIN POLITICAL POLICE, WHICH ISSUED BY A NUMBER OF KPZB MEMBERS KNOWN TO HIM, AND IS SENT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

Taking into account the exceptional dimensions of the police provocation in the KPZB and KSMZB, the systematic mass transfer to the Union under the guise of political emigrants of Polish agents for active counter-revolutionary work, we are carrying out the following operational measures:

We took into account political emigrants, former members of the KPZB living on the territory of Belarus, and we are actively developing them.

We arrest everyone who has compromising material.

We are identifying and arresting former members of the Belarusian Hromada, the "Zmagannya Club", the "Association of the Belarusian School" and other nationalist organizations of Western Belarus, who came to us under the guise of political emigrants and are agents of Polish intelligence and the nationalist  
mami.

We are arresting all the KPZB ferrymen who are crossing over from Poland to our side.

At the same time, I consider it necessary to put before you the question of liquidating the house of political emigrants in Minsk.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BSSR (LEPLEVSKY)

December 3, 1935

ÿ617

mountains Minsk

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 248. L. 31-40. Script. Typescript.

\*

The entire paragraph is underlined by hand in pencil.

\* \_ \* Crossed out in the margins with one line.

\*\* Last name is ticked.

No. 548

PROVIDING NOTE G.A. Molchanova I.V. STALIN, L.M.  
KAGANOVICH, A.A. ANDREEV, N.I. Ezhov, V.M. MOLOTOV, G.K. ORDZHONIKIDZE  
TO SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS ON THE FACTS OF OPPOSITION  
TO THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT

December 9, 1935

OWL. SECRET

I am sending you copies of special reports\* about the facts of opposition to the Stakhanovist movement:

- 1) Office of the NKVD in the Saratov region;
- 2) Directorate of the NKVD in the Kursk region;
- 3) Directorate of the NKVD in the Moscow region.

p.p. BEGINNING SECRET-POLIT. OF THE GUGB DEPARTMENT - G. MOLCHANOV

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BEGINNING SECRET-POLIT. DEPARTMENT OF GUGB -

comrade MOLCHANOV

REFERENCE

about the characteristic facts of counteracting the Stakhanov movement

According to the materials of the UGB  
UNKVD for the Saratov Territory on 9/XII-1935.

Lead battery factory. The best Stakhanovite of the plant, FILIMONOV, a foundry worker, brought the output rate to 211%, pulling other foundry workers with him.

Foreman of the foundry ZAYTSEV N.G. (he was anti-Soviet, had connections with people convicted in 1934 in the case of setting fire to the plant, was suspected of sabotage intentions) instead of helping FILIMONOV, he rearranged it to a damaged form, did not provide air supply, which immediately reduced productivity.

Zaitsev poisoned FILIMONOV and the Stakhanovites in general, calling them chami", endowing with the nicknames "Astrakhanovites", trying in every possible way to discredit the best Stakhanovite strikers.

Zaitsev is arrested. These facts are confirmed by the investigation.

Machine-building plant them. Kaganovich. The young moulder SVESH NIKOV, a member of the Komsomol, switched to Stakhanov's methods of work, exceeding the norm by 230%. The backward elements among the workers began to hinder his work. In particular, on 30/XI a board was stolen from SVESHNIKOV, which was necessary for upsetting molds. SVESHNIKOV was forced to quit his job and look for his board, which he found at the molder N.I. Zhupyrin. (recently entered the factory, born in 1909, in the past a pupil of an orphanage).

In response to SVESHNIKOV's requests to give the board back, ZHUPYRIN scolded SVESHNIKOV and only at the insistence of the party organizer KUDZELKO gave it back. After SVESHNIKOV picked up his board, ZHUPYRIN hit him in the face with an iron rod, then threatened to kill him.

ZHUPYRIN also beat up the Stakhanovite VOROBYEV and the worker GEIBEL on the grounds of revenge for exposing him as a scumbag.

Zhupyrin is arrested. He pleaded guilty to beating the Stakhanovite SVESHNIKOV. The investigation continues.

Volzhsky cast iron foundry. The Stakhanovites Khlyupin, Balaki REV and others began to sharply increase their output rates. Brigadier IVANOV N.K. (a former churchman, born in 1887) began to resist them: he delayed the issuance of the necessary devices, tools, gave out inappropriate details, as a result of which a marriage turned out.

In addition, YVANOV scolded the Stakhanovites in every possible way with obscene words, handing out tools, saying: "Here, choke, Stakhanovites"; The Stakhanovist Khlyupin campaigned not to increase labor productivity.

IVANOV is arrested. An investigation is underway.

Metal Plant No. 1. Worker of the tin-soldering shop Stakhanovite ALEKSANDROV E.U., non-party, for several months exceeded the output rate (in August by 189%, in September 274, in October - 142 and in November - 142). Shop manager TARKHANOV (in the past, a handicraftsman who used hired labor lost his voice, but was restored) 28/XI-s/g. among the workers he said that he would make sure that ALEXANDROV would not comply with the norms and would leave the factory anyway. 30/XI -s/g. ALEXANDROV was

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50 basins were made, of which 8 basins and 30 handles were stolen, which were found at the workshop worker Sergey KIRPICHENKO. TARKHANOV did not take any measures against KIRPICHENKO.

TARKHANOV and KIRPICHENKO are scheduled for arrest.

Alkaline battery factory. Worker of the automatic shop SOLDIER-

KIN A.G., a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a Stakhanovite, for the first time at the plant achieved the highest indicators of labor productivity, fulfilling the norm by 238%. W/HP-s/g. SOLDATKIN in the tool pantry was choosing a tap from five pieces given to him by the storekeeper KATKOVA. At this time, the manager entered the pantry. pantry FILIPPOV N.G., pulled out all the taps from SOLDATKIN and, throwing one tap through the window, said: "Take what they give, but if you don't want it, sit or go home." SOLDATKIN, having not received a tap, borrowed it from the worker SOLOVIEVA and worked until the end of her shift as her tap.

In a short time, SOLDATKIN made 20 rationalization proposals, which were transferred to them by the beginning. shop MELNIKOV. MELNIKOV kept these proposals for 12 days, without giving any movement, returned them back with a demand to rewrite each proposal on a separate piece of paper. Of the submitted proposals for 10/XII-s/g. MELNIKOVYYM has put into practice only one thing. Thanks to this proposal for the winding of steel springs, the norm is fulfilled by more than 200% and the scrap is reduced to zero, instead of 35%. SOLDATKIN made a proposal to sharpen the "rod-latch" part using a drum, which SOL DATKIN personally tested and gave positive results, i.e. instead of 4.000 pcs. per shift, honed on an emery grinder, productivity increases to 25,000 pieces. This proposal is hindered in every possible way by the head of the shop, MELNIKOV. SOLDATKIN turned on this issue to the technical director of the plant, ADMIRALSKY, the latter also took no action.

Recently, SOLDATKIN began to reduce the norm: for the 1st half of November, he fulfilled the norm by 163% and for the 2nd by 122%. The reasons for the decline in labor productivity by SOLDATKINS must be attributed solely to the ugly attitude of the head of the workshop MELNIKOV, foreman KRASOVSKII, who was expelled from the CPSU (b) as a Trotskyist. Starting from 25/XI to 5/II-s/g. SOLDATKIN is driven daily from one machine to another, and on some days there were cases when in one day he visited 2-3 machines, as a result of which SOLDATKIN's working time was spent on transitions, familiarization and testing of the machine, due to which productivity labor decreased on some days from 76 to 80%. The machine installed by SOLDATKIN, on which he worked all the time, is being repaired within 15 days, while it could be repaired within 3-8 hours.

Wagon repair plant. Ryazan-Uralsk. wish. dor.

The workers of the salvage shop, the turning shop of the blacksmith's shop showed high rates of labor productivity. So, for example: the turner SHAGAEV, with a rate of turning bandages of 3.3 slopes, began to turn 9.5 slopes; OSIPOV, at the same rate, grinds 7-8 slopes. The blacksmith shop completes the task by 130-140%. Accordingly, the wages of workers increased. In connection with this, the counter-revolutionary elements are trying to oppose the Stakhanovites. Beginning KIRILIN and his deputy KOROLEV among the workers are campaigning for a revision of prices, knowing that a reduction in prices for work will cause mass discontent among the workers.

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By the measures taken through the party committee of the plant, the reduction in prices was prevented.

Beginning KIRILIN and his deputy KOROLEV, former active Mensheviks, tricked their way into the CPSU(b), but when they checked a batch of documents, they were expelled from the party and brought to criminal responsibility.

Road ORS, Ryazan-Ural railway. dor. Economist of the Road ORS CIMM, ex. member of a counter-revolutionary group, campaigning against the Stakhanov movement. CIMM in the circle of colleagues said:

"If STAKHANOV exceeded his quota by 700%, then this means that the worker STAKHANOV is being exploited by the Soviet government by 700%, i.e. there is unprecedented exploitation of the working class in the country...

STAKHANOV's achievements and methods of work will lead to a decrease in the actual material level of the workers, increase physical and mental stress to the point of exhaustion of the workers.

TsIMM, a former manager of an estate in Estonia, is suspected of provocateur activity in the period of 1905, under the Soviet authorities was arrested twice by the NKVD. Currently arrested and brought to justice under Art. 58/10 of the Criminal Code.

Pier Uvek. The workers of the mechanization workshop decided to join the Stakhanov movement and took upon themselves the obligation to eliminate the existing breakthrough in the repair of mechanisms. In connection with this, the head of the mechanization shop KOSSOV Yu.P. In addition to the demobilization of the collective of workers, by glossing over the facts of the existing breakthrough in the shop, he organized the persecution of the best Stakhanovite production workers. Thus, the skilled workers of the machine shop YARKIN, EGOROV, SMIRNOV, STEPANOV were transferred by KOSSOV to rough work because the latter tried to expose his disorganizing activities. After that, KOSSOV told the rest of the workers:

"...What is being done in our workshop - do not take it out into the wild ... otherwise I will be kicked out of work."

As a result of sabotage by KOSSOV, a repair program for 7 units was disrupted. conveyors, 330 electric motors and other mechanisms.

In this regard, the general meeting expelled Kossov from the members of the trade union. union.

KOSSOV is brought to criminal responsibility. An investigation is underway.

Along with active actions directed against the Stakhanov movement, beating and discrediting the Stakhanovites, it is necessary to note the presence of moments when the heads of shops and foremen sabotage the Stakhanov movement, do not create proper working conditions for the Stakhanovites, transfer them from one machine to another, put the Stakhanovites on the worst equipment, they are not supplied with raw materials, as a result of which the production indicators of the Stakhanovites are reduced.

Combine plant. In the shops of the combine plant, because of chaos and disorderly conduct, the work of the Stakhanovites is hindered, and sometimes one shop slows down the work of another shop. For example: in the tool shop, where tools and fixtures for other shops are produced, head. The technical control department GORIN and his brother Alexey GORIN, the receiver, miss an obvious marriage. Increasing productivity by making rejects - tool

shop simultaneously disrupts the work of other shops.

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2/X the well-known noble Stakhanovite BARYSHEV changed 4 stamps during the working day because of their unsuitability, which reduced his productivity.

Stakhanovites are idle in the shops due to the lack of tools, materials and production assistance. For example:

In the mechanical-assembly shop (headed by VERNADSKY and PASHENNYKH), driller MORDAKOVA reduced the production rate due to the fact that there is one key for all drilling machines. It takes a long time to find the key.

The MALINA driller is idle due to the lack of shell drills.

The female workers of GORELOVA, PODOL'SKAYA, VINOKUROVA are transferred from machine to machine and cannot increase productivity.

Worker PODOLSKAYA made a proposal to VERNADSKY to rationalize the work (fixing fixture for part No. 857).

The proposal was ignored.

Adjuster VASILYEV made many rationalization proposals that speed up the work process. His proposals are not implemented.

In the foundry, the Stakhanovites ASHARIN, STODNEV, ZHULILOV stand idle every day because they are not provided with land - flasks.

The roof of the foundry is leaking, causing jobs to become damp and work to be slowed down.

Metalworks No. 17. Stakhanovite ALEKSANDROV fulfilled the norm in August by 189%, in September by 274%, in October and November he reduced it to 143%. The reasons for the decrease are due to the lack of supply of raw materials, for which they are forced to stand idle for 15-20 minutes. in the queues, and to the statement of ALEXANDROV to the foreman TARKHANOV that he was poorly supplied with raw materials, TARKHANOV replied: "Nothing, you will do more than anyone else and there is nothing for you to cry."

Military furniture factory. Kamenev. Stakhanovets ESTERMAN 26/XI-s/g. could not receive during the entire shift of work, as his machine was out of order and was being repaired. The repair of his machine tool was delayed by the factory mechanic CHEKANOV, in the past the son of a big kulak, who crawled into the Komsomol, but was subsequently exposed and expelled.

At the same factory, in the finishing shop, the Stakhanovites of CHEKUNOV and YAKUSHEV brought the productivity of labor on the mastic of chairs to 200%. Beginning shop IVLIEV - former. merchant - systematically transfers the indicated Stakhanovites from one place to another, as a result of which the manufacturer



activity is falling, and some workers in the shops above CHEKUNOVA and YAKUSHEVA they ridicule that they cannot keep up with Stakhanov's pace.

IVLIEV is scheduled for arrest.

Plant "Traktorodetal". Master VERTOUSOV P.P. in every possible way hinders the overfulfillment of the norms by the Stakhanovite locksmith MELNIKOV (a member of the Komsomol), gives incorrect instructions in work, as a result of which marriage is obtained, does not supply the necessary tools. The machine on which MELNIKOV works is out of order. Vertousov's brother was arrested and convicted for anti-Soviet activity.

In the regions of the region, the facts of opposition to the Stakhanov movement were also noted, mainly in industrial facilities and workshops of the MTS.

Pugachevskaya MTM. The head of the machine shop NIKISHIN, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in order to disrupt the work of the Stakhanovites, presents them with the wrong work, on

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which they show performance samples. In entrusting the work of the Stakhanovs to the Tsam-turners (OVCHINNIKOV, KOZHENYAKIN), NIKISHIN gives them incorrect calculations, which is why the products of the Stakhanovites are rejected.

The RK VKP(b) was asked to bring NIKISHIN to party responsibility.

Gor. Rtishchevo. The worker of the bacon factory SENIN Timofey, being transferred to the slaughter of shengs (for slaughtering livestock), at a rate of 300 heads, slaughtered 1015 heads daily. Head shop KUKISHEV (in the past we judge by the law of August 8) not only did not create the necessary conditions for SENIN, but removed him from slaughter and transferred him to another job, and put his son and worker BESPALOV to slaughter, who do not exceed the slaughter norm of 300 heads and delay the movement of the conveyor.

The Rtishchevsky regional department was given the task of holding KUKISHEV accountable.

We also cite some characteristic facts of the counter-revolutionary statements of specialists in connection with the Stakhanovite movement.

Professor ORLOV - an adm. expelled from Leningrad, working at the Krekingzavod head. laboratory, in the presence of a number of experts on the issue of the Stakhanov movement, he said:

"This method is ripping off 3 skins from workers and specialists. After the Stakhanovite production becomes a mass phenomenon, the government will raise the norms, the worker will fall into bondage, and then they will sit on his neck.

BANKOVSKY - head. the water treatment laboratory of the Saratov CHPP, a Pole by nationality, anti-Soviet, agreeing with the opinion expressed by ORLOV on the issue of the Stakhanov movement, added that "the whole

The system of Soviet power is built on lies and bullying.”

Engineer PUDOV, who works at the Cracking Plant, declared: “In connection with the Stakhanovist movement, a handful of rulers will hold 140 million donkeys even tighter in their hands and will ride as they please,” while making a counter-revolutionary attack on Comrade. STALIN. In addition, he said that he could give a lot of good things for production, but he did not want to do this, because he was paid a pittance.

The chief engineer of the alkaline battery plant, TSUBAKIN, the son of a priest, who was anti-Soviet, said among the specialists of the plant: “STAKHANOV did nothing, the point is that now is the time when heroes are needed, and now their government is doing it.”

GRITSELEVICH

CA FSB. F. 3. Op. 2. D. 121. L. 120-132. Copy. Typescript.

\* Special messages are not published

No. 549

LETTER FROM AMERICAN JOURNALIST  
L. PARROTA I.V. STALIN

Ju December 1935

Translation from English. language

Dear Mr. Stalin, I would like to personally draw your attention to the case of Zakhary Lvovich Mikhailov, who was my assistant and for a number of years a friend of the entire American colony in Moscow.

Mr. Mikhailov was arrested on August 23 and, as I was informed today. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court was sentenced to death on charges of espionage. Being unable, in the absence of any evidence, it is necessary

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LUBYANKA. January 1922 - December 1936

I want to challenge the verdict of the court in any way, I want to appeal to you personally, as one living being to another, with an appeal for mercy, which you can show in relation to this man of 56 years of age. Mr Mikhailov is an old revolutionary who fought against tsarism in Moscow in 1905. As a result of his actions, he was forced to live in exile in England for 20 years. He returned to Russia only after the overthrow of tsarism. Mr. Mikhailov's wife took all the measures prescribed by Soviet law to obtain mercy in his favor: she applied for a review of the case to the USSR Prosecutor General, Mr. Vyshinsky, she appealed for mercy to Mr. Kalinin. I am writing directly to you in the hope that you will find it possible to give him support.

Lindsay M. Parrot, Correspondent, International  
News Service of America

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 248. L. 43. Copy. Typescript.

No. 550

M.M.'s NOTE Litvinova I.V. STALIN AND V.M.  
MOLOTOV O Z.L. MIKHAILOV-SHOFMAN

December 11, 1935

Owls. secret  
URGENT

No. 353/I

The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court sentenced citizen MIKHAILOV to death on charges of espionage. The case, the essence of which I do not know, interests me only because Mikhailov for many years was a correspondent for English and American newspapers, and more recently, the secretary of Hearst's press correspondent. Having learned from Mikhailov's wife about the death sentence, American correspondents became very excited, sent telegrams to America and mobilized the American embassy. The American Chargé d'Affaires came to the Narkomindel today about this and said that he had already received a request from the State Department. He admitted that, since he was a Soviet citizen, he had no right to interfere in the matter, but in private he considered it necessary to warn of the possibility of intensifying the anti-Soviet Hearst campaign.

\*According to our information, Mikhailov filed a petition for pardon. In addition, Troyanovsky told me that Comrade Vyshinsky protested the verdict. I believe that either Mikhailov should have been pardoned, or the verdict should have been canceled and replaced with another one at the prosecutor's protest. It would be good to do this before the campaign in the American press begins\*.

LITVINOV

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 248. L. 52. Original. Typescript.

\* The text contains Stalin's resolution: "Repeal the decision of the Military Collegium Supreme Court on capital punishment c. Mikhailov, replace.

\*—\* Crossed out in the margins with two lines.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 551

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

# ON CHANGING THE SENTENCE OF Z.L. MIKHAILOV-SHOFMAN

December 16, 1935

No. 35, item 154. - Question of the USSR Prosecutor's Office.

Agree with the proposal of the Prosecutor of the Union to replace Mikhailov Shofman with capital punishment (execution) by 8 years in prison.

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 248. L. 49. Copy. Typescript.

\*

The resolution was adopted by a poll of PB members dated 15.XII.35.

\*\*

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Vyshinsky, Vinokurov, Litvinov.

No. 552

## SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON THE POLISH NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION

December 15, 1935

No. 57833

Top secret

The NKVD Directorate for the Leningrad Region uncovered and liquidated the Polish nationalist youth organization, which set itself the task of creating sabotage cells at the defense factories of Leningrad and preparing terrorist activities. The organization was associated with the resident of the II Department of the Polish General Staff, the Polish vice-consul in Leningrad Karsh. The following members of the organization were arrested:

\*1. Khodyko Eduard Andreevich, Pole, head. a canteen for command personnel of a special-purpose heavy aviation brigade in Detskoye Selo;

2. Kovalchevsky Sigismund Petrovich, born in 1909, Pole, freight forwarder at the Kirov Plant;

3. Voishvillo Bronislav Vladimirovich, born in 1913, Pole, inspector at the Kirov Plant;

4. Vladislav Feliksovich Kudin, born in 1913, Pole, technician in the field of microphotography;

5. Alfred Vikentievich Poplavsky, born in 1912, Pole, modeller at the Sverdlov factory;

6. Karoliunas Maria Kazimirovna, born in 1901, Lithuanian, convicted under 58-6 of the Criminal Code, served her sentence in a camp, an employee;

7. Merzhitsky Franz Iosifovich, born in 1911, Pole, worker at the Lensoviet factory;

8. Gust Anton Mikhailovich, Pole, Polish defector, employee of the Locomotive Repair Plant;

9. Melnikov Boris Alekseevich, born in 1913, Russian, laboratory assistant; 10\*. Girinskaya Irina Leonidovna, born in 1914, Polish woman, employee - (all

non-partisans).

The testimony of the confessed participants Kovalchevsky, Khodyko, Voishvillo, Poplavsky and Kudin established that the organization was connected with the Polish intelligence through Khodyko, who was an agent of the Vilna exposition of the 2nd Department of the Polish General Staff.

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Khodyko was transferred illegally across the border from Poland to the USSR in 1924 armed with a Colt revolver and contacted, according to a turnout given to him in Leningrad, with the Polish agent Khadkevich for joint espionage activities. In 1928, Khadkevich was arrested and shot, but Khodyko was not exposed then.

In 1935, Khodyko was contacted by the resident of the 2nd Department of the Polish General Staff, the Polish vice-consul in Leningrad Karsh, who now, in connection with the exposure of his espionage activities, must leave the USSR (an exit visa has been issued for a period up to December 21 of this year). ).

Karsh told Khodyko that he was aware of Khodyko's work at the Vilna exposition and offered to work on his instructions in the future.

On the instructions of Karsh, Khodyko collected and handed over to him a number of espionage information about a special-purpose heavy aviation brigade, artillery improvement courses for the officers of the Red Army and parts of the Red Army of the Leningrad garrison.

ÿThe organization, which took shape in June 1935, worked to educate Polish youth in a nationalist, fascist spirit. In particular, funds were raised for the construction of a monument to Piysudski in Poland\*.

On created at the factories. Karpova, them. Sverdlov, them. The Lensoviet and the Locomotive Repair Cell were entrusted with the task of committing acts of sabotage by the time the war between Poland and the USSR began.

ÿÿThe organization planned, after strengthening its ranks, the preparation of a number of terrorist acts. First of all, the preparation of a terrorist act against the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. Zhdanov.

I enclose the testimony of Khodyko, Kovalchevsky and Voishvillo\*\*.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yagoda

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

KHODYKO Eduard Andreevich dated December 5, 1935

Khodyko Eduard Andreevich — born in 1898, ur. Vilna province, Litsk district, Zhnermun volost, m. Zhirmun; living Detskoye Selo, Lyaminsky lane, 5, apt. 2; Belarusian, citizen of the USSR. Passport confiscated upon arrest. Director of the command staff canteen of Lenvoentorg, at the military unit 24-66, located: Children's Village, Boulevard. Kikvidze, d. No. 1. Father was a rural doctor, had his own house. Before the revolution he lived in the mountains. Petrograd together with his parents, studied and then served. Khodyko's wife Alexandra Ivanovna, dependent on me, daughter Albina, 3 years old. In 1919 he graduated from the Petrograd Commercial School. Non-partisan.

In 1924, he was involved in illegal border crossing from Poland, sentenced by the People's Court of the Detsko Selsky District to 6 months of forced labor on probation. 2 lines in stock.

Question: When did you arrive in Leningrad?

Answer: After the illegal crossing of the state border from Poland, together with my comrade Anton Mikhailovich Gust, committed in May 1924 in the region of the mountains. Minsk; after serving a two-week quarantine together with Gust at the Minsk Quarantine Point, Gust and I arrived in D-Selo to visit Gust's relative, Ivan Ivanovich Gust, who

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At that time he worked as a foreman at the Leningrad Agricultural Institute in Detskoye Selo.

Question: Did you know the address of Ivan Ivanovich Gust?

Answer: Yes, the address of Gust I.I. — Detskoe Selo, Oktyabrsky Boulevard, 6, was known to me and to my comrade AM Gust, who corresponded with him.

Question: How did you get to Poland?

Answer: After I graduated from a commercial school in Petrograd in 1919, I took my parents to their homeland in the Vilna province, Lida district, Zhnermunskaia vol., m. Zhirmuny. There, the parents had their own house and a small land.

Question: From 1919 until the illegal transition from Poland to the USSR, did you always live in Zhirmuny?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What did you do?

Answer: He was engaged in clerical work, for some time he worked as a census taker at the "Vuyt" Trunz.

Q: Was Trunz connected to the police?

Answer: No, it wasn't.

Question: And you?

Answer: I was not connected with the police either.

Question: Who is Gust, to whom you arrived in Sov. Union?

Answer: A relative of my friend. In 1925 he went to Poland to the village of Skorvody, Zhirmunsky district, Vilna province.

Question: Were you called to the police in Poland?

Answer: No, never called.

Question: With whom did you live after Gust's departure from the Soviet Union?

Answer: I lived with priest Przherembel, who was arrested by the GPU and subsequently deported to Poland.

Question: Do you know Chodkevich Boleslav?

Answer: Yes, I met Khodkevich at Przherembel's.

Question: What do you know about the further fate of Khodkevich?

Answer: I know that he was arrested by the GPU. Its subsequent fate for me unknown.

Question: Did you cross the border with a weapon?

Answer: No, neither I nor Gust had weapons.

Question: We know that you crossed the border armed, do you confirm this?

Answer: No, I do not.

Question: We know that you were armed with a Colt revolver. Do you continue to insist on your testimony that you crossed the border without being armed?

ŸŸ Answer : Yes, I admit that when I crossed the border from Poland into the Soviet Union I had a Colt revolver\*\* with me.

Question: Where did you purchase the weapon?

Answer: I bought a Colt by chance in Poland from my fellow villager Karkot Vikentiy.

Question: For what purpose did you have a weapon with you during the transition?

Answer: For self-defense in the event of an attack by Polish border guards.

Question: Where did you put the weapons?

Answer: Before coming to Minsk to the GPU, I left the revolver in the forest.

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Question: During your interrogation in Minsk at the GPU, did you report that you had a Colt with you during the transition?

Answer: No, he didn't.

Question: Why did you conceal this from the investigating authorities?

Answer: I didn't mean to arouse suspicion.

Question: What suspicion?

Answer: I have heard that those who go with weapons are arrested and then imprisoned for a long period of time.

Question: From whom did you hear?

Answer: From fellow villagers.

Question: Gusts - your comrade in transit - knew that you were carrying a weapon?

Answer: No, I didn't know.

Question: Why did you hide it from him?

Answer: For the same reason - I did not want to take risks. He could have spoken out during the investigation.

Question: The investigation knows that you had this weapon with you in 1930. Do you confirm this?

Answer: No, I do not.

Question: Kirichenko G.K., detained by the NKVD. A Colt revolver was seized. During the interrogation, Kirichenko testified that he had taken the Colt revolver from you. Do you confirm this?

ÿÿ Answer : Yes, I confirm.\*\*

Question: How did you get the revolver?

Answer: Upon leaving the prison in Minsk, I went to the forest where my revolver was hidden, took it away, and it was with me until 1930.

Question: Were you summoned to the GPU in connection with the Kirichenko case?

Answer: No, they didn't.

Question: The investigation is aware that you received weapons from the Polish police, on whose instructions you arrived on the territory of the Soviet Union. The investigation invites you to answer on the merits.

ÿÿ Answer: I admit that I arrived on the territory of the Soviet Union on behalf of the Polish police. I received the weapons from Captain Lashevsky, who is in Vilna\*\*.



Question: So you were recruited by the police to work against the Soviet Union. Tell us who recruited you and where?

Answer: As I have already shown above, I arrived on the territory of Poland in 1919 and lived there continuously until I moved to the Sov. Union, i.e. May 1924

In 1922, the elder of Zhirmuny, I was recruited for clerical work. I was brought in after I did some of the "voit's" assignments - to watch for suspicious persons. The surname "Vuita" was Trunz. Trunts knew that I had arrived from Soviet Russia, that I did not want to go back there and that I was satisfied with my stay in Poland.

In the process of fulfilling Trunts' assignments to monitor suspicious persons, I reported that my comrade Anton Gusts had the intention of illegally leaving for the Soviet Union, where he had relatives somewhere near Leningrad, Trunts instructed me to get close to Gusts and continuously - but watch him.

At the end, it seems, of October 1923, following the instructions of Trunts, I went with a package to Vilna at the address: Ostrobramskaya street, house No. I don't remember

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2 or 3, house from the corner, 2nd floor. In this apartment, at the address indicated on the envelope, I had to ask for "Pan Captain Lashevsky" and personally hand over this package to him. Arriving in Vilna, I found this apartment and was personally received by Captain Lashevsky. Lashevsky, after reading the letter, questioned me in detail about my autobiography, in detail, was especially interested in the reasons for my transfer to Poland, my connections in Soviet Russia, and said that he had a good review of me from the wuit and other persons. This ended my conversation with Captain Lashevsky. The captain gave me 20 zlotys and told me to come to the same address the next evening. The next day, at the appointed hour, I was at Lashevsky's apartment. I found him and another officer at the captain's apartment, whom he called either Tadeusz or Zmigrodsky, as it turned out later, this was his first and last name. The captain again briefly questioned me on the same questions as the day before. The second officer did not ask me any questions. Then Lashevsky directly put the question to me whether I consider myself prepared for the execution of a responsible assignment connected with an illegal departure to Soviet Russia.

Question: Did you accept Captain Lashevsky's proposal?

Answer: After much persuasion on the part of Lashevsky and Zmigrodsky, hints on their part about the possible unpleasant consequences for me and my parents in the event of my refusal, I accepted Lashevsky's proposal for an illegal transition to Soviet Russia.

Question: What instructions did you receive from Captain Lashevsky?

Answer: This time I did not receive any instructions. Lashevsky told me

so that I could return home, get close to Gust and, in the event of his repeated offer to go to Soviet Russia, accept this offer, at the same time informing the "vuit". When I returned home, I contacted Gusts and after negotiations with him agreed on the time of crossing the border. On this, in accordance with Lashevsky's instructions, he informed "Vuyta".

A month later, I was summoned to Vilna through the "voit" to the same apartment.

Question: Who hosted you this time?

Answer: The same captain Lashevsky.

Question: What was the nature of your talks?

Answer: Upon learning that I had agreed with Gust about an illegal defection to the side of the Sov. Russia and that we are thinking of making the transition in the spring of 1924, Lashevsky in several conversations with me, which usually dragged on for 5 hours every evening, instructed me in detail both about crossing the border and about my work in the USSR on the instructions of the Vilna exposition 2 Division Paul Headquarters.

Question: Did Lashevsky tell you to report to the border to cross the border?

Answer: No, the initiative should have belonged to Gusts.

Question: Did Gust know about the purpose of your transfer to the Sov. Russia?

Answer: No, Lashevsky forbade me to talk about this.

Question: What instructions did the captain of the Vilna exposition, Lashevsky, give you?

Answer: Upon arrival in Soviet Russia, I had to officially appear at the OGPU bodies, explaining the reason for crossing the border as unemployment, legalize myself and settle in Leningrad. After I had done this and made sure that there was no surveillance on me, I had to go to Detskoe Selo near Leningrad and contact the Pole Khodkevich Boleslav, using the password "Greetings to you and Ostrobramskaya from Tadeusz" \*\*.

I had to receive all further instructions about my work in the USSR from Chodkiewicz Boleslav.

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Question: Did you contact Khodkevich upon your arrival in Leningrad?

Answer: Yes, I supported Gust's desire to go to his relative in D-Selo, which gave me the opportunity to establish contact with Khodkevich, especially since Gust's relative was admitted to the house of priest Przherembel, where Khodkevich used to be as a friend.

Question: How were you supposed to inform Lashevsky about your successful border crossing and settlement?

Answer: We agreed that two months after crossing the border, I would inform him in a closed letter, in a changed handwriting on behalf of a woman, at the address: Vilna, Post Office, poste restante, mailbox No. 29, that I feel well after a long illness. In addition, we agreed that several times a year I would inform him allegorically about my prosperous life in the USSR.

Question: How did Khodkevich receive you?

Answer: He was delighted at my arrival, said that I should settle down in the Children's Village, familiarize myself with the situation, after which he would give me instructions about my work on Lashevsky's assignments.

Question: What tasks did you receive from Khodkevich?

Answer: After some time, Khodkevich began to draw me into the work of collecting espionage information about the Detsko-Selsky garrison. In addition, Chodkiewicz recommended that, on a suitable occasion, I take advantage of the possibility of getting some work as a civilian employee in one of the units or headquarters of the garrison.

Question: Where did you meet with Khodkevich?

Answer: Before the arrest of Khodkevich in the apartment of priest Przherembel, as well as in his apartment.

Question: Can you name the circle of acquaintances of you and Khodkevich in Detskoye Selo?

Answer: The Karoliunas family, Gusts and his relatives were closest to us.  
whisks.

Question: What other instructions did you receive from Khodkevich?

Answer: I had no further instructions from Khodkevich, since he was soon arrested.

Question: How did you continue your espionage work in favor of Poland after the arrest of Chodkiewicz[a]?

Answer: After the arrest of Khodkevich[a], I stopped my espionage activities and  
had no contact with anyone.

Everything is written down from my words correctly, I personally read it, in which I sign Khodyko

INTERROGATED: Beg. 8 Dep. 00 UGB Migbert Pom.  
Beginning 8 Dep. 00 Levitt

Head of the Special Department of  
the GUGB NKVD USSR GAI

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 248. L. 53-65. Script. Typescript.

\*

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "T. Molotov, Voroshilov. I. Sta-  
lin"; "Molotov read"; Voroshilov.

\*—\* Each last name is marked with a check mark.

\*\* \_\*\* It is underlined in the margins with one line.

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No. 553

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE FACTS OF PERSECUTION OF STAKHANOVTSSES (168)

December 16, 1935

No. 35, p. 36 - On the persecution of the Stakhanovites-Krivososovites on the railway. transport.

Consider it necessary to hold an open trial in cases of persecution of the Stakhanovites-Krivososovites at the Likhobory depot of the M. Okruzhnaya railway. and at st. Divination Zap. railway with application to the accused Zerin and Voropay of 10 years of imprisonment.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op.Z. D. 973. L. 9. Original. Typescript.

\*  
The decision was adopted by a poll of members of the PB on 29.XI.35.

No. 554

NOTE by Ya.S. AGRANOVA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE MEMBERS  
OF THE OPPOSITION GROUP IN THE AUCP(b)

December 28, 1935

Owls. secret

The NKVD of the USSR has materials that active in the past members of the right-wing opportunist group UGLANOV: 1) Evgeny Andreevich AFANASIEV, member. VKP(b) since 1918, a student of the Military Academy of Communications and 2) Egor Fedorovich KULIKOV maintain organizational communication with each other and carry out counter-revolutionary work.

On the basis of these data, E. A. Afanasyev was arrested by us, who testified during the investigation that he and KULIKOV, remaining until recently in counter-revolutionary positions, subjected the leadership of the CPSU (b) to slanderous attacks. In particular, AFANASIEV testified that the villainous murder of Comrade. He and KULIKOV regarded Kirov as "the result of an unbearable party regime."

During the investigation, it was established that AFANASIEV had been in touch with Alfred Karlovich BORMANN, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1909,

a former member of the Presidium of the former society of old Bolsheviks, who fully shared the counter-revolutionary attitudes of Afanasiev.

BORMAN, who was arrested by us, confessed to this.

I am sending the protocols of interrogations of AFANASIEV dated 3/X1 and BORMANN dated 17/XP-1935. KULIKOV, a former member of the Ugolanov group, mentioned in AFANASIEV's testimony, was arrested by us in the city of Sverdlovsk.

ZAM. PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR (AGRANOV)

CA FSB. F. 3. Op. 2. D. 58. L. 280-281. Script. Typescript.

Published without interrogation protocols.

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No. 555

NOTE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. TO STALIN ABOUT  
THE "TERRORISM" GROUP

December 23, 1935

No. 423 hp  
Secret

On October 31, 1935, Pavel Ivanovich Sokolov was arrested in the city of Leningrad.

Sokolov, a native of the Ivanovo-Industrial Region, a member of the White Army, who emigrated overseas during the Civil War, arrived in the USSR on the Latvian steamer "People", where he was listed as the second assistant to the captain of this steamer, having a Latvian passport with him.

Sokolov arrived in the USSR on the instructions of the White Guard organization of the Russian All-Military Union to organize terrorist acts.

In Leningrad, Sokolov recruited a citizen of the USSR Telitsyn S.A., born in 1898, an engineer of the Leningrad City Council, and his brother Telitsyn A.A., born in 1911, a 4th year student of the Institute of Water Transport Engineers.

Sokolov instructed the Telitsyns to create a terrorist group in Leningrad to organize terrorist acts. The Telitsyns agreed to carry out Sokolov's task, but due to his arrest, they did not carry it out. I consider it necessary to transfer the case on the charge of Sokolov and Telitsyn to the Military Tribunal of the LVO for consideration in accordance with the law of December 1, 1934, with the application of SHOOTING to the accused.

I ask for your instructions.

A. Vyshinsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 230. L. 61. Original. Typescript.

No. 556

SPECIAL MESSAGE G.G. BERRIES I.V. TO STALIN ON  
THE DETENTION OF THE POLISH AGENT

December 27, 1935

\*

57976

\*3 Recently, there has been a significant increase in the activity of Polish intelligence, expressed in the increased transfer of reconnaissance and sabotage agents to Soviet territory\*.

In addition to the previously reported data on the detentions of Polish agents in Belarus (reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks under No. from Poland:

1) \*In the area of the 17th border detachment (Slutsk direction), while trying to leave for Poland, an unknown person in Red Army uniforms (without buttonholes) was detained, who initially refused to identify himself.

Numerous espionage information and documentary data on units of the Red Army of the Smolensk garrison, as well as two fictitious Soviet passports, were seized when the detainee was kept in a field bag.

Of the discovered spyware, the following deserve special attention\*:

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- a) Drawings of the tank "B-T";
- b) Drawings of powder cellars;
- c) Data on the production of spare parts for machine guns, tanks and aircraft at plant No. 35 in Smolensk;
- d) The deployment and detailed location of tank, aviation units, airfields and district fire depots for the Smolensk and Rzhev garrisons with a description of military garages and a number of other data on the military development of the Belarusian Military District.

ŸThe investigation established that the detainee was a native of the mountains. So snowiec (Poland)  
- Skshekovsky Adam Stanislavovich.

Skshekovsky confessed that he was an agent of the Stolpetskaya reconnaissance dance and that he was sent to the USSR in October of this year. with the task of settling in Smolensk, where to organize an intelligence residency. His transfer to the USSR was preceded by the passage of a special intelligence school in Poland\*.

During his stay in Smolensk (about two months), Skshekovsky changed three apartments.

\*A search found and confiscated a portable camera and photographic accessories in one of the apartments, with which he photographed military installations. In another apartment, a coded letter was confiscated addressed to Ibragimov (under this name Skshekovsky was hiding in Smolensk), in which he was invited, on behalf of intelligence, to remain in Smolensk and continue working. The letter is dated December 8th.

While in Smolensk, Skshekovsky established contact with the following persons, from whom he received in personal conversations the secret information of interest to him about the units of the Red Army\*:

Semyakin - electrician of the 5th air brigade (re-enlisted, non-partisan);

Vasin - storekeeper of a military hospital, non-partisan;

Rachkov is a worker at the Tsudotrans plant named after I. Kalinin, non-partisan;

Kamtovich \*\* - a nurse in a military hospital, non-partisan.

\*All the listed persons were arrested and confessed to the communication of secret data on the Smolensk garrison to Skshekovsky.

2) On December 21 of this year, in section 18 of the border detachment (Mozyr direction), 500 meters from the border, an unidentified person in a white camouflage coat was found moving to the rear. During an attempt to detain the unknown person fired back and was killed in a shootout. When killed, they found: a carbine with 20 rounds, a revolver with 5 rounds, a pocket electric flashlight of Polish origin and iodoform, usually used by agents to fill in traces against their pursuit by search dogs.

According to preliminary data, the victim is a prominent Polish saboteur Oleshko \*, who repeatedly made armed crossings to Soviet territory on the orders of Polish intelligence.

3) \*In the area of the 15th border detachment (Minsk direction), an agent of the Vilna reconnaissance plyacovka Yanushko Yevhen was detained while crossing from Poland. It has been established that as early as 1931 Yanushko tried to illegally enter the USSR, but was detained on our territory and expelled to Poland.

Yanushko confessed that since 1925 he had been an internal agent of the political police and that in 1931 he was sent to the USSR on assignments from the political police\*. After being expelled from the USSR to Poland, Yanushko was placed on police orders in the Vilna prison to cover and develop political prisoners.

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\* In 1933, Yanushko was released from prison to cover the activities of communist organizations; \* during his work in the police, he failed a number of cells of the Communist Party of Western Belarus.

In November 1935, Yanushko, as a proven and qualified agent, was transferred to the political police for further use in the Vilna reconnaissance dance.

\* At present, Yanushko was heading to the USSR with assignments: to settle in Kharkov, where to get a job as a worker at the Kharkov Tractor Plant \*. In the boiler shop of KhTZ, Yanushko was supposed to create a sabotage group with the task of carrying out a sabotage act (by explosion or arson) to disable the plant.

About the time of the act of sabotage, Yanushko had to receive a special instruction through a courier, who would be sent to him by intelligence.

4) \*In the area of the 17th border detachment (Slutsk direction), an agent of the Luninets reconnaissance dance Pashkevich Anton \* was detained while crossing from Poland.

Pashkevich confessed that he had been sent to the USSR to restore in the Slutsk region the connections of the prominent Polish saboteur Zankevich, who had been crushed in 1933-34.

It should be noted that in 1930 Pashkevich was used by the Communist Party of Western Belorussia as a smuggler of party literature.

5) \*In the area of the 15th border detachment (Minsk direction), when crossing from Poland, an agent of the Vileika reconnaissance dance Sokol Nikolai was detained, who fled in November of this year. to Poland\* from the Zaslavl region (BSSR).

Sokol confessed that he was sent to the USSR as a recruiter and to collect espionage information in the border regions\*\*\*.

PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR YAGODA

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 248. L. 80-84. Script. Typescript.

\* Above the text, handwritten in pencil: "Owls. secret. From Comrade Berries.

\*- 1 \* Underlined in pencil by hand.

\*\* All surnames are marked by hand with a pencil tick.

\*\*\* The proposal is crossed out in the margins with a single line.

No. 557

NOTE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOV ABOUT THE "TERRORISM" GROUP



January 7, 1936

No. 6/Iss

Sov. secret

In Leningrad, a counter-revolutionary terrorist group was uncovered, which was preparing a terrorist attack against Comrade. Zhdanov consisting of: 1) Tolmacheva A.A., from the nobility, ex. officer of the Life Guards Grenadier Regiment; 2) Grachev K.I., from the nobility, the son of the owner of the company of gold items; 3) Nuzhina A.A., from the cross of the yan-kulaks.

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For a number of years, this group carried out sharp anti-Soviet agitation, bitterly criticizing all the measures of the Soviet government, repeatedly showing terrorist sentiments against the leaders of the party and especially against the leader of the party, comrade. Stalin and Secretary of the Central Committee and the Leningrad Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. Zhdanov.

In 1935, Tolmachev and Grachev began preparing a terrorist attack against comrade. Zhdanov. Preparatory actions were expressed: 1) in the discussion of the plan of the terrorist act; 2) in familiarization with the route of the car comrade. Zhdanov; 3) in the acquisition of weapons. The case is submitted by me for consideration to the Military Tribunal of the Leningrad Military District with the application of the law of December 1, 1934. I consider it necessary in relation to Tolmachev and Grachev, as the main organizers of the preparation of the terrorist act, to use execution.

I ask for your instructions.

Vyshinsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 230. L. 63, 63v. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: Stalin "I propose to shoot all three"; "T. Molotov - for. Poskrebyshov "Ott. Vyshinsky"; "Reported. Vyshinsky. Poskrebyshov. 7.1".

No. 558

NOTE A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V. STALIN  
and V.M. MOLOTOV ON THE  
CASE OF THE TROTSKIST GROUP IN MOSCOW

January 8, 1936

No. 7/Iss

Sov. secret

\* I have sent to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR the case of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist group in Moscow consisting of:

Botina A.I., ex. member of the CPSU(b) since 1919, expelled in 1933 for Trotskyism; his wife Subbotina-Zolotova E.I. \* ex. a member of the CPSU (b) from 1919 to 1934, who left the party due to her Trotskyist views; Zolotova Z.I., former member of the CPSU (b) from 1918 to the day of arrest (instructor of the Dzerzhinsky district committee of the CPSU (b)); Zolotova-Astakhova V.I., ex. a member of the CPSU (b) since 1921, who worked as the duty secretary of the secret department of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR; Astakhova S.A., ex. member of the CPSU (b) from 1919 to 1921 and from 1925 to 1935, and Chubukov I.V., formerly. member of the CPSU(b) since 1919, expelled from the party for Trotskyism in 1933

\*In the case found that Subbotin A.AND. during the October demonstration on Red Square in 1935, he prepared a terrorist attack against the leader of the party, comrade. Stalin.

During his arrest, a revolver illegally kept from him was confiscated from Subbotin  
revolver systems.

The remaining members of this group were aware of Subbotin's terrorist intentions and were themselves also terrorist-minded, and Subbotin's wife, Subbotina-Zolotova E.I. fake documents.

In view of these circumstances, I consider it necessary to apply to all the accused the law of December 1, 1934, and as a measure of punishment

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in relation to Subbotin A.AND., Subbotina-Zolotova E.I., Astakhova S.A. and Chubukova I.V., as the most active part of this group, to choose the highest measure - execution.

I ask for your instructions,

A. Vyshinsky

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 230. L. 65, 65v. Script. Typescript.

\* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "From comrade Vyshinsky."

\* Underlined in pencil.

No. 559

NOTE G.G. BERRIES AND A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V.  
TO STALIN WITH A COPY OF L.M. ZAKOVSKY IN THE  
CASE OF THE LIQUIDATED ZINOVIEV ORGANIZATION

January 11, 1936

No. P/Iss/55103

Owls. secret

At the same time, a copy of the memorandum of the head of the NKVD department of the Leningrad Region, comrade. Zakovsky in the case of the liquidated counter-revolutionary organization, headed in Leningrad by active Zinovievites, teachers of Soviet party schools, Mirovitsky Ya.F. and Dozhdev P.I., and in Belarus - the company commander of the 1st railway battalion V.S. Zimatsky.

We consider it necessary in respect of 11 defendants: V.S. Zimatsky, Ya.F. Mirovitsky, P.I. Dozhtsev, G.A. Timakova S.I., Naritsa M.A., Belsky M.I. and Shanina A.A. extract the investigative materials from the case and submit for consideration to the visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, applying to them the law of December 1, 1934.

With regard to the most active leading members of the counter-revolutionary organization, namely:

1) Jan Frantsevich Mirovitsky, born in 1901, member of the CPSU(b), expelled from the party in connection with this case, teacher of Leninism at the Soviet party school of the Okhta chemical plant;

2) Georgy Andreevich Gaidukov, born in 1905, ex. member of the CPSU (b), expelled in connection with this case, head. Soviet Party School of the Okhta Chemical Plant;

3) Petr Ivanovich Dozhdev, born in 1899, ex. a member of the CPSU(b), expelled from the party in connection with this case, a teacher of the history of the CPSU(b) of the Soviet party school of the Petrograd district in Leningrad and

4) Zimatsky Vasily Safronovich, born in 1912, company commander of the 1st separate railway battalion, b / p, from the fists - we consider it necessary to apply capital punishment - execution.

With regard to the remaining 7 members of the organization, we consider it possible to choose imprisonment for a term of 8 to 10 years.

The case against the remaining 23 defendants (the list is attached) is supposed to be considered by the special collegium of the Leningrad Regional Court.

Attachment: a copy of the memorandum and a list of those arrested.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yagoda Prosecutor  
of the USSR Vyshinsky

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Copy

Top secret

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Commissar General of State Security comrade. Berry

January 2, 1936

No. 20279 Leningrad

In the case of liquidated in Leningrad by the Special Department of the UNKVD LO Ph.D. Zinoviev terrorist organization, which had its cells in the [separate] railway. battalion in the mountains. Polotsk (BSSR) and on the territory of the Kalinin region, the investigation (which was conducted within 3 months) on we are finished.

The materials of the preliminary investigation, the consciousnesses of those arrested in the case of MIROVITSKY, ZIMATSKY, GAYDUKOV, DOGDEV, ZHELO BAYEVA and "others" have established \*:

a) liquidated k.-r. the organization was closely connected with k.-r. Zinovevsky ter. center, liquidated in 1934-1935. after the murder of Comrade Kirov. Leading role in k.-r. organization, including an inspiring organizing role in terrorist work, was played by a group of Zinovievites under the leadership of Mirovitsky, a teacher at the Leningrad Soviet Party School of the Okhtinsk Chem. plant, recruited to the Leningrad K.-r. Zinoviev terrorist center KOTOLYNOV.

b) In the implementation of the terrorist plan outlined by K.-R. Zinoviev terrorist center, the organization, liquidated after the murder of Comrade Kirov, worked on organizing terrorist groups in order to carry out a terrorist act against Comrade T.T. STALIN, MOLOTOV, KAGANOVICH and other leaders of the party and the Soviet government.

c) The main group of the accused Zinovievites carried out active counter-revolutionary work for a number of years against the leadership of the party and the Soviet. government under the leadership of Mirovitsky and penetrated the ranks of Soviet party schools: the soviet party school of the Okhta chemical plant, the soviet party school of the Petrograd [ad] district, the soviet party school of the head. "Russian Diesel", Soviet party school head. "Volcano" of the city of Leningrad.

d) A group of participants in the organization, led by Mirovitsky, in the process of c.-r. work for the purpose of consolidating k.-r. forces to fight the party and owls. the government contacted a counter-revolutionary group of kulak - white guard and bandit elements, headed by obv. in the Zimac Kim case.

e) The organization is heterogeneous in its composition, unites c.-r. Zinoviev, kulak-White Guard and bandit elements, who by fraudulent means penetrated into the Party. On the whole, the organization, by its general method of struggle, put forward the implementation of a broad program of terrorist acts.

f) In order to prepare for an armed uprising, the organization carried out counter-revolutionary subversive work within the party, at industrial enterprises, in the countryside and in the Red Army by recruiting command personnel into the organization. Zimatsky were recruited into the organization: 1. K-r [separate] railroad. b [battalion] a Ermolaev A.E.; 2. K-r company of the same battalion Poberalis S.I.; 3. Help the commander of the company of the same b[atallio] Shanin A.A.; platoon commander of the same battalion Shukavilov N.S.

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According to the investigation, the emergence of a liquidated counter-revolutionary organization is depicted as follows. In 1931, being a student of the Electromechanical Institute, Mirovitskii Ya.F. met Kotolynov, who was also a student at the Institute of Physics and Mechanics, now the Leningrad Industrial Institute. In the middle of 1932, Kotolynov, knowing Mirovitsky by this time as a c.r. hostile to the leadership of the party, began to process it. In October 1933, having found out that MIROVITSKY was standing on the k.r. Zinoviev platform, recruited him as his political associate in the underground k.r. Zinoviev terrorist organization.

KOTOLYNOV acquainted MIROVITSKII with the tasks of the organization, pointed out to him that the organization was striving to replace the party leadership by all means by ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV, YEVDOKIMOV and others.

KOTOLYNOV set the main tasks for MIROVITSKY:

- a) In order to expand the organization, to draw into its ranks mainly members of the Party who are vacillating and who disagree with the general line of the Party.
- b) In those areas where it turns out to be possible, to carry out subversive work to undermine the authority of the Party and its activities.

The accused MIROVITSKY testified: "... KOTOLYNOV pointed out to me that our views on collectivization] and other measures of the current party leadership are shared by many members of the party, who, like him, KOTOLYNOV, are members of the Zinoviev underground organization existing in Leningrad, which sets itself the task of removing the existing leadership of the party and placing ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV, YEVDOKIMOV and others at the head of the leadership. KOTOLYNOV invited me to join this organization, and I gave him my consent.

After the defeat in 1934-1935. k.r. Zinoviev terrorist center and the arrest of KOTOLYNOV MIROVITSKII continued recruiting new members into the organization and cohesion of terrorist groups.

MIROVITSKY testified about this: "The last time I met with KOTOLYNOV was in October 1934, when he gave me the task of selecting especially reliable people and preparing them for active terrorist activity.

Giving this task, Kotolynov pointed out that the time had come when it was necessary to take up arms and shoot at the leadership of the party from top to bottom, since democratic methods could not force the currently existing leadership to move away from the leadership of political life.

And further: "... They were privy to my terrorist plans and each of them gave his consent to participate in terrorist acts:

1) GAYDUKOV, member All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Head of the Soviet Party School of the Okhta Chemical Plant;

2) E. B. ZHELOBAEVA, student of the same Soviet party school (I cohabited with her);

3) P. I. DOZHDEV, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, teacher at the Soviet party school of the Okhta chemical plant. These individuals, like myself, were hostile to the leadership of the party and were ready to participate in any terrorist act."

At the same time, the company commander of the 1st separate] railway battalion in Polotsk Vasily ZIMATSKY, being on vacation in 1933

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in Leningrad, begins recruiting in k.r. organization. The organization set as its task the overthrow of the Soviet] government by means of an armed uprising and the use of terrorist acts against members of the government\*.

At the same time, in 1933, ZIMATSKY recruited into the organization a number of persons involved by us in this case, among them P. I. Dozhdev, a teacher of the history of the party in the Soviet party school of the Petrograd region.

On this occasion, ZIMATSKY testified: "When discussing the organizational and program issues of the organization as early as 1933 with Dozhdev Petr, IVLEV, TIMAKOV, both at a meeting of the Leningrad leading center, and at separate meetings, we proceeded from one assessment. ki of the existing leadership of the party, that at the head of this leadership is a limited, immensely stubborn, power-hungry dictator, that not the government, but the party headed by Stalin is the dictator in the country. Thanks to this dictatorship, the best representatives and leaders of the party - ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV and TROTSKY found themselves removed from leadership and political life and forced to defend their views in underground work within the party.

Underground work against the leadership of the party of leaders of great authority for me, such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, which I knew even earlier from the materials published in the press, strengthened my decision to wage a fight against the party, the existing Soviet government.

The struggle against STALIN carried out by ZINOVYEV for me, in turn, was the banner of the program of action of our organization put forward by me.

Member of the organization DOZHDEV P.I. on the instructions of ZIMATSKY, he starts recruiting and by 1934 he is recruiting to the K.R. activities of the head Soviet party schools ZAVYALOVA S.N. and GAYDUKOVA G.A. and subsequently informs the latter about the presence of c.r. organizations in Leningrad.

Being a member of Zinoviev, Gaidukov G.A. in turn seeks connections with the counter-revolutionary] Zinoviev groups and in 1935 established

forges ties with Zinoviev. GRIGORYEVA Olga (former technical secretary of the Zinoviev underground group on Porokhovykh in 1925), from whom he learns about the presence at the Krasnoznamennets plant of the Zinoviev group headed by the secretary of the party committee NESTEROVA.

Thus, in 1935, the parallel organizations of MIROVITSKY and ZIMATSKY through DOGDEV, GAYDUKOV, and GRIGORIEV are mutually linked and carry out a united k.r. work, having as its main task the elimination of the present-day party leadership.

- The organization put forward terror as the main method of struggle\*.

On this occasion, the accused ZHELOBAEVA testifies: "In February 1935, at a K.R. meeting where the plan for the creation of c.r. terrorist organization, as I indicated in my testimony of October 22, 1935, we came to a unanimous agreement on the need to expand our organization by creating a number of terrorist cells in the Ukraine, in particular in Kharkov,

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leaving this work to MIROVITSKY, who was to go to Kharkov for permanent work at one of the military factories.

GAYDUKOV told MIROVITSKY that upon his arrival in Kharkov it was necessary for him to begin to identify the c.r. motivated workers and recruit them into our organization.

The creation of terrorist cells in the Ukraine and their leadership were entrusted to MIROVITSKY. GAYDUKOV, on the other hand, was entrusted with the leadership of the c.r. terrorist center in Leningrad. In connection with the departure of MIROVITSKY, it was decided to get together and draw up an operational plan of action.

On the same occasion, the accused] GAYDUKOV testifies: "When I was with Mirovitsky Ya.F. was at ZHELOBAEVA's apartment, then we also had a conversation about the need to commit a terrorist act against Comrade Stalin. At the same time, Mirovitsky Ya.F. offered to organize a terrorist group, in which he invited me and ZHELOBAEVA, members of the terrorist group, to join.

At the same time, Mirovitsky Ya.F. declared that as long as Stalin leads the party, there will be no good, he must be removed.

Elena Petrovna and I agreed to join this group, since I personally believed that Stalin should be removed, and only by applying terror to him.

Testimony of Pyotr Ivanovich Dozhdev: "In the program of our k.r. The organization mainly included the following issues: 1) the overthrow of the Soviet power by means of an armed uprising of all those dissatisfied with the Soviet power of the K.R. elements. A signal for an uprising in the absence of outside intervention, in our opinion

opinion, there should have been terrorist acts against the leaders of the party and the Soviet government, personally against comrade t. STALIN and MOLOTOV. Other defendants also testify to this.

— \* —

34 people are being tried in the case, the list of those arrested is attached. We ask you to urgently resolve the issue in which court instance this case is to be considered. We consider it necessary to consider the case in Leningrad by the visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court. With respect to the accused: 1) Jan Frantsevich Mirovitsky; 2) Zimatsky Vasily Safronovich; 3) Petr Ivanovich Dozhdev; 4) Georgy Andreevich Gaidukov; 5) Ivlev Vasily Anisimovich; 6) Elena Petrovna Zhelobaeva; 7) Ivan Antonovich Dozhdev; 8) Timakov Semyon Nikanorovich; 9) Naritsa Mikhail Alexandrovich; 10) Belsky Melenty Ivanovich; 11) Aleksey Alexandrovich Shanin - to apply the law of the government of 1.12.34.

Attachment: list of those arrested\*.

BEGINNING UPR. NKVD LO ZAKOVSKY  
BEGINNING. SPECIAL. DEP. LVO SHAPIRO

CORRECT: BEGINNING. OF THE SPECIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE GUGB NKVD OF THE USSR GAI

APRF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 230. L.68-76. Script. Typescript.

Published without attachment.

DOCUMENTATION

721

No. 560

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE USE OF PERSONS DEPARATED AND EXPIRED IN  
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE,

AND ADMISSION OF THEIR CHILDREN TO EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS»

February 9, 1936

No. 36, paragraph 41. - On the use of persons expelled and exiled at work and the admission of their  
manner children to educational institutions. in an administrative

Approve the draft circular to all the NKVD and the prosecutors of the union and autonomous republics,  
the heads of the NKVD krai (regional) departments and the krai (regional) prosecutors.

(See Attachment)